Zevachim 74a (עד.) — the Talmud in English

And we learned

later, in our chapter: The limbs of valid burnt-offerings that became mixed with the limbs of a blemished burnt-offering, which may not be sacrificed,

Rabbi Eliezer says:

Initially, it is prohibited to sacrifice any of the limbs in the mixture. However,

if

after the fact,

the head of one of them has already been sacrificed—

all

from then on

the heads

may be sacrificed.

The reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s ruling is that, by Torah law, the disqualified item is nullified in the majority of valid items. The Sages, however, imposed a stringency with regard to such a mixture, ruling that the principle of nullification by a majority does not apply to it. On the other hand, the Sages also imposed a leniency: If there is a basis to “attribute” the matter and say that the prohibited item is no longer present in the mixture—for example, one head has already been sacrificed, in which case it is possible to attribute and say that it was the blemished head—then, although it remains uncertain whether it was the valid or the blemished one, telinan, we attribute it to the blemished one. The principle of nullification by a majority is then restored to its Torah status, that “one in two is nullified,” and all the heads are permitted to be sacrificed.

The Gemara answers: Rava follows the Sages, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and uphold the principle of permanent disqualification. Therefore, even disqualification caused by a mixture containing a prohibited item is considered permanent disqualification.

But

he,

Rabbi Eliezer, who said that if the head was offered all of them may be offered, held this way because

he followed the opinion of Hanan the Egyptian,

who holds that even slaughtered offerings are not permanently disqualified, as we find concerning the goats of Yom Kippur.

The two goats of Yom Kippur—the first being the inner goat, whose blood is sprinkled in the innermost area of the Sanctuary, and the second being the goat sent to the wilderness—are considered a “pair,” with each one preventing the other from fulfilling its function. That is, if one of them is missing, the service cannot be performed with the other.

As it was taught in a beraita: Hanan the Egyptian says:

If it happened that the goat sent away died,

even

if it died after the inner goat had already been slaughtered and its

blood

had already been collected

in a vessel,

the inner goat is not permanently disqualified from being offered because its partner is missing.

Rather, he brings its partner,

another goat,

and pairs it

with the inner goat as its partner, in the role of the goat sent away. He then sprinkles the blood of the inner goat, which had already been collected in the vessel, and offers its portions burned on the altar.

We do not say: Since the inner goat was disqualified from being offered when the goat sent away died, it is permanently disqualified.

It is therefore demonstrated that Hanan the Egyptian holds that even offerings disqualified from being offered after they had been slaughtered are not permanently disqualified. Rabbi Eliezer follows his opinion.

Rav Naḥman said in the name of Rabba bar Avuha, who said in the name of Rav: A ring

an ornament

of idolatry,

which is not nullified by a majority, because the Sages decreed that an object of idolatry is not nullified even in a mixture of one against a thousand,

that became mixed with one hundred rings,

thereby rendering the entire mixture prohibited,

and one of them fell into the Great Sea,

and we do not know whether the ring that fell into the sea was a permitted ring or a ring of idolatry—

the rings

that remain are

all permitted.

By Torah law, “one among two is nullified.” The Sages imposed a stringency concerning idolatry, ruling that it is not nullified by a majority. Conversely, they were lenient when there is room to attribute the matter and say that the idolatry is no longer present in the mixture—for example, when there is reason to say that the ring of idolatry is the one that fell into the sea and is no longer among the rings. Although this is a remote attribution, since there is only a one-in-one-hundred chance that the ring that fell was the ring of idolatry, the Sages nevertheless did not prohibit the mixture in such a case. Rather, they restored it to its Torah-law status, according to which one among two is nullified,

as we say: This

ring

that fell

into the sea is the ring

of the prohibited item

that

fell.

All the rings that remain are therefore the permitted rings.

Rabba raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

We learned in our Mishna that if a disqualified animal became mixed with valid offerings,

even

one

single

disqualified animal that became mixed

with ten thousand

valid offerings—

they must all die.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: Before the first head was sacrificed, all the heads had been disqualified from sacrifice, and this disqualification occurred when they were already slaughtered. Nevertheless, we do not say that disqualification while they are slaughtered disqualifies them forever. Rather, we say that once the first head has been sacrificed, all of them become fit for sacrifice. If so, why did Rava say that if a disqualified animal became mixed with valid offerings and the valid offerings were subsequently identified, they are nevertheless disqualified forever, and if one sacrifices them they do not effect acceptance!?

