Zevachim 7a (ז.) — the Talmud in English

According to Rabbi Shimon, they do not

undergo redemption

while unblemished, as is the law with all offerings that cannot be redeemed while unblemished and cannot be sacrificed as tamid offerings, because they were purchased with funds from the previous year.

However,

according to the Rabbis,

they

do undergo redemption while unblemished,

because the court stipulates concerning them that if they are found to be superfluous, the sanctity of a tamid offering will not take effect upon them; rather, they will have only sanctity of value, and sanctity of value can be redeemed with non-sacred money. [And the redemption money will have the status of “the surplus of the teruma,” which is the money remaining after money has been “set aside” from all the half-shekel funds in the collection boxes for the purchase of the tamid offerings and the other communal offerings].

Once those tamid offerings have been redeemed while unblemished and have again become non-sacred, they may be consecrated anew as the tamid offerings of the new year, by purchasing them again with the half-shekel funds of the new year.

It is thus evident that Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the Rabbis and holds that the court does not have the authority to stipulate that the designation made by the priests should not take effect. If so, even regarding the goats of Shavuot it is impossible to say that Rabbi Shimon holds that the court stipulates that the designation of the second goat should not take effect until the following day; rather, the designation took effect upon both goats from the previous day. The proof therefore stands: an offering can effect atonement for failure to fulfill a positive mitzva even after designation.

Furthermore,

even if you were to say, with difficulty, that the obligation to bring two goats on Shavuot applies only when they were designated one after the other, and that the second is effective to atone for impurity occurring between the designation of the first and the designation of the second [on the eve of the Festival!], you would still find it difficult: Is it possible to explain that the two goats of Shavuot were required in such a case?

For

Rabbi Yirmeya indeed asked Rabbi Zeira:

According to Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning, that the second goat comes to atone for impurity occurring between the first and the second, what is the law concerning

the two goats of Shavuot

that they slaughtered simultaneously, and

collected their blood in two cups, and the blood of the first was sprinkled,

and thereby all those who were impure attained atonement? From now on, the blood of the

second,

according to Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning,

for what is it sacrificed?

The question is whether one can say that the blood of the second goat comes to atone for impurity that occurred between the slaughter of the second and the sprinkling of its blood. Rabbi Zeira said to Rabbi Yirmeya: The blood of the second is sacrificed

for impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of this one and that one,

Indeed, atonement is possible even for the sin of impurity that occurred between slaughter and sprinkling; therefore, the blood of the second should be sprinkled.

And the Gemara infers from Rabbi Yirmeya’s words:

His question was only

whether the second goat atones for

a positive mitzva violated after slaughter, but

for a positive mitzva violated

after designation, he had no question,

as it certainly atones!

And we reject this:

Perhaps

Rabbi Yirmeya

was speaking hypothetically.

He was uncertain regarding both possibilities. At first, he considered whether Rabbi Shimon’s intention, when he said that the second goat atones for impurity that occurred between one and the other, was specifically impurity occurring between the designation of the first and the designation of the second on the eve of the Festival, but that it cannot atone for impurity occurring after its designation; or perhaps it also atones for impurity occurring after designation, and it comes for impurity occurring on the Festival itself, between the offering of the first and the offering of the second.

He had an additional uncertainty: If you say that the goat can atone even for impurity occurring after designation, it is still possible to question whether it can also atone for impurity occurring between slaughter and sprinkling. Rabbi Zeira resolved this for him by saying that it can atone even until the moment of sprinkling.

Consequently, we have no proof from Rabbi Yirmeya’s words that an offering effects atonement even after designation, for he himself was uncertain whether it atones for impurity occurring after designation. [However, there is proof from Rabbi Zeira’s words that it atones even after slaughter, until the moment of sprinkling, but the uncertainty remains as to whether the halakha follows him] .

It was stated: A thanksgiving-offering that was slaughtered

with an alteration of sanctity, meaning that he slaughtered it

for the thanksgiving-offering of another,

and this refers to a case in which the other person had a thanksgiving-offering. This is considered an alteration of sanctity, because instead of slaughtering this thanksgiving-offering for itself, he slaughtered it for someone else’s thanksgiving-offering . It is not an alteration of ownership, since he did not slaughter the thanksgiving-offering with the intention that someone else attain atonement through the sprinkling of the blood.

