Gittin 26b (כו:) — the Talmud in English

A difficulty arises from the contradiction between the statement of Rabbi Elazar and the statement of Rabbi Elazar!

Once we have established that the first clause of the Mishna follows the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, yet the tanna permits the scribe to prepare the forms of bills of divorce, there is a contradiction in the Mishna: In the latter clause it says that Rabbi Elazar validates all of them except bills of divorce for women.

And we answer:

There are two tannaitic opinions, both in accordance with Rabbi Elazar.

There is a dispute among the tannaim regarding Rabbi Elazar's opinion as to whether he applies a decree prohibiting the form due to the concern that the essential portion might be written, or whether he does not.

Rabbi Shabbetai said in the name of Hezekiah—

The reason that one must leave blank the place for the names of the man and the woman is

because of quarrels. And

the Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi Meir, who says that the signatures of the witnesses effect the divorce,

and by Torah law it is not necessary that the writing of the bill of divorce be performed for its sake—

And in strict law, even the essential portion could also be written.

Fundamentally, the scribe could write even the name of the man and the name of the woman. However,

sometimes she hears the scribe writing,

and we are concerned that the woman might hear that the scribe is writing a bill of divorce in her husband's name,

and she thinks: He instructed him!

She would think that her husband had instructed him to write it.

And she would quarrel with him.

This would cause a quarrel between her and her husband—

Therefore, one must leave blank the names of the man and the woman. Likewise, one must leave blank the date of the bill of divorce, so that it will not be an early-dated bill of divorce. But he may write, “You are hereby permitted to any man,” without the husband's instruction, since this cannot cause a quarrel.

Rav Hisda said

in the name of

Avimi—

The reason that the scribe must leave blank the essential portion is

because of the ordinance for the sake of abandoned wives.

Some say

that this follows

Rabbi Meir, and some say

that it follows

Rabbi Elazar.

Some say it is Rabbi Meir, who says that the signatures of the witnesses effect the divorce—

And in strict law, even the essential portion could also be written.

Fundamentally, the scribe could write even the essential portion without the husband's instruction.

But sometimes he would quarrel with her,

and we are concerned that he might quarrel with her,

become angry with her, and throw it to her,

and in his anger he would throw the bill of divorce to her,

leaving her abandoned and keeping her so.

As a result, she would remain divorced without a husband. But since the names of the man and the woman must be written, we assume that by the time the scribe writes them, he will have calmed down and reconciled with her.

Some say it is Rabbi Elazar, who says that the witnesses who observe the delivery effect the divorce—

And in strict law, even the form should not be written.

Fundamentally, the scribe should not even prepare the form, since we apply a decree prohibiting the form due to the concern that the essential portion might be written. However,

sometimes he needs to travel overseas,

and the husband is in a hurry to travel overseas,

and he cannot find a scribe,

and he will not find a scribe to write a bill of divorce for him,

and he leaves her

without divorcing her,

and goes

to travel overseas,

leaving her abandoned and keeping her so.

She will remain an abandoned married woman. Therefore, they permitted the scribe to prepare a bill of divorce, and he will need to add only the names of the man and the woman and the date:

We learned in the Mishna that the scribe must also leave blank

the place for the date:

The tanna stated it categorically,

the tanna taught it in an explicit and absolute manner,

and taught: “

one who writes forms of bills of divorce,”

it makes no difference

without distinguishing whether he divorced her

after marriage,

after he had married her,

and it makes no difference

whether he divorced her

after betrothal,

after he had betrothed her, before he had married her—

And the Gemara asks:

Granted,

if he divorced her

after marriage,

it is understandable why the scribe must leave the place for the date blank in the bill of divorce—

according to the one who says

that the reason they instituted a date in bills of divorce is

because

his wife, who is

his niece,

might commit adultery, and he would take pity on her so that she would not receive the punishment of strangulation in court, and he would write her a bill of divorce without a date. When they testify against her in court that she committed adultery, she would produce her bill of divorce and say, “I was divorced at the time of the adultery”—

there is a reason

why the scribe must leave the place for the date blank, so that he cannot shield her with an early-dated bill of divorce by claiming that she had committed adultery after the divorce.

And

according to the one who says

that the reason they instituted a date in bills of divorce is

because of produce.

The husband may eat the produce of his wife's usufruct property only until the divorce. In order for the woman to collect from purchasers who bought produce from the husband after he divorced her—when the produce that the husband sold to the purchasers was sold unlawfully—if she were to produce an undated bill of divorce, the purchasers would say that she had only now been divorced and that they had purchased the produce lawfully, before the divorce, from the husband. Therefore, they instituted that the date be written in the bill of divorce, so that she could collect the produce from the purchasers.

There is a reason

why even a bill of divorce with an early date is invalid: We are concerned that he might write in the bill of divorce that he divorced her before the time when he actually divorced her, enabling her to collect the produce from the purchasers unlawfully. Therefore, the scribe must leave the date of the bill of divorce blank.

But

if he divorced her

after betrothal,

from the time that he betrothed her—

Granted, according to the one who says

that they instituted a date in bills of divorce

because

he might shield

his niece, there is a reason.