According to your explanation, this is difficult:

Why

must they all die? Why do we not

say that once the first animal among all the animals in the mixture dies, there is reason to attribute the matter and say that

the animal

that died

was the

prohibited animal that

died, and all the others may be offered?

—

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rava:

Rav—who permitted the rings after one fell into the sea—did so because

he

followed the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer.

As we learned: Rabbi Eliezer says,

If the limbs of a blemished burnt offering became mixed with the limbs of valid burnt offerings, then

if

after the fact

the head

of

one of them was offered, all the heads may all be offered.

This is because we attribute the matter and say that the head that was offered was the blemished head. The same applies to a ring of idolatry: We attribute the matter and say that the ring that fell was the prohibited ring. The Mishna, however, which says that if a disqualified animal became mixed with valid offerings they must all die, and that they are not permitted after the first animal dies, follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and do not accept such an attribution.

But Rava raised an objection to Rav Naḥman:

Is that so? Didn’t Rabbi Elazar say: Rabbi Eliezer permitted offering all the heads

one by one—[the heads remaining after the first head was offered]—

only two at a time?

But

The reason is that an additional “side of permissibility” is needed in order to permit nullification by a majority. Therefore, the two heads must be offered specifically together. In that case, concerning each head we say: If you were to prohibit it, you would be determining that it is the prohibited one; if so, its partner must necessarily be the permitted one. Since its partner is offered, this one too may be offered. This “statement” has no basis in the law itself; rather, in such a manner the Sages relaxed the stringency they imposed against nullification by a majority, in cases where such a statement can be made.

But

to offer them

one by one, Rabbi Eliezer did not

permit.

If so, here too, when one ring fell from the mixture, this is difficult: Why did Rav permit using each of the rings separately? Why did he not require using two rings together, just as Rabbi Eliezer required two heads to be offered together?

He said to him,

Rav Naḥman said to Rava:

I too was speaking of two at a time.

The rings were not permitted for benefit from each ring separately. Rather, the rings must be sold two at a time, so that one can “say” concerning each ring in the pair: Just as the second one is permitted, so too this one is permitted.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: If a ring of idolatry became mixed with one hundred rings

of permitted items,

and forty

rings separated from the mixture

to one place, and sixty to another place,

and afterward

one separated from the forty

rings and became mixed with other permitted rings,

it does not prohibit

the rings with which it became mixed, as the Gemara will explain.

But if

one ring separated

from

the sixty

rings [after they had separated from the one hundred] and the separated ring became mixed with permitted rings, it

prohibits

all the rings with which it became mixed.

The Gemara discusses Rav’s statement:

What is different

if

one

of the forty rings

did not

prohibit the mixture into which it entered? It is because

we say that the prohibited item,

that is, the ring of idolatry that became mixed with the one hundred when they were all together,

is present among the majority.

We attribute the matter and say that the prohibited ring is among the sixty rings, which are the majority relative to the forty. [This attribution applies only after one ring separated from the forty. But when the forty themselves separated, they were not permitted on the basis of the attribution that “the prohibited item is among the majority.”]

If so, when

one ring separated from

among

the sixty as well [after all sixty had separated to another place], why does it prohibit the mixture into which it entered? Why do we not attribute the matter and

say, “the prohibited item is among the majority,”

meaning that the prohibited ring remained among the fifty-nine, while the one that separated was a permitted ring?

Rather, say that

this is what Rav said:

Forty separated

rings from the one hundred, and the forty rings separated

all to one place,

where they became mixed with other rings;

they do not prohibit

their mixture, because we say, “the prohibited item is among the majority,” and the prohibited ring remained among the sixty that remained. But if

sixty

rings separated from the one hundred

to one place,

and became mixed with other rings, they

prohibit

their mixture.

There is no longer a difficulty concerning one ring that separated, because according to this explanation of Rav’s statement, we find no distinction between a ring that separated from the forty and one that separated from the sixty.

And Rav Yehuda said:

When I stated

Rav’s ruling—that forty rings that separated and became mixed with other rings do not prohibit their mixture—

before Shmuel, he said to me,

Shmuel said to me:

Leave idolatry alone,

meaning, do not be lenient or permit it, even in a case of a compound uncertainty. For the ring first became mixed with one hundred permitted rings, and afterward forty separated and became mixed with other rings, yet one may not be lenient. The law of idolatry is especially stringent,

as its uncertainty and even a compound uncertainty remain prohibited forever.

