Zevachim 77b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rav Huna said:

What are we dealing with here? With an animal possessing a defect

of cataracts in the eye,

which has a blemish in the eye that is not so conspicuous. Such a defect disqualifies only animals but not birds, since nothing disqualifies a bird except the loss of a limb; and here this is not the loss of a limb, but only a blemish in the eye,

and in accordance with Rabbi Akiva,

who said:

If they ascended

animals possessing defects such as the defect of “cataracts in the eye” onto the altar, again

they do not descend

from it. Since such a defect does not disqualify birds, then with regard to animals, if he transgressed and brought them up, the altar rendered them fit to be offered upon it.

And we object:

Say that Rabbi Akiva said

that the altar rendered them fit to be offered where

after the fact,

when he transgressed and brought them up. But

with regard to ab initio, did Rabbi Akiva say

that he is permitted to bring animals possessing defects of cataracts in the eye onto the altar?!

Rav Pappa said: What are we dealing with here? For example, when they ascended

first

onto the ramp,

and whoever did this did so in transgression. But now, after they were brought up, after the fact, onto the ramp, it is permitted ab initio to bring them up from the ramp to the altar. And this is what the tanna of the beraita is discussing, because we hold that just as the altar sanctifies the disqualified offerings [and below it will be explained which disqualified offerings] and renders them fit to be offered upon the altar, so too the ramp sanctifies and renders fit [those same disqualified offerings that the altar sanctifies]. And once they were rendered fit to be offered upon the ramp, it is again permitted ab initio to bring them up from the ramp to the altar.

And we challenge:

If so,

that it is dealing with a case in which they were brought up after the fact onto the ramp, and therefore it is permitted ab initio to bring them up from the ramp to the altar because they were rendered fit for offering by their being brought up onto the ramp, why is it permitted to bring them up only when they became mixed with the limbs of a valid burnt-offering? Behold,

even

if the limbs of the animal with cataracts in the eye were brought up when they were

as they were [and not in a mixture] onto the ramp, it would also be permitted ab initio to bring them up from the ramp to the altar?!

[and not as part of a mixture], it should likewise be permitted initially to raise them from the ramp to the altar!?

Rather, the reason of Rabbi Eliezer

who permitted bringing up the limbs of an animal with a defect that became mixed with the limbs of a valid burnt-offering is because

the Torah excluded

that there is a prohibition against bringing up the limbs of animals possessing defects only when they are by themselves, and not when they are in a mixture with valid limbs. As it is stated:

“ A defect is in them.”

And we expound: only when

“a defect is in them,”

when they are by themselves,

is it that they shall not be accepted. But through a mixture

with the limbs of unblemished animals,

they shall be accepted.

And the Rabbis

expound this verse as follows:

When a defect is in them, it is that they shall not be accepted; but when their defect has passed—

they shall be accepted!

And we do not say that they were rejected from offering forever because they had possessed a defect.

And Rabbi Eliezer,

from where does he derive that it is permitted to bring up an animal that had formerly possessed a defect, and that we do not say that it was rejected forever?

He expounds it from what is written: “For their corruption

is in them,

a defect

is in them, they shall not be accepted.” “In them” and “in them” are two exclusions. From one exclusion he learns that with regard to the limbs of an animal possessing a defect that became mixed, it is permitted to bring them up; and from the other exclusion he learns that an animal whose defect passed is not rejected from offering.

And the Rabbis do not expound “in them, in them”

as two exclusions.

And we refute: Now that you have established the reason of Rabbi Eliezer, that he permitted bringing up the limbs of an animal possessing a defect that became mixed with the limbs of an unblemished burnt-offering because he learned from the exclusion of the verse that it is permitted to bring them up when they are found in a mixture with valid limbs, why did Rabbi Eliezer say: “

I regard

them above as though they were wood”?

The Torah rendered them fit

to be brought up as limbs because they are in a mixture with valid limbs; and why was it necessary for him to say, “We regard” them as though they were wood?

And we answer: Rabbi Eliezer

was speaking according to the words

of the Rabbis;

he said to them,

and this is what he said:

According to me—

the Torah rendered them fit

even when he intends to burn them. But

according to you,

since you do not expound this verse as I do,

at least concede to me

that

the meat

of an animal

possessing a defect is considered like wood, just as is the case with the meat of a sin-offering,

for you concede to me that if it became mixed with the meat of a burnt-offering, it is offered as wood [for this is the position of the tanna of the beraita who disagrees with the tanna of the Mishna].

