Zevachim 7b — the Talmud in English

And we answer: Indeed,

as a fixed atonement it does not atone

for a sin offering on those liable for a positive commandment, for it is not a fixed and absolute atonement for them; but

as a floating atonement it does atone,

it provides a temporary and partial atonement even for those liable for a positive commandment.

Therefore, if he has already set aside a burnt offering for a positive commandment that he has violated, he is no longer included in the atonement of the sin offering. And in such a case Rava said: “A sin offering that he slaughtered on behalf of one who is obligated [and has set aside] a burnt offering is valid.” But when he slaughtered a sin offering intending that another person who had violated a positive commandment should achieve atonement through it, and he had not yet set aside a burnt offering for his atonement, the sin offering is disqualified—for a sin offering also atones for a positive commandment as a floating atonement, and it follows that slaughtering the sin offering for his atonement is considered a change of ownership, as Rava said: “A sin offering atones for those liable for a positive commandment by means of a kal va-chomer.” Therefore Rava said: “A sin offering that he slaughtered on behalf of one who is obligated for nothing is disqualified, for there is no person in Israel who is not obligated by a positive commandment.”

And Rava said: A burnt offering that he slaughtered not for its sake,

which is valid, except that it did not count for its owner as his obligation

—it is forbidden to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.

And the source that it is forbidden to sprinkle its blood not for its sake is:

If you wish, say it is from Scripture; if you wish, say it is from reasoning.

If you wish, say it is from Scripture:

as it is stated,

“You shall observe what issues from your lips”

and so on. And earlier [2a] they expounded from “and you shall make it a freewill offering” that after he changed it and slaughtered it not for its sake, the sacrifice is considered a freewill offering, and even in the case of a freewill offering it is forbidden to change its designation. Therefore, it is forbidden to sprinkle its blood not for its sake.

If you wish, say it is from reasoning:

Can it be that because he changed it once, he may continue to change it again,

as at the beginning of the chapter

—as this reasoning was mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, [there].

And Rava said: A burnt offering that comes after the death

of its owners, through the heir, does not have the disqualification of a change of ownership. Therefore, only if

he slaughtered it with a change of sacred designation is it disqualified

from counting as his obligation. But if

he slaughtered it with a change of ownership,

it is

valid, for there is no owner after death,

as the heir is not considered the owner of the sacrifice.

And Rav Pinchas, son of Rav Ami, said: There is an owner after death,

for the heir is considered the owner of the sacrifice. Therefore, if the heir slaughtered it for the sake of someone else, it did not count for its owner—the heir—as his obligation.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Pinchas, son of Rav Ami:

Did you

say specifically

“There is an owner after death”,

meaning, does a change of ownership prevent acceptance in a sacrifice brought by an heir, as it does in every sacrifice slaughtered with a change of ownership,

and

therefore even when the heir’s sacrifice was slaughtered for the sake of another person’s atonement,

he must bring another burnt offering

in order to fulfill his obligation? And this is so even though the heir is not obligated because of a vow; the obligation to bring it from his father’s assets rests upon him [according to the one who says that the lien is of biblical status].

Or perhaps,

since the heir himself did not vow to bring a sacrifice, even if his sacrifice was slaughtered with a change of ownership, the owner is not obligated to bring another sacrifice. And what you said, “There is an owner after death,” means that the heir achieves atonement through the same burnt offering that he inherited from his father,

for if he has several positive commandments,

of the heir,

it atones for him.

He said to him,

Rav Pinchas, son of Rav Ami:

I said it specifically,

meaning that if it was slaughtered not for the sake of its owner—the heir—the heir must bring another sacrifice.

And Rava said: A burnt offering

does not provide a substantive atonement, for the principal atonement depends upon repentance; rather,

it is a gift,

like a person who brings a gift to a king when he comes to greet him, after he sinned against him and then appeased him through his advocates.

And Rava proves that the atonement is not accomplished through the offering of the burnt offering, for whichever way one looks at it:

What are the circumstances? If there is no repentance,

how can the sacrifice atone? And

yet

it is said regarding this,

“The sacrifice of the wicked is an abomination”!?

And if there is repentance, why do I need a burnt offering

for atonement?

But it was taught: One who violated a positive commandment and repented

does not move from there until they forgive him?!

Rather, learn from this: it is not an atonement; rather, it is a gift, which comes after the atonement! ( And this is your mnemonic for the order of Rava’s statements: sin offering that he slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering; a sin offering that he slaughtered on behalf of one who is obligated for a sin offering; a sin offering atones for those liable for a positive commandment. Burnt offering that he slaughtered not for its sake; a burnt offering that comes after

it is not atonement, but

it is a gift,

which comes after the atonement! (

death; a burnt offering

is a gift.