Therefore, its mixture and any further mixture into which that mixture enters remain prohibited forever.

They raise an objection from a source to Shmuel,

from what we learned:

An uncertain object of idolatry is prohibited.

But

a compound uncertainty is permitted.

What are the circumstances? A cup of idolatry that fell into a storehouse full of cups—

he,

all of them are prohibited.

If one of them separated

from the cups into which the cup of idolatry had become mixed, and that cup became mixed with other cups—even if it became mixed

with ten thousand

permitted cups—they are all prohibited. [This is still called an “uncertain object of idolatry,” rather than a “compound uncertainty,” because the first mixture, in which the prohibited object is

certainly

present, is considered like the prohibited object itself and not like an uncertainty concerning it. Only when one cup separates from that mixture and becomes mixed with other cups is it uncertain whether the prohibited object itself is present in the new mixture; that mixture is then considered an “uncertain object of idolatry.”]

But if afterward one separated

from the ten thousand to

a mixture of

ten thousand

permitted cups, all of them are

permitted.

Rabbi Eliezer, who said that if the head was sacrificed all of them may be sacrificed, held this way because

It is demonstrated that the tanna of the beraita held that a compound uncertainty is permitted even in the case of idolatry. This is difficult for Shmuel, who prohibited it even through mixtures extending to the end of the world!

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult for Shmuel, because

it is a dispute between Tannaitic authorities;

the Tannaim disagree about this matter:

As it was taught in a beraita: Badan pomegranates

that were prohibited because of the prohibition of fruit from the first three years of a tree or because of teruma are not nullified by a majority, because they are one of the six types of significant items that are not nullified, as explained earlier. Therefore, they

prohibit

their mixture

even in any quantity.

What are the circumstances?—

he ruled in accordance with Hanan the Egyptian,

If one of them fell into ten thousand

permitted Badan pomegranates,

and

one separated

from the ten thousand to

a mixture of

ten thousand

other permitted pomegranates, all of them are

prohibited.

who maintains that even slaughtered offerings are not permanently disqualified, as we find with regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur.

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon:

If prohibited Badan pomegranates became mixed

with

a

ten thousand

permitted pomegranates, all of them are

prohibited.

But

if one separated

from the ten thousand to

a mixture of

three

Badan pomegranates [the pomegranate that separated from the ten thousand, together with the two pomegranates with which it became mixed]

and

afterward one separated from the

three to another place, it is permitted

to eat the one that separated. The pomegranates from which it separated are also permitted, because this is a compound uncertainty.

Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning is as stated earlier: Any mixture in which the prohibited item itself is certainly present is not considered an “uncertain prohibition”; rather, its status is that of a certain prohibition. Only the second mixture, which contains an item that separated from the first mixture, is considered an uncertainty, since we do not know with certainty that the prohibited item itself is mixed into it. If one item separated from the second mixture and became mixed into a third mixture, the third mixture is a “compound uncertainty.” Therefore, the item that separated from it is permitted to eat, and the third mixture itself becomes permitted when that item separates, since from that point there is reason to attribute the prohibited item to the item that separated.

Therefore, Shmuel correctly said that idolatry has no possibility of becoming permitted even to the end of the world, because he follows Rabbi Yehuda, who said that even if an item separated from a mixture of ten thousand into another mixture of ten thousand, all of them are prohibited. The stringency of idolatry, which is not nullified, is like the stringency of Badan nuts, which are not nullified.

But the Gemara still discusses Shmuel, who said, “Leave idolatry alone, as its uncertainty and compound uncertainty remain prohibited forever”:

Shmuel—

The two goats of Yom Kippur—the first being the goat whose blood is sprinkled within and before the innermost chamber, and the second being the goat sent to the wilderness—are considered a “pair,” with each one “preventing” the other from being used. That is, if one of them is absent, the service cannot be performed with the other.

whose opinion does he follow?

If he follows Rabbi Yehuda,

why did he say, “Leave idolatry alone”?

Rabbi Yehuda also prohibits even in the case of other prohibitions,

because he holds that a significant item that is not nullified remains prohibited to the end of the world!

