Zevachim 3b — the Talmud in English

If the partition saved

the partition

in

the tent of

the dead

the

severe one,

that is because

it is so

the way of human beings to

divide tents

with a partition. Therefore, the second side of the partition is considered a tent in its own right. But how

will

the partition

in a vessel—

earthenware

save the foods from the impurity of a creeping creature,

the light one, for

it is

there is no

the way of human beings to

divide

with a partition

in an earthenware vessel?

Therefore, even though they divided it with a partition, we consider the two sides of the partition as one “inside.”

The Gemara asks that, seemingly, it follows that Rav’s words—“what is not of its kind does not destroy within it”—depend on the dispute in this beraita:

For

this works according to the Rabbis,

who said that a partition does not block in an earthenware vessel: Rav’s words, that what is not of its kind does not destroy within it, are understandable. For just as a partition does not divide the inside of an earthenware vessel into two places because the partition is not considered of the kind of the earthenware vessel, so slaughtering for the sake of non-sacred things does not destroy the anonymous intention for the sake of sacred things, since it is not of its kind.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who derived by a kal va-chomer that a partition, even though it is not of the kind of the oven, divides it and destroys within it,

what is there to say?

Why, according to him, when one slaughters a sin-offering for the sake of non-sacred things, which is not of its kind, is the sin-offering not disqualified?

We answer: in truth, Rabbi Eliezer holds the principle stated by Rav, that what is not of its kind does not destroy within it. He disagreed with the Rabbis only concerning a partition, because

Rabbi Eliezer is stating a kal va-chomer:

since in the severe impurity of the tent of the dead a partition is effective to save, it is all the more so that it should be effective in an earthenware vessel for the light impurity of a creeping creature, even though it is not of the kind of the earthenware vessel.

We challenge:

If so,

that in the place where we derived a kal va-chomer, even what is not of its kind destroys within it,

there,

in the slaughter of sacred offerings,

let us also say

a kal va-chomer:

If sacred offerings profane sacred offerings

through an intention involving a change of sacred designation, even though both are sacred offerings and the change is not so great,

non-sacred things,

which are entirely different from sacred offerings,

is it not all the more so

that one who slaughters for the sake of non-sacred things will profane the sacred offering?! On the strength of this difficulty, the Gemara brings another explanation:

Rather,

this is

Rav’s reason—

as Rabbi Elazar.

For Rabbi Elazar said: What is Rav’s reason

for saying that one who slaughters a sin-offering for the sake of a burnt-offering disqualifies it, but if he slaughters it for the sake of non-sacred things it is valid? Because it is stated:

“And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel.”

And the verse is expounded as follows: there is nothing that can profane sacred offerings except sacred offerings themselves; therefore only

sacred offerings [

such as a sin-offering for the sake of a burnt-offering]

profane sacred offerings.

And non-sacred things do not profane sacred offerings!

We challenge: since you established Rav’s words even according to Rabbi Eliezer, who derived by a kal va-chomer that a partition, which is not of its kind, will save in an earthenware vessel, but he does not derive by a kal va-chomer that non-sacred things profane sacred offerings because of the scriptural decree, “And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel,”

it follows that the verse came and removed it from the kal va-chomer.

If so, it is difficult:

here too,

in the case of the partition in the oven, how did Rabbi Eliezer derive by a kal va-chomer that it blocks? Surely

let

the verse of

“inside”,

which teaches “its inside but not the inside of its inside,”

come and remove it from the kal va-chomer!

That is, if we derive by a kal va-chomer from the tent of the dead that an ordinary partition is effective to divide the oven [even though the partition is not considered of the kind of the oven], then why was a special exclusion of “inside” needed to exclude foods that are inside the vessel from becoming impure through the airspace of the oven? It would have been sufficient that the partition of the vessel itself blocks.

Rather, it must necessarily be that the exclusion of “its inside but not the inside of its inside” is needed because the partition of merely the vessel’s wall does not block. If so, it is difficult: how did Rabbi Eliezer derive by a kal va-chomer that a partition saves in an earthenware vessel? From the verse that teaches “its inside but not the inside of its inside,” it is evident that one cannot learn merely by a kal va-chomer that a partition saves!

