Zevachim 4a (ד.) — the Talmud in English

We learned in our Mishna: All offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid. This implies that, ideally, we require the service to be performed for its sake, and only after the fact are they valid when the service was performed not for its sake. And we raise the question:

From where do we know that we require

ideally

slaughtering for its sake?

And we explain:

As the verse states: “

And if his offering is a sacrifice of peace-offerings.” “

The term “sacrifice” denotes slaughtering, and this verse is expounded as follows:

The slaughtering

of his offering

must be for the sake of peace-offerings!

And we challenge this: From where do we know that “sacrifice” denotes slaughtering?

Perhaps “

sacrifice of peace-offerings”

is merely their name

for all sacrifices of peace-offerings, and there is no inference here that the slaughtering must be for the sake of peace-offerings?!

And we answer: The wording of the verse demonstrates that it comes to teach that the slaughtering of the offering must be for its sake. For one can infer this from the difference in the wording of the verses:

As it is written

with regard to the other services, “

the one who offers the blood of the peace-offerings,” “

the one who throws the blood of the peace-offerings,”

and it is not written

with regard to them

“sacrifice”

of the peace-offerings;

whereas

if

here it were written “

sacrifice”

of peace-offerings,

infer from it

that the peace-offerings are not called “sacrifice of peace-offerings,” but rather that the verse comes to teach us

that the slaughtering must be for the sake of peace-offerings!

We have found that slaughtering

must ideally be performed for its sake.

The other services

[receiving, carrying, and throwing]

from where do we know

that they too must ideally be performed for their sake?

And if you would say that we should derive

the other services through a binyan av

from slaughtering,

there is room to refute this:

What is special about slaughtering

that it has a stringency not found in the other services, and therefore the verse was stringent regarding it as well, requiring it to be performed for its sake? Would you say the same with regard to the other services, concerning which the verse was not stringent, and which therefore likewise do not have to be performed for their sake?

And what is the stringency of slaughtering?

For slaughtering invalidates

when performed

not for the sake of the persons who will eat the offering at Passover

[If one slaughtered the Paschal offering with the intention that it be for people who are not fit to eat a Paschal offering, such as sick or elderly people who are unable to eat an olive-bulk of meat from the offering, the offering is invalidated]. This is not so with the other services of the offering: If one received, carried, or threw the blood of the Paschal offering with the intention that it be for people who are not fit to eat it, the offering is not invalidated .

Rather,

the law requiring the other services to be performed for their sake is derived for each service from a separate verse:

The source for the requirement that receiving be performed for its sake is as follows:

The verse states: “

the one who offers the blood of the peace-offerings”

[and “offering” here means receiving the blood] . We derive from the superfluous wording of the verse, which says “the blood of the peace-offerings” rather than merely “blood”:

The receiving must be for the sake of peace-offerings!

And we challenge this:

Let the Merciful One write

the requirement that receiving alone be performed for its sake,

and derive slaughtering from it; why, then, was it necessary to write “sacrifice of the peace-offerings” as well?

—why was it necessary to write “the sacrifice of peace offerings” as well?

And we answer:

Because there is room to refute: What is special about receiving

that it is more stringent than slaughtering?

For the service of receiving is invalid

when performed by

a non-koen or a woman , whereas slaughtering is valid even when performed by them. Therefore, slaughtering cannot be derived from receiving, since receiving is more stringent than it.

Slaughter, by contrast, is valid even when performed by them. Therefore, slaughter cannot be derived from receiving, since receiving is more stringent than it.

We have found slaughtering and receiving

which must ideally be performed for their sake.

Throwing—

from where do we know?

And if you would say that we should derive it from these

[from slaughtering and receiving to throwing], there is room to refute this:

What is special about these, for they require the north

Slaughtering and receiving, for some offerings, must be performed specifically on the northern side of the Temple courtyard,

and

they

are found

as these two services

in the inner sin-offerings,

whose blood the High Priest sprinkles inside, in the Sanctuary, and not on the outer altar. Would you say the same with regard to throwing, which has no law of the north at all and is not performed in the inner sin-offerings?

Rather,

the source that throwing must be performed for its sake is derived from the precise wording of the verse:

The verse states: “

the one who throws the blood of the peace-offerings.”

Since it does not say merely “blood,” but “the blood of the peace-offerings,” we learn:

The throwing must be for the sake of peace-offerings!

And we challenge this:

Let the Merciful One write

the law requiring a service to be performed for its sake

concerning throwing

alone,

and derive

the other services

from it?

And we answer:

Because there is room to refute: What is special about throwing

in that it has a stringency

for which a non-koen who performs it is liable

the one who throws the blood

to death. Would you say the same with regard to the other services, for which a non-koen who performs them is not liable to death?

Can you say the same about the other services, for which a non-priest is not liable to death?