If

Shmuel holds

like Rabbi Shimon,

this too is difficult, because

Rabbi Shimon permits even in the case of idolatry a compound uncertainty, just as he permits it in the case of a significant item!

a compound uncertainty, just as with a significant item!?

And if you would say—

perhaps you would say that we have not found an explicit statement by Rabbi Shimon that a compound uncertainty is permitted in the case of idolatry, and we should say,

Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between idolatry and other prohibitions,

holding that a compound uncertainty is prohibited in the case of idolatry, and Shmuel follows Rabbi Shimon—this is still difficult:

But there is the teaching: An uncertain object of idolatry is prohibited, but a compound uncertainty is permitted.

As it was taught: Hanan the Egyptian says:

Who is

the tanna of this beraita?

It is neither Rabbi Yehuda,

who prohibits even a compound uncertainty,

nor Rabbi Shimon.

For we said that he is stringent concerning idolatry and holds the same way concerning it as Rabbi Yehuda!

The Gemara answers:

Actually,

this beraita is according to

Rabbi Shimon,

and Rabbi Shimon holds that a compound uncertainty is permitted both in the case of idolatry and in the case of other prohibitions.

And Shmuel—

If it happened that the goat sent away died,

he agrees with Rabbi Yehuda in one matter,

concerning the law of idolatry, where one must be stringent and prohibit a compound uncertainty forever.

But he disagrees with him in one matter:

Concerning other prohibitions, one need not be stringent; rather, a compound uncertainty is permitted.

The Master said:

Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Prohibited Badan pomegranates that fell into ten thousand permitted pomegranates—all of them are prohibited.

And if they fell

from the ten thousand into three, and from the three

one fell

to another place,

it is

permitted.

