Zevachim 5b — the Talmud in English

And if you will challenge:

What is there about the thanksgiving-offering

that makes it more stringent than a guilt-offering,

for it requires bread, whereas a burnt-offering and peace-offerings

do not require bread?

They will prove it.

And the argument returns: this one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one.

The common aspect of them is that they are sacred offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are valid but do not effect acceptance.

I, too, will bring a guilt-offering, which is sacred, and if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is valid but does not effect acceptance.

And we raise an objection:

What is there about the common aspect of them, that they come through a vow or a freewill offering?

Can you say this concerning a guilt-offering, which does not come through a vow or a freewill offering? And therefore, even if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it should ascend to the altar and effect acceptance, for it is excluded by “it” stated concerning a sin-offering.

Rather, Rava said:

the source that a guilt-offering slaughtered not for its sake is valid but does not effect acceptance is learned through an analogy, as it is stated:

“This is the law ...

for a burnt-offering ... and for a guilt-offering ... and for the sacrifice of the peace-offerings.” -

The verse compared

the guilt-offering

to the peace-offerings,

saying:

Just as peace-offerings are sacred, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, they are valid and do not effect acceptance,

so, too, I will bring a guilt-offering, which is sacred;

if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is valid but does not effect acceptance.

And we raise an objection:

What have you seen that you compared

the guilt-offering

to the peace-offerings?

But in the verse “This is the law,” a sin-offering is also mentioned; therefore,

I will compare

the guilt-offering

to the sin-offering,

and it should be rendered entirely invalid when one slaughtered it not for its sake?

And we answer:

The Merciful One excluded this

and wrote concerning the sin-offering:

“It,”

to teach us that only a sin-offering is rendered invalid through slaughter not for its sake, but not other offerings; even a guilt-offering is not rendered invalid.

(Mnemonic:

Gimel Shin Nun Shin

Dalet)

Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them, and they were sitting and saying: It was difficult for Reish Lakish:

From where is it also established that

a guilt-offering, which does not come after death,

is valid but does not effect acceptance? And why did

Rabbi Elazar

not say to him: A guilt-offering also comes after death,

and is valid but does not effect acceptance? If so, a guilt-offering is like the other offerings, and one can also learn concerning a guilt-offering slaughtered with a change of sacred designation or a change of ownership that it is valid but does not effect acceptance. [Though the guilt-offering itself is not sacrificed after death, since there is no one for whom it can effect atonement, nevertheless it is considered an offering that comes after death, because its law is that it grazes until it develops a blemish, is sold, and with its proceeds burnt-offerings are purchased for the “summer of the altar”—that is, communal freewill burnt-offerings brought when there are no offerings to burn upon the altar] .

Even though the asham itself is not offered after death, since there is no one for whom it can effect atonement, nevertheless it is considered an offering that comes after death, because its law is that it must be left to graze until it develops a blemish and is sold, and with its proceeds olot are purchased for the “summer of the altar”—that is, freewill olot of the community brought when there are no offerings to burn on the altar ] .

Rav Sheshet said to them

to Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman:

Here, the

guilt-offering

itself also is not sacrificed after death, like a sin-offering, because the one for whom it effects atonement has died. Rather,

for what is it sacrificed?—

only for its surplus

[which, after it develops a blemish, is sold, and with its proceeds burnt-offerings are brought for the summer of the altar]. If so, it is impossible to prove from the fact that its surplus is valid and does not effect acceptance that when the guilt-offering itself is slaughtered with a change of sacred designation, the guilt-offering is likewise valid but does not effect acceptance. For a sin-offering slaughtered with a change of sacred designation is entirely disqualified, even though

the sin-offering also has its surplus sacrificed.

And it follows that there is no proof from the fact that the surplus is valid and does not effect acceptance concerning the law of a change of sacred designation in the offering itself. [The manner in which the surplus of a sin-offering is sacrificed is not in the case of a sin-offering whose owners died, like a guilt-offering whose owners died, because a sin-offering whose owners died must die. Rather, it is when the sinner separated two sin-offerings, intending to effect atonement through one of them and for the second to serve as responsibility, so that if one were lost he could achieve atonement through the other, and he sacrificed one of the two and achieved atonement through it. The law of the second is then that it grazes until it develops a blemish, is sold, and with its proceeds burnt-offerings are brought for the summer of the altar. Indeed, it is valid even after the owners’ death, but not by the law of a sin-offering, rather as a burnt-offering.]

The manner in which the surplus of a hattat is offered is not the case of a hattat whose owners died, as with an asham whose owner died, because a hattat whose owners died must be left to die. Rather, it is the case where a sinner set aside two hattat offerings, intending to achieve atonement through one and for the second to serve as a replacement, so that if one were lost he could achieve atonement through the other. He offered one of the two and achieved atonement through it. The law of the second is that it is left to graze until it develops a blemish, then sold, and an olah is brought with its proceeds for the summer of the altar. It is indeed valid even after the owner’s death, but not under the law of a hattat; rather, as an olah ].

And Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman rejected Rav Sheshet’s claim, because it is impossible to learn the law of a guilt-offering from the law of a sin-offering—

Concerning a sin-offering,

even though its surplus is sacrificed,

nevertheless a change of sacred designation in the offering itself does disqualify it, because

the Merciful One excluded

in its case

explicitly

“A sin-offering

it is,” and we expound “it” to mean that it remains as it is: if one slaughters a sin-offering with a change of sacred designation, the offering is entirely disqualified.

This is not so concerning a guilt-offering, in which no exclusion was stated. Therefore, if we find that the surplus of a guilt-offering is valid, this teaches that a change of sacred designation in a guilt-offering that is sacrificed is also valid, even though it does not effect acceptance for its owners.

And we raise an objection:

Concerning a guilt-offering, too, it is written: “A guilt-offering

is

it,”

so why does a change of sacred designation not disqualify it as it disqualifies a sin-offering?

And we answer:

That

“it” stated concerning a guilt-offering—

it is written after the burning of the sacrificial portions.

And a change in the service at the stage of burning the sacrificial portions cannot disqualify the offering, since even if one does not burn the portions at all, the offering is valid.

And

as it was taught:

Rabbi Eliezer, who disqualifies a guilt-offering slaughtered with a change of sacred designation like a Paschal-offering and a sin-offering, returned and reasoned [to disqualify a change of sacred designation in a guilt-offering] through another principle: concerning a sin-offering it is stated “it,” and therefore one for its sake is valid and one not for its sake is disqualified. Concerning a Paschal-offering it is stated “it,” and therefore one for its sake is valid and one not for its sake is disqualified.

A guilt-offering, too, has “it” stated concerning it; therefore, one for its sake is valid and one not for its sake is disqualified.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: Concerning a sin-offering, “it” is stated at slaughter, and therefore we expound concerning it: “it”—one for its sake is valid, and one not for its sake is disqualified. Concerning a Paschal-offering, “it” is stated at slaughter, and therefore we expound concerning it: one for its sake is valid, and one not for its sake is disqualified.

But concerning a guilt-offering, it was not stated

“it”

except after the burning of the sacrificial portions,

and it is not possible to disqualify the offering because of the disqualification in the burning, since

it itself, when the sacrificial portions were not burned, is valid.

And a change of sacred designation is no worse than not burning at all.

And we raise an objection: If we do not expound “it,” which is written at the burning of the sacrificial portions of a guilt-offering, to disqualify it,

then “

it,”

why do I need it?

And we answer:

For that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: A guilt-offering that was detached for grazing,

whose owners died or who achieved atonement through another guilt-offering, and therefore the court ruled that this guilt-offering should go out to graze until it develops a blemish, and with its proceeds burnt-offerings should be brought for the summer of the altar—once the court ruled that its law is to graze, the designation “guilt-offering” was detached from it, and it is considered, without a specific designation, a burnt-offering for the summer of the altar.

Therefore, if

one slaughtered it without specification,

even before it was actually sent out to graze, it is

valid

as a burnt-offering, for once the designation “guilt-offering” was detached from it, it stands for a burnt-offering.

And the Gemara infers: It implies that specifically if

the designation

of a guilt-offering was detached from it—

yes [indeed, it is valid as a burnt-offering]; but if it has

[действительно, пригодна как всесожжение]; но если ее еще

not yet been detached,

and one slaughtered it without specification before the court ruled that its law was to graze—

no,

it is not valid as a burnt-offering, because the designation of a guilt-offering still rests upon it. And as a guilt-offering, one cannot sacrifice it, since this concerns a guilt-offering whose owners died or who already achieved atonement through another.