Mnemonic!)

It was also taught likewise

that a burnt offering is a gift:

Rabbi Shimon said: Why does a sin offering

come?

It comes

?

And, in a parenthetical statement, the Gemara explains: apparently, his question,

“Why

does a sin offering

come,”

is perplexing, for it is obvious that it comes

to atone!?

Rather,

the Gemara explains that this is his intention:

Why does a sin offering come

before a burnt offering?

It is like

an advocate [a defense attorney]

who enters

to appease the king for his anger against a person who sinned against him; only after

the advocate has appeased

the king

does

the sinner himself

enter with

a gift, after it,

the advocate.

It is analogous to

an advocate

[a defense attorney]

who enters

to appease the king for his anger against a person who sinned against him, and only after

the advocate has appeased

the king

does

the sinner himself enter with

a gift, after him,

the advocate.

We learned in the Mishna: All the sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid,

except for the Paschal offering and the sin-offering.

Above [4b] we learned that all the sacrifices must be performed for their sake, because all the sacrifices were equated with peace-offerings in the verse, “This is the law of the burnt-offering, of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the sacrifice of the peace-offerings,” and concerning the peace-offerings themselves it is said, “the sacrifice of the peace-offerings,” to teach us that the slaughter must be for the sake of peace-offerings. But the Paschal offering was not included in this equation, and therefore the Gemara discusses:

The

Paschal

offering — from where do we know

that there is a mitzva to perform it for its sake, like the other sacrifices, and also from where do we know that if one changed [the intention] in performing it, it is invalid?

And the Gemara answered:

As it is written, “

Observe the month of spring and perform the Paschal offering.”

And we expound: It is a mitzva

that all its performances be for the sake of the Paschal offering!

We found

that a change of sacred designation may not be made in the Paschal offering, because its mitzva is that it be performed for its sake;

from where do we know concerning a change of owners

that it may not be made in the Paschal offering?

As it is written, “

And you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Paschal offering,”

and we expound:

That the slaughter shall be for the sake of the Paschal offering!

And if it is not needed for a change of sacred designation,

as we already learned its law from “and you shall perform the Paschal offering,”

apply it to a change of owners.

We found

that one must have the intention of the sacrifice and of its owners

as a mitzva.

To invalidate

when one changed [the intention] to the name of another sacrifice or other owners,

from where?

The verse says, “

And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering to

the Lord your God,”

the verse changed its wording and said that the slaughter shall be for the sake of the Paschal offering, to teach you that a Paschal offering slaughtered with a change of sacred designation is invalid.

Rav Safra raised an objection against this:

And is

this “

and you shall slaughter

the Paschal offering,” from which you learned that the verse changed its wording to teach invalidation,

what it came for?

But

this is needed for that which Rav Naḥman said, for Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha: From where [do we know] concerning the surplus of the Paschal offering

[if one designated a Paschal offering, it was lost, and he sacrificed another in its place, and afterward the lost Paschal offering was found]

that it may be sacrificed

as a

peace-offering? As it is stated, “

And you shall slaughter the Paschal offering to

the Lord your God, sheep and cattle.”

What does “sheep and cattle” teach?

But does not the Paschal offering come only from sheep and goats? Rather, from here

you learn

concerning the surplus of the Paschal offering that it shall be

sacrificed

as something that comes from

all

the sheep and from

all

the cattle,

both males and females,

and what is it—

peace-offerings!

[For concerning the other sacrifices, the Torah established that they come either only from males or only from females, whereas peace-offerings come both from males and from females.] And if so, this verse is not superfluous, to be expounded as though the verse changed its wording to invalidate a change of sacred designation.

Rather, Rav Safra said:

Indeed, “

and you shall slaughter the Paschal offering”

came

to

teach

that which Rav Naḥman said, that the surplus of the Paschal offering is sacrificed as a peace-offering, and it is not available for teaching that a Paschal offering is invalidated by a change of sacred designation. And the source that a change of sacred designation and a change of owners invalidate the Paschal offering is expounded as follows: “

that the surplus of a Paschal offering is offered as a peace offering, and it is not available to teach that a Paschal offering becomes invalid through a change in sacred designation. The source that both a change in sacred designation and a change in the owner’s designation render a Paschal offering invalid is derived as follows: “

Observe the month of spring

and perform the Paschal offering”—

as a mitzva,

that all its performances should not be performed

with a change of sacred designation. “

And you shall say: It is the sacrifice of the Paschal offering”—

as a mitzva,

that one should not slaughter it

with a change of owners. “

It”—

it shall be in its state, for only [when performed] for its sake is it valid; and its meaning is

to invalidate, both here

in a change of sacred designation

and here

in a change of owners. For it is valid only if it was performed according to its mitzva.

