Zevachim 7b (ז:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer: Indeed,

as a fixed atonement, it does not atone

for those liable to bring an offering for failure to fulfill a positive commandment, since it is not a fixed and absolute atonement for them; however,

as a temporary atonement, it does atone,

as a temporary and partial atonement, even for those liable to bring an offering for failure to fulfill a positive commandment.

Therefore, if he had already designated an olah for a positive commandment that he had failed to fulfill, he is no longer included in the atonement of the hatat. It was in this sense that Rava said: “A hatat that one slaughtered for someone who is obligated to bring—and had designated—an olah is valid.” But when one slaughtered a hatat with the intention that another person who had violated a positive commandment should attain atonement through it, and that person had not yet designated an olah for his atonement, the hatat is invalid—for a hatat also provides temporary atonement for failure to fulfill a positive commandment. Consequently, slaughtering the hatat for his atonement is considered a change of ownership, as Rava said: “A hatat atones for those liable to bring an offering for failure to fulfill a positive commandment by means of a kal va-homer.” Therefore, Rava said: “A hatat that one slaughtered for someone who is not obligated to bring any offering is invalid, for there is no Jew who is not obligated to fulfill a positive commandment.”

And Rava said: An olah that one slaughtered not for its sake,

which remains valid, although it does not fulfill its owner’s obligation as such—

it is prohibited to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.

The source for the prohibition against sprinkling its blood not for its sake is:

Alternatively, it may be derived from a verse; alternatively, it may be derived from reasoning.

Alternatively, it may be derived from a verse:

as it is stated,

“You shall observe what has crossed your lips”

and so on. Earlier [2a], they expounded from the phrase “and you shall offer it as a freewill offering” that once he changed the intention and slaughtered it not for its sake, the offering is considered a freewill offering; and even in the case of a freewill offering it is prohibited to change the intention. Therefore, it is prohibited to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.

Alternatively, it may be derived from reasoning:

Can it be that because he changed his intention once, he may continue to change it again?

As was stated at the beginning of the chapter—

as this reasoning was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter [there].

And Rava said: An olah brought after the death

of its owners, by the heir, is not subject to the disqualification of a change of ownership. Therefore, only if

he slaughtered it with a change of sanctity is it invalid

from fulfilling its owner’s obligation. But if

he slaughtered it with a change of ownership,

it is

valid, for there is no owner after death,

as the heir is not considered the owner of the offering.

And Rav Pinhas, son of Rav Ami, said: There is an owner after death,

as the heir is considered the owner of the offering. Therefore, if the heir slaughtered it for someone else, it does not fulfill its owner’s—the heir’s—obligation.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Pinhas, son of Rav Ami:

Did

the Master mean specifically

that there is an owner after death,

that is, does a change of ownership impede an offering brought by an heir, as it does any offering slaughtered with a change of ownership,

and

therefore, even an heir whose offering was slaughtered for the sake of another person’s atonement

must bring another olah

in order to fulfill his obligation? This is so even though the heir is not obligated by virtue of a vow, since he is obligated to bring it from his father’s assets [according to the one who says that a lien on property by Torah law is in force].

Or perhaps,

since the heir himself did not vow to bring an offering, even if his offering was slaughtered with a change of intention, the owner is not obligated to bring another offering. And what you said, “There is an owner after death,” means that the heir attains atonement through the olah he inherited from his father,

for if he has several positive commandments

that the heir had failed to fulfill,

it atones for him.

He said to him,

Rav Pinhas, son of Rav Ami:

I meant it specifically:

if it was slaughtered not for the sake of its owner—the heir—the heir is obligated to bring another offering.

And Rava said: An olah

does not provide actual atonement, for the primary atonement depends on repentance; rather,

it is a gift,

like a person who brings a gift to a king when he comes to greet him after having sinned against him, and then appeases him through his advocates.

Rava proves that atonement is not achieved through the offering of the olah, for in either event:

What are the circumstances? If there is no repentance,

how can the offering atone?

But

it is stated regarding such a case:

“The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination”!

And if there is repentance, why do I need an olah

for atonement?

But it was taught in a beraita: If one violated a positive commandment and repented—

he does not move from there until they forgive him?!

Rather, conclude from this:

it is not atonement, but

it is a gift,

which comes after the atonement! (

And as a mnemonic for the order of Rava’s statements:

Hatat

that one slaughtered for the sake of a hatat; a hatat that one slaughtered

for one

who is obligated to bring a hatat; a hatat

aton

es for those liable to bring an offering for failure to fulfill a positive commandment.

Olah

that one slaughtered not for its sake; an olah brought

after

death; an olah

is a gift

.

Mnemonic!)

A beraita was also taught in this regard,

that an olah is a gift:

Rabbi Shimon said: Why does a hatat

come?

By way of an aside, the Gemara explains: His question,

“Why

does a hatat

come,”

is apparently perplexing, for it is obvious that it comes

to atone!