We answer: Rabbi Eliezer holds that

this

“inside”

is not a redundant verse from which to expound “its inside but not the inside of its inside”; rather,

it is needed for foods that one coated with clay

around them, in such a manner that a creeping creature cannot touch the food, but only the clay,

and brought them

the foods coated with clay

into the airspace of an oven

in which there is a creeping creature. From “its inside” we learn that they become impure through the airspace of the oven.

And Scripture needed to teach us this law, because

it might enter your mind to say: since through touching

the creeping creature

they do not become impure,

for the creeping creature cannot touch the foods because they are coated with clay around them, therefore

through its airspace

of the oven

they likewise do not become impure; it teaches us

the verse “its inside,” which teaches “its inside but not the inside of its inside”: only when the foods are placed in a vessel are they not rendered impure because they are in the “inside of the inside,” but not when they are coated with clay around them.

And since Rabbi Eliezer holds that “inside” is expounded for this law, it is not redundant to exclude through a kal va-chomer. Therefore, his view is that a partition is effective to save from impurity in an earthenware vessel, and destroys within it even though it is not of its kind, and blocks between the creeping creature and the foods; its source is the kal va-chomer from a partition that saves in the tent of the dead.

And the Rabbis

held that “inside” is redundant, because

those

foods that one coated with clay

do not need Scripture

to teach that they become impure in the oven, since their coating is useful only regarding impurity through contact, for a creeping creature cannot touch the foods themselves.

But there is no room to say that one might have thought that they would not become impure through the airspace of an earthenware vessel, since the airspace does not render impure by itself; rather, the presence together with the creeping creature in the airspace of the vessel renders the food impure. Certainly, if one brought them into the airspace of an oven, they became impure, and therefore it is unnecessary to expound “its inside” [that is, the additional vav of “its inside,” from which we will expound below “its inside but not the inside of its inside”].

Therefore the Rabbis learned from “its inside” that only being within the inside of another vessel in the oven saves from becoming impure through the “inside” of the oven, but not a partition that is not of its kind, because it does not “destroy within it.”

Rav Yosef bar Ami raises a contradiction between a change of sacred designation

a sin-offering in the name of a burnt-offering

and a change of owners

a sin-offering of Reuben on the condition that Simeon achieve atonement through it,

and resolves:

And this is how he challenged it:

Who said that Rav

Rava said:

A sin-offering

for forbidden fat

that one slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering

for blood

is valid ,

but if one slaughtered a sin-offering

in the name of a burnt-offering,

it is disqualified.

Apparently, when it is not of the same type,

when one slaughtered it in the name of a burnt-offering,

it invalidates it,

whereas

when it is of the same type,

when one slaughtered it in the name of another sin-offering,

it does not invalidate it.

But Rav said: A sin-offering that one slaughtered

with a change of owners

for someone who is obligated to bring a sin-offering

is

disqualified,

but if one slaughtered it

for someone

who is not obligated to bring a sin-offering, but

is obligated only to bring a burnt-offering,

it is

valid .

Apparently, the opposite principle is demonstrated: When one slaughters a sin-offering for someone who is obligated to bring a sin-offering like him,

the matter

is of the same type;

it

invalidates it,

and it is disqualified?!

And he resolves, Rav Yosef bar Ami: The law of a change of sacred designation differs from that of a change of owners. There, in the case of a change of sacred designation, “ and he shall slaughter it as a sin-offering” —

that its slaughter must be in the name of a sin-offering —

the Merciful One stated!

And

therefore, if one slaughtered a sin-offering for forbidden fat in the name of a sin-offering for blood, the sin-offering is not disqualified, because

].

and we are not concerned that he slaughtered the sin-offering for forbidden fat in the name of a sin-offering for blood. Therefore, even though it was slaughtered in the name of an offering of the same type,

it does not invalidate it. [But if one slaughtered it in the name of a burnt-offering, even though it is not precisely of the same type, it disqualifies and invalidates it, because concerning this the verse explicitly stated “it,” to exclude.]

But

here,

in the case of a change of owners, “

and he shall effect atonement for him”

is written,

and we expound: “for him” —

but not for another!

Therefore it is disqualified only through one of the same type, for

“another” analogous to him

is implied,

that is, in a situation

where

his fellow

is obligated to achieve atonement like him. If he slaughters it with a change of owners, in the name of another who is obligated to bring a sin-offering like him, the offering is disqualified; but when the other is “not of the same type,” meaning that he is not obligated to bring a sin-offering like him, slaughtering it for him does not disqualify the offering .

