Zevachim 4b — the Talmud in English

And although there are two

stringencies—[that its disqualification is inherent in it, and that it applies after death]—among those four stringencies,

not necessarily,

since it is possible to say that they also exist with a change of owners, as follows,

the two

remaining stringencies—[the inherent disqualification in all four services, and that it exists both in the community and in an individual]

at least, specifically.

And on the basis of those two stringencies, one cannot derive the change of owners from the change of sacred designation.

And the Gemara explains what the two stringencies that are not specifically so are:

1.

What is different about the change of owners, that its disqualification is not inherent in it

because it is only

mere thought; the change of sacred designation, too

why should it be considered an inherent disqualification, when

it is mere thought!

Rather, necessarily, this is not a deficiency in mere thought alone, but

since he considered it

for the sake of another offering,

he disqualified it

with an inherent disqualification. And if so,

here too,

with regard to the thought of changing owners, it can be said:

since he considered it

so that other owners would achieve atonement through it,

he disqualified it

with an inherent disqualification.

2.

And according to Rav Pinhas, son of Rav Mari, who said

that if the person who set aside the offering dies, the heir becomes the owner of the offering, and they must perform it with the intention that the heir, who is its owner, achieve atonement through it, according to him

there is

a disqualification of

change of owners

also

after the death

of the person who set it aside, and after death there is no distinction between the law of a change of sacred designation and the law of a change of owners.

[continued] And the Gemara continues its question: From where do we know that a change of owners disqualifies in the other services? For one cannot derive it from a change of sacred designation, since

two

stringencies

at least can be raised as a refutation. That is, a change of sacred designation has two stringencies [the inherent disqualification in all four services, and that it exists both in the community and in an individual] that a change of owners does not have. If so, there is still room to raise a refutation: What is distinctive about a change of sacred designation, which has these stringencies, and therefore applies in all the services, unlike a change of owners? And from where do we know that the disqualification of a change of owners takes effect in all four services?

That is, the law of a change in the designation of the offering has two stringencies—the intrinsic invalidity in all four rites and its applicability to communal offerings as well as individual offerings—that do not apply to a change of owners. If so, one can still raise the following objection: What is special about a change in the designation of the offering, which has these stringencies and therefore applies to all the rites, unlike a change of owners? And from where do we know that a change of owners invalidates all four rites?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

We find a verse teaching that a change of owners disqualifies in the sprinkling [in addition to slaughter, which was already derived above]:

The verse says: “

And it shall be accepted for him, to atone for him.”

And atonement is through the sprinkling of the blood, and we expound: “to atone for him,”

but not for another.

And it follows that the sprinkling of the blood must be performed for its owner, the one who achieves atonement through the sprinkling.

And we object:

And is this “

to atone for him”

brought for this purpose? This is needed for that which was taught: “

And it shall be accepted for him, to atone for him”—

Rabbi Shimon says

this verse is expounded as follows:

That which is

upon him,

namely, an offering that he undertook through a vow to bring, is

his responsibility,

and setting aside the offering is not sufficient; rather, he is obligated to offer it, and if it is lost, he is obligated to bring another offering in its place, and as long as his vow has not been fulfilled, it is not accepted for him.

And that which is

not upon him,

such as when he said, “This is an offering,” whereby he did not undertake a vow,

is not his responsibility,

even though his voluntary offering was not fulfilled.

And Rav Yitzhak bar Avdimi said: What is the reason

that when he vowed, “It is incumbent upon me to bring an offering,” he does not fulfill his obligation merely by setting aside the offering, but remains responsible for it if it is lost?—

Since he said

“It is”

incumbent upon me

an offering, it is

as one who has it loaded upon his shoulder,

for an obligation is placed in his words [as though it were “laid upon his shoulder”] until the offering is offered, and therefore setting it aside is not sufficient.

And since this verse is expounded for the obligation of responsibility of the one who vows, it is no longer available to expound it for a change of owners in the sprinkling!

And we answer:

Rav Ashi

did not derive it from “to atone for him,” but

from “

and it shall be accepted for him, to atone”

he says, and its meaning is: for him to atone, but not for another!

, whose meaning is: for him to effect atonement, but not for another!

We have found

the source that a change of owners disqualifies in the services of

slaughter and sprinkling.