Rather,

the Gemara explains that this is his intention:

Why does

a hatat

come before an olah?—

It is analogous to

an advocate

[a defense attorney]

who enters

to appease the king for his anger against a person who sinned against him, and only after

the advocate has appeased

the king

does

the sinner himself enter with

a gift, after him,

the advocate.

We learned in the Mishna: All offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid

except for the Paschal offering and the sin offering.

Earlier [4b] we learned that all offerings must be performed for their sake, because all offerings were juxtaposed to peace offerings in the verse: “This is the law of the burnt offering, of the meal offering, and of the sin offering, and of the guilt offering, and of the sacrifice of the peace offerings,” and with regard to the peace offerings themselves it is stated: “the sacrifice of peace offerings,” to teach us that the slaughter must be performed for the sake of peace offerings. But the Paschal offering was not included in this juxtaposition, and therefore the Gemara discusses:

The

Paschal

offering—

from where do we know that there is a mitzva to perform it for its sake, as with the other offerings, and also from where do we know that if one changed its designation while performing it, it is invalid?

And the Gemara answers:

as it is written: “

Observe the month of spring and perform the Paschal offering.”

And we derive: It is a mitzva

that all its procedures be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering!

We found

that changing the sacred designation is not permitted in the Paschal offering, because its mitzva is that it be performed for its sake;

from where do we know

that changing the owners’ designation is not permitted in the Paschal offering?

As it is written: “

And you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Paschal offering,”

and we derive:

that the slaughter shall be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering!

And if it is not needed for the matter of changing the sacred designation,

as we already learned its law from “and you shall perform the Paschal offering,”

apply it to the matter of changing the owners’ designation.

We found

that one must have in mind the offering’s designation and the designation of its owners

as a mitzva.

To invalidate

when one changed it to the designation of another offering or of other owners,

from where?

The verse states: “

And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering to

the Lord your God.” The verse deviated from its usual formulation and stated that the slaughter must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering, to teach you: A Paschal offering that was slaughtered with a change of sacred designation

is invalid.

Rav Safra raised an objection:

But is

this “

and you shall slaughter

the Paschal offering,” from which you learned that the verse deviated in order to teach disqualification,

what it came for?

But

this verse is needed for the teaching of Rav Naḥman, as Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuh: From where do we know concerning the surplus of the Paschal offering [if one designated a Paschal offering, it was lost, and he sacrificed another in its place, and afterward the lost Paschal offering was found]

[if one designated a Paschal offering, it was lost, and one offered another in its place, and afterward the lost offering was found]

that it is sacrificed

as a

peace offering? As it is stated: “

And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering to

the Lord your God, sheep and cattle.”

What does the verse mean by “

sheep and cattle”?

Does it not teach that the Paschal offering may be brought only from sheep or goats?

Rather, from here

you learn

with regard to the surplus of the Paschal offering, that it shall be

sacrificed

as an offering that comes from

all

the sheep and from

all the cattle, whether males or females.

And what is that—

a peace offering! [For with regard to the other offerings, the Torah established that they come either only from males or only from females, whereas peace offerings come both from males and from females.] If so, this verse is not superfluous, so as to be interpreted as teaching that a change of sacred designation is disqualifying.

[For with regard to other offerings, the Torah established that they come either only from males or only from females, whereas peace offerings may come from both males and females.] If so, this verse is not superfluous and cannot be understood as changing the verse’s wording to establish that a change in sacred designation renders the offering invalid.

Rather, Rav Safra said:

Indeed, “

and you shall slaughter the Paschal offering”

came

to

teach

the teaching of Rav Naḥman, that the surplus of the Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace offering, and it is not available to teach that a Paschal offering is invalidated by a change of sacred designation. The source that a change of sacred designation and a change of owners’ designation are disqualifying in a Paschal offering is expounded as follows: “

that the surplus of a Paschal offering is offered as a peace offering, and it is not available to teach that a Paschal offering becomes invalid through a change in sacred designation. The source that both a change in sacred designation and a change in the owner’s designation render a Paschal offering invalid is derived as follows: “

Observe the month of spring

and perform the Paschal offering”—

as a mitzva,

that all its procedures should not be performed

with a change of sacred designation. “

And you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Paschal offering”—

as a mitzva,

that one should not slaughter it

with a change of owners’ designation. “

It”—

it shall remain in its state, meaning that it is valid only when performed for its own sake. And its implication is

to invalidate, both here

with regard to a change of sacred designation

and here

with regard to a change of owners’ designation! For it is valid only when it is performed as commanded.

And we found that the slaughter

of the Paschal offering is disqualified by a change of sacred designation or by a change of owners’ designation [as it is written, “It is the sacrifice of the Paschal offering”].