We found that the slaughter

is invalidated by a change of sacred designation or by a change of owners in the slaughter of the Paschal offering [as it is written, “It is the sacrifice of the Paschal offering”];

the other performances

in which a change of sacred designation was made in the Paschal offering,

from where do we know

that they invalidate [it, and from where do we know that one must have the intention in them for the sake of the owners as a mitzva]? —

Since the verse revealed

in “and you shall perform the Paschal offering” that all its performances shall be for the sake of the Paschal offering,

it revealed

through this the verse that we learn by “what do we find” that there is no distinction between slaughter and the other performances, both with regard to a mitzva and with regard to invalidation! [Included in this is that it is a mitzva to have the intention for the sake of the owners also in the other performances.]

Rav Ashi said:

It is impossible to learn from this verse that a change of sacred designation or of owners invalidates in the other performances, because

“since it revealed, it revealed”

we do not say,

and it is not considered “what do we find”; the laws of the other performances are not learned from the laws of slaughter, and we do not learn that a change of sacred designation invalidates from the mitzva to perform it for its sake. [And we also do not know that there is a mitzva to have the intention “for the sake of the owners.”]

Rather,

if so, it will once again be difficult:

the other performances, from where

is it known that there is a mitzva to have the intention in them for the sake of the owners, and that if one made in them a change of sacred designation or a change of owners, it invalidates the Paschal offering?

And we answer:

As it is written, “

This is the law of the burnt-offering and of the meal-offering

and of the sacrifice of the peace-offerings.” And immediately adjacent to this it says, “On the day that He commanded the children of Israel to offer their sacrifices,”

and

this verse speaks of the Paschal offering, for

it was taught

[in Sifra, Tzav, chapter 18]: “

On the day that He commanded the children of Israel to offer their sacrifices”—

this is the firstborn offering, the tithe, and the Paschal offering.

And since this is so, it follows that

the verse equated it

the Paschal offering

with the peace-offerings

[through the juxtaposition of the verse “On the day that He commanded,” which concerns the Paschal offering, with the verse “This is the law,” which concerns the peace-offerings], to teach you:

Just as concerning peace-offerings, both a change of sacred designation and a change of owners are required as a mitzva, so too all

the sacrifices, including the Paschal offering,

both a change of sacred designation and a change of owners

are required

as a mitzva.

And since the Paschal offering was equated with peace-offerings with regard to the mitzva, it is also learned from this equation that the other performances of the Paschal offering invalidate it like slaughter, as we expound there afterward:

And like the peace-offerings

shall be the law of the Paschal offering—

just as concerning peace-offerings, between slaughter and the other performances you did not distinguish among them,

and all of them must be performed for their sake

as a mitzva,

so too concerning the Paschal offering you shall not distinguish between slaughter,

in which a change of sacred designation and a change of owners invalidate it,

and the other performances,

and all of them must be performed for their sake; and this

is to invalidate,

like the law of the slaughter of the Paschal offering.

And we challenge this:

But,

since you learned from the equation that the Paschal offering was equated with peace-offerings—“the sacrifice of the Paschal offering

it”—

why do I need it?

And we answer: “It” was not said concerning the Paschal offering to teach about itself, but

to

teach that “it” written concerning the guilt-offering does not invalidate,

as it was taught: Concerning the Paschal offering it says

“it”

at the slaughter,

and we expound, “It shall be in its state,” to teach that the laws of the Paschal offering were stated

to invalidate,

including the thought “for its sake,” which was stated concerning it as invalidating;

but concerning the guilt-offering it was not said

“it”

at the slaughter,

rather

only

after the burning of the sacrificial fats

was it said concerning it, “It is a guilt-offering,”

and

behold,

it itself is valid when its sacrificial fats were not burned, and therefore a thought of change does not invalidate it, for it is impossible that a thought of change during the burning should invalidate it more than when it was not burned at all.

We further learned in the Mishna that a sin-offering slaughtered not for its sake is invalid.

And we raised the matter:

A sin-offering, from where do we know

that there is a mitzva to perform it for its sake and for the sake of its owners, and that a change of sacred designation or a change of owners invalidates it?

And it answered:

As it is written, “

And he shall slaughter it as a sin-offering”—

that the slaughter shall be for the sake of a sin-offering!

We found slaughter—

receiving, from where?