Zevachim 3b (ג:) — the Talmud in English

If the partition saved

the partition

in

a tent

of the dead

the

more severe

this is because

it is the case that

people ordinarily

divide tents

with a partition, therefore, the second side of the partition is considered a tent in its own right. But how

can

the partition

in a vessel—

an earthenware vessel

save the food from the impurity of a creeping animal

which is less severe, since

it is

not

the practice of people to

divide

with a partition

in an earthenware vessel?

Therefore, despite the fact that they divided it with a partition, we consider the two sides of the partition as one “inside.”

The Gemara asks that, seemingly, it follows that Rav’s words—“what is not of its kind does not destroy within it”—depend on the dispute in this beraita:

For

this is understandable according to the Rabbis,

who said that a partition does not block impurity in an earthenware vessel. Rav’s statement that something not of its type cannot invalidate its status is then understandable. Just as the partition does not divide the inside of the earthenware vessel into two areas because the partition is not considered of the type of an earthenware vessel, so too, slaughtering an offering with the intention that it be for a non-sacred offering does not invalidate the unspecified intention that it be for its designated purpose, because that intention is not of its type.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who derived by a kal va-chomer that a partition, despite not being of the same type as the oven, divides it and invalidates something within it,

what is there to say?

Why, according to him, when one slaughters a sin-offering with the intention that it be for a non-sacred offering—which is not of its type—is the sin-offering not disqualified!?

We answer: In truth, Rabbi Eliezer accepts Rav’s principle that something not of its type cannot invalidate its status. He disagreed with the Rabbis only with regard to a partition, because

Rabbi Eliezer stated a kal va-chomer:

Since a partition is effective in the more severe impurity of a tent of the dead to save what is beyond it, it certainly should be effective in an earthenware vessel against the less severe impurity of a creeping animal, despite not being of the same type as the earthenware vessel.

We object:

If so,

if, in the case where we derive a kal va-chomer, something not of its type can invalidate its status,

there,

in the matter of slaughtering offerings,

let us also say

a kal va-chomer:

If sacred offerings invalidate sacred offerings

through an intention that changes the designation of the offering, despite the fact that both are sacred offerings and the change is not so great,

non-sacred offerings,

which are completely different from sacred offerings,

all the more so

should one who slaughters with the intention that it be for a non-sacred offering invalidate the sacred offering! On the basis of this difficulty, the Gemara offers another explanation:

Rather,

this is

the reason for Rav’s

statement: It is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar.

For Rabbi Elazar said: What is the reason for Rav’s

statement that one who slaughters a sin-offering with the intention that it be an elevation-offering disqualifies it, whereas if he slaughters it with the intention that it be for a non-sacred offering, it is valid? It is because it is stated:

“And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel.”

The verse is expounded as follows: There is nothing that can profane sacred offerings except sacred offerings themselves. Therefore, only

sacred offerings [

such as a sin-offering slaughtered with the intention that it be an elevation-offering]

invalidate sacred offerings,

but non-sacred offerings do not invalidate sacred offerings!

The Gemara objects: Since you have established Rav’s statement even according to Rabbi Eliezer, who derived by a kal va-chomer that a partition, although not of its type, saves what is in an earthenware vessel, but he does not derive by a kal va-chomer that non-sacred offerings invalidate sacred offerings because of the scriptural decree, “And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel,”

it follows that the verse came and removed it from the kal va-chomer.

If so, the following difficulty arises:

Here too,

with regard to the partition in an oven, how could Rabbi Eliezer derive by a kal va-chomer that it blocks impurity?

Let

the verse of

“inside,”

which teaches “inside it, but not inside its inside,”

come and remove it from the kal va-chomer!

That is, if we derive by a kal va-chomer from a tent of the dead that a mere partition is effective in dividing the oven [despite the fact that the partition is not considered of the type of the oven], why was a special exclusion of “inside” needed to exclude food that is inside the vessel from contracting impurity through the airspace of the oven? It would have sufficed that the partition of the vessel itself blocks the impurity.

Rather, necessarily, the exclusion of “inside it, but not inside its inside” is needed because a partition consisting merely of the wall of the vessel does not block impurity. If so, it is difficult: How could Rabbi Eliezer derive by a kal va-chomer that a partition saves what is in an earthenware vessel, when the verse teaching “inside it, but not inside its inside” proves that one cannot derive merely by a kal va-chomer that a partition saves?!

