Zevachim 5a (ה.) — the Talmud in English

It might have been thought

4

we do not know with regard to what

he must safeguard the utterance of his lips, and if he does not safeguard it, it shall be a voluntary offering. For as long as it was not known that, at the outset, one must have the intention lishmah, the act performed lishmah is not included in his obligation to safeguard the utterance of his lips.

And therefore

the Torah stated

the derivation from

“This is the law”,

to teach you that with regard to all offerings there is an obligation to perform them, at the outset, with the proper intent.

And

indeed, this derivation is not sufficient, because

if the Torah had stated only

“This is the law”,

it might have been thought

that if one did not perform his offerings with the proper intent,

they would be rendered entirely invalid. Therefore

the Torah stated also

“the utterance of your lips,”

“the utterance of your lips”,

to teach us that if one did not perform it with the proper intent, the offering is valid as a voluntary offering; it simply does not fulfill the owner’s obligation arising from his vow.

Reish Lakish was lying on his stomach [

he was lying on his abdomen, with his face toward the ground]

in the beit-midrash [

in the study hall]

and he raised a difficulty—

with regard to what we learned: “All offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid, but they have not fulfilled the owners’ obligation” [and he did not know that the source for this is derived from “the utterance of your lips”]—

if they are valid,

why should offerings slaughtered not for their sake not

effect acceptance

and fulfill their owners’ obligations?

And if they do not effect acceptance, why

do

they come?

That is, how are they valid for sacrifice?

Rabbi Elazar said to him:

Behold,

we find

a similar law

with regard to

the offerings of a deceased person that

are brought after death

by the heir,

which are valid but do not effect acceptance,

because there is no atonement for the dead after their death. You too should not be surprised that offerings slaughtered not for their sake are valid even though they do not effect acceptance.

As we learned

in tractate Kinnim [at the end of chapter 2]:

A woman

who gave birth and designated sin-offering and burnt-offering for her atonement and purification from the ritual impurity of childbirth,

and brought her sin-offering and died

before she had the opportunity to bring her burnt-offering,

the heirs shall bring her burnt-offering.

But if she brought

her burnt-offering

first

and died

before she had the opportunity to bring her sin-offering,

the heirs shall not bring her sin-offering,

because a sin-offering whose owners have died is left to die.

It is thus proved from the fact that “the heirs bring her burnt-offering,” even though there is no atonement or acceptance after death, that it is possible to bring an offering even though it does not effect acceptance for its owner.

He said to him

Reish Lakish:

I agree with you concerning the burnt-offering [

and likewise concerning shelamim], for indeed we find

that it comes after death,

which proves that it is brought even where it does not effect acceptance. But with regard to an

asham, which does not come after death, from where do we know

that it is sacrificed where it does not effect acceptance, such as when it was slaughtered not for its sake?

Rabbi Elazar said to him

Rabbi Elazar:

Your disagreement is right beside you [

we find a tanna in our Mishna who disagrees with the first tanna and holds as you do, that an asham slaughtered not for its sake is unfit to be sacrificed, just as a sin-offering slaughtered not for its sake is unfit]—

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even the asham

that was slaughtered not for its sake is unfit, like a sin-offering not slaughtered for its sake.

Reish Lakish was astonished that Rabbi Elazar had offered him this answer, and

said:

But is

this what they say about him: He is a great man?

But

I was saying an unequivocal Mishna [

my astonishment concerns an anonymous Mishna, which validates an asham slaughtered not for its sake and invalidates only a sin-offering],

and you say to me—

Rabbi Eliezer!?

Rather, Reish Lakish said: I will open an opening for myself

and explain that there is a reason to validate an asham offering performed not for its sake even though it does not effect acceptance, as it is written:

“The utterance of your lips”

and so on.

Thus Reish Lakish expounded the matter on his own:

Is this a voluntary offering?

But

it is a vow, as

we

expounded this verse

earlier.