And we explain:

And the Rabbis,

what is their response to Rabbi Eliezer’s argument?

Here,

the limbs of an animal possessing a defect,

are repulsive

to bring up onto the altar, even as wood. But

there,

the limbs of a sin-offering that became mixed with the limbs of a burnt-offering

are not repulsive.

The limbs of the sin-offering are not repulsive to offer them as wood.

Mishna:

The limbs

of many valid burnt-offerings that became mixed

with a limb

of one

blemished

burnt-offering—for by Torah law, one among two is nullified, and it is permitted by Torah law to offer all of them, but the Sages decreed and were stringent to prohibit the entire mixture—

Rabbi Eliezer says: If

after the fact,

the head of

one

of them

was offered,

from now

all the heads

in the mixture may be offered ab initio. For the Sages were lenient regarding the stringency with which they had been stringent to prohibit the entire mixture, and said that if it is possible to suspend and say that the prohibition has already separated from the mixture, even if this is a suspension based on a remote possibility, the entire mixture is permitted. Therefore, here we suspend, with regard to the heads in the mixture, that the head which was offered after the fact was the head of the blemished animal, and the other heads are the heads of the valid animals.

And likewise, if after the fact

the legs of one of them

were offered,

from now

all the legs

may be offered ab initio, because one may suspend and say that the legs which were offered first are the legs of the blemished animal.

And the Sages say: Even if all of them were offered,

all the heads or all the legs,

except for one of them,

even so, we do not suspend and say that among those heads and legs there was the head and the legs of the blemished animal; rather, we are concerned that the last limb belongs to the blemished animal. For the Sages did not permit the mixture, which they had been stringent to prohibit, through a suspension, except that even that one which remained from the entire mixture

goes out to the place of burning,

like the law of all the limbs of the mixture.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Eliezer rendered fit only

when one of the heads was offered after the fact,

but

to take

two by two

heads [or legs] and burn them together, so that there should be an additional side of permission, besides the suspension that the first head offered after the fact was the head of the blemished animal; and this is the permission of “migo,” whereby we say regarding each and every head within the pair of heads: “Since its fellow is permitted, it too is permitted.” “

Migo” is based on this: if we say that one head of the pair is prohibited, then necessarily its fellow is permitted. And since we permitted its fellow, we also permit it, for how can we prohibit it more than its fellow?

And this “migo” is not on account of reasoning, but is a particular form of permission, by which it is possible to be lenient regarding the stringency with which the Sages were stringent to prohibit the entire mixture, on the basis of such a claim of migo. And such a form joins the “suspension,” that we suspend that the prohibition was in what had already separated from the mixture at the outset.

But to offer the heads or the legs

one by one, it was not

permitted

by Rabbi Eliezer. For if he offers each head individually, there is no side of “migo,” which says: Since the other is permitted, this one too is permitted.

Rabbi Yaakov raised an objection to Rabbi Yirmeya

from what we learned in the Mishna:

“And the Sages say: Even if all of them were offered except for one of them, it goes out to the place of burning.”

And from here you learn that Rabbi Eliezer, who disagrees with them, holds that that one may indeed be offered; yet it does not have the “migo” of a pair?!

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him

to Rabbi Yaakov:

Bar Taḥlifa

[the name of an amora]

I shall explain to you: What is the one

that remained about which Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree?

One pair

of two heads or two legs, for only in this way does Rabbi Eliezer disagree and permit burning them together.

Mishna:

a.

The blood

of offerings that is destined to be sprinkled on the altar

which became mixed with water—

if it has

in the blood mixed with the water

the appearance of blood,

then it is

valid

for sprinkling. But if its appearance changed as a result of the water mixed with it, and the appearance of the blood is not discernible, it is disqualified.

b. And if the blood

became mixed

with blood

with wine,

whose color is red like the color of blood, and the appearance of the blood is not discernible in it—

we regard it,

the wine,

as though it were water,

and estimate whether, if blood had become mixed with such a measure of water, the appearance of the blood would have been discernible in the mixture of the blood and the water or not.

c.

Blood

of the offering became mixed

with the blood of an animal

of non-sacred [animals],

or with the blood of a wild animal,

which is not offered on the altar—

we regard it,

the blood of the animal or wild animal,

as though it were water,

and estimate whether the appearance of the blood would have been discernible in such a measure of water.