We answer: Rabbi Eliezer holds that

this

“inside”

is not a superfluous expression from which to derive “inside it, but not inside its inside.” Rather,

it is needed for food that was encased in clay

around it, in such a way that a creeping animal cannot touch the food and can touch only the clay,

and he inserted them

the food encased in clay

into the airspace of an oven

containing a creeping animal. From “inside it” we learn that they contract impurity through the airspace of the oven.

The verse had to teach us this law because

it might enter your mind to say: Since, through contact

with the creeping animal,

they do not become impure,

for the creeping animal cannot touch the food because it is encased in clay around it, therefore

through its airspace

of the oven

they likewise do not become impure; it teaches us

the verse “inside it,” which teaches “inside it, but not inside its inside”: only when the food is placed inside a vessel is it not rendered impure because it is in the “inside of the inside,” but not when it is encased in clay around it.

Since Rabbi Eliezer holds that “inside it” is expounded for this law, it is not superfluous to exclude the matter from the kal va-chomer. Therefore, he maintains that a partition is effective to save from impurity in an earthenware vessel, and invalidates something within it even though it is not of its type, thereby blocking the impurity between the creeping animal and the food. Its source is the kal va-chomer from a partition that saves in a tent of the dead.

And the Rabbis

held that “inside it” is superfluous, because

those

foods that were encased in clay

do not require a verse

to teach that they become impure in the oven. Their encasement is effective only with regard to impurity through contact, since the creeping animal cannot touch the food itself.

But there is no room to say that one might have thought that they would not become impure through the airspace of an earthenware vessel, since the airspace itself does not render impure; rather, being together with the creeping animal in the airspace of the vessel renders the food impure. Surely, if they were placed in the airspace of an oven, they would become impure, and therefore it is unnecessary to expound “inside it” [that is, the extra letter in “inside it,” from which the Gemara will later derive “inside it, but not inside its inside”].

Therefore, the Rabbis derived from “inside it” that only being inside the “inside of the inside” of a vessel in the oven saves one from becoming impure through the “inside” of the oven, but not a partition that is not of its type, because it does not “invalidate its status within it.”

Rav Yosef bar Ami raises a contradiction between a change of sacred designation

a sin-offering in the name of a burnt-offering

and a change of owners

a sin-offering of Reuben on the condition that Simeon achieve atonement through it,

and resolves:

And this is how he challenged it:

Who said that Rav

Rava said:

A sin-offering

for forbidden fat

that one slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering

for blood

is valid ,

but if one slaughtered a sin-offering

in the name of a burnt-offering,

it is disqualified.

Apparently, when it is not of the same type,

when one slaughtered it in the name of a burnt-offering,

it invalidates it,

whereas

when it is of the same type,

when one slaughtered it in the name of another sin-offering,

it does not invalidate it.

It follows from Rav Yosef bar Ami’s challenge that he understood Ravva’s position to be that slaughtering a sin-offering for blood in the name of a sin-offering for forbidden fat constitutes a change of sacred designation, but does not disqualify it, like a sin-offering slaughtered in the name of an ordinary animal, which does not invalidate it. [The reason is that he challenged him not from a burnt-offering slaughtered in the name of a burnt-offering, but only from blood in the name of forbidden fat, which appeared to him to be a change of sacred designation.] It requires examination what he concluded in his resolution, when he learned from the verse that the essential point is that a sin-offering was slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering: Did he mean that there is no change of sacred designation here, because there is only one designation of sin-offering? Or did the verse teach that this change of sacred designation does not disqualify a sin-offering, and that its status is like that of one slaughtered in the name of an ordinary animal, which does not rise to the owners’ obligation? [See note 5 on folio 2a.] Below [7a], the later authorities dispute this matter. Birkat HaZevah read there in Rashi that the sin-offering did not rise to the owners’ obligation, in the Mishna of Rabbi understood that it was valid and did rise to the owners’ obligation. More simply, the issue is whether the designation of the sin is applied to the offering, as we learned below [46b]: A sin-offering is slaughtered in the name of the sin; and this change of sacred designation causes it not to rise to the owners’ obligation, even though the designation of sin-offering itself was not changed. Or perhaps the designation of the offering depends only on its being a sin-offering, and a thought in the name of the sin does not change the designation of the offering. [And see the novellae of the Gaon Rabbi Hayyim on Keritot 27a. We will discuss this at greater length in its place.]

But Rav said: A sin-offering that one slaughtered

with a change of owners

for someone who is obligated to bring a sin-offering

is

disqualified,

but if one slaughtered it

for someone

who is not obligated to bring a sin-offering, but

is obligated only to bring a burnt-offering,

it is

valid .