Rabbi Zeira and Rabbi Yitzhak bar Abba were sitting, and Abaye was sitting with them, and they were sitting

and they were astonished at the answer that Reish Lakish had devised for himself,

and they said:

Is it not

difficult for Reish Lakish

why an

asham

slaughtered not for its sake is valid? After all, the law of an asham differs from the law of a burnt-offering and shelamim,

as it does not come after death,

and we do not find that it is sacrificed where it does not effect acceptance. If so, how

does he derive it from the text—how did he resolve this—through this verse,

of

“the utterance of your lips”,

when this verse was stated with regard to a burnt-offering and shelamim? One can refute the derivation:

Say

that only a burnt-offering or shelamim

that comes through a vow or as a voluntary offering,

if it is slaughtered not for its sake, nevertheless

let it come but not effect acceptance [

that the other rites should be performed upon it without acceptance]; but an

asham,

which does not come through a vow or as a voluntary offering,

let it not come at all,

since it is not included in the verse, “The utterance of your lips you shall safeguard”!

Abaye said to them: Reish Lakish began his lesson from here

with regard to the interpretation of the verse concerning a sin-offering, as it is stated:

“And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering,”

“it” is a restrictive term, and it teaches us that specifically “it,” the sin-offering, has the following law: if it is slaughtered

for its sake, it is valid, and if it is slaughtered

for another purpose, it is

invalid.

This implies that other sacred offerings, even if they were slaughtered

for other purposes, are

valid.

And an asham offering is included among the sacred offerings.

One might have thought that even though they were slaughtered for other purposes, they would

be

effective

for their owners;

the verse therefore states:

“That which came forth from your lips,”

teaching that they are merely voluntary offerings and that one does not fulfill one’s obligation through them, whether the obligation is that of a vow or that of an asham.

But it may nevertheless be refuted from the other side: Since the verse “That which came forth from your lips” was stated with regard to burnt-offerings and peace-offerings that come as vows or voluntary offerings, from where do we know that an asham, which does not come as a vow or voluntary offering, has the same law—that it is valid but does not effect acceptance?

And say:

An offering

that comes as a vow or voluntary offering, if it is slaughtered for another purpose,

may be brought

but may not effect acceptance;

but an offering that is an

asham,

which is not included in the verse “That which came forth from your lips,”

may also effect acceptance,

even though it was slaughtered for another purpose?

Abaye said: You cannot say that an asham effects acceptance

even when it was slaughtered for another purpose—

you cannot say that!

For it is a

kal va-chomer

from

a

burnt-offering:

What

burnt-offering,

which

is less stringent and

does not effect atonement

for the sin over which the offering is brought, if it is slaughtered for another purpose,

does not effect acceptance

for its owner;

an asham,

which is more stringent,

and effects atonement

for sins,

is it not certainly the case that if it is slaughtered for another purpose,

it

does not effect acceptance?

And if you reject the kal va-chomer and say:

What is distinctive about a burnt-offering

that makes it more stringent than an asham offering?

It is distinctive in that

it is burned

entirely

on the altar. Can you say the same with regard to an asham, which is less stringent than it, since it is eaten by the priests, and therefore it should effect acceptance even when it is slaughtered for another purpose?

Peace-offerings

that are eaten by their owners

will prove

the contrary: they are less stringent than an asham in that they do not come for a sin, and nevertheless they do not effect acceptance when they are slaughtered for other purposes; how much more so an asham, which comes for a sin.

And if you reject the kal va-chomer from peace-offerings and argue:

What is distinctive about peace-offerings

is that they have a stringency that an asham does not have;

they are distinctive in that

they

require libations and the waving of the breast and thigh,

and an asham cannot be derived from them by a kal va-chomer—

A burnt-offering will prove

that it does not have the waving of the breast and thigh, and nevertheless it does not effect acceptance when it is slaughtered for another purpose.

And the ruling returns: neither this one can be viewed as like that one, nor that one can be viewed as like this one; the common denominator between them [

the burnt-offering and the peace-offerings] is

that they are sacred offerings and were slaughtered for other purposes,

and

they are valid but do not effect acceptance.

I too will include an asham, which is sacred and was slaughtered for another purpose,

which is

valid but does not effect acceptance .

And there is still room to refute:

It may still be refuted:

What is distinctive about the common denominator between them [

the burnt-offering and peace-offerings]?

They exist among communal offerings [

a burnt-offering in the daily and additional offerings, and peace-offerings in the lambs of Shavuot]. Can you say the same with regard to an asham, which is never sacrificed as a communal offering?

And we answer:

A thanksgiving-offering will prove

that it is not sacrificed as a communal offering, and nevertheless, if it is slaughtered for another purpose, it does not effect acceptance.