Rabba said:

This is not considered an alteration of sanctity; therefore it is

valid

and counts for the owners toward their obligation.

Rav Ḥisda said:

This too is considered an alteration of sanctity; therefore it is

disqualified,

and does not count for the owners toward their obligation.

And the Gemara explains their reasoning:

Rabba said: It is valid,

for

a thanksgiving-offering was slaughtered for a thanksgiving-offering,

and an alteration of sanctity applies only when one slaughters an offering for an offering of a different type [and even if one slaughters a sin-offering for fat for a sin-offering for blood, the sin-offering is not disqualified, since both offerings are of the sin-offering type].

Rav Ḥisda said: It is disqualified,

because

it must be slaughtered for his own peace-offerings,

and since he changed it to the peace-offerings of another person, it does not count for him toward his obligation .

Rabba said: From where do I say this

that a thanksgiving-offering slaughtered for another thanksgiving-offering is valid? From that

as it is taught: “

And the flesh of the sacrifice of the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings

on the day that he offers his sacrifice

and so on.” -

Abba Ḥanin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The verse “the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings

comes

to teach: A thanksgiving-offering slaughtered for a peace-offering is valid

and counts for the owners;

peace-offerings slaughtered for a thanksgiving-offering are disqualified

from counting for the owners toward their obligation.

And what is the difference between this and that? —

A thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering,

as in the wording of the verse, “the thanksgiving-offering of his peace-offerings,” which relates the thanksgiving-offering to the peace-offerings. Therefore, if one slaughtered a thanksgiving-offering for a peace-offering, it is not considered an alteration of sanctity.

But peace-offerings are not called a thanksgiving-offering.

Therefore, when one slaughters peace-offerings for a thanksgiving-offering, it is considered an alteration of sanctity, and they do not count for the owners toward their obligation.

And from here Rabba inferred: It is specifically concerning

peace-offerings for a thanksgiving-offering that Rabbi Eliezer said that it is

did Rabbi Eliezer say that it is

disqualified,

because he changed the peace-offerings to an offering with another name.

Precisely

if he slaughtered

this thanksgiving-offering

for

another thanksgiving-offering,

of another person, it is

it is valid,

since he did not change the name of the offering.

Is that not so,

meaning, does this not refer even to a case in which he slaughtered it for the thanksgiving-offering

of his fellow,

and nevertheless Rabbi Eliezer declared it valid?

And we reject Rabba’s proof:

No.

Rabbi Eliezer declared it valid only when he changed this thanksgiving-offering to another thanksgiving-offering

of his own,

and Rabbi Eliezer’s novelty is that even if one designated two thanksgiving-offerings for two different events that obligate one to bring a thanksgiving-offering—for example, for emerging from the sea and for being released from prison—and slaughtered one for the other, it is valid.

And we object: According to your statement, it is specifically when he slaughtered it for his own thanksgiving-offering that it is valid,

but

if he slaughters his thanksgiving-offering for the thanksgiving-offering

of his fellow, what is the law? —

It is disqualified.

If so, this is difficult for you:

Rather than teach

that one who slaughtered

his own peace-offerings for a thanksgiving-offering is disqualified,

because of an alteration of sanctity in the name of the offering,

let him teach

a greater novelty: Even though he did not change the name of the offering, but slaughtered

a thanksgiving-offering

of his own

for a thanksgiving-offering

like the one for which another person was obligated, which is not a change in the name of the offering, nevertheless it does not count for him toward his obligation,

and all the more so, peace-offerings for a thanksgiving-offering,

where he changes the name of the offering.

And we answer: The novelty in the case where he

slaughtered peace-offerings for his own thanksgiving-offering was necessary

to teach us.

For

it might enter your mind to say: Since a thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering, peace-offerings are also called a thanksgiving-offering; and when he slaughters them

for peace-offerings

for a thanksgiving-offering, let them be valid

and count for their owners toward their obligation. Therefore,

it teaches us

that only a thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering, but peace-offerings are not called a thanksgiving-offering .