Receiving—

from where

do we know that a change of owners disqualifies in it?

And should you say that he derives

receiving

from slaughter and sprinkling, there is a basis for refutation:

, this can be refuted:

What is distinctive about sprinkling and slaughter, for

they are

services for which one is liable when performed outside

the Temple courtyard, for if one slaughters sacred offerings outside the Camp of the Divine Presence or sprinkles the blood of sacred offerings there, he is liable for extirpation. This is not so with receiving and carrying. Thus, the service of slaughter and sprinkling is more stringent than receiving and carrying. How, then, can we derive disqualification through a thought of changing owners in receiving from slaughter and sprinkling?

Rather, Rav Ashi said:

The source for disqualification through a thought of changing owners in all the services is not derived from “the flesh of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace-offering,” but

it comes from

what is said regarding

the nazirite’s ram: “

And he shall make the ram a peace-offering sacrifice,”

and we expound

that its performance shall be for the sake of a peace-offering.

And if it is not applicable

in this exposition

to a change of sacred designation, for it is derived

above

from there, from “And if his sacrifice is a peace-offering”—

, from “And if his sacrifice is a peace offering”—

apply it to a change of owners!

And since it is derived from the nazirite’s ram, this is a derivation that includes all the services, as it says “he shall make,” whose meaning is all the performances.

Rav Aha bar Abba said to Rava:

What did the derivation accomplish for a change of owners in sprinkling and receiving from this verse? For

say

that this verse contains a generalization and a specification, and we expound it as follows: “And the ram

he shall make”—

a generalization,

that all the performances of the ram shall be with the proper intention. “

A sacrifice

of peace-offerings”—

a specification,

that only the slaughter must be performed with the proper intention. And we have already learned in the beraita of the thirteen principles by which the Torah is expounded that in a verse containing

a generalization and a specification—

the generalization contains only what is in the specification.

And according to this,

slaughter, yes [indeed must be performed with the proper intention],

[it indeed must be performed with the proper intention],

but anything else [the other services of the offering],

[the other sacrificial rites]

no,

do they not need to be performed with the proper intention?! And again we have no source for a change of owners in receiving, carrying, and sprinkling.

Rava answered him:

If it were written “And the peace-offering ram

he shall perform a peace-offering sacrifice”—

he shall make a peace-offering sacrifice”—

as you say, it would be considered a generalization and a specification, because at first the verse generalized, “he shall make a peace-offering,” and afterward specified, “sacrifice,” to teach that its performances shall be for the sake of a peace-offering. But

it would be considered a generalization and a specification, because the verse would first state the generalization, “he shall perform as a peace offering,” and then specify, “sacrifice,” teaching that all its rites must be for the sake of a peace offering. But

now that it is written “And the ram

he shall perform a sacrifice of peace offerings,”

he shall make a sacrifice of peace-offerings,”

the verse has interrupted the generalization “he shall make a peace-offering” by the specification “sacrifice,” which was written between “he shall make” and “peace-offerings”; therefore

it is

this generalization

an incomplete generalization [whose words were not completed because of the interruption in the middle of the generalization],

[whose wording is not completed because of the interruption in the middle], and

and every incomplete generalization—

one does not expound it as a generalization and specification.

Ravina said: One always expounds

by means of a generalization and specification even when the generalization is incomplete; rather, here it is a generalization, specification, and generalization, not a generalization and specification. For at the end of this verse it says, “a sacrifice of peace-offerings

to the Lord,” and by writing “to the Lord” the verse returned

returns and makes a general statement

and generalized,

to teach that every service of an offering to the Lord must be performed with the proper intention; and if it is not applicable to the proper intention, apply it to a change of owners.

Rav Aha of Difti said to Ravina: But the first generalization is not similar to the later generalization,

and it is impossible to expound it as a generalization, specification, and generalization. For

the first generalization,

derived from “he shall make a peace-offering,”

includes only the

only the

performances

of the offering that are designated for atonement [which are slaughter, receiving, carrying, and sprinkling]—

and no more. Whereas

Whereas

the later generalization comes to teach about

teaches about

all

the services of the offering that are

for the Lord,

including the pouring of the remainder

of the blood

and the burning of the sacrificial portions,

which do not obstruct atonement. Since the first generalization is not similar to the last generalization, it is impossible to expound it as a generalization, specification, and generalization.