The other procedures

in which a change of sacred designation was made in the Paschal offering—

from where do we know

that they are disqualifying, [and from where do we know that one must have in mind the designation of the owners in them as a mitzva]? —

Since the verse revealed

in “and you shall perform the Paschal offering” that all its procedures must be performed for the sake of the Paschal offering,

it revealed

through this verse, by means of a bama matzinu—an inference from an analogous case—that there is no distinction between slaughter and the other procedures, both with regard to the mitzva and with regard to disqualification! [Included in this is that it is a mitzva to have in mind the designation of the owners during the other procedures as well.]

Rav Ashi said:

It is impossible to learn from this verse that a change of sacred designation or of owners’ designation is disqualifying during the other procedures, because

since the verse revealed it, it revealed it,

we do not say that this constitutes an inference from an analogous case. Therefore, the laws of the other procedures are not learned from the laws of slaughter, and we do not learn that a change of sacred designation is disqualifying from the mitzva to perform it for its sake. [And we also do not learn from this that there is a mitzva to have in mind “for the sake of the owners.”]

that this is a “what do we find” inference. We do not derive the laws of the other procedures from the laws of slaughter, and we do not learn that a change in sacred designation renders the offering invalid from the mitzva to perform it for its own sake. [Nor do we learn from it that it is a mitzva to have the owner’s designation in mind.]

Rather,

if so, the difficulty arises again:

from where do we know concerning the other procedures

that it is a mitzva to have in mind the designation of the owners during them, and that if one performed them with a change of sacred designation or a change of owners’ designation, it is disqualifying in the Paschal offering?

And we answer:

as it is written: “

This is the law of the burnt offering and of the meal offering and of the sacrifice of the peace offerings.” And immediately thereafter it is stated: “On the day that He commanded the children of Israel to offer their sacrifices,”

and of the sacrifice of the peace offerings.” Immediately afterward it says: “On the day that He commanded the Children of Israel to offer their sacrifices,”

and

this verse speaks of the Paschal offering, as

it is taught [in Sifra, Tzav, chapter 18]: “

[in Sifra, Tzav, chapter 18]: “

On the day that He commanded the children of Israel to offer their sacrifices”—

this refers to the firstborn offering, the tithe offering, and the Paschal offering.

And since this is so, it follows that

the verse juxtaposed

the Paschal offering

to the peace offerings [by placing the verse “On the day that He commanded,” which concerns the Paschal offering, next to the verse “This is the law,” which concerns peace offerings], to teach you:

[by placing the verse “On the day that He commanded,” which concerns the Paschal offering, next to the verse “This is the law,” which concerns peace offerings], teaching you:

Just as with peace offerings, both a change of sacred designation and a change of owners’ designation are required as a mitzva, so too with all

offerings, including the Paschal offering,

both a change of sacred designation and a change of owners’ designation

are required

as a mitzva.

And since the Paschal offering was juxtaposed to peace offerings with regard to the mitzva, this juxtaposition also teaches that the other procedures of the Paschal offering are disqualifying, just as slaughter is, as we expound there subsequently:

And like peace offerings

shall be the law of the Paschal offering—

just as with peace offerings, you did not distinguish between slaughter and the other procedures,

but all of them must be performed for their sake

as a mitzva,

so too, with regard to the Paschal offering, you shall not distinguish between slaughter

during which a change of sacred designation or a change of owners’ designation is disqualifying

and the other procedures,

but all of them must be performed for its sake, and this

is to disqualify,

as is the law with regard to the slaughter of the Paschal offering.

And we ask:

But, since you learned from the juxtaposition that the Paschal offering was juxtaposed to peace offerings—“The sacrifice of the Paschal offering

since you learned from the equation that the Paschal offering was equated with peace-offerings—“the sacrifice of the Paschal offering

it”—

why do I need it?

And we answer: The word “it” was not stated with regard to the Paschal offering to teach something about the Paschal offering itself. Rather, it

comes

to teach that the word “it” stated with regard to a guilt offering does not indicate disqualification,

as it is taught: With regard to the Paschal offering, it is stated “

it”

with regard to the slaughter,

and we expound “it shall remain in its state,” to teach that the laws of the Paschal offering were stated

to disqualify,

including the thought “for its sake,” which was stated with regard to it as a disqualification.

But with regard to a guilt offering, it is not stated “

it”

with regard to the slaughter,

rather

only

after the burning of the sacrificial portions

is it stated with regard to it, “It is a guilt offering,”

and

behold,

the offering itself is valid even when its sacrificial portions were not burned. Therefore, a thought involving a change does not disqualify it, since it is impossible for a thought involving a change during the burning to disqualify it more than the failure to burn the sacrificial portions altogether.

We also learned in the Mishna that a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is invalid.

And we deliberate over it:

The sin offering—from where do we know

that there is a mitzva to perform it for its sake and for the sake of its owners, and that a change of sacred designation or a change of owners’ designation is disqualifying in it?

And the answer is:

as it is written: “

And he shall slaughter it as a sin offering”—

that the slaughter shall be performed for the sake of a sin offering!

We found the matter with regard to slaughter—

from where do we know it with regard to receiving?