Zevachim 6a — the Talmud in English

Because

it became for them

considered as a sacrifice

of partners, ![](pamud.bmp "

exact location of the page")

and partners cannot perform substitution.

But if you say that it does not become theirs

the father’s sacrifice for his heirs, but it remains their father’s sacrifice,

let them also say!

For it is an individual’s sacrifice, and why did Rabbi Yohanan say that they cannot perform substitution in it?

And we answer: In truth, the father’s sacrifice is not acquired by his heirs, and nevertheless one cannot ask why they do not perform substitution in it, because

the case there is different,

with two heirs: even if they are not partners in the sacrifice, they cannot perform substitution in it, because

the verse says

“if he substitutes a substitution”—

to include the heir

who performs substitution in his father’s sacrifice. But only

one heir performs substitution, but not two

heirs

perform substitution!

And it is a scriptural decree that two heirs do not perform substitution, even though they are not partners in the sacrifice.

Rav Yaakov of Nehar Pekod raised an objection to him: If you derive from “he substitutes a substitution” that its meaning is to exclude and establish the verse specifically with one heir and not with two heirs,

then from now on, concerning the second tithe

the two,

as it is written

concerning its redemption,

“and if he redeems it, he shall redeem it,”

and we expound

to include the heir

who adds a fifth when he redeems his father’s second tithe [and is not like a stranger, who is exempt from adding a fifth],

so too

did we expound it to teach that only where there is

one—

redeems

and adds a fifth,

but not two

heirs

redeem

and add a fifth!? And we answer:

the second tithe is different,

the second tithe,

for with regard to their father it too exists as a partnership.

Since a second tithe belonging to partners is liable for a fifth, therefore the singular language written concerning the tithe also refers to the plural, and the verse “if he redeems it, he shall redeem it” is not expounded to exclude two heirs. This is unlike substitution, for substitution can be performed only in an individual’s sacrifice and not in a sacrifice belonging to partners; therefore the wording of the verse, “if he substitutes a substitution,” is expounded to say that specifically one heir performs substitution, and it excludes two heirs from substitution.

Rav Asi said to Rav Ashi: And from it,

from what we learned—that one heir can perform substitution—it is possible to prove as you said, that an heir acquires his father’s sacrifice and can attain atonement through it. For

if it is satisfactory according to you that it becomes theirs,

the heir’s father’s sacrifice,

this is why one

heir

at least performs substitution.

But if you say that it does not become theirs

for the heirs, and they cannot attain atonement through it, then even when there is only one heir,

how

can he

perform substitution?

For we find that only one who attains atonement can perform substitution! For—

But Rabbi Abbahu said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan

two laws:

The first: A person can consecrate a sacrifice so that his fellow attains atonement through it, and not the one who consecrated it himself. However, there are laws concerning this sacrifice that pertain to the one who consecrated it, and there are laws that pertain to the one who attains atonement.

On the one hand, if a blemish occurred in that sacrifice and he came to redeem it, then if

the one who consecrated it

redeems it, he

adds a fifth

[as is the law of the “owner of the sacrifice,” who is liable to add a fifth to its redemption]. But if the one who attains atonement redeems it, he is considered like a stranger, who is exempt from adding a fifth.

Yet, on the other hand, if he comes to perform substitution in that sacrifice, only

the one who attains atonement performs

in it

substitution,

for such is the law of substitution: only the “owner of the sacrifice” can perform substitution, and no other person performs substitution; and with regard to the law of substitution, specifically the one who attains atonement is considered the “owner of the sacrifice,” and not the one who consecrated it.

And

another law Rabbi Yohanan said:

One who contributes from his own for his fellow’s

who repairs his fellow’s produce from the prohibition of untithed produce by designating his own produce as teruma in order to permit his fellow’s untithed produce—

the benefit of disposition

is

his,

for the one who separates it may give the teruma to whichever priest he wishes to give it.

And from the first law that Rabbi Yohanan said—that only the one who attains atonement performs substitution—it is proven that an heir acquires the sacrifice. For if he does not acquire it, he cannot attain atonement through it, and if he does not attain atonement through it, how can he perform substitution in it?

And we reject this: This is not proof for Rav Ashi, because even if an heir does not acquire his father’s sacrifice so as to be considered its actual owner and attain complete atonement through it as his father would have attained atonement through it, for

it does not establish atonement

that it has no “established” and complete atonement for the heir, nevertheless

it provides incidental atonement

the sacrifice provides him with a light, “floating” atonement [“floating” is an expression of comparison for a light atonement, which is not complete and absolute], and this light atonement is sufficient for the heir to be called the owner of the sacrifice and to perform substitution in it.

But, on the other hand, when two heirs inherit a meal-offering, they can offer it, and this light atonement through which the heirs attain atonement does not make it a “meal-offering of partners,” which is not offered.

It was asked of them:

The sacrifices that were slaughtered not for their sake, which we learned above are valid, but have not counted for their owners for the purpose of their obligation, and they must return and bring another sacrifice—whether

they atoned

those sacrifices

for what they came for [for the sin for which they were brought, such as one who set aside an olah to atone for the violation of a positive commandment], and their owners no longer need fear the sufferings, but the owner is nevertheless obligated to bring an additional sacrifice in order to fulfill his obligation,

or

they did not atone,

and as long as he has not brought the other sacrifice, he must fear the sufferings expected to come upon one who has still not received atonement?