Ravina said to him:

This,

the tannaitic authority who expounds by means of a generalization, specification, and generalization despite the fact that the latter generalization is not similar to the first generalization,

is the tannaitic authority of the school of Rabbi Ishmael, who expounds

generalizations and specifications in this manner.

general statements and specific statements in this manner.

And the Gemara explains how, through a generalization, specification, and generalization, one learns that all the services designated for atonement must be performed for the sake of the owner of the offering:

A generalization, specification, and generalization: You may expound only in accordance with the nature of the specification—

just as the specification explicitly refers to a service

[slaughter] that obstructs atonement,

and we require

that it be performed

with the proper intention, so too every service

that obstructs atonement

we require

that it be performed

with the proper intention.

And if it is not applicable to a change of sacred designation, apply it to a change of owners.

And we object: It is possible to expound it in another manner—

If the specification explicitly refers to a service such that one

of the kind

is liable for it

for extirpation if one performed it

outside [for slaughtering sacred offerings outside entails extirpation],

[since slaughtering sacrificial animals outside entails karet],

then every service for which one is liable outside

must be performed for its sake. It follows that specifically

slaughter and sprinkling,

for which one is liable for extirpation if one performed them outside,

yes [indeed must be performed for its sake], but the services of

[they indeed must be performed for the sake of the owner], whereas

receiving and carrying,

for which one is not liable outside,

no,

they do not need to be performed with the proper intention?

Alternatively,

we shall expound it as follows:

Just as the specification explicitly refers to something requiring the north,

for there are offerings whose slaughter is only in the north of the courtyard,

and it exists in the inner sin-offerings,

whose blood is sprinkled inside, in the Sanctuary,

so too every

service act

requiring

performance in the

north [such as receiving the blood, which too, in some offerings, is performed specifically in the north]

[such as receiving the blood, which too takes place in the north specifically for some offerings]

and existing

in all offerings, even

in the inner sin-offerings,

is the one that must be performed with the proper intention. It follows that only

slaughter and receiving ,

for both of them we find a manner in which they are performed specifically in the north and apply even to the inner sin-offerings,

yes [indeed are included in the generalization that they must be performed for its sake], but

[they indeed are included among the rites that must be performed with the proper intention], but

sprinkling

on the altar, for which we find no law of north at all and which does not apply to the inner sin-offerings,

no, is it not included among the services that must be performed with the proper intention?! And we answer: Indeed, these two possibilities apply to the exposition of the verse, but since

The Gemara answers: Indeed, both of these possibilities apply to the exposition of the verse. However, since

it can be said this way,

that the generalization comes to include a service for which one is liable outside, namely sprinkling,

and

on the other hand

it can be said this way,

that the generalization comes to include only a service that requires the north and applies to all offerings, namely receiving, and the two derivations

are equally balanced, and

therefore they said that

both of them should come,

to say that all the services should be performed with the proper intention. [And the service of carrying is learned from receiving, as above on page a: “The Merciful One brought receiving in the language of carrying, to say that carrying does not leave the category of receiving”] .

Another formulation: They stated this answer in another formulation—

stated this answer in a different manner: [

It is equally balanced, and every

one and one, every service learned through one of the derivations,

, every rite derived through one of the teachings,

let it remain in its matter,

let it remain with its derivation from the verse.

And it emerges that a change of owners in all the [avodot] is learned from the principle of generalization, specification, and generalization, for if it is not needed for a change of sanctity, apply it to a change of owners.

Alternatively,

in fact, a change of owners [applies] in slaughter and sprinkling; it is not learned from the nazirite’s ram, but only receiving [is learned from it]. Therefore, it is impossible to learn [by means of] generalization and specification to exclude sprinkling, since the invalidation of

sprinkling

in a change of owners

emerges from Rav Ashi,

who learned it above from “and it shall be accepted for him to atone” — for him and not for another, that a change of owners invalidates in sprinkling. And necessarily, sprinkling was not excluded from the generalization and specification .

And now the Gemara returns to explain the derivation for a change of owners in all the [avodot] from the verse, “And the nazirite’s ram he shall make a sacrifice of peace-offerings to the Lord.”

We have found the nazirite’s ram

for which they expounded from the verse concerning it that “its [avodot] must be performed for the sake of peace-offerings,” and we learned through “if it is not needed” that a change of owners invalidates it.