Therefore, even when he divorces her after betrothal, the date must be written in the bill of divorce, so that he cannot shield her.

But according to the one who says

that the reason for the institution of a date in bills of divorce is

because of produce,

and an early-dated bill of divorce is invalid so that she cannot unlawfully collect the produce of usufruct property from the purchasers—

A betrothed woman, does she have

any entitlement to

produce!?

After all, a husband has no right to eat the produce of her usufruct property while she is betrothed, and the reason for the institution of a date does not apply; there should be no need at all to write a date in the bill of divorce.

And the Gemara answers:

Rav Amram said: I heard this matter from Ulla,

who said

that the reason they required the place for the date to be left blank in the case of a betrothed woman is

because of an ordinance for the sake of the child—

And I did not know what that was.

I did not know how to explain what “an ordinance for the sake of the child” means in the case of a betrothed woman—

Once I heard

when I heard

that which was taught

in the beraita—

One who says

to the witnesses,

“Write a bill of divorce for my betrothed,

but I do not wish to divorce her now; rather,

when I marry her,

after I marry her,

I will divorce her,” it is not a bill of divorce—

And Ulla said: What is the reason

that this bill of divorce is invalid for effecting the divorce? It is

because of a decree, lest they say: Her bill of divorce preceded her son!

There is concern that when he marries her, she might become pregnant, and when he divorces her, they will see that the date of the bill of divorce is from the time of the betrothal and will say that he had already divorced her at the time of the betrothal, and that her son was born from an adulterous relationship, without marriage and betrothal.

Here too,

in our Mishna as well, the place for the date must be left blank even in the case of a betrothed woman,

as a decree lest

the scribe write the date of the betrothal, while he does not divorce her until after the marriage, and

they will say: Her bill of divorce preceded her son!

Rabbi Zeira said that Rabbi Abba bar Sheila said that Rav Hamnuna the Elder said that Rav Adda bar Ahava said that Rav—

The halakha is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar

in the latter clause of the Mishna, which invalidates even the form of the bill of divorce, as a decree due to the essential portion.

Rav called Rabbi Elazar: “The happiest of the sages!”

Rav called Rabbi Elazar the most fortunate of the sages, since the halakha follows his opinion.

The Gemara asks:

Even with regard to other documents, as well!?

Does Rav also rule in accordance with Rabbi Elazar with regard to other documents, in which he validates the forms of other documents?

But Rav Pappi said in the name of Rava—

This attestation of the judges,

the certification by which the judges confirm that the signatures of the witnesses are indeed their signatures,

if it is written before

it was written before

the witnesses testified

that it was their handwriting before the court

about their signatures,

that these are their signatures,

it is invalid.

The attestation is invalid because the matter appears to be false. Although the judges signed only after the witnesses testified before them that these were their signatures, nevertheless, the writing of the attestation itself appears to be false, since they wrote that the witnesses had testified before them regarding the signatures before the witnesses had actually testified.

Apparently,

since the certification

appears to be false,

it is invalid—

here too,

if he prepares the document before the divorce, it

appears to be false,

it appears to be false!?

The Gemara answers:

It is not so!

The ruling of Rav Pappi is not the halakha—

As is demonstrated

by the

words of

Rav Naḥman,

and therefore Rav ruled in accordance with Rabbi Elazar—

For Rav Naḥman said: Rabbi Meir used to say,

one who wishes to divorce his wife—

even

if the husband

found

the bill of divorce

in a garbage dump,

and the names of the man and the woman were written in it properly—if

they signed

it with witnesses for her sake,

and he gave it to her, it is valid.

Since Rabbi Meir's opinion is that the signatures of the witnesses effect the divorce, the essential element of the bill of divorce is the signatures, and it is not necessary that the writing be performed for her sake.

This proves that we are not concerned that it might appear to be false, since the bill of divorce was not written for the sake of this woman at all, and nevertheless he may divorce her with it.

And even the Rabbis,

who disagree with Rabbi Meir and hold that a bill of divorce found in a garbage dump is invalid,

did not disagree with Rabbi Meir except with regard to bills of divorce for women, for which writing for her sake is required;

they disagreed with Rabbi Meir only regarding a bill of divorce, since they hold that there is a requirement that it be written for her sake.

But with regard to other documents,

for which there is no requirement that they be written for the sake of the parties,

they did not disagree

and the debtor may use a document that he found in a garbage dump in order to borrow money, and we are not concerned that it might appear to be false.

We find an additional proof that, with regard to other documents, we are not concerned that they might appear to be false—

For Rav Asi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said—

A document with which one borrowed money

on the day of its signing, even

if

he

repaid it

on the day it was signed,

he may not borrow again

with

the

same

document a second time, even on the very day of the first loan,

since its lien has already been forgiven.

For regarding the second loan, the witnesses did not sign, and it is merely an oral loan, from which he cannot collect from purchasers.

The Gemara infers—

The reason is that its lien has been forgiven,

and therefore this document cannot be used again.

But

if the document had also been signed with regard to this loan, although the document had been written before the act of lending, it would not be invalid,

because we are not concerned that it might appear to be false.

We are not concerned that it appears to be false, and therefore we likewise would not invalidate an attestation of the judges because it appears to be false.