Zevachim 3a (ג.) — the Talmud in English

As we learned in tractate Gittin [24a]:

“Moreover, he wrote”

a bill of divorce in order

“to divorce his wife, but then reconsidered”

divorcing her.

“His townsman found it, and said to him: My name is the same as yours, and my wife’s name is the same as your wife’s”—

“it is unfit to divorce with it.”

This proves that an unspecified bill of divorce is unfit. For if an unspecified bill were fit, it would follow that every bill written for the purpose of divorce, containing the names of the husband and wife, would be fit for all husbands and wives whose names appear in the bill. For if we say that it is unnecessary to designate the bill for a particular husband and wife, but that it is fit even when unspecified, then a general intention for the purpose of severance would suffice.

Why, then, could another husband not divorce his wife with a bill that this husband wrote for this wife, when the names of the husband and wife are identical in both couples?

Rather, it is proven from here that an unspecified bill of divorce is not considered lishmah. And concerning this Rava asks: Why is the law of an unspecified bill of divorce different from that of an unspecified offering?

And we reject this:

“Perhaps there it is different,”

because the bill was not written without specification, but rather

“it was detached for the purpose of divorcing that particular woman.”

Therefore it became unfit. For even if an unspecified bill is fit, nevertheless, once the bill has been designated for a particular couple, it is no longer considered a bill written without specification. For even if we say that the bill need not be written for a particular husband and wife, once it is designated for them, the lishmah of the bill applies specifically to them, and it is no longer possible to divorce another woman married to another husband with it.

Rather,

Rava proved from here that an unspecified bill of divorce is unfit:

As we learned [there]:

“Moreover”—

if

“he has”

two wives whose names are identical,

“and he wrote”

a bill of divorce in order

“to divorce”

his

“senior”

wife,

“and then reconsidered”—

he may not use it

“to divorce”

his

“junior” wife, despite the fact that her name is identical to the name of the senior wife written in the bill.

Here, after all, the same man wrote the bill for one of his wives, and nevertheless it is unfit for divorcing his second wife. If an unspecified bill were considered to have been written lishmah, why can he not divorce the second wife with it? The husband of the second wife is the same husband as that of the first, and the bill was written by virtue of him for the purpose of divorcing his wife. What difference does it make whether he divorces the first wife or the second? Indeed, had he written it without specification, it would have been fit for divorcing her; all the more so when it was written for this divorcing husband, and he is divorcing his wife.

And we reject this:

“Perhaps there it is different,”

the matter is different and does not resemble a bill written without specification, since

the matter differs and is not comparable to a bill written without specification, since

“this bill”

was designated

“for the purpose of divorcing that woman,” namely, the bill was designated solely for divorcing the senior wife. Therefore it is unfit for divorcing the junior wife. An unspecified bill written for the purpose of divorce, by contrast, may be fit for divorcing any woman, since it has not yet been designated for a particular woman.

“Rather, from this”

Rava learned that an unspecified bill of divorce is unfit:

“Moreover”—

“he said to the scribe: Write”

a bill of divorce for one of my two wives [whose names are identical],

“and I will divorce whichever one I wish!”

That bill is

“unfit for divorcing with it!”

This proves that an unspecified bill of divorce is unfit.

And we reject this:

“Perhaps there it is different,”

because the bill is suitable for both of his wives, and therefore it does not function as a bill written “without specification,” because

“there is no retroactive clarification.”

That is, when he divorces one of them, it is not clarified retroactively that, at the time the bill was written, it was written without specification. For perhaps, at the time he wrote the bill, the husband had intended to divorce the other woman, in which case the bill was designated for the other wife; and once it was designated for her, it is no longer possible to divorce this one with it.

“Rather, from this”

Rava proved, as we learned in tractate Gittin [26a]:

“One who writes templates of bills of divorce must leave blank”

the

“place”

for the name of

“the man, the place for the woman, the place for the witnesses, and the place for the date.”

“And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: He must also leave blank the place for”

“Behold, you are permitted to all men”!

This implies that if he writes the names of the man and woman without specification [and likewise, “Behold, you are permitted to all men”], the bill is unfit, despite having been written for the purpose of severance!

Therefore Rava distinguished between a bill of divorce and offerings, and said that an ordinary woman is not presumed destined for divorce. Even if he writes, “Behold, you are permitted to all men,” the bill is not, without specification, presumed to be for the purpose of divorce!

He then raised another matter

Rava:

“Did Rav Yehuda say in the name of Rav: A sin offering that he slaughtered for the purpose of a burnt offering is unfit,”

but if he

“slaughtered it for the purpose of a non-sacred animal,”

it is

“fit”?

