Zevachim 2b — the Talmud in English

And we raised it: But does

this

verse speak of an offering of

a freewill offering

, for which the owner bears no responsibility? But is it not

a vow

, for it is explicitly stated in the verse, “as you vowed,” and with a vow he is responsible for it?

Rather

, this is what the verse comes to teach us:

if you did as you vowed

, and performed the rites of the offering for its sake, that offering shall be

a vow

, and you have fulfilled with it your obligation of your vow;

but if you did not

as you vowed, but performed its rites not for its sake,

it shall be a freewill offering

, and you do not fulfill with it your obligation of your vow.

And

since we learned that its law is like that of a freewill offering, then one may not alter it in additional rites by performing them not for its sake, for even an offering that is

a freewill offering

—is one permitted to alter it?

But the prohibition against thinking an incorrect thought concerning consecrated offerings is derived below [29b] from “he shall not reckon,” and it includes all consecrated offerings, both vows and freewill offerings!

Ravina said to Rav Pappa:

It is a pity

that you were not with us

, for your place of residence was not in our vicinity

last night

, at the onset of Shabbat,

within the boundary

of

your domain

, a place that was within the Shabbat boundary, and you could not come and hear what

Rava juxtaposed as superior teachings and resolved them

.

What

are the

superior teachings

with which Rava posed one against the other?

For

we learned: All offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid, except that they do not count for the owners for fulfillment of their obligation

. And Rava deduced:

The reason

is that they were slaughtered

not for their sake

, meaning that he uprooted them from slaughter for their sake by thinking of another offering;

but

if he slaughtered them

without specification

, without directing his intention for their sake, but also without uprooting them and altering them for the sake of another offering,

they counted

those offerings

also for the owners for fulfillment of their obligation

.

Apparently, one who slaughters

without specification is also considered as though he slaughtered for their sake

.

And we juxtapose against it: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of this woman

, but was written for the sake of another woman bearing the same name,

is invalid

to divorce this woman with it.

And

it implies that it is not specifically when it was written for the sake of another woman, but also if it was written

without specification

, where the scribe wrote a particular name in the bill of divorce but did not intend it for a particular woman, rather only so that it would be ready when necessary if a husband should come to divorce a woman bearing such a name,

it is also invalid

, such a bill of divorce. [And below it will be explained how it is deduced from this Mishna that even an unspecified bill of divorce is invalid.]

And it is proven that a bill of divorce made with an unspecified intention is not considered as having been made for her sake. And it is astonishing: What is the difference between an unspecified act in a bill of divorce and an unspecified act in an offering? And why, in the case of an offering, is performance for the sake of consecrated offerings effective even though he does not think of the specific offering that he consecrated, whereas in the case of a bill of divorce it is not effective to write it “for the sake of divorce” until he knows for whose sake it is written?

And Rava answered

:

Offerings without specification stand for their sake

; they

stand

for it. Therefore, even when he did not explicitly direct his intention during their rites to perform them for the sake of a particular offering, they are made for its sake, because every offering, by virtue of being an offering bearing a particular name, is designated for performance for the sake of that offering and for the sake of its owner who brought it. Therefore, only if he altered it in his thought for the sake of another is it uprooted from its designation; but in an unspecified case it is as though it were made for its sake.

But

an ordinary woman is not presumed destined for divorce

, and therefore if he writes in a bill of divorce a woman’s name without specification, and does not intend it for the divorce of a particular woman, and likewise if he does not write the bill of divorce at the husband’s instruction, the writing is not considered an unspecified act for her sake, because a married woman, by herself, is not ordinarily presumed destined for divorce.

And we raised a question concerning Rava’s words:

And the offerings

whose rites were performed

without specification

, concerning which Rava said that they are

valid

“and count for the owners for fulfillment of their obligation”—

from where do we know it

, from where did Rava learn this law?

If you say [that Rava learned it] from this that we learned: All offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake, etc.

—but it did not teach

“All offerings

that were not slaughtered for their sake

are valid, except that they do not count for the owners for fulfillment of their obligation”—for this wording would also refer to offerings slaughtered without specification, which likewise were not slaughtered for their sake; and since their unspecified status is not for their sake, they would not count for fulfillment of the obligation. Since we did not teach in this wording, it is proven that with offerings an unspecified act is considered as an act for their sake, and they count for the owners for fulfillment of their obligation.