We have found all of them

[slaughtering, receiving, and throwing]

to require performance for their sake; from where do we derive carrying?

And if you would say that we should derive it from all of them,

there is room to refute this:

What is special about all of them

in that they are considered stringent services, since their performance is

a service

that is obligatory,

which cannot be dispensed with; would you say the same regarding carrying,

which is not an obligatory service,

which can be dispensed with?

For one can slaughter the offering near the altar, receive its blood there, and throw the blood on the altar without carrying it at all .

Rather,

the law requiring carrying to be performed for its sake is derived as follows:

The verse states, in the passage concerning carrying the limbs and bringing them from the place of slaughtering to the ramp of

in the passage concerning carrying the limbs and bringing them from the place of slaughter to the ramp of

the altar: “

And the koen shall offer all of it to the altar.”

And the master said: “

Offering”

is carrying the limbs to the ramp ,

which must specifically be performed by a koen. This proves that “offering” denotes carrying. On the other hand,

it was taught

with regard to the verse, “And he shall slaughter the young bull, and the sons of Aaron, the kohanim, shall offer the blood”: “

And they shall offer it”

is receiving the blood

[and not carrying it].

And the Merciful One expressed

the law of receiving the blood

in the language of carrying

[“and they shall offer it”],

to say that carrying

the blood has the same status as receiving the blood, and that carrying too must be performed for its sake. This teaches us

that carrying does not leave

[is not excluded]

from the category of receiving,

despite the fact that carrying is a service that can be dispensed with.

And we have found the halakha of changing the sacred designation,

that one must slaughter the offering for its own designation and not for the designation of another offering,

from where do we derive the halakha of changing the ownership,

that one must slaughter it with the intention that its owners achieve atonement through it, and not with the intention that another person achieve atonement through it? [And later, on 46b, we learned in the Mishna that a thought of changing the ownership renders the offering invalid] .

Rav Pinehas, son of Rav Ami, said: The verse states: "

And the flesh of the slaughtered offering of his thanksgiving peace-offerings."

The word “slaughtered offering” is superfluous and comes to teach us

that the slaughter must be performed for the designation of a thanksgiving-offering.

This derivation would seem to be superfluous, since we learned the halakha of changing the sacred designation from other verses, as explained above. Therefore:

If it is not necessary for changing the sacred designation, which we derive from there, apply it to changing the ownership!

And we raise an objection:

But

if

this

verse, “And the flesh of the slaughtered offering of his thanksgiving peace-offerings,”

is it only coming for this purpose? It is needed for that which was taught in a beraita: "

And the flesh of the slaughtered offering of his thanksgiving peace-offerings"—

Abba Hanin says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: This

verse

comes to teach—

a thanksgiving-offering that one slaughtered for the designation of a peace-offering is valid;

this is not considered changing the sacred designation at all, and that thanksgiving-offering fulfills its owners’ obligation. But

a peace-offering that one slaughtered for the designation of a thanksgiving-offering is invalid [the offering itself is valid, but it is invalid for fulfilling his vow] .

What is the distinction between this and that?—

A thanksgiving-offering is called "

a peace-offering,"

since it is one of the category of peace-offerings. Therefore, when one slaughters it for the designation of a peace-offering, this is not considered changing the sacred designation ,

whereas peace-offerings

ordinary

are not called "

a thanksgiving-offering."

Therefore, it is considered changing the sacred designation when one slaughters a peace-offering for the designation of a thanksgiving-offering, and one does not fulfill the obligation of his vow through that peace-offering. Since this verse comes to teach that a thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering, whereas a peace-offering is not called a thanksgiving-offering, the verse is not available to be expounded by the principle, “If it is not necessary for changing the sacred designation, apply it to changing the ownership”?!

And we answer:

We are speaking of the word "

slaughtered offering."

We derive from the superfluous word “slaughtered offering” that if it is not necessary for changing the sacred designation, one should apply it to changing the ownership. Abba Hanin in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, by contrast, derived from “his thanksgiving peace-offerings” that a thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering, whereas peace-offerings are not called thanksgiving-offerings.

We derive from the superfluous word “sacrifice” that if it is not needed for the matter of changing the sacred designation, it should be applied to the matter of changing the owners’ designation. Abba Hanan, in the name of Rabbi Eliezer, derived from “of his peace-offerings” that a thanksgiving-offering is called a peace-offering, whereas peace-offerings are not called thanksgiving-offerings.

And still

we ask: The verse, “And the flesh of the slaughtered offering of his thanksgiving peace-offerings,”

is needed

to teach another law and is not superfluous for changing the ownership, since we learned in the Sifra: “And the flesh of the slaughtered offering of his thanksgiving peace-offerings shall be eaten on the day of his offering”—we learn that a thanksgiving-offering is eaten for one day and one night [only].