“Apparently,”

only when he intended it for something that is

“of its kind does it destroy it,”

such as when he slaughtered it for the purpose of another offering, which is also of the category of offerings. Such an intention uproots the offering’s designation and thereby renders it unfit. But slaughtering it for the purpose of a non-sacred animal,

“which is not of its kind, does not destroy it,”

because non-sacred animals, which are not of the category of sacred offerings, cannot uproot the designation of the offering, since the designation of non-sacred property does not take hold of the offering.

And he raised an apparent contradiction: “Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of this woman,” but rather for the sake of any other woman , “is unfit” for divorcing this woman, “and even” when it was written “for the sake of” another woman who is “an idolater,” who is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal, “it is also unfit,” the bill of divorce!

is

“not of its type does not ruin it,” because an unconsecrated status, which is not of the category of sacred offerings, cannot remove the offering’s designation, since the designation of an unconsecrated animal does not take hold upon the offering.

And they raise an objection from a source: “Any bill of divorce that was written not for this woman,”

but for any other woman

,

“is invalid”

for divorcing this woman,

“and even”

if it was written

“for”

another woman who is

“an idolater,”

who is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal,

“it is also invalid,”

the bill!

Apparently, this law contradicts what we find concerning invalidating intent with regard to offerings. A gentile woman is not of the same kind as a Jewish woman, since she is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce as the Jewish woman is. How, then, can intent for her sake ruin and invalidate the bill of divorce? And what is the distinction between the law of a bill of divorce, which must be written for its sake, and the law of an offering, which requires its service to be performed for its sake, and yet with regard to which the rule was established that “something not of its kind does not ruin its status”?

And Rava

answered: The law of a bill of divorce, which must be written for the sake of this particular woman, and in which an unspecified bill is invalid, differs from the law of consecrated offerings, which, even when unspecified, are presumed to be designated for the service of the offering. Therefore, they invalidated

a bill of divorce

written for the sake of a gentile woman—not because intent for the sake of a gentile woman invalidates it, for even if we say

that the gentile woman is removed from its category,

because something not of its kind does not ruin its status, it would nevertheless be invalid, because it

would be

like a bill of divorce written

unspecified,

not for the sake of this particular woman.

And

a bill of divorce written

unspecified is invalid [even when it was not written “for the sake of another woman,” but merely was not written “for the sake of this woman,” it is invalid].

In contrast,

By contrast,

consecrated offerings,

if one slaughtered them for the sake of non-sacred offerings, they are valid, because we say:

remove non-sacred offerings from their category,

since non-sacred status cannot take effect upon consecrated offerings and cannot ruin their status, as it is not of the same kind as consecrated offerings; consequently,

they would be—

their slaughter is considered—

unspecified, and unspecified

with regard to consecrated offerings

is valid.

They are valid .

And Rava raised a further matter against Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, who said: “A sin-offering that one slaughtered for the sake of an elevation-offering is invalid; if he slaughtered it for the sake of non-sacred purposes, it is valid”

—

another matter: Is it possible

that

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, “A sin-offering that one slaughtered for the sake of an elevation-offering is invalid, but for the sake of non-sacred purposes it is valid”?

Apparently,

if you say so, it is evident that Rav holds

that something of its kind ruins its status, but something not—

of its kind does not ruin its status.

If so, this is difficult:

But wasn’t it taught

that a novel law is stated in the passage concerning the impurity of earthenware vessels? Food and liquids located inside an earthenware vessel become impure with impurity imparted by a creeping creature even if the food and liquids did not touch the dead creeping creature, but were merely with it within the airspace of the vessel. For example, if a creeping creature fell into the airspace of an earthenware vessel, and food or liquids were also inside the vessel, and the creeping creature did not touch them, the food or liquids located in the airspace of the vessel become impure despite not having touched the creeping creature.

And so it is written in the passage concerning earthenware vessels [Leviticus 11:33]: “And any earthenware vessel into which one of them [the impure creeping creatures] falls, everything that is inside it shall become impure.” The Sages expounded this repetition of the word “inside,” and the fact that it would have been possible to write “within” instead of “inside,” as though the word “within” had been written four times.

One occurrence of “within” among the four occurrences teaches that if there was a large earthenware oven, with its opening above, and a creeping creature fell inside it, while within the airspace of the oven there was a vessel filled with food or liquids [when the opening of the vessel was higher than the opening of the oven], those foods or liquids inside the vessel do not become impure. They are not considered to be located together with the creeping creature within the airspace of the earthenware oven, because the vessel containing the food and liquids interposes against the impurity. We expound: “Everything that is inside it shall become impure”—only food and liquids located

inside it

of the earthenware vessel become impure from the creeping creature,

but not

those located

inside its interior!

