Gittin 26a (כו.) — the Talmud in English

If the father did not wish it, she is not betrothed.

Since he consummated the marriage only on condition, and the condition was not fulfilled. Conversely, if the father wished it, she is betrothed, even though at the time of intercourse it was uncertain whether he wished it or did not wish it. Nevertheless, we say: The matter is retroactively clarified, and it becomes clear that from the moment of intercourse there was betrothal.

In any event, it is proven that this is not in accordance with Rava. For one must distinguish between “depending on his own דעת” and “depending on the דעת of others.”

Rava said to

Rav Mesharsheya: In fact,

whether according to Rabbi Yehuda or according to Rabbi Shimon, it makes no difference whether it depends on his own דעת or whether it depends on the דעת of others,

and they always

hold that there is retroactive clarification.

And

if you say: If so, why did Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon hold, with regard to tithes, that one may not say, “The tithe that I am going to measure”?

One can say:

There, as the reason is explicitly stated:

They said

Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon

to Rabbi Meir: Do you not concede

that there is cause for concern

lest the jug burst, with the result that this person will retroactively be drinking untithed produce,

since the teruma will never become clarified?!

He said to them: When it bursts!

That is to say: There is no cause for concern about this, since it is uncommon.

In any event, it is explained that the reason for Rabbi Yehuda’s and Rabbi Shimon’s position is not that “there is no retroactive clarification,” but rather that they were concerned lest the jug burst.

Mishna:

One who writes forms of bills of divorce,

a scribe who takes payment for writing a bill of divorce and wants to have bills of divorce prepared, because sometimes people come to hire him to write a bill of divorce while he is occupied writing other documents, and therefore he wants to have prepared documents available to him—

although the scribe may write the entire text of the bill of divorce even before the husband instructs him to write a bill of divorce for him,

he must leave

blank in the bill of divorce the

place

where the name of

the man, and

likewise the

place

where the name of

the woman, and

likewise the

place

where

the date

of the divorce should be written.

The same law applies to

loan documents—

although the scribe may write the entire text of the document before the borrower comes before him,

he must leave

blank in the document the

place

where the name of

the lender should be written, and likewise the

place

where the name of

the borrower

should be written, and likewise the

place

where the amount of

the money

should be written, and likewise the

place

where

the

date

of the loan should be written, so that the document will not be an improperly antedated document.

And the same applies to

documents of sale—

although the scribe may write the entire text of the document even before the seller and the buyer come before him,

he must leave

blank in the document the

place

where the name of

the buyer, and

likewise the

place

where the name of

the seller should be written, and likewise the

place

where the amount of

the money

should be written, and likewise the

place

where

the

field

that he sold him should be described—where it is located and what its boundaries are—and

also

the

place

where

the date

of the sale should be written.

For the sake of the ordinance.

Rabbi Yehuda invalidates all of them,

whether with regard to a bill of divorce or with regard to other documents, and even if he left these places blank; since the document was written before the parties asked him to write their document, it is an invalid document.

Rabbi Elazar validates all of them,

as, with regard to all documents, the scribe may prepare the document before the parties come before him,

except for bills of divorce,

for which the scribe may not prepare the bills of divorce, and it is not sufficient that the scribe leave these places blank, since—

it is stated: “And he shall write for her,” for her sake!

Since the writing of the bill of divorce must be performed for the sake of the woman, the scribe may not prepare the bill of divorce before the husband instructs him to write it.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said:

He must leave

blank

even

the

place

where the following should be written in the bill of divorce:

“Behold, you are permitted to marry any man,”

as this too is an essential part of the bill of divorce.

And it is Rabbi Elazar’s opinion.

The tanna of the Mishna holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar’s opinion,

who says: The witnesses who observe the delivery effect the divorce,

as the witnesses who see the bill of divorce being given from the husband’s hand to the woman’s hand are the witnesses who confer upon the bill of divorce its force of severance, and not the witnesses who sign it. The requirement that the witnesses sign the bill of divorce is only due to an ordinance of the Sages,

and

since the essential element of the bill of divorce is its writing and not its signing,

we require

that the

writing

of the bill of divorce

be for her sake,

and not the signing of the bill of divorce. Therefore, one must leave blank the place where “Behold, you are permitted to marry any man” should be written.

And it is necessary,

as Shmuel had to state this with regard to three mishnayot—that the tanna of the Mishna holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, that the witnesses who observe the delivery effect the divorce—and it would not have been sufficient for Shmuel to state this with regard to only one Mishna.

For had he taught us this only with regard to the first one,

if Shmuel had said this only with regard to the Mishna that one must write the bill of divorce while it is detached and not while it is attached to the ground,

we would have said:

In that

Mishna, “One may not write on something attached to the ground,”

it is that we are compelled to establish it

as meaning that the Mishna must be interpreted

in accordance with Rabbi Elazar,

who says that the witnesses who observe the delivery effect the divorce.

