Zevachim 77b (עז:) — the Talmud in English

And we explain:

Rav Huna said:

Here we are dealing with an animal possessing a blemish

of a blemish in the eye,

meaning that it has a defect in the eye that is not particularly noticeable. Such a blemish disqualifies only animals, but not birds, since nothing disqualifies a bird except the loss of a limb; here, however, this is not the loss of a limb, but only a defect in the eye,

and in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva,

who said:

If they ascended,

if animals possessing a blemish such as a blemish in the eye ascended onto the altar, then

they do not descend

from it. Since such a blemish does not disqualify birds, in the case of animals, if one transgressed and placed them on the altar, the altar renders them fit to be offered upon it.

And we challenge this:

Say that Rabbi Akiva said

that the altar renders them fit to be offered in a case

where one acted after the fact,

meaning that he transgressed and placed them upon it. But

did Rabbi Akiva say

that, initially, one is permitted to place animals possessing a blemish in the eye upon the altar!?

Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with a case in which they ascended

initially

onto the ramp,

and whoever did so acted in violation of a prohibition. But now, after they have been placed, after the fact, on the ramp, it is permitted initially to raise them from the ramp to the altar. This is the case discussed by the tanna of the beraita, because we maintain that just as the altar sanctifies disqualified offerings [and below it will be explained which disqualified offerings are meant] and renders them fit to be offered upon the altar, so too the ramp sanctifies and renders fit [those same disqualified offerings that the altar sanctifies]. Once they have been rendered fit to be offered upon the ramp, it is again permitted initially to raise them from the ramp to the altar.

And we question this:

If so,

if the case is one in which they were placed, after the fact, on the ramp, and it is for that reason permitted initially to raise them from the ramp to the altar, because they were rendered fit for offering by being placed on the ramp, why is it permitted to raise them only when they became mixed with the limbs of a valid burnt-offering?

Even

if the limbs of the animal with a blemish in the eye were placed on the ramp while they were

as they were

[and not as part of a mixture], it should likewise be permitted initially to raise them from the ramp to the altar!?

Rather, the reason for Rabbi Eliezer's

permission to raise the limbs of an animal with a blemish that became mixed with the limbs of a valid burnt-offering is that

the Torah excluded

the prohibition against raising the limbs of animals with blemishes as applying only when they are by themselves, and not when they are mixed with valid limbs. As it is stated:

“

a blemish is in them.” And we expound: Only when

a blemish is in them,

when they are by themselves,

is it the case that they shall not be accepted. But when they are present through a mixture

with the limbs of unblemished animals,

they shall be accepted.

And the Rabbis

interpret this verse as follows:

When a blemish is in them, it is the case that they shall not be accepted; but when their blemish has passed—

they shall be accepted!

We do not say that they are permanently rejected from being offered because they had once possessed a blemish.

And Rabbi Eliezer,

from where does he derive that it is permitted to raise an animal that had previously possessed a blemish, and that we do not say that it is permanently rejected?

He derives it from what is written: “For their corruption is

in them, a

blemish is

in them, they shall not be accepted.” The expressions “in them” and “in them” constitute two exclusions. From one exclusion he learned that it is permitted to raise the limbs of an animal with a blemish when they became mixed with other limbs, and from the other exclusion he learned that an animal whose blemish passed is not rejected from being offered.

And the Rabbis do not interpret “in them” and “in them”

as two exclusions.

And we refute this: Now that you have established the reason for Rabbi Eliezer's opinion—that he permitted raising the limbs of an animal with a blemish when they became mixed with the limbs of an unblemished burnt-offering because he derived from an exclusion in the verse that it is permitted to raise them when they are mixed with valid limbs—why did Rabbi Eliezer say: “

I regard

them above as though they were wood”?

The Torah has rendered them fit

to be raised as limbs because they are mixed with valid limbs; why, then, was it necessary to say that “we regard” them as though they were wood?

And we answer: Rabbi Eliezer

was speaking according to the statement

of the Rabbis;

he said to them,

and this is what he said:

According to me,

the Torah has rendered them fit

even when one intends to burn them. But

according to you,

since you do not interpret this verse as I do,

at least concede to me

that

the meat

of an animal

with a blemish is considered like wood, just as is the case with the meat of a sin-offering,

for you agree with me that if it became mixed with the meat of a burnt-offering, it is burned as wood [as this is the opinion of the tanna of the beraita who disagrees with the tanna of the Mishna].