What is the reason

that they required the court to detach from it the designation of a guilt-offering? Once he achieved atonement through another guilt-offering or its owners died, it already stands on its own for grazing, and the designation “guilt-offering” should have been removed from it automatically.

Rather, because

the verse says: “A guilt-offering

is

it”—

it shall remain as it is!

The designation of a guilt-offering remains upon it until the court detaches it , and therefore the verse needed to state “it” concerning a guilt-offering.

And it emerges for the conclusion that Rabbi Elazar’s position is perplexing: why did he not answer Reish Lakish that an asham also comes after death and does not effect acceptance, and the same law applies that, when there is a change in the sanctity, it is valid but does not effect acceptance.

Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattena was sitting with them, and they were sitting and saying:

That which Rabbi Elazar said

above, in reply to the objection of Reish Lakish, who objected: If they do not effect acceptance, why do they come

We find [sacrifices] that come after death, which are valid but do not effect acceptance—

Let Reish Lakish say to him

to Rabbi Elazar: What is the proof from sacrifices that the heirs bring, that there is bringing a sacrifice without effecting acceptance? On the contrary,

those

sacrifices that the heirs bring

should also be brought and effect acceptance

for the heirs who bring them! And from where do you know that there is bringing a sacrifice without effecting acceptance!?

Rav Adda bar Mattena said to them:

How could the sacrifices of the deceased effect acceptance for the heirs? Does the olat

of a woman who gave birth,

from which Rabbi Elazar proved that the heirs bring their mother’s ola, have the ability to effect acceptance for the heirs? But

if she gave birth—

who gave birth to her sons?

And how is it possible for them to have acceptance through a “sacrifice of a woman who gave birth”?

Rav Ashi strongly objected to him: And who tells us

that the sacrifice of a woman who gave birth comes to effect acceptance only for what she sinned in her childbirth [as explained in Niddah 31b]?

For

behold,

if there are several

mitzvot

of positive commandments incumbent upon her,

the woman who gave birth, for whose neglect she is obligated to achieve atonement through an ola sacrifice—who

does not achieve atonement

for them when she brings the sacrifice of a woman who gave birth? And it is proven that the ola sacrifice of a woman who gave birth has the power to atone for many positive commandments.

And since

even

when there are several

mitzvot

of positive commandments incumbent upon her,

the woman who gave birth,

achieves atonement

for all of them through the ola of the woman who gave birth —

her heirs too achieve atonement

through the ola of the woman who gave birth when they brought it in her place, for the sacrifice was not designated solely for atonement as a “sacrifice of a woman who gave birth” .

And we raised the matter:

Is it to say

that from what you said, that her heirs can achieve atonement through her ola, we learn

that they acquire it

—her heirs acquire her sacrifice?

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he left a meal-offering for his two sons, and died, it is offered

that meal-offering by his sons, and there is no deficiency of

partnership [for it is impossible to bring a meal-offering as a partnership], but rather it is offered by them without their being its owners.

[since a meal offering cannot be brought jointly by partners]. Rather, it is brought by them even though they are not its owners.

And if it enters your mind that they acquire it

the heirs acquire their father’s sacrifice, as implied by Rav Ashi’s words, then the heirs cannot offer the meal-offering that they inherited from their father, for

“a person

when he brings a meal-offering”

the Merciful One said—

to exclude partners!?

And conversely, this too will be difficult—

and

for it is possible to say that the heirs bring their father’s sacrifice and it is not considered the sacrifice of partners, because

they do not acquire it

the heirs do not acquire their father’s sacrifice?

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he left

a

animal sacrifice for his two sons and died—

it is offered

by them,

and they may not perform substitution with it,

for if they performed substitution with it using another non-sacred animal, that animal does not become a substitute sacrifice, because one who performs substitution with a sacrifice belonging to partners does not effect substitution .

If you say that they acquire it

the heirs acquire their father’s sacrifice,

this is

what Rabbi Yoḥanan said,

for

“if he left an animal for his two sons,

they may not perform substitution with it” ,