Zevachim 4b (ד:) — the Talmud in English

And even though the two

stringencies—[that its disqualification is intrinsic, and that it remains after death]—are among those four stringencies,

not necessarily

meaning, it is possible to say that they also apply in the case of shinui ba'alim, as will be explained below,

the two

remaining stringencies—[the intrinsic disqualification in all four sacrificial rites, and that it applies to communal offerings as it does to individual offerings]

are indeed, necessarily so.

And on the basis of those two stringencies, one cannot derive shinui ba'alim from shinui kodesh.

The Gemara explains what the two stringencies that are not necessarily applicable are:

1.

What is different about shinui ba'alim, that its disqualification is not intrinsic

because it is merely

a thought; shinui kodesh, too

, why should it be regarded as an intrinsic disqualification? After all,

it is merely a thought!

Rather, it is necessarily the case that the deficiency is not merely in the thought itself, but

once he conceived of it

as being for another offering,

he disqualified it

with an intrinsic disqualification. And if so,

here too,

with regard to the thought of shinui ba'alim, it may be said:

once he conceived of it

so that other owners would achieve atonement through it,

he disqualified it

with an intrinsic disqualification.

2.

And according to Rav Pinḥas, son of Rav Mari, who said

that if the person who set aside the offering dies, the heir becomes the owner of the offering, and it must be performed so that the heir, who is its owner, will achieve atonement through it, according to his view

there is

a

disqualification of shinui ba'alim

also

after the death

of the person who set it aside, and after death there is no distinction between the law of shinui kodesh and the law of shinui ba'alim.

And the Gemara continues its question: From where do we know that shinui ba'alim disqualifies during the other sacrificial rites? It cannot be derived from shinui kodesh, since

two

stringencies

at least can be raised as an objection.

That is, shinui kodesh has two stringencies—the intrinsic disqualification in all four rites, and its applicability to communal offerings as well as individual offerings—which shinui ba'alim does not have. If so, one can still object: What is unique about shinui kodesh, which has these stringencies and therefore applies during all the rites, unlike shinui ba'alim? And from where do we know that the disqualification of shinui ba'alim takes effect during all four rites?

Rather, Rav Ashi said

we find a verse teaching that shinui ba'alim disqualifies during zerika [in addition to slaughter, which was already derived above]:

The verse says

“And it shall be accepted for him, to atone for him.”

Atonement is effected through the sprinkling of the blood, and we expound: “to atone for him,”

but not for another.

This indicates that the sprinkling of the blood must be performed for the owner, the one who achieves atonement through the sprinkling.

The Gemara challenges this:

And is this

“to atone for him”

what it comes for? This is needed for that which was taught:

“And it shall be accepted for him, to atone for him”—

Rabbi Shimon says

the verse is expounded as follows:

One which

is upon him—

that is, an offering which he became obligated through a vow to bring—he is

responsible for it.

It is not sufficient merely to set aside the offering; rather, he must offer it, and if it is lost, he is obligated to bring another offering in its place. Until his vow has been fulfilled, it is not accepted for him.

And one which

is not upon him—

for example, when he said, “This is an offering,” without obligating himself through a vow—he

is not responsible for it,

even though his voluntary offering has not been fulfilled.

And Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said: What is the reason

that when he vows, “It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering,” he does not discharge his obligation merely by setting aside the offering, but remains responsible for it if it is lost?

Once he says

“it is”

incumbent upon me

to bring an offering, he is

like one who has it placed upon his shoulders

—the obligation is, as it were, “placed upon his shoulders” until the offering is brought; therefore, setting it aside is insufficient.

And since this verse is expounded as establishing the person who vows’ responsibility, it is no longer available to be expounded with regard to shinui ba'alim during zerika!

The Gemara answers:

Rav Ashi

did not derive it from “to atone for him,” but

from

“And it shall be accepted for him, to atone”

he said,

and its meaning is: for him, to atone, but not for another!

We have found

the source that shinui ba'alim disqualifies during the rites of

slaughter and zerika.

