Zevachim 7a — the Talmud in English

According to Rabbi Shimon, they are not

they

redeemed while unblemished, since this is the law of all offerings that cannot be redeemed while they are unblemished, and it is impossible to offer them as temidin, because they were purchased with the funds of the previous year.

But

according to the Sages,

they

are redeemed while unblemished,

because the stipulation of the court takes effect concerning them: if they are found to be superfluous, the sanctity of an offering of temidin will not take effect upon them, but only sanctity of value, and sanctity of value can be redeemed with ordinary money. [And the money of the redemption will have the law of “surplus of the contribution,” which is the money remaining after they “contributed” from all the money of the half-shekel the money for purchasing temidin and the other communal offerings into the collection boxes].

And once those temidin have been redeemed while they are unblemished, and have again become ordinary property, it is possible to consecrate them again as temidin of the new year, by purchasing them anew with the half-shekel funds of the new year.

And it is proven that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Sages and holds that the court does not have the authority to stipulate that the designation of the priests should not take effect. If so, also concerning the goats of Shavuot it is impossible to say that Rabbi Shimon holds that the stipulation of the court is that the designation of the second goat should not take effect until the following day; rather, the designation takes effect upon both goats from the previous day. And the proof returns that an offering can effect atonement for a positive commandment even after designation.

And furthermore,

even if you should say, with difficulty, that the obligation to bring two goats on Shavuot applies only in a case where they designated them one after the other, and the second is effective to atone for the impurity between the designation of the first and the designation of the second [on the eve of the Festival!], you will still find difficulty: is it possible to explain that the two goats of Shavuot were required in such a manner?

For

Rabbi Yirmeya indeed asked Rabbi Zeira:

according to Rabbi Shimon’s reason, that the second goat comes to atone for the impurity between the first and the second, what is the law concerning

the two goats of Shavuot

that they slaughtered simultaneously, and

received their blood in two cups, and the blood of the first was sprinkled,

and thereby all the impure persons attained atonement, and from now on, the blood of the

second,

according to Rabbi Shimon’s reason,

for what is it offered?

The uncertainty is whether it is possible to say that the blood of the second goat comes to atone for impurity that occurred between the slaughter of the second and the sprinkling of its blood. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: The blood of the second is offered

for impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of this one and that one,

indeed, it is possible to attain atonement even for the sin of impurity that occurred between slaughter and sprinkling, and therefore the blood of the second should be sprinkled.

And the Gemara infers from Rabbi Yirmeya’s words:

It was not a question for him until this point except

whether the second goat atones for

a positive commandment that is after slaughter, but

for a positive commandment

that is after designation it was not a question for him,

because it certainly atones!

And we reject this:

Perhaps

Rabbi Yirmeya

was saying, “if you should find it stated.”

He was uncertain concerning both possibilities: initially he considered whether Rabbi Shimon’s intent, that the second goat atones for impurity that occurred “between this one and that one,” is specifically impurity between the designation of the first and the designation of the second on the eve of the Festival, but it cannot atone for impurity that occurred after its designation; or perhaps it also atones for impurity after designation, and it comes for impurity that occurred on the Festival itself between the offering of the first and the offering of the second.

And he had an additional uncertainty: if you should find it stated that the goat can atone even for impurity after designation, it is still necessary to be uncertain whether it can also atone for impurity that occurred between slaughter and sprinkling. Concerning this Rabbi Zeira resolved for him that it can atone even until the time of sprinkling.

And consequently, we have no proof from Rabbi Yirmeya’s words that an offering atones even after designation, for he himself is uncertain whether it atones for impurity after designation. [However, from Rabbi Zeira’s words there is proof that it atones even after slaughter, until the time of sprinkling, but the uncertainty remains perhaps the halakha is not in accordance with him] .

It was stated: A thanksgiving-offering that he slaughtered

with a change of sanctity, and the change was that he slaughtered it

for the thanksgiving-offering of his fellow,

and it is speaking of a case in which his fellow had a thanksgiving-offering. It is considered a change in sanctity, since instead of slaughtering this thanksgiving-offering for itself, he slaughters it for someone else’s thanksgiving-offering . And this does not involve a change of ownership, since he did not slaughter the thanksgiving-offering with the intention that someone else attain atonement through the sprinkling of the blood.