Apparently, the opposite principle is demonstrated: When one slaughters a sin-offering for someone who is obligated to bring a sin-offering like him,

the matter

is of the same type;

it

invalidates it,

and it is disqualified?!

And he resolves, Rav Yosef bar Ami: The law of a change of sacred designation differs from that of a change of owners. There, in the case of a change of sacred designation, “ and he shall slaughter it as a sin-offering” —

that its slaughter must be in the name of a sin-offering —

the Merciful One stated!

And

therefore, if one slaughtered a sin-offering for forbidden fat in the name of a sin-offering for blood, the sin-offering is not disqualified, because

a sin-offering was slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering,

and we are not concerned that he slaughtered the sin-offering for forbidden fat in the name of a sin-offering for blood. Therefore, even though it was slaughtered in the name of an offering of the same type,

it does not invalidate it. [But if one slaughtered it in the name of a burnt-offering, even though it is not precisely of the same type, it disqualifies and invalidates it, because concerning this the verse explicitly stated “it,” to exclude.]

But

here,

in the case of a change of owners, “

and he shall effect atonement for him”

is written,

and we expound: “for him” —

but not for another!

Therefore it is disqualified only through one of the same type, for

“another” analogous to him

is implied,

that is, in a situation

where

his fellow

is obligated to achieve atonement like him. If he slaughters it with a change of owners, in the name of another who is obligated to bring a sin-offering like him, the offering is disqualified; but when the other is “not of the same type,” meaning that he is not obligated to bring a sin-offering like him, slaughtering it for him does not disqualify the offering .

Rav Haviva raises a contradiction between a change of owners and the interior of its interior and resolves: And this is how he challenged it: But who said that Rav —

was precise and wrote that “his fellow analogous to him” means one of the same type, and that it invalidates it by nullifying its designation. That is, a change of sacred designation disqualifies the offering, but it remains as a voluntary offering for its owner, since it is not a complete disqualification; whereas a change of owners, although it does not disqualify the offering, does not leave it for its owner even as a voluntary offering. [This does not appear to be the view of Tosafot above [2a], for they established the Mishna as referring to a change of owners, and concerning this the Gemara said that it should be a voluntary offering.]

a sin-offering that one slaughtered

with a change of owners

for someone who is obligated to bring a sin-offering

like him —

is disqualified, whereas for someone obligated to bring a burnt-offering it is valid!

Apparently, one of the same type invalidates it, whereas one not of the same type does not invalidate it.

But it was taught in a beraita: “

Its interior”

but not “

the interior of its interior,”

and even a metal vessel saves the foods inside it from becoming impure, even though a metal vessel is not of the same type as an earthenware vessel. This proves that even one not of the same type invalidates it?!

And Rav Haviva resolves:

Four instances of “

its interior”

are written in the passage concerning the impurity of creeping creatures in an earthenware vessel. That is: In this passage, the word “its interior” is written twice, and since it would have been possible to write only “interior,” but “its interior” was written, it is considered as though the word “interior” had been written twice. And since “its interior” was written twice, we expound twice:

interior —

its interior; interior —

its interior. Thus, it is as though the Torah had written “interior” four times.

One

was written

for itself,

to introduce the law that foods become impure from the airspace of an earthenware vessel,

and one for a gzera shava

to teach that the vessel itself also becomes impure from the airspace: Even if the creeping creature did not touch the vessel, but was suspended only in its airspace, it is impure.

One

comes to say:

“Its interior”

of this vessel, only of an earthenware vessel, causes impurity through the airspace,

but not the interior

of a vessel

of another kind.

And the other — “

its interior”

but not “

the interior of its interior”: A vessel containing foods saves them from the impurity of a creeping creature in the airspace of the oven.

And

not only does an earthenware vessel save the foods inside it, because it is of the same type as the oven and invalidates within it, but

even a metal vessel

saves the foods inside it from becoming impure through the airspace of the oven. Although it is not of the same type as the oven, it “invalidates” within it by partitioning off a place of its own, and it is called “the interior of its interior”! [And necessarily, the principal point of the verse is to teach about a metal vessel, which invalidates even when it is not of the same type. For if it had been written to teach that an earthenware vessel saves, it would have sufficed for the verse to write, “Everything that is within it shall become impure,” and we would have known that an earthenware vessel, which is of the same type, invalidates within it, since once it is of the same type as the oven, its “interior” would automatically not be considered the “interior” of the oven. From the superfluous vav in “its interior,” it is understood that the decree of the verse is that even a metal vessel, which is not of its type, also invalidates within it and saves the foods from being included within the airspace of the oven.]

a vessel containing food protects the food from impurity caused by a creeping creature in the air of the oven