even

if it died after the goat that was brought within had already been slaughtered and the blood of the goat brought within had already been received in a cup, the goat brought within is not permanently disqualified from sacrifice because its partner is absent. Rather, he brings its partner, another goat, and pairs it with the goat brought within as its partner, as the goat sent away. He then sprinkles the blood of the goat brought within, which had already been received in the cup, and sacrifices its sacrificial portions. And we do not say: Since the goat brought within was disqualified from sacrifice when the goat sent away died, it is disqualified forever. It is therefore demonstrated that Hanan the Egyptian maintains that even offerings disqualified from sacrifice while already slaughtered are not permanently disqualified. Rabbi Eliezer holds in accordance with him. Rav Naḥman said that Rabba bar Avuha said that Rav said: A ring an ornament of idolatry, which is not nullified by a majority, because the Sages decreed that an object of idolatry is not nullified even in a thousand, that became mixed with one hundred rings, thereby rendering the entire mixture prohibited, and one of them fell into the Great Sea, and we do not know whether the ring that fell into the sea was a permitted one or one of idolatry— the rings are permitted, the entire rings. By Torah law, “one in two is nullified.” The Sages imposed a stringency with regard to idolatry, ruling that it is not nullified by a majority. Accordingly, they imposed a corresponding leniency when there is room to attribute the matter and say that the idolatrous object is no longer present in the mixture—for example, when there is room to say that the idolatrous ring is the one that fell into the sea and is no longer among the rings. Although this is a remote attribution, since there is only a one-in-one-hundred chance that the ring that fell was the idolatrous one, nevertheless, in such a case the Sages did not prohibit the mixture. Rather, they restored it to its Torah status, that one in two is nullified. For we say: This ring that fell into the sea, it is the prohibited ring that fell. All the rings that remain are the permitted rings. Rabba raised an objection to Rav Naḥman: We learned in our Mishna that if a disqualified animal became mixed with valid offerings, even one single disqualified animal that became mixed with ten thousand valid offerings— they must all die. But according to your statement, a difficulty arises: Why must they all die? Why should we not say that once the first animal among all the animals in the mixture dies, there is room to attribute the matter and say that this one that died, that animal which died, is the prohibited animal that died, and all the others may be sacrificed!? He said to him, Rav Naḥman said to Rava: Rav, who permitted the rings when one fell into the sea, did so because he ruled in accordance with Rabbi Eliezer. As we learned: Rabbi Eliezer says, If the limbs of a blemished burnt-offering became mixed with the limbs of valid burnt-offerings, if after the fact the head of one of them was sacrificed, all the heads may be sacrificed. For we “attribute” the matter and say that the head that was sacrificed was the disqualified head. The same applies to an idolatrous ring: We attribute the matter and say that the ring that fell was the prohibited ring. Our Mishna, however, which says that if a disqualified animal became mixed with valid offerings they must all die, and they are not permitted after the first one dies, follows the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Eliezer and do not maintain that such an attribution applies. Rava nevertheless raised a difficulty to Rav Naḥman: Is that so? But Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Eliezer did not permit sacrificing all the remaining heads, one by one, but two by two. The reason is that an additional “side of permissibility” is required in order to permit nullification by a majority: The two heads must be sacrificed specifically together. In that manner, with regard to each of the heads, we can “say”: If you maintain that it is prohibited, you are thereby determining that it is the prohibited one, and consequently its fellow must be the permitted one. Since its fellow is sacrificed, this one may also be sacrificed. This “statement,” however, has no basis in the fundamental law; rather, in such a manner the Sages relaxed the stringency they had imposed, that the prohibited object not be nullified by a majority, in cases where such a “statement” can be made. But sacrificing them one by one, Rabbi Eliezer did not permit. If so, here too, when one ring fell from the mixture, a difficulty arises: Why did Rav permit using each of the rings separately, and not require using two rings together, just as Rabbi Eliezer required sacrificing two heads together? He said to him, Rav Naḥman said to Rava: I, too, was speaking of two by two. It was not permitted to derive benefit from each ring separately. Rather, the rings must be sold two at a time, so that one can “say” with regard to each ring of the pair: Just as the second one is permitted, so too is this one permitted. Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: An idolatrous ring that became mixed with one hundred rings of permitted items, and forty rings separated from the rings to one place, and sixty to another place, and afterward one separated from the forty rings and became mixed with other permitted rings— it does not prohibit the rings with which it became mixed, as will be explained. But if one separated ring from the sixty rings [after they had separated from the original one hundred] and the separating ring became mixed with permitted rings, it prohibits all the rings with which it became mixed. The Gemara analyzes Rav’s statement: What is different if one of the rings does not prohibit its mixture, because we say: The prohibited object, that idolatrous ring that became mixed with the one hundred when they were together, is present in the majority. For we attribute the matter and say that the prohibited ring is among the sixty rings, which constitute the majority relative to the forty. [This attribution applies only after one ring separated from the forty; when the forty themselves separated, they were not permitted on the basis of the attribution that “the prohibited object is in the majority.”] If so, when one ring separated from the sixty as well [after all sixty had separated to another place], why does it prohibit its mixture? Why do we not attribute the matter and not say, “The prohibited object is in the majority,” that the prohibited ring remained among the fifty-nine, while the one that separated is a permitted ring!? Rather, say that this is what Rav said: Forty separated rings from the one hundred, and the forty rings separated all to one place, where they became mixed with other rings— they do not prohibit their mixture, because we say, “The prohibited object is in the majority,” and the prohibited ring remained among the sixty that remained. But if sixty rings separated from the one hundred to one place, and became mixed with others, they prohibit their mixture. The difficulty concerning one ring that separated therefore no longer arises. According