Rabbah said:

This change is not considered a change of sanctity, and therefore it is

valid

and counts for the owners toward their obligation.

Rav Hisda said:

This manner too is considered a change of sanctity, and therefore it is

disqualified,

for it does not count for the owners toward their obligation.

And the Gemara explains their reasons:

Rabbah said: It is valid,

for

a thanksgiving-offering was slaughtered for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering,

and a change of sanctity applies only when one slaughters an offering for the sake of an offering of another type, [and even if he slaughters a sin-offering for forbidden fat for the sake of a blood sin-offering, the sin-offering is not disqualified, since both offerings are of the type of sin-offering].

Rav Hisda said: It is disqualified,

because

we require it to be slaughtered for the sake of his own peace-offering,

and since he changed it for the sake of another person’s peace-offering, it did not count for him toward his obligation .

Rabbah said: From where do I say it

that a thanksgiving-offering that he slaughtered for the sake of another thanksgiving-offering is valid? From this

as it is taught: “

And the flesh of the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings

on the day that he offers his sacrifice

and so on.” \-

Abba Hanin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The verse came

“the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings”

to teach: A thanksgiving-offering that he slaughtered for the sake of a peace-offering is valid,

and counts for the owners,

a peace-offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering is disqualified

from counting for the owners toward their obligation.

And what is the difference between this and that? —

A thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering,

as the verse says, “the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings,” in which the thanksgiving-offering is related to peace-offerings; therefore, when he slaughters a thanksgiving-offering for the sake of a peace-offering, it is not called a change of sanctity.

But peace-offerings are not called thanksgiving-offerings.

Therefore, when he slaughters a peace-offering for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering, it is considered a change of sanctity, and it does not count for the owners toward their obligation.

And from here Rabbah inferred: specifically concerning

a peace-offering for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering

did Rabbi Eliezer say that it is

disqualified,

because he changed the peace-offering to an offering bearing another name.

Is it not the case

that if he slaughtered

this thanksgiving-offering

for

the sake of another thanksgiving-offering,

he is

valid,

for he did not change the name of the offering?

Is it not so,

that it is speaking even of a case where he slaughtered it for the thanksgiving-offering

of his fellow,

and nevertheless Rabbi Eliezer declared it valid?

And we reject Rabbah’s proof:

No.

Rabbi Eliezer declared it valid only when he changed from this thanksgiving-offering to another thanksgiving-offering

of his own,

and Rabbi Eliezer’s novelty is that even if he designated two thanksgiving-offerings for two different events that obligate a thanksgiving-offering, such as for ascending from the sea and for emerging from prison, and slaughtered one for the sake of the other, it is valid.

And we ask: according to your words, it follows that specifically when he slaughtered it for the sake of his own thanksgiving-offering it is valid,

but

if he slaughters his thanksgiving-offering for the sake of the thanksgiving-offering

of his fellow, what is the law? —

It is disqualified.

If so, you will find difficulty: instead of

teaching

that he slaughtered

his peace-offering for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering and it is disqualified,

because of a change of sanctity in the name of the offering,

let it teach

a greater novelty, that even though he did not change the name of the offering, but slaughtered

a thanksgiving-offering

of his

for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering

as another person is obligated to bring—which is not a change in the name of the offering—and nevertheless it does not count for him toward his obligation,

and all the more so a peace-offering for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering,

which changes the name of the offering.

And we answer: the novelty of the law in the case where he

slaughtered a peace-offering for the sake of his own thanksgiving-offering was necessary for him

to teach us.

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since a thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering, peace-offerings are also called thanksgiving-offerings; and when he slaughters them

for peace-offerings

for the sake of a thanksgiving-offering, let them be valid

and count for their owners toward their obligation. Therefore

it teaches us

that only a thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering, but peace-offerings are not called thanksgiving-offerings .