Rav Haviva raises a contradiction between a change of owners and the interior of its interior and resolves: And this is how he challenged it: But who said that Rav —

получить такое же искупление, как он. Если жертву зарежут с изменением владельца, для другого человека, который, как и он, обязан принести жертву за грех, жертва становится непригодной. Но если это человек, не относящийся к тому же виду, то есть другой не обязан принести такую же жертву за грех, принесение жертвы для него не делает жертву непригодной .

и отвечает:

a sin-offering that one slaughtered

with a change of owners

for someone who is obligated to bring a sin-offering

like him —

is disqualified, whereas for someone obligated to bring a burnt-offering it is valid!

Apparently, one of the same type invalidates it, whereas one not of the same type does not invalidate it.

But it was taught in a beraita: “

Its interior”

but not “

the interior of its interior,”

and even a metal vessel saves the foods inside it from becoming impure, even though a metal vessel is not of the same type as an earthenware vessel. This proves that even one not of the same type invalidates it?!

And Rav Haviva resolves:

Four instances of “

its interior”

are written in the passage concerning the impurity of creeping creatures in an earthenware vessel. That is: In this passage, the word “its interior” is written twice, and since it would have been possible to write only “interior,” but “its interior” was written, it is considered as though the word “interior” had been written twice. And since “its interior” was written twice, we expound twice:

interior —

its interior; interior —

its interior. Thus, it is as though the Torah had written “interior” four times.

One

was written

for itself,

to introduce the law that foods become impure from the airspace of an earthenware vessel,

and one for a gzera shava

to teach that the vessel itself also becomes impure from the airspace: Even if the creeping creature did not touch the vessel, but was suspended only in its airspace, it is impure.

One

comes to say:

“Its interior”

of this vessel, only of an earthenware vessel, causes impurity through the airspace,

but not the interior

of a vessel

of another kind.

«

its interior”

but not “

the interior of its interior”: A vessel containing foods saves them from the impurity of a creeping creature in the airspace of the oven.

And

not only does an earthenware vessel save the foods inside it, because it is of the same type as the oven and invalidates within it, but

even a metal vessel

saves the foods inside it from becoming impure through the airspace of the oven. Although it is not of the same type as the oven, it “invalidates” within it by partitioning off a place of its own, and it is called “the interior of its interior”! [And necessarily, the principal point of the verse is to teach about a metal vessel, which invalidates even when it is not of the same type. For if it had been written to teach that an earthenware vessel saves, it would have sufficed for the verse to write, “Everything that is within it shall become impure,” and we would have known that an earthenware vessel, which is of the same type, invalidates within it, since once it is of the same type as the oven, its “interior” would automatically not be considered the “interior” of the oven. From the superfluous vav in “its interior,” it is understood that the decree of the verse is that even a metal vessel, which is not of its type, also invalidates within it and saves the foods from being included within the airspace of the oven.]

другого».

А другое — из стиха «

внутри него»

а не «

внутри того, что находится внутри него»: сосуд, в котором находятся продукты, защищает их от нечистоты, исходящей от мелкого животного в воздухе печи.

И

не только глиняный сосуд защищает находящиеся внутри него продукты, поскольку он относится к тому же виду, что и печь, и тем самым создает различие внутри нее, но

даже обычный сосуд

[то есть любой сосуд, не являющийся глиняным сосудом и очищающийся посредством погружения в воды миквы]

защищает

находящиеся внутри него продукты от осквернения воздухом печи. И хотя он не относится к тому же виду, что и печь, он все же «портит» ее внутреннее пространство тем, что отделяет для себя отдельное место, и это называется «внутри того, что находится внутри него»! [Вынужденно следует, что основной смысл стиха — научить закону об обычном сосуде, который создает различие даже несмотря на то, что он не относится к тому же виду. Если бы стих был написан для того, чтобы научить, что глиняный сосуд защищает продукты, достаточно было бы написать: «все, что находится внутри, станет нечистым», и мы бы знали, что глиняный сосуд, относящийся к тому же виду, создает различие внутри печи. Ведь поскольку он относится к тому же виду, его внутреннее пространство само собой не считалось бы внутренним пространством печи. Из избыточной буквы в слове «внутри него» следует, что по постановлению Торы даже обычный сосуд, который не относится к тому же виду, также создает различие и спасает продукты от включения в воздух печи].