Zevachim 4a — the Talmud in English

We learned in our Mishna: All the offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid. And it follows that, ab initio, we require the service to be performed for its sake, and only after the fact are they valid when the service was performed not for its sake. And we raised the question:

From where do we know that we require

ab initio

slaughtering for its sake?

And we explain:

For the verse says: “

And if his offering is a slaughtered peace-offering.” “

Slaughtered offering” is an expression of slaughter, and this verse is expounded as follows:

The slaughtering

of his offering

shall be for the sake of peace-offerings!

And we challenge: And from where do we know that “slaughtered offering” is an expression of slaughter?

Perhaps “

slaughtered offering—peace-offerings”

is their name

of all peace-offerings, and there is no derivation from here that the slaughtering must be for the sake of peace-offerings?!

And we answer: The wording of the verse proves that it comes to teach that the slaughtering of the offering must be for its sake. For one must infer from the change in the wording of the verses:

Since it is written

with regard to the other services, “

he who offers the blood of the peace-offerings,” “

he who sprinkles the blood of the peace-offerings,”

and it did not write

with regard to them

‘slaughtered offering”—

the peace-offerings,

whereas

here

it is written “

slaughtered offering”—

peace-offerings,

infer from it

that the peace-offerings are not called “a slaughtered peace-offering,” but the verse comes to teach us

that the slaughtering shall be for the sake of peace-offerings!

We have found slaughtering

which must be performed for its sake ab initio.

The other services

[receiving, carrying, and sprinkling]

from where do we know

that they must be performed for their sake ab initio?

And if you say, let us derive

the other services by a mah matzinu

from slaughtering,

there is room to refute:

What is unique about slaughtering

is that it has a stringency that does not apply to the other services, and therefore the verse was stringent with regard to it also that it be performed for its sake. Can you say the same concerning the other services, with which the verse was not stringent, and therefore they too need not be performed for their sake?

And what is the stringency of slaughtering? —

For slaughtering invalidates

the slaughtering

when it is not for the sake of the eaters on Passover

[for if he slaughtered—that is, slaughtered the Paschal offering with the intention of people who are not fit to eat the Paschal offering, such as sick or elderly people who cannot eat an olive-sized quantity of meat from the offering, the offering is invalid]. This is not so with the other services of the offering: if he received, carried, or sprinkled the blood of the Paschal offering with the intention of people who are not fit to eat it, the offering is not invalidated .

Rather,

the law of service for its sake in the other services is learned for each service from a special verse:

The source that receiving must be performed for its sake is—

The verse says “

he who offers the blood of the peace-offerings”

[and “offering” means receiving the blood] , and we expound from the redundancy of the verse, which stated “the blood of the peace-offerings” and not merely “blood”—

the receiving shall be for the sake of peace-offerings!

And we challenge:

Let the Merciful One write in connection with receiving

alone that it must be performed for its sake,

and derive slaughtering from it; why was it necessary to write also “the slaughtered offering of the peace-offerings”?

—why was it necessary to write “the sacrifice of peace offerings” as well?

And we answer:

Because there is room to refute: What is unique about receiving

is that it is more stringent than slaughtering,

for the service is invalid

the service of receiving

when performed by a non-koen or a woman ,

whereas slaughtering is valid even when performed by them; therefore, it is impossible to derive slaughtering from receiving, since it is more stringent than it.

We have found slaughtering and receiving

which must be performed for their sake ab initio.

Sprinkling—

from where do we know?

And if you say, let us derive it from these

[from slaughtering and receiving to sprinkling], there is room to refute:

What is unique about these, for they require the north

—slaughtering and receiving in the case of some offerings must be performed specifically on the northern side of the courtyard—

and

also

they are found

for these two services

in the inner sin-offerings,

whose blood the High Priest sprinkles inside, in the Sanctuary, and not on the outer altar. Can you say the same concerning sprinkling, for which there is no law of north at all and which does not apply to the inner sin-offerings .

Rather,

the source that sprinkling must be performed for its sake is from the precise wording of the verse:

The verse says: “

he who sprinkles the blood of the peace-offerings,”

and from the fact that it did not say merely “blood,” but rather “the blood of the peace-offerings,” we learned—

the sprinkling shall be for the sake of peace-offerings!

And we challenge:

Let the Merciful One write

the law of service for its sake

with regard to sprinkling

alone,

and derive

the other services

from it?

And we answer:

Because there is room to refute: What is unique about sprinkling

is that it has a stringency,

for a non-koen who performs it is liable

the one who sprinkles the blood

to death.

