Zevachim 78a (עח.) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehuda says:

a species is not nullified by its own species; therefore

blood does not nullify blood,

and even if a drop of sacrificial blood became mixed in a large vessel containing unconsecrated animal blood or blood of an animal, all the mixed blood is fit for sprinkling.

d.

If

the blood of a fit sacrifice became mixed

with the blood

of

disqualified

it shall be poured

all

into the drain.

This applies even if the fit blood is the greater quantity. For although the disqualified blood is nullified [by Torah law] in the majority of fit blood, the Sages decreed that all of it must be poured out, so that people would not come to permit the mixture even when the disqualified blood is the greater quantity and there is no nullification by a majority.

And likewise, if fit blood of the soul, which is fit for sprinkling, became mixed

with the blood of exudation

[which emerges in a trickle, unlike the blood of the soul, which emerges in a flow,] which is disqualified for sprinkling,

all of it shall be poured

all the blood

into the drain,

even though the blood of the soul is the majority.

Rabbi Eliezer

is not concerned about this decree; rather, he

declares

the mixture fit for sprinkling.

e. And the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer

that if he did not consult

the priest as to whether to offer the mixed blood,

and he offered

it on the altar, it is

fit.

For according to the Sages, the blood is disqualified only by virtue of a decree; but after the fact, if he sprinkled it, it is fit.

Gemara:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: They taught

in our Mishna that a mixture containing a majority of water and a minority of blood is fit for sprinkling because of the appearance of blood in it

only

in a case

where water fell into blood,

and the water became more plentiful than the blood. In that case, because of the appearance of blood, we declare it fit for sprinkling, even though most of it is water.

But,

if

blood fell into water

[and the blood did not fall into the water all at once, but in a flow of blood into the water,] we say:

the first [drop] is nullified as it comes.

Each of the first drops, before there was enough of them to produce the appearance of blood in the water, was nullified in the majority of water. And even when, eventually, many drops join together and produce the appearance of blood in the water, the first drops that were nullified do not become reawakened and join the later drops to render the mixture fit, because they had already been rejected when there was no appearance of blood in the water; and once they were rejected from being sprinkled on the altar, they became permanently disqualified.

Rav Pappa said: But with regard to

the mitzva of

covering

the blood,

this is not so;

rather, if the blood of a wild animal or bird, which requires covering, became mixed with water [where there too the requisite measure is enough to produce the appearance of blood in the water], we do not say, “the first [drop] is nullified as it comes”; rather, it becomes reawakened, and the blood that fell first joins the blood that fell last, making it subject to the obligation of covering,

because there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot.

It is only with regard to consecrated matters that we say: Once they have been rejected once, they are rejected permanently.

Reish Lakish said: The piggul, the notar, and the impure [food]:

if one had before him three pieces of consecrated meat, each piece containing an olive-bulk, and each one was prohibited by a different prohibition,

which he mixed together,

meaning that he took two of them, for example, the piggul and the notar, or the notar and the impure piece, placed them together in his mouth, and mixed them together by chewing,

, and ate them, he is exempt

from lashes, even if they had warned him not to eat them.

The reason for this is that when a person chews two substances in his mouth,

it is impossible for one species not to become more plentiful than the other and nullify it.

For when he chews the two substances in his mouth, it is inevitable that a minority of one becomes mixed with a majority of the other, since it is impossible for the mixing to be equal during the chewing, so that one could say that in every act of chewing and eating there are two equal portions from each of the prohibited pieces. Therefore, if at the beginning of the chewing the piggul meat was the majority and the notar was the minority, the minority of notar is nullified by the majority of piggul, and thereby the minority of notar joins the piggul and becomes like it. From that point, there is a majority of piggul in his mouth [since the minority of notar has itself become piggul after being nullified in the majority], and consequently there is no olive-bulk of notar.

Conversely, if at the beginning of the chewing the notar was the majority and the piggul was the minority, the minority of piggul is nullified by the majority of notar, and thereby the minority of piggul joins the notar. Consequently, there is no olive-bulk of piggul.

If so, it is uncertain whether he is liable for eating the two olive-bulks on account of notar or on account of piggul, and therefore he is not flogged. And we say:

Infer

from Reish Lakish’s statement

three [principles]:

a.

Infer —

prohibitions can nullify one another.

It is not said that only a permitted substance has the power to nullify a prohibited substance, for here one prohibition nullifies another.

b. And infer,

the imparting of flavor in a majority

is not a Torah prohibition.

That is, the principle found in the laws of “nullification by a majority,” that if the prohibited substance imparts flavor to the majority it is not nullified, is not a Torah law, but only a stringency enacted by the Sages. For when the piggul and the notar are mixed, for example, when one was the remnants of a meal-offering and the other was meat, their flavors are discernible in one another. Why, then, are they nullified in the majority, if we say that anything whose flavor is discernible is not nullified in a majority by Torah law? Rather, it is proven from here that even a minority whose flavor is discernible in the majority is nullified by Torah law; and what we find that is not nullified is so only by rabbinic law.

c.

And infer —

a doubtful warning is not considered a warning.

For it was explained that here, in either event, one of the prohibited pieces constitutes the majority at the time of eating, while the other is the minority. Why, then, is he not flogged at all for eating them, even for one of them? Rather, it is proven from here that at the time of the warning one must know which prohibited piece he is transgressing with—whether notar or piggul. Since, at the time he eats, it is unknown which piece is the majority of the prohibition and which is the minority, whose prohibition is nullified, the warning is a doubtful warning, and is not considered a warning.

Rava raised an objection

to Reish Lakish’s second ruling—that imparted flavor is not prohibited by Torah law—from that which we learned in tractate Hallah [3:7]:

If one made dough from wheat and from rice —

if it contains

in the dough

the flavor of grain,

it is obligated

in hallah.

And Rava infers:

And although the majority

of the dough is

rice,

which is not subject to the obligation of separating hallah, the dough is nevertheless subject to the obligation of hallah. This proves that the grain flavor in the rice gives the rice the status of food subject to the obligation of separating hallah. On the surface, this obligation appears to be by Torah law, which presents a difficulty to Reish Lakish, since his statement implies that imparted flavor in a majority is not a Torah law.

And we answer: In fact, the obligation to separate hallah from rice dough that contains the flavor of grain is only

rabbinic.

And we challenge this: Can you really say that the law of imparted flavor is only rabbinic? But

if so, read the latter clause: And one may fulfill with it

by eating matza baked from that dough

his obligation on Passover.

This proves that the Mishna is discussing a Torah law and not a rabbinic one!?