Zevachim 3a — the Talmud in English

For we learned in tractate Gittin [24a]:

Moreover, he wrote

a get in order

to divorce his wife, but then reconsidered

divorcing her.

His townsman found it, and said to him: My name is like your name, and my wife's name is like your wife's name—

it is invalid for divorcing with it.

And it is proven that an unspecified get is invalid. For if an unspecified get were valid, it would follow that every get written for the sake of divorce, in which the names of the husband and wife are written, would have to be valid for all those husbands and their wives whose names appear in the get. For if we say that it is not necessary to designate the get for specific husband and wife, but it is valid even when unspecified, then a general intention for the sake of severance is sufficient.

And why should another husband not be able to divorce his wife with a get that this husband wrote for this woman, when the names of the husband and wife are identical in the two couples?

Rather, it is proven from here that an unspecified get is not considered to be for her sake. And concerning this Rava asks: why is the law of an unspecified get different from an unspecified offering?

And we reject this:

Perhaps the matter there is different,

for the get was not written unspecified, but rather

it was detached for the sake of the divorce of that one.

Therefore it became invalid. For even if an unspecified get is valid, nevertheless, when the get was designated for a particular couple, it is no longer considered a get written unspecified. For even if we say that the get need not be written for the sake of specific husband and wife, if it was designated for them, the being-for-her-sake of the get takes effect specifically toward them, and it is once again impossible to divorce another woman belonging to another husband with it.

Rather,

from here Rava proved that an unspecified get is invalid—

For we learned [there]:

Moreover—

if

he has

the husband

two wives whose names are identical,

and he

wrote

a get in order

to divorce

his

older

wife, but then reconsidered—

he may not divorce with it

his

younger

wife, despite the fact that her name resembles the name of the older wife written in the get.

Here, after all, the same man wrote the get for one of his wives, and nevertheless it is invalid for divorcing his second wife with it. And if an unspecified get were considered to have been written for her sake, why can he not divorce the second wife with it? For here the husband of the second wife is the husband of the first, and by virtue of him the get was written for the sake of divorcing his wife. What difference is it whether he divorces the first wife or the second with it? For if he had written it unspecified, it would be valid for divorcing with it; all the more so when it was written for the sake of this divorcer, and he is divorcing his wife.

And we reject this:

Perhaps the matter there is different;

it is different, and it is not comparable to a get written unspecified, since

it was detached for him

this get

for the sake of the divorce of that one,

for that get was designated only for divorcing the older wife. Therefore it is invalid for divorcing the younger wife with it. This is not so with a get written for the sake of an unspecified divorce: it is possible that it is valid for divorcing any woman, since this get has not yet been designated for a particular woman.

“Rather, from this”

Rava learned that an unspecified bill of divorce is invalid:

Rather, from this

Moreover, he said to the scribe: Write

a get for one of my two wives [whose names are identical],

and whichever one I wish, I will divorce!

That get is

invalid for divorcing with it!

And it is proven that an unspecified get is invalid.

And we reject this:

Perhaps the matter there is different,

for the get is suitable for both his wives, and therefore it does not function as a get written “unspecified,” because

there is no retroactive determination.

That is, the matter was not clarified retroactively at the time that he divorces one of them, that this get was written unspecified. For perhaps, at the time of writing it, the husband did not have that wife in mind for divorce, and consequently the get was designated for the second wife. And once it was designated for the second wife, it is no longer possible to divorce this one with it.

Rather, from this

Rava proved, for we learned in tractate Gittin [26a]:

One who writes forms of gittin must leave blank

the

place

of the name of

the man, the place of the woman, the place of the witnesses, and the place of the date.

And Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: He must also leave blank the place “

Behold, you are permitted to all men”!

And it follows that if he writes the name of the man and the woman unspecified [and likewise “Behold, you are permitted to all men”], the get will be invalid, despite having been written for the sake of severance!

And therefore Rava distinguished between a get and offerings, and said that an ordinary woman is not destined for divorce; and even if he writes “Behold, you are permitted to all men,” the get does not stand unspecified for the sake of divorce!

Rava then raised

another

matter:

Did Rav Yehuda say in the name of Rav: A sin-offering that he slaughtered for the sake of an elevation-offering is invalid,

but if he

slaughtered it for the sake of an unconsecrated animal,

it is

valid?