Can you say the same concerning the other services, for a non-koen is not liable to death for performing them?

We have found all of them

[slaughtering, receiving, and sprinkling]

to require intention for their sake; from where is carrying derived?

And if you say, let us derive it from all of them,

there is room to refute:

What is unique about all of them

is that they are considered stringent services, for their service is

a service

that is obligatory,

which cannot be dispensed with; can you say this concerning carrying,

which is not an obligatory service,

which can be dispensed with?

For one can slaughter the offering near the altar, receive its blood there, and sprinkle the blood on the altar without carrying it at all .

Rather,

the law of carrying for its sake is learned as follows:

The verse says

in the section concerning carrying the limbs and bringing them from the place of slaughter to the ramp

of the altar: “

And the koen shall offer all of it to the altar,”

and the Master said: “

offering”

this is the carrying of the limbs to the ramp ,

which must specifically be performed by a koen. It is proven from here that “offering” is an expression of carrying. On the other hand,

it was taught

concerning the verse, “And he shall slaughter the bull, and the sons of Aaron, the koanim, shall offer its blood”: “

And they shall offer it,”

this is the receiving of the blood

[and not its carrying].

And the Merciful One expressed

the law of receiving the blood

in the language of carrying

[“and they shall offer it”],

to say that the carrying

of the blood is governed by the law of receiving the blood, meaning that carrying too must be performed for its sake, and to teach us

that carrying does not go out

[is not excluded]

from the category of receiving,

even though carrying is a service that can be dispensed with.

And we have found [the law of] change of sacred designation,

that they are obligated to slaughter the offering for its sake and not for the sake of another offering,

from where do we derive [the law of] change of owners?

That one must slaughter it with the intention that its owners achieve atonement through it, and not that another person achieve atonement through it? [And below, on 46b, we learned in the Mishna that a thought of change of owners invalidates] .

Rav Pinhas, son of Rav Ami, said: The verse says,

“And the flesh of the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering of his peace-offerings”;

and the word “sacrifice” is superfluous and comes to teach us

that the slaughter shall be for the sake of a thanksgiving offering.

And apparently this teaching is superfluous, for we learned the law of change of sacred designation from other verses, as explained above. Therefore,

if it is not needed for change of sacred designation, which we derive from there, assign it to change of owners!

And we raise an objection:

But

if

this

verse, “And the flesh of the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering of his peace-offerings,”

is what it comes for? It is needed for that which was taught:

“And the flesh of the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering of his peace-offerings”—

Abba Hanin says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: This

verse

comes to teach—

a thanksgiving offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace-offering is valid,

for this is not change of sacred designation at all, and that thanksgiving offering counts for its owners toward fulfillment of their obligation. But

a peace-offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a thanksgiving offering is invalid [the offering itself is valid, but it is disqualified from fulfilling through it the obligation of his vow] .

What is the difference between this and that?—

A thanksgiving offering is called

“peace-offerings,”

for it is included among the offerings of peace-offerings, and therefore it is not considered change of sacred designation when one slaughters it for the sake of peace-offerings .

But peace-offerings

ordinary

are called

“thanksgiving.”

Therefore, it is considered change of sacred designation when one slaughters peace-offerings for the sake of a thanksgiving offering, and one does not fulfill the obligation of the vow through those peace-offerings. And since this verse comes to teach that a thanksgiving offering is called peace-offerings, while peace-offerings are not called a thanksgiving offering, if so, the verse is not available to expound by “if it is not needed for change of sacred designation, assign it to change of owners”?!

And we answer:

We are saying

“sacrifice”

[specifically]. We expound from the superfluous word “sacrifice” that if it is not needed for change of sacred designation, assign it to change of owners. Whereas Abba Hanin in the name of Rabbi Eliezer derived from “the thanksgiving offering of his peace-offerings” that a thanksgiving offering is called peace-offerings, while peace-offerings are not called a thanksgiving offering.

We derive from the superfluous word “sacrifice” that if it is not needed for the matter of changing the sacred designation, it should be applied to the matter of changing the owners’ designation. Abba Hanan, in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, derived from “of his peace-offerings” that a thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering, whereas peace-offerings are not called thanksgiving-offerings.

Still,

we raise an objection: surely the verse “And the flesh of the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering of his peace-offerings”

is needed

to teach another law, and it is not superfluous for change of owners, for we learned in the Sifra: “And the flesh of the sacrifice of the thanksgiving offering of his peace-offerings, on the day of his offering it shall be eaten”—we learned that a thanksgiving offering is eaten for a day and a night [only].