That is, objects located “inside” a vessel that is located “inside” an earthenware vessel, but which are not within the airspace of the earthenware vessel itself, do not become impure.

And even

if the vessel containing the food is

a

metal vessel [“metal vessel” is a general designation for all vessels that can be purified by immersion, called “rinsing,” as opposed to earthenware vessels, which cannot be purified by immersion], and it is not an earthenware vessel, it

protects

the food from becoming impure, because of the principle “inside it—but not inside its interior.” The food is considered to be located only “inside” the vessel that is located “inside” the oven, and not within the airspace of the oven itself [but only “inside its interior”]; therefore, it does not become impure from the creeping creature located in the airspace of the oven.

It is thus proven that even a metal vessel,

which is not of the same kind as an earthenware vessel, also “ruins its status”—that is, the “inside” of a metal vessel can ruin the “inside” of an earthenware oven, interpose, and separate between the food inside the metal vessel and the inside of the oven.

If so, why is a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of non-sacred purposes not invalidated because non-sacred status is “not of its kind,” when here we find that even something not of its kind can ruin its status?!

And Rava

answered this difficulty: In fact, something not of its kind cannot ruin its status. The reason a metal vessel protects what is inside it within an earthenware vessel is only that a metal vessel is considered of the same kind as an earthenware vessel, since both are vessels, and something of the same kind ruins its status. But non-sacred offerings in relation to consecrated offerings are considered “not of its kind,” and therefore intent for the sake of non-sacred purposes does not invalidate consecrated offerings. For

the Sages made

the status of

non-sacred offerings in relation to consecrated offerings

like one kind in relation to another, which does not ruin its status,

just as

we find that the Sages said that

a partition in an oven

of earthenware does not protect the food.

That is, a partition made within the earthenware oven itself is not effective to interpose between the creeping creature located on one side of the partition and the food located on its other side, because a “partition” is not considered of the “same kind as the oven.” Therefore, it cannot ruin the inside of the oven by dividing it into two separate “insides.” And so we say:

Just as a partition in an oven is not effective at all

to interpose between the creeping creature and the food, since a partition is not of the same kind as the oven,

so too, non-sacred offerings in relation to consecrated offerings,

which are not of their kind,

are not effective at all!

For we learned

[in tractate Kelim 8a]:

An oven

of earthenware

whose airspace was divided

up to the height of the oven’s opening into two “insides”

by

means of a partition of

boards or sheets,

and a creeping creature was found

in the oven

in one place,

while on the other side of the partition there was food—

everything is impure!

The partition was ineffective, since it is not considered to be “of the same kind as the oven” and cannot ruin and divide the inside of the oven into two separate areas. Rather, the creeping creature and the food are considered to be located together, within one interior.

We also learned in the latter clause of that Mishna:

A beehive that is defective,

that has split and thereby lost its status as a vessel, even if the beehive was

stopped up,

sealed at the place of the split

with straw [the stopper seals the opening created at the place of the split], this beehive is no longer considered a vessel.

Therefore, if the beehive was hanging,

suspended

in the

airspace of an earthenware oven, and there was

a creeping creature inside it

of the beehive—

the

oven is impure.

Since the split beehive is not considered a vessel, it does not interpose between the creeping creature inside it and the interior of the oven; the creeping creature inside the beehive therefore renders the oven impure, as well as the food and liquids inside it.

Likewise, if there was a

creeping creature in the oven,

and food inside the split beehive, the beehive does not protect it, because this is not considered “inside it—but not inside its interior,” since it is not a vessel that divides off an independent “inside.” Therefore,

the food inside it is impure.

The food became impure according to the law governing food located together with a creeping creature within the airspace of an earthenware vessel. Although the wall of the beehive is a partition between the food and the airspace of the oven, it cannot interpose, because a partition considered “not of its kind” cannot ruin its status and remove from the oven its designation of “inside.”

And Rabbi Eliezer declares pure

the food inside the beehive, because he holds that although the split beehive is not considered a vessel, it can nevertheless protect the food as a partition that divides the oven.

Rabbi Eliezer said: It follows by a kal va-homer

that the beehive’s partition should protect the food: For

if a partition protected

a partition

in

a

tent containing a corpse,

interposing between the corpse and the food and rendering the place of the food a separate tent, thereby protecting the food beyond the partition from the severe impurity of a tent containing a corpse,

will it not protect

a partition made

in an earthenware vessel

by interposing between the creeping creature and the food and protecting it from the impurity of a creeping creature,

which is lenient?!

The Sages said to him,

Rabbi Eliezer:

No.