For there is a contradiction in the Mishna:

It teaches

in the first clause:

“One may not write

on something attached to the ground,” and

it teaches

in the latter clause:

“If he wrote it

while it was attached, detached it, signed it, and gave it to her, it is valid.” Therefore, Shmuel had to resolve this by saying that the tanna holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who says that the witnesses who observe the delivery effect the divorce. The intention of the Mishna is to say that one may not write the tofes of the bill of divorce on something attached to the ground, lest he come to write the toref of the bill of divorce on something attached to the ground as well. But after the fact, if he wrote the tofes while it was attached, detached it, wrote the toref of the bill of divorce while it was detached, and gave it to her, it is valid.

But

in the

latter clause

of that Mishna, which states, “Everyone is qualified to write the bill of divorce,”

it teaches

in the latter clause:

“For the validity of the bill of divorce is only through its signatures,”

indicating that the Mishna is giving a reason why everyone is qualified to write the bill of divorce. It says that the essential element of the bill of divorce is the signing and not the writing, and therefore everyone may write it—

say:

We would say that the Mishna is in accordance with the opinion of

Rabbi Meir, who says: The witnesses who sign effect the divorce,

and therefore even a deaf-mute may write the toref of the bill of divorce.

Therefore, Shmuel had to teach us that the Mishna stating, “Everyone is qualified to write the bill of divorce,” applies only to the tofes, while a competent person must write the toref.

And had he taught us this only with regard to that one,

even though Shmuel said that the Mishna stating that everyone is qualified to write the bill of divorce holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, one could still say that

that one too,

these mishnayot,

can be established

as possibly being

in accordance with Rabbi Elazar.

But this one,

our Mishna,

say:

One could say:

Since the latter clause

of the Mishna

is Rabbi Elazar’s,

as Rabbi Elazar disagrees with the first tanna in the latter clause and holds that all are valid except for bills of divorce—

we would therefore say that the tanna of the

first clause,

which validates them even with regard to bills of divorce,

does not

hold in accordance with

Rabbi Elazar,

and it is not necessary to leave blank the place for “Behold, you are permitted to marry any man,” in accordance with Rabbi Meir. The requirement to leave blank the place for the names of the man and the woman is due to the concern of hostility, as is explained later in the sugya.

It is necessary.

Therefore, Shmuel had to teach us that even the first clause of the Mishna holds in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, and consequently one must leave blank the place for the man’s and the woman’s names so that the scribe will write the names for their sake. Therefore, Shmuel says that one must also leave blank the place for “Behold, you are permitted to marry any man”:

We learned in the Mishna the reason that the scribe must leave the place of the toref blank:

For the sake of the ordinance:

What is meant by “the ordinance”?

Rabbi Yonatan said:

For the sake of the scribe’s ordinance,

they permitted the scribe to write the bill of divorce even before the husband instructed him to write it.

And it is Rabbi Elazar’s opinion, who says: The witnesses who observe the delivery effect the divorce,

and therefore, by Torah law, the writing of the bill of divorce must be for her sake.

And strictly speaking, he should not write even the tofes,

and as a matter of law, it should have been that we did not permit the scribe to write even the tofes without the husband’s instruction, since there is concern that, as a result, the scribe might come to write the toref not for her sake.

But for the sake of the scribes’ ordinance,

so that he would have a prepared bill of divorce in his possession,

they permitted him,

they permitted him

the Sages

to write the tofes not for her sake. And they issued a decree with regard to other documents as well, requiring that one leave a blank place in the document, so that people would not come to err and validate the toref of bills of divorce as well.

And

Rabbi Yehuda invalidates all of them,

even if he left the place of the toref blank—

because

he issued a decree concerning the tofes on account of the toref.

Therefore, it is forbidden for him to write the tofes without the husband’s instruction. And again,

he issued a decree

concerning

documents on account of bills of divorce.

It is forbidden for the scribe to prepare even the tofes of the document.

And Rabbi Elazar validates all of them,

with regard to all documents,

except for bills of divorce—

because he holds that

he issued a decree concerning the tofes on account of the toref,

requiring that it be written for her sake, so that we would not err and validate the toref when it was not written for her sake. But with regard to other

documents on account of bills of divorce, he did not issue a decree

.

We learned in the Mishna that Rabbi Elazar’s reason is

as it is stated: “And he shall write for her,”

for her sake:

And the Gemara asks:

But when “for her” is written, it is written with regard to the toref!

Indeed, what is written in the Torah concerning the requirement that the writing be for her sake applies only to the toref. Why, then, does Rabbi Elazar hold that even the tofes must be written for her sake?

And it answers:

Rather, say:

Rabbi Elazar does not intend to say that this law is derived from the verse, but rather:

because it is stated

in the Torah,

“And he shall write for her,” for her sake,

which teaches that the toref must be written for her sake, we therefore issue a decree that the tofes too must be written for her sake.

And we challenge this: