Zevachim 5b (ה:) — the Talmud in English

And if you will challenge this:

What can be said about the todah

which is more stringent than an asham,

since it requires bread, whereas an olah and shelamim

do not require bread—

they prove.

And the argument returns: This one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one.

The common denominator between them is that they are consecrated offerings, and if they were slaughtered not for their own sake, they are valid but do not effect acceptance.

I, too, will include an asham, which is consecrated, and if it was slaughtered not for its own sake, it is valid but does not effect acceptance.

And we challenge this:

What is the common denominator between them? That they are brought as either a vow or a freewill offering;

can you say the same of an asham, which is not brought as a vow or a freewill offering? Therefore, even if it was slaughtered not for its own sake, it should be fit to be offered on the altar and should effect acceptance, since it is excluded by the word “that” stated with regard to a hattat.

Rather, Rava said:

the source that an asham slaughtered not for its own sake is valid but does not effect acceptance is learned by means of a juxtaposition, as it is stated: “

This is the law ...

for an olah ... and for an asham ... and for a sacrifice of shelamim.” \-

The verse juxtaposed

the asham offering

with the shelamim,

teaching:

Just as shelamim are consecrated offerings, and if they were slaughtered not for their own sake they are valid but do not effect acceptance;

I, too, will include an asham, which is consecrated,

if it was slaughtered not for its own sake, it is valid but does not effect acceptance.

And we challenge this:

What did you see that led you to juxtapose

the

asham with the shelamim?

The verse “This is the law” also mentions a hattat, and therefore,

I can juxtapose

the

asham with the hattat,

and disqualify it entirely when it was slaughtered not for its own sake.

And we answer:

The Merciful One excluded this,

and wrote with regard to a hattat offering: “

That,”

to teach us that only a hattat is disqualified by slaughter not for its own sake, but other offerings are not disqualified; even an asham is not disqualified.

(Mnemonic:

Gimel shin nun shin

dalet)

Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman were sitting, and Rav Sheshet was sitting with them, and they sat and said: The following difficulty was troubling Reish Lakish:

How do we know that also

an asham, which does not come after the death

of its owner, is valid but does not effect acceptance? And why did

Rabbi Elazar not say to him:

An asham also comes after death

and is valid but does not effect acceptance? If so, an asham is like the other offerings, and from this it is possible to learn that an asham slaughtered with a change in the sanctity designated for it or with a change in the ownership designation is valid but does not effect acceptance. [

Even though the asham itself is not offered after death, since there is no one for whom it can effect atonement, nevertheless it is considered an offering that comes after death, because its law is that it must be left to graze until it develops a blemish and is sold, and with its proceeds olot are purchased for the “summer of the altar”—that is, freewill olot of the community brought when there are no offerings to burn on the altar ] .

Rav Sheshet said to them,

to Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman:

The

asham

itself also is not offered after death, as is the case with a hattat, because the person who was to achieve atonement has died. Rather,

for what is it offered?—

Only for its surplus

after it develops a blemish, it is sold and olot are brought with its proceeds for the summer of the altar. If so, it is impossible to prove from the fact that its surplus is valid but does not effect acceptance that when the asham itself is slaughtered with a change in the sanctity designated for it, the asham is likewise valid but does not effect acceptance. For a hattat that was slaughtered with a change in the sanctity designated for it is entirely disqualified, even though

the hattat too has a surplus that is offered.

And it follows that the fact that the surplus is valid but does not effect acceptance provides no proof concerning the law of a change in the sanctity designated for the offering itself. [

The manner in which the surplus of a hattat is offered is not the case of a hattat whose owners died, as with an asham whose owner died, because a hattat whose owners died must be left to die. Rather, it is the case where a sinner set aside two hattat offerings, intending to achieve atonement through one and for the second to serve as a replacement, so that if one were lost he could achieve atonement through the other. He offered one of the two and achieved atonement through it. The law of the second is that it is left to graze until it develops a blemish, then sold, and an olah is brought with its proceeds for the summer of the altar. It is indeed valid even after the owner’s death, but not under the law of a hattat; rather, as an olah ].

Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman rejected Rav Sheshet’s claim, because the law of an asham cannot be learned from the law of a hattat: With regard to a

hattat,

even though its surplus is offered,

nevertheless a change in the sanctity designated for the offering itself does disqualify it, because

the Merciful One excluded

it

explicitly, stating: “A hattat

it,” and we expound “it” to mean that it must remain in its original state: If a hattat is slaughtered with a change in the sanctity designated for it, the offering is entirely disqualified.

This is not so with regard to an asham, concerning which no such exclusion was stated. Therefore, if we find that the surplus of an asham is valid, this teaches that a change in the sanctity designated for an asham itself is also valid, even though it does not effect acceptance for its owner.

And we challenge this:

With regard to an asham too, it is written “An

asham

it.”

Why, then, does a change in the sanctity designated for it not disqualify it, as it disqualifies a hattat?

And we answer:

That

“it” stated with regard to an asham—

it is written after the burning of the sacrificial portions.

A change in the service at the stage of burning the sacrificial portions cannot disqualify the offering, since even if the sacrificial portions are not burned at all, the offering remains valid.

And

as it was taught: Rabbi Eliezer [who disqualifies an asham slaughtered with a change in the sanctity designated for it, like a Pesaḥ and a hattat] returned and reasoned [to disqualify a change in the sanctity designated for an asham] by another argument: With regard to a hattat it is stated “it”; therefore, when offered for its own sake it is valid, and when not for its own sake it is disqualified. With regard to the Pesaḥ it is stated “it”; therefore, when offered for its own sake it is valid, and when not for its own sake it is disqualified.

Rabbi Eliezer, who disqualifies a guilt-offering slaughtered with a change of sacred designation like a Paschal-offering and a sin-offering, returned and reasoned [to disqualify a change of sacred designation in a guilt-offering] through another principle: concerning a sin-offering it is stated “it,” and therefore one for its sake is valid and one not for its sake is disqualified. Concerning a Paschal-offering it is stated “it,” and therefore one for its sake is valid and one not for its sake is disqualified.

The same applies to an asham: “It” is stated with regard to it; therefore, when offered for its own sake it is valid, and when not for its own sake it is disqualified.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: With regard to a hattat, “it” is stated in connection with slaughter; therefore, we expound it: When offered for its own sake it is valid, and when not for its own sake it is disqualified. With regard to the Pesaḥ, “it” is stated in connection with slaughter; therefore, we expound it: When offered for its own sake it is valid, and when not for its own sake it is disqualified.

But with regard to an asham, it is not stated

“it”

except after the burning of the sacrificial portions.

It is impossible to disqualify the offering because of the disqualification involved in that burning, since

the offering itself, when its sacrificial portions were not burned, is valid.

A change in the sanctity designated for it is no worse than not burning them at all.

And we challenge this: If we do not expound the word “it,” written in connection with the burning of the sacrificial portions of an asham, to disqualify it,

then “

it,”

why do I need it?

And we answer:

It is needed for that which Rav Huna said in the name of Rav.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: An asham that was severed for grazing

when its owners died or achieved atonement through another asham, and the court therefore instructed that this asham be sent out to graze until it develops a blemish, after which an olah is brought with its proceeds for the summer of the altar—once the court has instructed that its law is to be sent out to graze, the designation “asham” is severed from it, and it is considered an unspecified olah for the summer of the altar.

Therefore, if

it was slaughtered without specification,

even before it was actually sent out to graze, it is

valid

as an olah, since once the designation “asham” has been severed from it, it is destined to be an olah.