Receiving—

from where

do we know that shinui ba'alim disqualifies during it?

And if you would say that he derives

receiving

from slaughter and zerika,

one can object:

What is unique about zerika and slaughter, that

they

are rites for which one is liable when performed outside

the Temple courtyard? If one slaughters consecrated animals outside the camp of the Divine Presence or sprinkles the blood of consecrated offerings there, he is liable to receive karet. This does not apply to receiving or conveying. Thus, the rites of slaughter and zerika are more stringent than receiving and conveying. How, then, can disqualification through a thought of shinui ba'alim during receiving be derived from slaughter and zerika?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The source for disqualification through a thought of shinui ba'alim during all the rites is not derived from “the flesh of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering”; rather,

it is derived from

what is stated concerning

the nazirite’s ram:

“And he shall perform the ram as a peace offering,”

and we expound

that its performance must be for the sake of a peace offering.

And if it is not needed

for this exposition

for shinui kodesh, which is derived

above

from there,

from “And if his sacrifice is a peace offering,”

apply it to shinui ba'alim!

Since it is derived from the nazirite’s ram, this derivation includes all the rites, as it says “he shall perform,” whose meaning encompasses all performances.

Rav Aḥa bar Abba said to Rava:

What has the derivation accomplished by establishing shinui ba'alim during zerika and receiving from this verse?

Say

that this verse contains a generalization and a specification, and we expound it as follows: “And the ram

he shall perform”—

a generalization,

meaning that all the rites of the ram must be performed with the proper designation. “A

sacrifice

of peace offerings”—

a specification,

meaning that only the slaughter must be performed with the proper designation. We have already learned in the beraita of the thirteen hermeneutical principles through which the Torah is expounded that when a verse contains

a generalization and a specification,

the generalization includes only what is specified.

Accordingly,

slaughter, yes

[it must indeed be performed with the proper designation],

but other matters

[the other rites of the offering]

do not

need to be performed with the proper designation?! We would then have no source for shinui ba'alim during receiving, conveying, and zerika.

Rava answered him:

If it were written

“And the ram of the peace offerings

he shall perform as a peace offering”—

as you say,

it would be considered a generalization and a specification, because the verse would first state the generalization, “he shall perform as a peace offering,” and then specify, “sacrifice,” teaching that all its rites must be for the sake of a peace offering. But

now that it is written

“And the ram

he shall perform as a sacrifice of peace offerings,”

the verse interrupts the generalization “he shall perform as a peace offering” with the specification “sacrifice,” which is written between “he shall perform” and “peace offerings.” Therefore,

it is

this generalization,

“an incomplete generalization”

[because its wording is interrupted in the middle],

and every incomplete generalization—

is not expounded as a generalization and a specification.

Ravina said: One always expounds

a generalization and a specification even when the generalization is incomplete; rather, here it is a generalization, a specification, and a generalization, not merely a generalization and a specification. For at the end of this verse it says, “A sacrifice of peace offerings

to the Lord,” and by writing “to the Lord,” the verse

returns and generalizes

, teaching that every rite of an offering to the Lord must be performed with the proper designation; and if it is not needed for the proper designation, apply it to shinui ba'alim.

, teaching that every rite of an offering to the Lord must be performed with the proper designation; and if it is not needed for the proper designation, apply it to shinui ba'alim.

Rav Aḥa of Difti said to Ravina: But the first generalization does not resemble the final generalization

and it cannot be expounded as a generalization, specification, and generalization. For

the first generalization,

derived from “he shall perform as a peace offering,”

includes

only the

rites

of the offering that are specifically connected with atonement [slaughter, receiving, conveying, and zerika]

and no more.

Whereas

the final generalization

comes to teach about

all

the rites of the offering that are

for the Lord,

including the pouring of the remainder of the blood

and

the burning of the sacrificial portions,

which do not impede atonement. Since the first generalization does not resemble the final generalization, it cannot be expounded as a generalization, specification, and generalization.