If so,

also concerning a bill of divorce it is taught: Every bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of

the

woman

in question

is invalid, and it is not taught: “

Every bill of divorce

that was not written for the sake of

the

woman

in question

is invalid,”

although this wording would teach us to invalidate even writing without explicit designation, and here too it is possible to infer from the fact that it was not written in this wording that a bill of divorce written without specification is valid, and only if it was explicitly written not for its sake is it invalid. And if so, it is necessarily not on the basis of this inference that Rava proved that an unspecified intention in offerings is valid; and again it is puzzling: from where is his source for validating it?

Rather, from this

Rava inferred that an unspecified intention in offerings is valid, as we learned below [13a]: “The Paschal offering and the sin-offering that one slaughtered for their sake and not for their sake are invalid,”

What does ‘for their sake and not for their sake’ mean? —

For the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a peace-offering!

And Rava inferred:

The reason

that the Paschal offering is invalid when he slaughtered it for its sake and not for its sake is because at the beginning of the slaughter he said that his slaughter was

for the sake of a Paschal offering,

and he continued the slaughter and said,

“I am slaughtering for the sake of a peace-offering,”

and it follows from this that

here,

if at the beginning of the slaughter he said

“for the sake of a Paschal offering,”

and afterward he said nothing, but continued to slaughter

without specification, the offering is valid

. It is evidently the case that their unspecified intentions are considered as their designated intentions, for had unspecified intentions not been considered as their designated intentions, the offering would have been invalid when its slaughter began for its sake and ended without specification.

And we ask: From where does it follow to Rava to infer this? For

perhaps there it is different,

since the beginning of the slaughter was with an intention for its sake,

as we say

:

Everyone who performs according to the first intention performs

and the entire continuation is considered as having been performed for its sake ; but when the slaughter was without specification from its beginning, from where do you know that it is valid?

Rather, from the latter clause

of the aforementioned Mishna Rava inferred, for we learned there in the latter clause: How do we find invalidity in a sin-offering and a Paschal offering that one slaughtered

not for their sake and for their sake:

in a case where he slaughtered at first

for the sake of a peace-offering

and afterward continued to slaughter

for the sake of a Paschal offering!

And Rava inferred:

The reason

that the Paschal offering and the sin-offering become invalid is

because he said

at first

“for the sake of a peace-offering,”

and afterward

“for the sake of a Paschal offering”; here,

if he began to slaughter

without specification

and afterward continued

for the sake of a Paschal offering —

it is valid,

and it is proven that one who slaughters without specification is valid, and this is because an unspecified intention is considered as an intention for its sake.

And we reject this: This is not Rava’s proof, for

perhaps there it is different,

in the case where he slaughtered initially without specification and continued for the sake of a Paschal offering, which is valid because

we say, “The end proves

the beginning,”

concerning its beginning,

concerning the beginning of the slaughter, which was without specification, that it too was performed for the sake of a Paschal offering . But when the entire slaughter, from its beginning until its end, was without specification, from where do we know that the offering is brought up for its owners?

Alternatively, there is another reasoning: It is impossible to infer Rava’s inference from the latter clause, “for the sake of a peace-offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering,” that the reason for the invalidity is that he mentioned at the beginning of his words “for the sake of a peace-offering,” whereas “without specification and for the sake of a Paschal offering” is valid. For it is truly possible that even “without specification and for the sake of a Paschal offering” is invalid; and the reason we did not teach in the latter clause “without specification and for the sake of a Paschal offering” is that

there is another reason why one cannot make Rava’s inference from the latter clause, “for the sake of a peace-offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering”: The reason for the invalidity may be that he mentioned “for the sake of a peace-offering” at the beginning of his statement. But in fact, it is possible that even “without specification and for the sake of a Paschal offering” is invalid. The reason that the latter clause does not state “without specification and for the sake of a Paschal offering” is that

since the tanna taught

in the first clause

“for their sake and not for their sake,”

which is invalid [but “for their sake and without specification” is valid, for everyone who acts according to the first intention acts],

he also taught

in the latter clause

“not for their sake and for their sake,”

which is invalid; but it is possible that “without specification and for their sake” is also invalid.