And we explain:

And the Rabbis,

what is their response to Rabbi Eliezer's argument?

Here,

the limbs of an animal with a blemish

are repulsive

for placement upon the altar, even as wood. But

there,

the limbs of a sin-offering that became mixed with the limbs of a burnt-offering

are not repulsive.

The limbs of the sin-offering are not repulsive when offered as wood.

Mishna:

The limbs

of many valid burnt-offerings that became mixed

with the limb

of one

animal with a blemish,

for by Torah law one item in two is nullified, and it would be permitted by Torah law to offer them all, but the Sages issued a decree and prohibited the entire mixture—

Rabbi Eliezer says: If,

after the fact,

the head

of

one of them

was offered,

from now on

all the heads

in the mixture may initially be offered. The Sages were lenient with regard to the stringency they had imposed in prohibiting the entire mixture, and said that if it is possible to attribute the prohibited item to another source and say that it has already separated from the mixture, even if this attribution is remote, the entire mixture is permitted. Accordingly, here, with regard to the heads in the mixture, we attribute the head that was offered after the fact to the animal with the blemish, and the remaining heads to the valid animals.

And likewise, if, after the fact,

the feet of one of them

were offered,

from now on

all the feet

may initially be offered, because we can attribute the feet that were offered first to the animal with the blemish.

And the Sages say: Even if all of them were offered,

all the heads or all the feet,

except one of them,

even so, we do not attribute the matter and say that among those heads and feet there had been the head and feet of the animal with the blemish; rather, we are concerned that the last limb belongs to the animal with the blemish. The Sages permitted the mixture, which they had stringently prohibited, through such an attribution only when

it goes to the place of burning

as is the law with regard to all the limbs of the mixture.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Eliezer rendered them fit

when one of the heads was offered after the fact

only

by taking

two at a time,

heads [or feet], and burning them together, so that there would be an additional basis for permitting them besides the attribution that the first head offered after the fact was the head of the animal with the blemish. This is the basis of migo, whereby we say with regard to each head within the pair of heads: Since its fellow is permitted, it too is permitted.

This migo is based on the fact that if we say that one head of the pair is prohibited, then necessarily its fellow is permitted. And since we have permitted its fellow, we also permit this one, because how can we prohibit it more than its fellow?

This migo is not based on logical reasoning alone; rather, it is a particular form of permission, through which one may be lenient concerning the stringency that the Sages imposed in prohibiting the entire mixture, on the basis of such a claim of migo. This form of permission joins the attribution, whereby we attribute the prohibition to the item that had already separated from the mixture at the outset.

But

to offer the heads or the feet

one at a time, he did not

permit, according to Rabbi Eliezer. For when each head is offered separately, there is no basis of migo, which says: Since the other is permitted, this one too is permitted.

Rabbi Yaakov raised an objection to Rabbi Yirmeya

from what we learned in the Mishna:

And the Sages say: Even if all of them were offered except one of them, it goes to the place of burning.

From here you learn that Rabbi Eliezer, who disagrees with them, maintains that that one may indeed be offered; yet it does not have the migo of a pair!?

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him,

to Rabbi Yaakov:

Bar Taḥlifa

[the name of an amora]

I shall explain it to you: What is “one”

that Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree about, the one that remains?

One pair,

of two heads or two feet. Rabbi Eliezer disagrees only in such a case and permits burning them together.

Mishna:

1.

The blood

of sacred offerings that is to be sprinkled upon the altar

that became mixed with water—

if it contains

within the blood mixed with the water

the appearance of blood,

it is

valid

for sprinkling. But if its appearance changed as a result of the water mixed with it, and the appearance of blood is no longer discernible, it is disqualified.

2. And if

the blood

became mixed

with wine,

whose color is red like the color of blood, and the appearance of the blood is not discernible in it—

we regard it,

the wine,

as though it were water,

and estimate whether, had the blood become mixed with such a measure of water, the appearance of blood would have been discernible in the mixture of blood and water.

3.

If

the blood of the offering

became mixed with the blood of an animal

of non-sacred animals,

or with the blood of a wild animal,

which is not offered upon the altar—

we regard it,

the blood of the animal or wild animal,

as though it were water,

and estimate whether the appearance of blood would have been discernible in such a measure of water.