Rava said: A sin offering for forbidden fat

slaughtered

for the sake of a sin offering

for blood—

is valid

and fulfills the owner's obligation. But if he slaughtered it

for the sake of an elevation offering,

it is

invalid

entirely and may not be offered at all.

What is the reason? —

“And he shall slaughter it for a sin offering”

the Merciful One said,

therefore, a sin offering for forbidden fat slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering for blood is valid,

since it was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering,

but if he slaughtered it

for the sake of an elevation offering, it is invalid [since the verse excluded and invalidated such a slaughter, as it is written, “and he shall slaughter it for a sin offering”!]

с изменением владельца, например если человек намеревался

And Rava said: A sin offering that he slaughtered

with a change of ownership—for example, if he intended

that

its blood would be sprinkled to effect atonement for

one

who is another person

obligated to bring a sin offering—

is invalid.

Only such a “change of ownership” invalidates it, because the second person is also obligated to obtain atonement through a sin offering, as will be explained.

But if

he slaughtered it with the intention

that its blood would be sprinkled to effect atonement for

one

who is another person

obligated only to bring an elevation offering,

it is

valid,

because this type of change of ownership does not invalidate the offering: the second person is not obligated to bring a sin offering like him.

What is the reason —

as it is stated

with regard to a sin offering,

?

excluding:

“for him”

and not for another!

This exclusion applies only to

another

who is

analogous to him,

that is,

obligated to obtain atonement in the same manner. He may not slaughter it with the intention that the other person obtain atonement through the sprinkling of the blood; if he nevertheless does so, the offering is invalidated through a change of ownership. But if the second person is not obligated to obtain atonement, he is not considered “another analogous to him,” and the exclusion “for him and not for another” does not apply to him. The offering is therefore not invalidated through a change of ownership.

недействительно, поскольку нет ни одного еврея, который не был бы обязан

And Rava said: A sin offering

that he slaughtered with the intention

that its blood would be sprinkled to effect atonement for

one who is not obligated in anything—

is invalid, for there is no Israelite who is not obligated

to obtain atonement for

a positive commandment.

A sin offering effects atonement even for those liable for violating positive commandments. Thus, although he said that he was slaughtering it for one who is not liable for anything, in fact he slaughtered it with the intention that this person obtain atonement through it for the positive commandment incumbent upon him. The offering is therefore invalidated because he changed it for the sake of an owner who is obligated to obtain atonement.

And the Gemara distinguishes nearby, between Rava’s words above, that if he slaughtered a sin-offering with the intention that his fellow, who is obligated to bring an olah-offering, should achieve atonement through it, this is not considered a change of owners—that is, in a case where his fellow had already set aside an olah-offering and it is found that his fellow no longer needs atonement through the sin-offering; whereas here, it is speaking of a case where his fellow had not set aside an olah-offering, for he is presumed to be one who is obligated in nothing.

And Rava said: A sin-offering atones

also

for those obligated because of a positive commandment,

and therefore, if he slaughters it with the intention that his fellow should achieve atonement through it, this is considered a change to the designation of one obligated in atonement like him, even though his fellow is obligated in atonement only for a positive commandment,]

by means of a kal va-chomer—

It atones for those liable to karet;

for those obligated because of a positive commandment, is it not all the more so?

And we raised a difficulty concerning it:

Does this mean

that atonement for a positive commandment

is a category of it

of atonement through a sin-offering

it is, [and therefore, even if he changes from his own atonement through a sin-offering to the atonement for another’s positive commandment, this is considered a change of owners]?

And didn’t Rava say:

But Rava said: A sin-offering that he slaughtered with the intention

that

one

who is someone else

who is obligated in a sin-offering

like him—

is invalid

because of a change of owners. But if he slaughtered it

for one who is obligated to bring an olah-offering—

it is valid,

because this is not a change of owners, since the second person is not fit to achieve atonement through this sin-offering.

And it is proven that Rava holds that atonement for a positive commandment is not of the same type as the obligation of a sin-offering, for he is obligated to bring an olah-offering because he violated a positive commandment, and nevertheless he is called one who is not obligated like him, since the sin-offering does not atone for a positive commandment.