Zevachim 78a — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Judah says:

a kind with its own kind is not nullified; therefore

blood does not nullify blood,

and even if a drop of sacrificial blood became mixed in a large vessel of unconsecrated blood or animal blood, all the mixed blood is fit for sprinkling.

d.

If sacrificial

fit blood

became mixed with

the blood of

disqualified

it shall be poured

all

into the channel.

Even if the fit blood is the greater quantity. For although the disqualified blood is nullified [according to Torah law] in the majority of the fit blood, the Sages decreed that all of it be poured out, so that people would not come to permit it even when the disqualified blood would be the greater quantity and there would be no nullification by the majority.

And likewise, if fit blood of the life-blood, fit for sprinkling, became mixed

with the blood of the dregs

[which emerges by trickling, and not like the life-blood, which emerges in a stream,] which is disqualified for sprinkling,

it shall be poured

all the blood

into the channel,

even though the life-blood is the majority.

Rabbi Eliezer

does not heed this decree, but

deems

the mixture fit for sprinkling.

e. And the Sages concede to Rabbi Eliezer

that if he did not deliberate

whether the priest should give the blood of the mixture,

and he gave

it upon the altar, it is

fit.

For according to the Sages, the entire disqualification of the blood is only because of a decree; but after the fact, if he sprinkled it, it is fit.

Gemara:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: They taught

in our Mishna that a mixture containing a majority of water and a minority of blood is fit for sprinkling because of the appearance of blood in it,

but

only in a case

where water fell into blood,

and the water became more numerous than the blood, in which case, because of the appearance of blood, we deem it fit for sprinkling upon the altar despite the fact that most of it is water.

But,

if

blood fell into water

[and the blood did not fall into the water all at once, but rather in a stream of blood into the water,] we say:

the first one is nullified first.

For each and every drop of the first drops, before there was in them a measure sufficient to give the water the appearance of blood, is nullified in the majority of the water. And even when, ultimately, when many drops join together, they give the water the appearance of blood, the first drops that were nullified do not return and become awakened to join in making it fit, because they had already been rejected when there was no appearance of blood in the water; and once they had been rejected one time from being sprinkled upon the altar, they are disqualified forever.

Rav Pappa said: And concerning

the mitzva of

covering

the blood,

it is not so,

but if the blood of a wild animal or bird, which requires covering, became mixed within water [where there too its measure is sufficient to give the water the appearance of blood], we do not say, “the first one is nullified first,” but it becomes awakened and the blood that fell first joins the blood that fell at the end, so as to make it liable for covering,

because there is no rejection with regard to mitzvot.

But with regard to consecrated things we say: Since they were rejected one time, they are rejected forever.

Reish Lakish said: The piggul, the notar, and the impure,

one who had before him three pieces of consecrated meat, each piece containing a measure of an olive-bulk, and each one was forbidden by a different prohibition,

which he mixed together,

for he took two of them, such as the piggul and the notar, or the notar and the impure, and put them together into his mouth, and by his chewing he mixed them together

, and ate them, he is exempt

from lashes, even if they warned him not to eat them.

And the reason for the matter is that when a person chews two things in his mouth,

it is impossible that one kind will not become greater than the other and nullify it.

For when he chews the two things in his mouth, it is necessarily the case that a minority of one is mixed into the majority of the other, because it is impossible that their mixing should be equal during the chewing, so that we would say that in every chewing and eating there are two equal parts from each of the forbidden pieces. Therefore, if at the beginning of the chewing the piggul meat was the majority and the notar was the minority, the minority of the notar is nullified in the majority of the piggul, and thereby the minority of the notar joins the piggul to become like it. And now there is in his mouth a majority of piggul [for the minority of the notar also became piggul, after it was nullified in the majority], and it follows that there is no olive-bulk of notar.

Conversely, if at the beginning of the chewing the notar was the majority and the piggul was the minority, the minority of the piggul is nullified in the majority of the notar, and thereby the minority of the piggul joins the notar, and it follows that there is no olive-bulk of piggul.

And if so, it is uncertain whether he is liable for eating the two olive-bulks on account of notar or on account of piggul, and therefore he does not receive lashes. And we say:

Infer from here

from the words of Reish Lakish

three:

a.

Infer from here —

prohibitions nullify one another.

And we do not say that only a permitted thing has the power to nullify a forbidden thing. For here one prohibition nullifies another.

b. And infer from here,

a thing that gives flavor in the majority,

is not of Torah law

that is, the principle found in the laws of “nullification by the majority,” that if the prohibition gives flavor to the majority, it is not nullified, is not a law from the Torah but only a stringency instituted by the Sages. For when the piggul and the notar are mixed, such as when one of them was remnants of a meal-offering and the other was meat, their flavors are discernible in one another; and why are they nullified in the majority, if we say that anything whose flavor is discernible is not nullified in the majority by Torah law? Rather, from here it is proven that even a minority thing whose flavor is discernible in the majority is nullified by Torah law, and what we find that it is not nullified is only by rabbinic law.

c.

And infer from here —

a doubtful warning is not called a warning.

For it was explained that here, in either event, one of the pieces of prohibition constitutes the majority at the time of the eating, and the other is the minority. And why does he not receive lashes at all for eating them, even for one of them? Rather, it is proven from here that at the time of the warning one must know which piece of prohibition he is transgressing with, notar or piggul. And since it is not known at the time he eats what the majority piece of the prohibition is and what the minority is, whose prohibition is nullified, the warning is a doubtful warning, and it is not called a warning.

Rava raised an objection

against the second law of Reish Lakish, that a thing that gives flavor is not forbidden by Torah law, from that which we learned in tractate Challa [3:7]:

If one made dough from wheat and from rice —

if it has

in the dough

the flavor of grain,

it is liable

for challa.

And Rava infers:

And even though the majority

of the dough is

rice,

which is not liable for the separation of challa, the dough is liable for challa. And it is proven that the giving of the flavor of grain into rice gives the rice the status of liability for the separation of challa. And in the straightforward understanding, it is implied that the liability is by Torah law, and this is difficult for Reish Lakish, for it is implied from him that giving flavor into the majority is not by Torah law.

And we answer: In truth, the obligation to separate challa from rice dough that has the flavor of grain is only

rabbinic.

And we challenge: Can you really say that the law of a thing that gives flavor is only rabbinic? But

if so, say the latter clause: And a person may fulfill through it

by eating matza baked from that dough,

his obligation on Passover.

And it is proven that the Mishna is speaking of a Torah-law matter and not of a rabbinic matter!?