Ravina said to him:

This

tanna, who expounds it as a generalization, specification, and generalization even though the final generalization does not resemble the first,

is the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael,

who expounds

generalizations and specifications in this manner.

The Gemara explains how, through a generalization, specification, and generalization, we learn that all rites specifically connected with atonement must be performed for the owner of the offering:

A generalization, specification, and generalization—you may derive only something similar to the specification—

just as the specification explicitly refers to a rite

[slaughter] that impedes atonement,

we require

it to be performed

for the proper designation; so too, every rite

that impedes atonement,

we require

it to be performed

for the proper designation.

And if it is not needed for shinui kodesh, apply it to shinui ba'alim.

The Gemara challenges this: It is possible to expound it differently:

If the specification explicitly refers to a rite

of a kind that

carries liability

for karet if performed

outside

[since slaughtering consecrated animals outside carries liability for karet],

so too, every rite for which one is liable when performed outside

must be performed for the proper designation. It would follow that specifically

slaughter and zerika

for which one is liable for karet if performed outside

yes

[must indeed be performed for the proper designation], but the rites of

receiving and conveying,

for which one is not liable when performed outside,

do not

need to be performed for the proper designation.

Alternatively,

we may expound it as follows:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to something requiring the north,

as there are offerings whose slaughter must take place only in the northern part of the courtyard,

and which applies to inner sin offerings,

whose blood is sprinkled inside, in the Sanctuary,

so too, every

sacrificial rite

requiring

performance in the

north

[such as receiving the blood, which too is performed in the north for some offerings],

and which applies

to all offerings, even

inner sin offerings,

is the one that must be performed with the proper designation. It would follow that only

slaughter and receiving

for both of which we find a form performed specifically in the north and which apply even to inner sin offerings

yes

[are indeed included among the rites that must be performed for the proper designation], but

zerika

on the altar, for which we find no law of the north and which does not apply to inner sin offerings,

does not

belong among the rites that must be performed for the proper designation?! The Gemara answers: Indeed, both of these possibilities apply to the exposition of the verse. But since

it can be said this way,

that the generalization comes to include a rite for which one is liable when performed outside, namely zerika,

and

on the other hand

it can be said this way,

that the generalization comes to include only a rite requiring the north and applying to all offerings, namely receiving, and the two derivations

are equally balanced, and

therefore they said that

both should come,

meaning that all the rites should be performed with the proper designation. [Conveying is derived from receiving, as stated above on page 1: “The Merciful One expressed receiving in the language of conveying, to indicate that conveying is not excluded from the category of receiving.”]

Another version

stated this answer in a different form—

[It is equally balanced, and each]

each one and the other,

every rite derived through one of the derivations,

remains established in the matter,

will retain its derivation from the verse.

It follows that a change of owner in all the avodot is derived through the principle of a generalization, specification, and generalization: Since the verse is not needed for a change of sacred designation, apply it to a change of owner.

Alternatively,

the change of owner is always relevant to slaughter and sprinkling; it is not derived from the nazirite’s ram, but only to receiving. Therefore, it is impossible to use the generalization and specification to exclude sprinkling, since the disqualification of

sprinkling

through a change of owner

is derived from Rav Ashi,

who derived it above from “and it shall be accepted for him to atone”—for him and not for another, meaning that a change of owner invalidates sprinkling. It is therefore necessarily the case that sprinkling was not excluded through the generalization and specification .

The Gemara now returns to explain the derivation of a change of owner in all the avodot from the verse, “And he shall prepare the nazirite’s ram as a peace-offering for the Lord.”

We have found this with regard to the nazirite’s ram,

for from the verse concerning it they expounded that “its avoda must be performed for the sake of a peace-offering,” and through “if it is not needed” we learned that a change of owner invalidates it.

The other peace-offerings—

from where

do we know that they must be performed for the sake of their owners?

And if you would say, let us derive it

by means of what we find,

from the nazirite’s ram,

there is a basis for refuting this derivation:

What is distinctive about the nazirite’s ram

is that it has a stringency not found in other peace-offerings,

for it is accompanied by other blood.

