Zevachim 6a (ו.) — the Talmud in English

Because

it would be considered

a sacrifice

of partners,

and partners cannot perform temura.

But if you say that it does not acquire

the father's sacrifice for his heirs, but rather it remains their father's sacrifice,

then let them perform temura as well!

For it is a sacrifice of an individual, so why did Rabbi Yohanan say that temura cannot be performed for it?

The Gemara answers: In truth, the father’s sacrifice is not acquired by his heirs. Nevertheless, one cannot ask why they do not perform temura for it, because

that case is different

—the case of two heirs—for even if they are not partners in the sacrifice, they cannot perform temura for it, because

the verse states: “

If he shall substitute

to include an heir,”

who performs temura with his father’s sacrifice. But only

one heir performs temura, but not two

heirs

performing temura!

It is a decree of the Torah that two heirs do not perform temura, even though they are not partners in the sacrifice.

Rav Yaakov of Nehar Pekod objects to it: If you expounded “he shall substitute” as meaning that the verse is limited specifically to one heir and not to two heirs,

then from now on, with regard to second tithe

second tithe,

as it is written

with regard to its redemption: “

And if he shall redeem it,”

and we expound:

to include an heir

who adds a fifth when redeeming his father’s second tithe [and is not like a stranger, who is exempt from adding a fifth],

is it likewise

expounded to teach that only when there is

one heir—he

redeems

and adds a fifth—

but not two

heirs

redeem

and add a fifth!? The Gemara answers:

Second tithe is different,

second tithe,

for it is also present in the domain of their father as a partnership.

Since second tithe belonging to partners is subject to the added fifth, the singular language used by the verse concerning second tithe also refers to a plurality, and the verse “If he shall redeem it” is not expounded to exclude two heirs. This is unlike temura, for which only a sacrifice belonging to an individual can be used, not a sacrifice belonging to partners. Therefore, the wording “If he shall substitute” is expounded to teach that specifically one heir performs temura, excluding two heirs from performing temura.

Rav Asi said to Rav Ashi: And from it

—from what we have learned, that one heir can perform temura—it is possible to prove your statement, that an heir acquires his father’s sacrifice and can attain atonement through it. For

if it is well according to your statement that he acquires it

the heir acquires his father’s sacrifice,

this is why one

heir

at least performs temura.

But if you say that he does not acquire it

for the heirs, and they cannot attain atonement through it, then even when there is only one heir,

how

can he

perform temura

? We have found that only one who attains atonement can perform temura! For—

Did Rabbi Abbahu not say that Rabbi Yohanan said

two laws:

First, a person may consecrate a sacrifice so that another person will attain atonement through it, rather than the one who consecrated it himself. Nevertheless, there are laws concerning this sacrifice that apply to the one who consecrated it, and others that apply to the one who attains atonement through it.

On the one hand, if a blemish occurred in that sacrifice and one came to redeem it, then if

the one who consecrated it

redeems it, he

adds a fifth [as the “owner of the sacrifice,” who is obligated to add a fifth to its redemption]. But if the one who attains atonement redeems it, he is considered like a stranger, who is exempt from adding a fifth.

On the other hand, if someone seeks to perform substitution with that sacrifice, only

On the other hand, if one comes to perform temura with that sacrifice, only

the one who attains atonement performs

with it

temura, for the law of temura is that only the “owner of the sacrifice” can perform temura, and no other person can. With regard to the law of temura, specifically the one who attains atonement is considered the “owner of the sacrifice,” and not the one who consecrated it.

for such is the law of substitution: only the “owner of the sacrifice” can perform substitution, and no other person performs substitution; and with regard to the law of substitution, specifically the one who attains atonement is considered the “owner of the sacrifice,” and not the one who consecrated it.

And

another law Rabbi Yohanan said:

One who contributes from his own produce on behalf of another’s

—who renders another person’s produce free of the prohibition of untithed produce by designating his own produce as teruma, thereby permitting the other person’s untithed produce—

the benefit of discretion

is

his,

since the one who separates the teruma may give it to whichever priest he wishes.

From Rabbi Yohanan’s first law, that only the one who attains atonement performs temura, it follows that an heir acquires the sacrifice. For if he does not acquire it, he cannot attain atonement through it; and if he does not attain atonement through it, how can he perform temura with it?

The Gemara rejects this: This is not proof for Rav Ashi, for even if an heir does not acquire his father’s sacrifice so as to be considered its owner in the full sense and attain complete atonement through it as his father would have,

it does not provide fixed atonement

—the heir does not attain “fixed,” complete atonement through it—nevertheless

it provides incidental atonement

—the sacrifice provides the heir with a lesser, “floating” atonement [the term “floating” is an analogy for a lesser atonement, which is neither complete nor definitive]. This lesser atonement is sufficient for the heir to be called the owner of the sacrifice and perform temura with it.

On the other hand, when two heirs inherit a meal offering, they can offer it. The lesser atonement that the heirs attain through it does not cause it to become a “meal offering of partners,” which may not be offered.

It was raised as a dilemma before them:

The offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake, which we learned above are valid, but they did not count for their owners as fulfillment of their obligation, and the owners must return and bring another offering: whether

they effected atonement

for those offerings

for that which they were brought for

[that is, for the sin for which they were brought—for example, one who designated an olah to atone for the violation of a positive mitzva], and their owners no longer need fear the afflictions destined to befall one who has not yet achieved atonement, although the owners are obligated to bring an additional offering in order to fulfill their obligation,

or they did not effect atonement,

and as long as he does not bring the other offering, he must fear the afflictions expected to befall one who has still not achieved atonement?

Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi, said: It is reasonable that they did not effect atonement. For if it enters your mind that they effected atonement, the

offering

second,

which we learned in the Mishna did not count for the owners as fulfillment of their obligation and that they must bring an additional offering—

why does it come?