The Gemara infers: It implies that specifically when

the designation

of “asham” has been severed from it,

yes [indeed, it is valid as an olah]; but if it has

not yet been severed,

and it was slaughtered without specification before the court instructed that its law was to be grazing,

no, it is not valid as an olah, because it still bears the designation of an asham. And it cannot be offered as an asham, since the case concerns an asham whose owners died or had already achieved atonement through another.

What is the reason

that the court must sever the designation of an asham from it? Once its owners achieved atonement through another asham or died, it is independently destined for grazing, and the designation “asham” should have been removed from it automatically.

Rather, it is because

the verse says: “An

asham

it”—

it shall remain in its original state!

The designation of an asham remains upon it until the court severs it. Therefore, the verse needed to state “it” with regard to an asham.

It follows that, according to the conclusion, Rabbi Elazar’s position is difficult: why did he not answer Reish Lakish that an asham too is brought after death and does not effect atonement, and that likewise, when the consecrated designation is changed, it should be valid but not effect atonement?

Rav Naḥman and Rav Sheshet were sitting, and Rav Adda bar Mattana was sitting with them, and they were sitting and saying:

That which Rabbi Elazar said

above, in response to Reish Lakish’s question, who asked: If they do not effect atonement, why are they brought

We find that offerings brought after death are valid but do not effect atonement—

Reish Lakish should say to him

to Rabbi Elazar: What proof is there from offerings brought by the heirs that an offering can be brought without effecting atonement? On the contrary,

those

offerings brought by the heirs

should also effect atonement for the heirs who bring them! And from where do you know that an offering can be brought without effecting atonement!?

for the heirs who bring them! And from where do you know that an offering can be brought without bringing atonement?

Rav Adda bar Mattana said to them: How could the offerings of the deceased effect atonement for the heirs? Is it conceivable that the

olah of a

woman who gave birth,

from which Rabbi Elazar proved that the heirs bring their mother’s olah, could effect atonement for the heirs? But

if she gave birth—

who gave birth to her sons?

And how could they attain atonement through a “woman-who-gave-birth offering”?

Rav Ashi challenged this: And who says to us

that the offering of a woman who gave birth comes to effect atonement only for what she sinned in connection with her childbirth [as explained in Niddah 31b]?

For

after all,

if there are several

positive

commandments incumbent upon her,

for which the woman who gave birth is obligated to attain atonement by means of an olah—

does she not attain atonement

for them when she brings the woman-who-gave-birth offering? This proves that the olah of a woman who gave birth can effect atonement for many positive commandments.

And since

even

when there are several

positive

commandments incumbent upon her,

the woman who gave birth

attains atonement

for all of them through the woman-who-gave-birth olah —

her heirs too attain atonement

through the woman-who-gave-birth olah when they bring it in her place, since the offering was not designated solely for atonement in its capacity as a “woman-who-gave-birth offering” .

We then raised the following question:

Does it follow

that from your statement that her heirs can attain atonement through her olah, we learn

that they acquire

her offering?

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If one left a meal-offering for his two sons and died, it is brought

that meal-offering by his sons, and there is no deficiency of

partnership

[since a meal-offering cannot be brought in partnership]; rather, it is brought by them without their being its owners.

And if it enters your mind that they acquire

the offering of their father, as implied by Rav Ashi’s statement, the heirs cannot offer the meal-offering they inherited from their father, since

“a person

when he brings a meal-offering”

the Merciful One stated

—to exclude partners!?

And conversely, the following difficulty arises—

and

it is possible to say that the heirs bring their father’s offering, and it is not considered a partners’ offering, because

they do not acquire

their father’s offering?

But Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If he left

an animal offering

for his two sons and died—

it is brought

by them,

but they may not perform substitution with it

: If they performed substitution with it by designating another non-sacred animal in its place, that other animal does not become a substitute offering, because one who performs substitution with a partners’ offering does not effect substitution.

If you grant that they acquire

their father’s offering,

this is

what Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

“If he left

an animal for his two sons,

they may not perform substitution with it” ,