Apparently,

only when he intended for the sake of something that is

of its kind does it destroy it,

such as when he slaughtered it for the sake of another offering, which too is of the kind of offerings; this intention is effective to uproot the offering’s designation and thereby invalidate it. But slaughtering it for the sake of an unconsecrated animal,

which

is

not of its kind, does not destroy it,

for unconsecrated animals, which are not of the kind of consecrated things, cannot uproot the designation of the offering, because the designation of unconsecrated property does not take hold upon the sacrifice.

And he raises an objection: Every get that was written not for the sake of this woman, but for the sake of any other woman , is invalid for divorcing this woman, and even if it was written for the sake of another woman who is an idolater, who is not subject to the laws of gittin and betrothal, it is also invalid, the get!

,

“is invalid”

for divorcing this woman,

“and even”

if it was written

“for”

another woman who is

“an idolater,”

who is not subject to the laws of bills of divorce and betrothal,

“it is also invalid,”

the bill!

Apparently, this law contradicts what we find concerning invalid thought in sacrificial offerings, for a gentile woman is not of the kind of an Israelite woman, since she is not subject to the laws of gittin as the Israelite woman is; so how does thought for her sake undermine and invalidate the get? And what is the distinction between the law of a get, which must be written for its proper purpose, and the law of a sacrifice, which requires the service to be performed for its sake, and nevertheless a rule was established concerning it that “one not of its kind does not invalidate it”?

And Rava

distinguished: the law of a get, which must be written for the sake of this particular woman, and in which an unspecified get is invalid, differs from the law of sacrificial offerings, which, even when unspecified, are destined for the service of the sacrifice. Therefore they invalidated

a get

written for the sake of a gentile woman, not because thought for the sake of a gentile woman invalidates it—for even if we say

remove the gentile woman from its kind,

because one not of its kind does not invalidate it, nevertheless it will be invalid because it

would be

like a get written

unspecified,

not for the sake of this particular woman,

and

a get written

unspecified is invalid

[for even when it was not written “for the sake of another woman,” but only was not written “for the sake of this woman,” it is invalid].

Unlike this,

sacrificial offerings,

if one slaughtered them for the sake of ordinary use, are valid, because we say

remove ordinary use from their kind,

since ordinary use cannot take effect upon sacrificial offerings and cannot invalidate them, because it is not of the kind of sacrificial offerings; and consequently

they would be—

their slaughter is considered—

unspecified, and unspecified

in sacrificial offerings

are valid

they are.

And Rava raised

against the words of Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, that “a sin-offering which one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt-offering is invalid; for the sake of ordinary use, it is valid”

another matter: Is it possible

that

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, ‘A sin-offering which one slaughtered for the sake of a burnt-offering is invalid; for the sake of ordinary use, it is valid’?

It follows,

for if you say this, it is demonstrated that Rav holds

that one of its kind invalidates it, whereas one not of its kind—

does not invalidate it.

And if so, this is difficult:

but it was taught,

a novelty was stated in the section concerning the impurity of earthenware vessels: foods and liquids found inside an earthenware vessel contract impurity through a creeping creature even though the foods and liquids did not touch the dead creeping creature, but were only together with it within the airspace of the vessel. For example, if a creeping creature fell into the airspace of an earthenware vessel, and food or liquids were also inside the vessel, and the creeping creature did not touch them, the food or liquids located in the airspace of the vessel contract impurity despite not having touched the creeping creature.

And so it is written in the section concerning earthenware vessels [Leviticus 11:33]: “And every earthenware vessel into the midst of which one of them [of the impure creeping creatures] falls, whatever is within it shall become impure.” And the Sages expounded from the repetition of the words “within it,” and from the fact that it would have been possible to say “within” instead of “within it,” for it is as though “within” had been written four times. "

“Within”—one of the four “withins”—comes to teach that if there was a large earthenware oven, with its opening open above, and a vessel full of food or liquids was in the airspace of the oven [when the opening of the vessel was higher than the opening of the oven], and a creeping creature fell into it, those foods or liquids inside the vessel do not become impure. For they are not considered to be located together with the creeping creature within the airspace of the earthenware oven, since the vessel in which the foods and liquids are located interposes against the impurity. And we expound, ‘Whatever is within it shall become impure’—only foods and liquids located

within it

of the earthenware vessel contract impurity from the creeping creature,

but not

those located

within its inner within!

That is, things located “within” a vessel that is located “within it” of an earthenware vessel, and were not within the airspace of the earthenware vessel itself, do not become impure.