For if the owners achieved atonement through the first offering and have no further need for atonement, for what purpose would the second offering come?

And we challenge this:

But if so, what

is the proof that offerings slaughtered not for their sake

did not effect atonement?

If so, the contrary difficulty will confront you:

why

was the first offering, which was slaughtered not for its sake,

sacrificed

? Since it does not effect atonement, why should we sacrifice it? [See Tosafot, who raised the question that this is the question of Reish Lakish—if they do not effect appeasement, why do they come?]

Rav Ashi said: Rav Sheisha, son of Rav Idi,

proved from the Mishna that they did not effect atonement, because

this is what was difficult for him

more about bringing the second than about bringing the first:

Granted, if you say that they did not effect atonement,

through the sacrifice of the first, it is still possible to understand why both are sacrificed, because the first offering, which was slaughtered

not for its sake—

it comes by virtue of its original designation!

Its designation was made in order that atonement be achieved through it, and although it was slaughtered not for its sake and therefore no longer effects atonement, the offering itself nevertheless remains extant, and it may be sacrificed because, at the time of its designation, it was designated for this purpose and was fit to effect atonement. But since he did not achieve atonement through it because it was slaughtered not for its sake, he must bring a

second offering,

which

comes to effect atonement.

But if you say that they effected atonement,

through the first, despite the fact that it was slaughtered not for its sake—

why does the second come?

There is no need for it at all! This was his compelling reason for saying that offerings slaughtered not for their sake do not effect atonement.

It was raised as a dilemma before them:

An olah offering that was slaughtered properly, for its sake, which effects atonement for the violation of a positive mitzva: Does it effect atonement even for

a positive mitzva committed after designation

[one violated a positive mitzva after designating the olah],

or

does it effect atonement only for what he violated before the designation, whereas for what he violated and did after the designation

it does not effect atonement?

it does not atone?

And the Gemara explains the two sides of the uncertainty:

Perhaps we say: It is analogous to a sin-offering—

just as with a sin-offering,

only for a sin

that preceded designation, it does

[indeed, it effects atonement], but for a sin

that followed designation, it does not

effect atonement,

so too here,

with regard to an olah, only for a sin

that preceded designation, it does.

But for a sin that was committed

after designation, it does not.

Or perhaps it is not analogous—an olah

to a sin-offering

, because with regard to a sin-offering, for every sin [for example, he ate forbidden fat and blood, or he ate forbidden fat unwittingly and learned of his unwitting act, and afterward again ate forbidden fat unwittingly]

he must bring one sin-offering

on its own, since a sin-offering does not effect atonement for several sins.

But

in this case, with regard to an olah offering,

since, if there are several

transgressions,

it effects atonement for all of them,

one olah offering effects atonement for all of them, perhaps even

for a positive mitzva,

for the violation of a positive mitzva

that was committed

after designation, it also effects atonement.

Come and hear from that which was taught in a beraita: It is stated with regard to an olah offering, “ And he shall lean his hand upon the head of the olah”— and it shall be accepted for him, to effect atonement for him.” And this is apparently difficult: Does laying on of hands effect atonement? Is atonement not achieved only through the blood, as it is stated:

that

was committed

after its designation as well.

“For the blood is the life; it effects atonement”?

For only through the sprinkling of the blood upon the altar does he achieve atonement!?

Rather, what is the meaning of

“And he shall lean”—“and it shall be accepted to effect atonement”?

It comes to teach you that if

he did not lay his hands on the animal because he regarded laying on of hands merely as

“the remnants of a mitzva”

[that is, he did not regard it as the essential mitzva, but only as the remnants of a mitzva, and therefore did not perform it],

the verse considers him as though he did not achieve atonement, yet

even though in reality he

did achieve atonement.

And the Gemara infers from the wording of the beraita:

What

is the meaning of

“he achieved atonement,”

and what

is the meaning of “as though he

did not achieve atonement”?

Is it not that “he

achieved atonement”

for a

positive mitzva that preceded designation,

but “he

did not achieve atonement for a positive mitzva of laying on hands,”

for the failure to fulfill the mitzva of laying on hands,

because

it is a positive mitzva committed after designation?

From here it is possible to resolve the dilemma, for it is proven that an olah does not effect atonement for a positive mitzva committed after designation.

for

a positive mitzva violated before designation,

but

he did not achieve atonement for a positive mitzva of placing the hands,

for neglecting the mitzva of placing the hands, because

it is a positive mitzva violated after designation? This can resolve the dilemma, since it proves that a burnt offering does not atone for a positive mitzva violated after designation.

From here it is possible to resolve the question, for it is proven that an olah does not atone for a positive commandment after the setting aside.

And we reject this:

Rava said:

But are you bringing proof from the neglect of a

positive mitzva of placing hands

to show that he does not attain atonement after the consecration? There is no proof from that, because

the case there is different, for as long as he has not slaughtered, he stands under "

Arise and place your hands!"

the command.

For he has not yet neglected the mitzva of placing hands, since he can still fulfill it, until the time of slaughter.

When does

the neglect of the

positive mitzva

occur? —

Only after slaughter,

when he can no longer place his hands. And concerning the neglect of a positive mitzva

after slaughter, we have no question,

as it is obvious that he does not attain atonement for sins committed after slaughter; the entire question concerns only sins committed between consecration and slaughter.

Rav Huna bar Yehuda said to Rava: Say

that the explanation of “it atoned” and “it did not atone” is as follows: "

It atoned"

for the person

with regard to every positive mitzva that he had transgressed, and he was saved from suffering. This includes atonement for the neglect of the positive mitzva of placing hands, as well.