From where

do we know that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering are eaten only for a day and a night?

The verse says

“sacrifice.”

And it implies that the superfluous word “sacrifice” comes to teach concerning a sin-offering and a guilt-offering?!

And we answer:

If so,

if the word “sacrifice” was written only for this exposition—that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering are eaten for a day and a night—why was “sacrifice” written at the beginning of the verse?

Let the verse write

“sacrifice” at the end of the verse, concerning eating:

“And the flesh of the thanksgiving offering of his peace-offerings”—

“sacrifice”

on the day of his offering it shall be eaten. And from the superfluous word “sacrifice” we would derive that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering are also eaten for a day and a night. And because of

what

was it written

“sacrifice”

at the beginning of the verse? Necessarily,

derive from it two things:

one, that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering are eaten for a day and a night; two, that one must slaughter for the sake of the atonement of its owners .

We have found slaughter,

that one must slaughter for the sake of the atonement of its owners, and if he changed, it did not count for the owners toward fulfillment of their obligation.

The other services

[receiving, conveying, and sprinkling]

from where

do we know that he is obligated to perform them for the sake of the owners’ atonement, and that change of owners invalidates?

And if you would say, let us derive

the other services

from slaughter,

it can be refuted:

What is true of slaughter,

that it is more stringent than the other services,

for it invalidates

the slaughter of the Paschal offering

not for the sake of those eating it

[an old person or a sick person]

on Passover;

can you say this of the other services, in which there is no invalidation through a thought not for the sake of those eating it in the Paschal offering? Perhaps a thought of change of owners would not invalidate them either!

Rather, the source that the other services too must be performed for the sake of the owners is learned through a “what we find” analogy, as follows:

Slaughter was stated with change of sacred designation, and slaughter was stated with change of owners. Just as in the slaughter stated with change of sacred designation you did not distinguish between slaughter and the other services,

and in all of them the service must be performed for the sake of that same offering,

so too, in the slaughter stated with change of owners, you shall not distinguish among them between slaughter and the other services,

and in all of them the service must be performed for the sake of the atonement of the owners of the offering.

But concerning this teaching,

there is room to refute,

that one should not compare the law of change of owners to the law of change of sacred designation, because

what is true of change of sacred designation, namely that

it has four stringencies that do not exist in change of owners:

a.

Its invalidation is in its substance.

A thought not for its sake during the service of the offering imposes invalidation upon the offering itself, and it is not merely a deficiency in the performance of the service [a deficiency in the performance of the service is called “its invalidation is in the sacred,” as opposed to invalidation that takes effect in the offering itself, which is called “its invalidation is in its substance”], whereas a thought of change of owners is only invalidation in the act of the service. [And below we ask: “What is different, that you called change of sacred designation ‘its invalidation is in its substance’ and change of owners ‘its invalidation is in the sacred’?”] .

b. The invalidation of change of sacred designation

exists in the four services,

for in each of the four services, if he thought that he was performing this service itself for the sake of another offering [for example, during the conveying of the blood of an elevation-offering, he thought that he was conveying it for the sake of peace-offerings], the invalidation of not being for its sake takes effect in it.

This is not so with change of owners, where the thought of change is that other owners will achieve atonement through it. Since atonement is only through the sprinkling of the blood, it follows that only if, while performing one of the services, he thinks that the sprinkling will be for the atonement of other owners does he invalidate it on account of change of owners. But if he does not think about the sprinkling, but only slaughters [or conveys or receives] for other owners, there is no invalidation of change of owners at all, because the entire nature of the change is in the atonement of other owners and not in performing the service for them .

C. Disqualification of change of sacred designation

exists

also

after death, for if the one who set apart the offering dies, the heir is obligated to offer it for the sake of that same offering which the bequeather set it apart for; which is not so with change of owners, because from the moment the one who set it apart dies, it is no longer possible to make it for the sake of the bequeather’s atonement.

D. Disqualification of change of sacred designation

d. The disqualification of a change of the sacred designation

exists in the community as in an individual, for a communal offering too must be made for its sake, and if he made it for the sake of another offering, the community does not fulfill its obligation through it; which is not so with the disqualification of change of owners, which is not possible with a communal offering, for all Israel are the owners of the offering, and it is not applicable to offer it for the sake of another Israelite.

for a communal offering must also be performed with the proper designation, and if it was performed for the designation of another offering, the community does not fulfill its obligation with it. This is not the case with the disqualification of a change of ownership, which is not possible with a communal offering, since all of Israel are the owners of the offering, and it is not applicable to sacrifice it for the sake of another Israelite.