Rather, we conclude that Rava’s inference—that an unspecified intention is considered as an intention for its sake—is from what we learned:

we conclude that Rava’s inference—that an unspecified intention is considered like an intention for its sake—is from what we learned:

For the sake of six matters the offering is slaughtered:

a.

For the sake of the offering —

that he should slaughter it for the sake of that for which the offering was consecrated, and not for the sake of another offering.

b.

For the sake of the one who offers —

that he should slaughter it so that its owners will attain atonement through it; that is, he should not slaughter it for the sake of the atonement of another person.

c.

For the sake of the Name —

that it be slaughtered for the sake of the Всевышний.

d.

For the sake of the fires —

that he should slaughter it with the intention of burning it in such a manner that it will be consumed by fire, and not that it should be roasted.

e.

For the sake of the fragrance —

that he should slaughter it with the intention of burning the limbs so that they will give off a fragrance when burned, and he should not think that he will first roast them and afterward burn them, because once they have been roasted they no longer give off a fragrance.

f.

For the sake of satisfaction —

for the sake of bringing contentment to the Всевышний, who commanded and whose will was fulfilled.

And the sin-offering and the guilt-offering

have an additional law: that he should slaughter them

for the sake of sin.

Rabbi Yosei said: Even one who did not have in his heart

for the sake of any one of all these, his offering is

valid,

for it is a stipulation of the court that they slaughter without specification and do not mention the name of the offering for whose sake they are slaughtering, for thus

the court stipulated that he should not say

that he is slaughtering

for its sake, lest he come to say

by mistake that he is slaughtering

not for its sake [that is, lest he mistakenly mention the name of another offering].

meaning, lest he mistakenly mention the name of another offering].

And Rava inferred:

And if it enters your mind that an unspecified intention is invalid,

how is it possible that

the court stands and stipulates a matter through which it becomes invalid

the offering? Rather, from here it is proven that an unspecified intention is valid. Therefore, so that they would not come to a stumbling block, the Sages instituted that they should say nothing, and through this they fulfilled their obligation, because an unspecified intention is considered as an intention for its sake .

And

it still remains to clarify:

concerning a bill of divorce, for which an unspecified intention is invalid —

from where?

From where did Rava learn that a bill of divorce made without specification is invalid , for he raised a question from the law of an unspecified bill of divorce concerning an unspecified offering?

It is possible to say that this is from what we learned: There was

the husband

passing through the marketplace and hearing the voice of scribes reciting to

the students studying with them how to write the forms of bills of divorce—

“So-and-so divorced such-and-such a woman from such-and-such a place,” and

the husband

said—

“This is my name and this is my wife’s name!”—

it is unfit to divorce with it, because it was not written for the sake of his wife, but without specific designation; and it is proven from here that a bill of divorce that was written without specific designation is unfit.

And we reject this: It is always possible that a bill of divorce written without specific designation is fit to divorce with, and that which we learned here, that it is unfit,

perhaps

is speaking

according to Rav Pappa, for Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with scribes who write for the purpose of studying, who do not write the bill of divorce for the sake of divorce ,

, meaning that they do not write the divorce document for the purpose of divorce.

and it was not written for the sake of severance at all, and therefore it is not applicable to consider this bill of divorce as having been written without specific designation, whose law is like [writing] for its sake. But in a situation in which he writes it for the sake of divorce, so that a bill of divorce will be ready for him if a husband and wife bearing these names should happen to come, it is possible to say that this bill of divorce is considered as without specific designation for its sake, and it is fit.

, and therefore this document cannot be considered to have been written anonymously, whose status would be the same as one written with the proper intention. But when a scribe writes it for the purpose of divorce, so that a divorce document will be ready if a man and woman with these names happen to come along, it is possible to say that this document is considered to have been written anonymously with the proper intention, and it is therefore valid.

Rather, from here

Rava learned that in bills of divorce, without specific designation does not have the law of [being written] for its sake.