Rava said: A sin offering for forbidden fat

slaughtered

for the sake of a sin offering

for blood—

is valid

and fulfills the owner's obligation. But if he slaughtered it

for the sake of an elevation offering,

it is

invalid

entirely and may not be offered at all.

What is the reason? —

“And he shall slaughter it for a sin offering”

the Merciful One said,

therefore, a sin offering for forbidden fat slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering for blood is valid,

since it was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering,

but if he slaughtered it

for the sake of an elevation offering, it is invalid [since the verse excluded and invalidated such a slaughter, as it is written, “and he shall slaughter it for a sin offering”!]

And Rava said: A sin offering that he slaughtered

with a change of ownership—for example, if he intended

that

its blood would be sprinkled to effect atonement for

one

who is another person

obligated to bring a sin offering—

is invalid.

Only such a “change of ownership” invalidates it, because the second person is also obligated to obtain atonement through a sin offering, as will be explained.

But if

he slaughtered it with the intention

that its blood would be sprinkled to effect atonement for

one

who is another person

obligated only to bring an elevation offering,

it is

valid,

because this type of change of ownership does not invalidate the offering: the second person is not obligated to bring a sin offering like him.

What is the reason —

as it is stated

with regard to a sin offering,

“and he shall effect atonement for him,”

excluding:

“for him”

and not for another!

This exclusion applies only to

another

who is

analogous to him,

that is,

obligated to obtain atonement in the same manner. He may not slaughter it with the intention that the other person obtain atonement through the sprinkling of the blood; if he nevertheless does so, the offering is invalidated through a change of ownership. But if the second person is not obligated to obtain atonement, he is not considered “another analogous to him,” and the exclusion “for him and not for another” does not apply to him. The offering is therefore not invalidated through a change of ownership.

And Rava said: A sin offering

that he slaughtered with the intention

that its blood would be sprinkled to effect atonement for

one who is not obligated in anything—

is invalid, for there is no Israelite who is not obligated

to obtain atonement for

a positive commandment.

A sin offering effects atonement even for those liable for violating positive commandments. Thus, although he said that he was slaughtering it for one who is not liable for anything, in fact he slaughtered it with the intention that this person obtain atonement through it for the positive commandment incumbent upon him. The offering is therefore invalidated because he changed it for the sake of an owner who is obligated to obtain atonement.

And the Gemara distinguishes nearby, between Rava’s statements above, that if one slaughtered a sin-offering with the intention that another, who is liable to bring an olah, should achieve atonement through it, this is not considered a change of owner; that is, this is referring to a case where the other person had already set aside an olah offering, and therefore he no longer requires atonement through a sin-offering. Here, by contrast, it is referring to a case where the other person had not set aside an olah offering, since he is presumed to be someone who is not liable for anything.

And Rava said: A sin-offering atones

also

for those liable for violating a positive commandment,

and therefore, if one slaughters it with the intention that another person should achieve atonement through it, this is considered a change to the designation of one who is liable for the same type of atonement, even if the other person requires atonement only for a positive commandment],

by means of a kal va-chomer—

If it atones for those liable for karet,

all the more so should it atone for those liable for violating a positive commandment!

We raise a difficulty:

Does this mean

that atonement for a violation of a positive commandment

“is of the same category”

as atonement through a sin-offering

? [And therefore, even if he changes the designation from his own sin-offering’s atonement to the atonement of another for a violation of a positive commandment, this is considered a change of owner]?

And didn’t Rava say:

A sin-offering that one slaughtered with the intention that

he should achieve atonement through it for

one

who is someone else

who is liable for a sin-offering

like him—

is invalid because of a change of owner. But if he slaughtered it

with the intention of atoning

for one who is liable to bring an olah—

it is valid,

because this is not a change of owner, since the other person is not eligible to achieve atonement through this sin-offering.

It is evident that Rava maintains that atonement for a positive commandment is not of the same category as the obligation of a sin-offering, since the person is liable to bring an olah because he violated a positive commandment, and nevertheless he is called one who is not liable like him, because a sin-offering does not atone for a positive commandment.