The other peace-offerings —

from where

do we know that they must be performed for the sake of their owners?

And if you would say, let us learn

by means of what is found in one case

from the nazirite’s ram,

there is a basis for refuting it:

What is different about the nazirite’s ram

that it has a stringency not found in the other peace-offerings?

For it has other bloods with it,

for the nazirite is obligated to bring with it a sin-offering and a burnt-offering, and it does not come by itself. Perhaps a change of owners invalidates only in its case, because it is stringent, but not in the case of the other peace-offerings.

And we answer:

If so,

if the law of a change of owners applies only to the peace-offerings of a nazirite,

the Merciful One should have written,

“And the ram he shall make a sacrifice of

his peace-offerings,”

for in this manner the law of performing the slaughter for its sake would have been attributed only to the nazirite’s ram [and through “if it is not needed for a change of sanctity” we would have learned it for a change of owners]. And because of

what

did the Torah write, “He shall make a sacrifice of

peace-offerings”? —

To include all peace-offerings,

which must be performed for their sake. And if it is not needed for a change of sanctity, apply it to a change of owners, in all the peace-offerings.

We have found [this] for peace-offerings,

that they must be performed for the sake of their owners.

The other sacred offerings —

from where do we know it?

And if you would say, let us learn

by means of what is found in one case

from peace-offerings,

there is a basis for refuting it:

What is different about peace-offerings

that they have a stringency,

for they require laying on of hands

of the owners,

and libations

of wine,

and the waving of the breast and thigh,

which are given to the koen; whereas in all the other sacrifices there is no waving of the breast and thigh, and some of them do not require laying on of hands and libations [for example, the firstborn, the tithe, and the Passover-offering], and some of them do not require libations [for example, a sin-offering and a guilt-offering].

Rather,

the source for a change of owners in the other sacrifices is learned as follows:

The verse says [Leviticus 7], “

this is the law of the burnt-offering, and of the meal-offering, and of the sin-offering, and of the guilt-offering, and of the inauguration-offerings, and of the sacrifice of the peace-offerings.”

The verse equated them

with all the sacrifices

to

peace-offerings —

Just as peace-offerings,

when he thought in them

a change of sanctity or a change of owners,

did not count for the owners for their obligation, but

we require

performing them

for its sake [for the sake of the offering and for the sake of its owners],

so too all

so too all

the sacrifices, when he thought in them

a change of sanctity or a change of owners,

did not count for the owners for their obligation, but

we require

performing them

for its sake,

for the sake of the offering and for the sake of its owners!

And we inquire about this: since we have learned that one must perform them for the sake of the sacred offering and for the sake of the owners, from where do we know that if he did not do so, the offering did not count for its owners for their obligation, but remained valid?

Let us say that where he slaughters them

with a change of sanctity or with a change of owners,

they should become invalid

entirely, because the deficiency of the thought “for its sake” invalidates the [avoda], and it will not help to render the offering valid even merely so as to permit its meat to be eaten?!

And we answer:

the verse says [Deuteronomy 23], “

Guard the utterance of your lips, and perform as you vowed,”

a freewill-offering.

But is it a “freewill-offering”?

This is a vow!

For “as you vowed” was said concerning it. Rather, this verse is expounded as follows:

If you performed as you vowed,

meaning that you offered it for the sake of the offering and for the sake of its owners,

it shall be a vow

and you will fulfill through it the obligation of your vow.

But if not,

meaning that you offered it with a change of sanctity or with a change of owners and did not perform as you vowed,

it shall be a freewill-offering!

And it implies that the offering is valid as a freewill-offering, despite the fact that he performed its [avodot] with a change of sanctity or a change of owners.

And

since we have learned from “Guard the utterance of your lips” that if the offering was not slaughtered for its sake, as he vowed, he did not fulfill his obligation and it counts for him only as a freewill-offering, seemingly one must understand why the Torah needed to equate all the sacrifices with peace-offerings. Could they not be learned from the verse “the utterance of your lips,” which was stated concerning all the sacrifices?

And we answer:

and it was necessary

to write also

“the utterance of your lips,”

and it was necessary

also [to write] the equation of

“this is the law.”

Because

if

the Merciful One had written only “the utterance of your lips,”