And even

if the vessel in which the food is located is

a vessel

of immersion

["Immersion" is a general name for all vessels that attain purity through immersion, called "immersion," excluding earthenware vessels, which do not attain purity through immersion], and it was not an earthenware vessel, it

protects

the food from becoming impure, because of “within it—but not within its inner within.” The foods are considered to be located only “within” the vessel located “within” the oven, and not within the airspace of the oven itself [but only within the inner within]; therefore they do not contract impurity from the creeping creature located in the airspace of the oven.

And it is demonstrated that even a vessel of immersion, which is not of the kind of an earthenware vessel, also “invalidates within it”; that is, the “within” of a vessel of immersion can undermine the “within” of the earthenware oven and interpose and separate between the food inside the vessel of immersion and the within of the oven.

And if so, why is a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of ordinary use not invalidated because ordinary use is “not of its kind,” whereas here we find that even something not of its kind can invalidate it?!

And Rava

answered this difficulty: In truth, one not of its kind cannot invalidate it. The reason that a vessel of immersion protects within an earthenware vessel is only that a vessel of immersion is considered of the same kind as an earthenware vessel, because both are vessels, and one of a kind invalidates within its kind. But ordinary use in relation to sacrificial offerings is considered “not of its kind,” and therefore thought for the sake of ordinary use does not invalidate sacrificial offerings. For

the Sages made

ordinary use

in relation to sacrificial offerings

to be considered a kind in relation to a different kind, which does not invalidate,

just as

we find that the Sages said that a

partition in relation to an oven

of earthenware is not effective to save the foods.

That is, a partition made within the earthenware oven itself is not effective to interpose between the creeping creature located on one side of the partition and the foods located on its other side, because a “partition” is not considered of the “kind of the oven,” and therefore cannot undermine the within of the oven, dividing it into two separate “inner spaces.” And so we say:

Just as a partition in relation to an oven is not effective for it at all

to interpose between the creeping creature and the foods, since a partition is not of the kind of the oven,

so too ordinary use in relation to sacrificial offerings,

which are not of their kind,

is not effective for it at all!

For we learned

[in tractate Kelim 8a]:

An oven

of earthenware

whose airspace they divided up to the height of the oven’s opening into two “inner spaces,”

by means of a partition of

with

boards or

sheets,

and a creeping creature was found

in the oven

in one place, and on the other side of the partition were the foods—

everything is impure!

The partition was ineffective, since it is not considered to be “of the kind of the oven,” to undermine and divide the oven’s inner space into two separate places; rather, the creeping creature and the foods are considered to be located together, within one [inner space].

plugged

And we also learned in the final clause of this Mishna:

A beehive that is defective,

having been torn, whereby its status as a vessel was annulled, even if the beehive was

stopped up

at the place of the tear

with straw

[the stopper closes the opening created at the place of the tear], this beehive is no longer considered a vessel. Therefore, if the beehive was

suspended

hanging

in the airspace of the oven

of earthenware, and there was

a creeping creature inside it

inside the beehive—

the oven is impure.

Since that torn beehive is not considered a vessel, it does not interpose between the creeping creature inside it and the inner space of the oven, and the creeping creature inside the beehive renders the oven, and the foods and liquids within it, impure.

And likewise, if there was

a creeping creature in the oven,

and there were foods inside the torn beehive, the beehive does not protect them, because this is not considered “within it—but not within its inner within,” for it is not a vessel that divides an inner space for itself. Therefore,

the foods within it are impure.

The foods became impure according to the law of foods located together with a creeping creature within the airspace of an earthenware vessel. And although the wall of the beehive is a partition between the foods and the airspace of the oven, it cannot interpose, because a partition that is considered “not of its kind” cannot undermine within it, to annul from it the designation “within” of the oven.

And Rabbi Eliezer purifies

the foods inside the beehive, for he holds that although the torn beehive is not considered a vessel, it can nevertheless protect the foods as a partition that divides the oven.

Rabbi Eliezer said: It is a kal va-chomer

that the partition of the beehive should protect the foods: for

if a partition protected

a partition

in

a tent

of the dead,

to interpose between the dead and the foods and to make the place of the foods a separate tent, thereby protecting the foods beyond the partition from the severe impurity of a tent containing the dead,

should it not protect

a partition made

in an earthenware vessel

to interpose between the creeping creature and the foods and protect them from the impurity of a creeping creature,

which is light?!

They said to him,

the Sages to Rabbi Eliezer:

No.