From where do we know concerning a sin-offering and a guilt-offering

that they too may be eaten only for one day and one night?

The verse states "

slaughtered offering."

This implies that the superfluous word “slaughtered offering” comes to teach this concerning a sin-offering and a guilt-offering?!

And we answer:

If so,

if the word “slaughtered offering” was written solely for this derivation—that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering are eaten for one day and one night—why was “slaughtered offering” written at the beginning of the verse?

Let the verse write "

“slaughtered offering” at the end of the verse, with regard to eating: "

And the flesh of his thanksgiving peace-offerings"—

a slaughtered offering

“shall be eaten on the day of his offering.” We would then derive from the superfluous word “slaughtered offering” that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering are also eaten for one day and one night. And why

for what reason

is

written “slaughtered offering”

at the beginning of the verse? Necessarily,

derive two things from it:

first, that a sin-offering and a guilt-offering are eaten for one day and one night; and second, that one must slaughter an offering for the atonement of its owners .

We have found slaughter,

that one must slaughter for the atonement of its owners, and if he changed this, the offering does not fulfill the owners’ obligation.

The other services [receiving the blood, conveying it, and sprinkling it]

[receiving the blood, carrying it, and sprinkling it]

from where

do we know that he must perform them for the atonement of the owners, and that changing the ownership renders the offering invalid?

And if you would say that we should derive

the other services

from slaughter,

this can be refuted:

What is the special feature of slaughter

that makes it more stringent than the other services?

It is that it renders invalid

the slaughter of the Paschal offering

not for the sake of its designated eaters [an elderly person or a sick person]

[for example, an elderly or sick person]

in the case of the Paschal offering.

Can you say the same concerning the other services, in which a thought not for the sake of the designated eaters does not render the Paschal offering invalid? It is possible that a thought of changing the ownership likewise does not render them invalid!

Rather, the source that the other services too must be performed for the owners is derived through a ma matzinu—an analogy from a parallel case—as follows:

Slaughter is stated with regard to changing the sacred designation, and slaughter is stated with regard to changing the ownership. Just as, in the case of the slaughter stated with regard to changing the sacred designation, you did not distinguish between slaughter and the other services

and in all of them the service must be performed for the designation of that offering,

so too, in the case of the slaughter stated with regard to changing the ownership, you should not distinguish among them between slaughter and the other services

and in all of them the service must be performed for the atonement of the offering’s owners.

But concerning this derivation,

there is a basis for refuting it,

as the law of changing the ownership cannot be compared to the law of changing the sacred designation, because

what is distinctive about changing the sacred designation is that

it has four stringencies that do not apply to changing the ownership:

1.

Its invalidity is in the offering itself.

A thought not for its proper designation during the service of an offering establishes invalidity in the offering itself; it is not merely a deficiency in performing the service. [A deficiency in performing the service is called “its invalidity is in the sacred service,” as opposed to an invalidity that takes effect in the offering itself, which is called “its invalidity is in the offering itself.”] A thought of changing the ownership, by contrast, constitutes only an invalidity in the act of the service. [And later we ask: “What is different, that you called changing the sacred designation ‘its invalidity is in the offering itself,’ whereas you called changing the ownership ‘its invalidity is in the sacred service’?”] .

2. The invalidity of changing the sacred designation

applies to all four services,

for during each of the four services, if he thought that he was performing that service itself for the designation of another offering [for example, while conveying the blood of a burnt-offering, he thought that he was conveying it for the designation of a peace-offering], the invalidity of not-for-its-proper-designation takes effect.

This is not so with regard to changing the ownership, since the thought constituting the change is that other owners will achieve atonement through it. Since atonement is achieved only through sprinkling the blood, it follows that he renders the offering invalid because of changing the ownership only if, while performing one of the services, he thinks that the sprinkling will be for the atonement of other owners. But if he does not think about the sprinkling and merely slaughters [or conveys or receives the blood] for other owners, there is no invalidity of changing the ownership, since the entire essence of the change concerns the atonement of other owners and not performing the service for them .

c. The disqualification of a change of the sacred designation

exists

also

after death,

for if the person who designated the offering dies, the heir is obligated to sacrifice it for the designation of the same offering that the deceased had designated. This is not the case with a change of ownership, since once the person who designated the offering dies, it is no longer possible to perform the offering for the atonement of the person who designated it.

d. The disqualification of a change of the sacred designation

applies to a communal offering as it does to an individual offering,

for a communal offering must also be performed with the proper designation, and if it was performed for the designation of another offering, the community does not fulfill its obligation with it. This is not the case with the disqualification of a change of ownership, which is not possible with a communal offering, since all of Israel are the owners of the offering, and it is not applicable to sacrifice it for the sake of another Israelite.