For the nazirite is obligated to bring a sin-offering and a burnt-offering with it; it does not come by itself. Perhaps a change of owner invalidates only it, because it is more stringent, but not other peace-offerings.

We answer:

If so,

if the law of a change of owner applied only to a nazirite’s peace-offering,

the Torah should have written

“And he shall prepare the ram as a sacrifice

of his peace-offerings,”

which would have attributed the requirement that the slaughter be performed for its sake only to the nazirite’s ram [and through “if it is not needed for a change of sacred designation” we would derive the law of a change of owner]. And

why

did the Torah write, “He shall prepare it as a sacrifice

of peace-offerings”?

To include all peace-offerings,

which must be performed for their sake. And if the verse is not needed for a change of sacred designation, apply it to a change of owner, with regard to all peace-offerings.

We have found this with regard to peace-offerings,

which must be performed for the sake of their owners.

The rest of all the sacred offerings—

from where do we derive it?

And if you would say, let us derive it

by means of what we find,

from peace-offerings,

there is a basis for refuting this derivation:

What is distinctive about peace-offerings

is that they have a stringency,

for they require semikha

by the owners,

and libations

of wine,

and the waving of the breast and thigh,

which are given to the koen. In contrast, among the other offerings, none has the waving of the breast and thigh; some do not require semikha and libations [such as a firstborn offering, tithe offering, and Paschal offering], and some do not require libations [such as a sin-offering and guilt-offering].

Rather,

the source for a change of owner in the other offerings is derived as follows:

The verse says [Leviticus 7], “

This is the law of the burnt-offering, and of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the ordination-offerings, and of the sacrifice of the peace-offerings.”

The verse juxtaposed them

to all the offerings

with peace-offerings

—

Just as with peace-offerings,

when one had a thought concerning them of

either a change of sacred designation or a change of owner,

they do not fulfill the owners’ obligation, but

we require

them to be performed

for its sake [that is, for the sake of the offering and for the sake of its owner],

so too all

the offerings, when one had a thought concerning them of

either a change of sacred designation or a change of owner,

they do not fulfill the owners’ obligation, but

we require

them to be performed

for its sake,

for the sake of the offering and for the sake of its owner!

And we raise the following question: Since we have learned that they must be performed for the sake of the sacred designation and for the sake of the owners, from where do we know that if this was not done, the offering does not fulfill its owners’ obligation, but nevertheless remains valid?

Perhaps, where he slaughters them

with a change of sacred designation or with a change of owner,

they should be entirely invalidated,

because the absence of a thought “for its sake” invalidates the avoda, and it would not suffice to render the offering valid even merely to permit its flesh to be eaten?!

We answer:

The verse says [Deuteronomy 23], “

You shall safeguard and perform what emerges from your lips, as you vowed,”

a voluntary offering. But is it a “voluntary offering”?

This is a vow!

For it says concerning it, “as you vowed.” Rather, this verse is expounded as follows:

If you performed it as you vowed,

that is, you offered it for the sake of the offering and for the sake of its owner,

it shall be a vow

and you thereby fulfill your obligation to fulfill your vow.

But if not,

that is, you offered it with a change of sacred designation or with a change of owner and did not perform it as you vowed,

it shall be a voluntary offering!

This implies that the offering is valid as a voluntary offering, despite the fact that its avoda was performed with a change of sacred designation or a change of owner.

And

since we have learned from “you shall safeguard what emerges from your lips” that if the offering was not slaughtered for its sake, as stipulated in his vow, he does not fulfill his obligation and it counts for him only as a voluntary offering, it would seem necessary to understand why the Torah had to juxtapose all the offerings to peace-offerings. Could they not be derived from the verse “the utterance of your lips,” which was stated with regard to all offerings?

We answer:

And it was necessary

to write also

“the utterance of your lips,”

and it was necessary

also to have the juxtaposition of

“This is the law.”

Because

if

the Merciful One had written only “the utterance of your lips,”