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said: It is reasonable that they did not atone.

For if it enters your mind that they atoned,

the

second

sacrifice, which we learned in the Mishna did not count for the owners for the purpose of their obligation and they must bring an additional sacrifice—

why does it come?

After all, if the owners received atonement through the first sacrifice and no longer need atonement, for what will the second sacrifice come?

And we object:

But rather, what

is your proof, that sacrifices slaughtered not for their sake

did not atone?

If so, the opposite difficulty will confront you:

why

is the first sacrifice, which was slaughtered not for its sake,

offered,

for since it does not atone, why do we offer it? [See Tosafot, who asked that this is the difficulty of Resh Lakish: “If they do not effect acceptance, why do they come?”]

Rav Ashi said: Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi,

proved from the Mishna that they did not atone, because

this is what was difficult for him

more concerning the bringing of the second than concerning the bringing of the first—

Granted, if you say that they did not atone

through the offering of the first, it is still possible to understand why both are offered, because the first sacrifice, which was slaughtered

not for its sake,

comes by virtue of its being for its sake!

For it was set aside in order to receive atonement through it, and although he slaughtered it not for its sake and it no longer atones, nevertheless the sacrifice itself exists, and he may offer it because at the time of its setting aside it was set aside for its sake and was fit to atone. But since he did not receive atonement through it because he slaughtered it not for its sake, he must bring a

second sacrifice,

which

comes to atone.

But if you say that they atoned

through the first, despite its having been slaughtered not for its sake—

why does the second come?

There is no need for it at all! And this was his proof for saying that sacrifices slaughtered not for their sake do not atone.

It was asked of them:

An olah sacrifice that was slaughtered according to its law, for its sake, which atones for neglecting a positive commandment—whether even

for a positive commandment after the setting aside [which he violated after setting aside the olah]

[that is, for violating a positive mitzva after the burnt offering was designated],

it atones, or

it atones only for what he violated before the setting aside, but for what he violated and did after the setting aside

it does not atone.

And the Gemara explains the sides of the doubt:

Do we say, it is like a sin-offering—

just as a sin-offering,

only for a sin

that preceded the setting aside, does

indeed atone [it atones], but for a sin

that followed the setting aside it does not

atone,

so here too,

in the case of an olah, only for a sin

that preceded the setting aside, does

but for a sin that was committed

after the setting aside, it does not.

Or perhaps it is not comparable

the olah

to a sin-offering,

for a sin-offering, for each and every sin [such as one ate forbidden fat and blood, or he ate forbidden fat unintentionally and became aware of his unwitting act, and afterward again ate forbidden fat unintentionally],

must bring one sin-offering

separately, for a sin-offering does not atone for several sins,

but

if

here,

in the case of an olah sacrifice,

since if there are several

violations

committed through it, it atones,

one olah sacrifice for all of them, then it is possible that even

for a positive commandment,

for the violation of a positive commandment

that

was committed

after the setting aside, it also atones.

Come and hear

from that which was taught in a beraita: It is said concerning an olah sacrifice, “

And he shall lay

his hand upon the head of the olah—

and it shall be accepted for him, to atone for him.”

And it is apparently difficult:

Does laying on of hands atone? But atonement is only through the blood, as it is stated, “

For the blood—it is the life—that effects atonement,”

for he receives atonement only through the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar!?

Rather, what does the verse come to teach by saying, “

And he shall lay”—

and it shall be accepted to atone”?

It comes to tell you that if

he did not lay on his hand because he regarded the laying on of hands as nothing more than

he made the laying on of hands

“the remainder of a mitzva” [which he did not regard as important as the essence of the mitzva, but as the remainder of a mitzva, and therefore did not perform it],

the verse regards it for him as though he did not atone, and

although in truth

—

he atoned.

And the Gemara derives from the language of the beraita:

What is “

atoned,”

and what is “

as though

he did not atone”?

What, is it not that “

he atoned”

for

a positive commandment that preceded the setting aside,

but

he did not atone for the positive commandment of laying on of hands,

for neglecting the mitzva of laying on of hands, because

it was a positive commandment after the setting aside?

From here it is possible to resolve the question, for it is proven that an olah does not atone for a positive commandment after the setting aside.

And we reject this:

Rava said:

And are you saying that from the nullification of the positive commandment

of semikha

you bring proof that he does not achieve atonement after designation? There is no proof from it, because

it is different there, for as long as he has not slaughtered, the command

“Stand and perform semikha!”

is incumbent upon him.

For he has still not nullified the positive commandment of semikha, since he can still fulfill it, until the time of slaughter.

When is there

nullification of the positive commandment

? —

Only

after slaughter,

for after it he cannot perform semikha. But concerning the nullification of a positive commandment

after slaughter, we have no question,

for it is obvious that he does not achieve atonement for sins committed after slaughter; and the entire discussion is only concerning sins committed between designation and slaughter.

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Say

that the explanation of “it atoned” and “it did not atone” is as follows: “

It atoned”

for the person

for every positive commandment that he had transgressed, and he was saved from afflictions. Included in this is that he also achieved atonement for the nullification of the positive commandment of semikha,