to this interpretation of Rav’s statement, we find no distinction between one that separated from the forty and one that separated from the sixty. And Rav Yehuda said: When I stated that ruling of Rav—that forty rings that separated and became mixed with others do not prohibit their mixture— before Shmuel, he said to me, Shmuel said to me: Leave idolatry, as far as being lenient and permitting it is concerned, even in such a case of compound uncertainty. For the ring first became mixed with one hundred permitted rings, and afterward forty separated and became mixed with others, yet one may not be lenient. For the status of idolatry is especially stringent, as its uncertainty and compound uncertainty remain prohibited forever. Therefore, its mixture and the mixture of its mixture remain prohibited forever. The following was raised as an objection to Shmuel from what we learned: An uncertain object of idolatry is prohibited. But an object involving compound uncertainty is permitted. What are the circumstances? A cup of idolatry that fell into a storehouse full of cups— all of them are prohibited. If one of them separated, from the cups with which the idolatrous cup became mixed, and the cup became mixed with other cups—even if it became mixed with ten thousand permitted cups—all of them are prohibited [for this is still called “an uncertain object of idolatry,” and not “an object involving compound uncertainty.” This is because the first mixture, in which the prohibited object is certainly present, is considered in its entirety to be the prohibited entity itself and not an uncertainty concerning it. Only when one item separated from that mixture and became mixed with others, creating uncertainty as to whether the prohibited object itself is present in the new mixture, is the mixture considered “an uncertain object of idolatry.”] But if afterward one separated from the ten thousand to a mixture of ten thousand permitted items, all of them are permitted. It is thus demonstrated that the tanna of the beraita maintains that compound uncertainty is permitted in the case of idolatry. This presents a difficulty to Shmuel, who prohibited it even to the end of the world!? And we answer: This is not a difficulty for Shmuel, because it is a dispute between tannaim; the tannaim disagree about this matter: As it was taught: Pomegranates of Badan that were prohibited because of orla or because of teruma are not nullified by a majority, since they are one of the six categories of significant items that are not nullified, as explained above. Therefore, they prohibit their mixture however small the amount. What are the circumstances?— One of them fell into ten thousand permitted pomegranates, and one separated from the ten thousand to a mixture of ten thousand other permitted items; all of them are prohibited. Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: If prohibited pomegranates of Badan became mixed with a group of ten thousand permitted ones, all of them are prohibited. But if one separated from the ten thousand to a mixture of three pomegranates of Badan [the pomegranate that separated from the ten thousand, together with the two with which it became mixed], and afterward one separated from the three to another place, it is permitted to eat the one that separated. Likewise, the pomegranates from which it separated are permitted, because of compound uncertainty. The reason for Rabbi Shimon’s ruling is as we said above: Any mixture in which the prohibited object itself is certainly present is not considered an “uncertain prohibition”; rather, its status is that of a definite prohibition. Only the second mixture, which contains an item that separated from the first mixture, is considered an uncertainty, since we do not know with certainty that the prohibited object became mixed into it. And if one item separated from the second mixture and became mixed into a third mixture, the third mixture is a “compound uncertainty.” Therefore, the item that separates from it is permitted to eat, and the mixture itself is also permitted when that item separates, since from that point there is room to attribute the prohibited object to the item that separated. Accordingly, Shmuel correctly said that idolatry has no permission even to the end of the world, because he holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who says that even if one item separated from ten thousand and became mixed with another ten thousand, all of them are prohibited. The stringency of idolatry, which is not nullified, is like the stringency applying to pomegranates of Badan, which are not nullified. The Gemara nevertheless continues to analyze Shmuel’s statement, in which he said: “Leave idolatry, as its uncertainty and compound uncertainty remain prohibited to the end of the world”: Shmuel— in accordance with whom did he rule? If he holds in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, why did he say, “Leave idolatry”? After all, Rabbi Yehuda prohibited even in the case of other prohibitions as well, for he holds that a significant item that is not nullified remains prohibited to the end of the world!? If Shmuel holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, a difficulty arises, since Rabbi Shimon permits even in the case of idolatry as well an object involving compound uncertainty, just as he does with regard to a significant item!? And if you would say that perhaps we have not found Rabbi Shimon explicitly stating that compound uncertainty is permitted in the case of idolatry, and we should say that Rabbi Shimon distinguishes between idolatry and other prohibitions, and holds that compound uncertainty is prohibited in the case of idolatry, while Shmuel holds in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, there is still a difficulty: Rather, what about that which was taught: An uncertain object of idolatry is prohibited, and an object involving compound uncertainty is permitted? Who is the tanna of this beraita? It is neither Rabbi Yehuda, who prohibits every case of compound uncertainty, nor Rabbi Shimon. For we said that he is stringent with regard to idolatry and holds in that matter in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda!? And we answer: Actually, this beraita is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Shimon holds that compound uncertainty is permitted both with regard to idolatry and with regard to other prohibitions. And Shmuel— held in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda in one matter, with regard to the law of idolatry, where one must be stringent and prohibit compound uncertainty to the end of the world. And he disagreed with him in one matter, for with regard to other prohibitions we are not stringent, but permit compound uncertainty. The Master said: Rabbi Shimon ben Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Shimon: Prohibited pomegranates of Badan that fell into ten thousand permitted pomegranates—all of them are prohibited. And if they fell from the ten thousand into three, and from the three one fell to another place, it is permitted. The Gemara assumed that the statement “they fell from ten thousand into three” means that one of the pomegranates in the mixture of ten thousand separated and became mixed with three pomegranates.