Zevachim 2b (ב:) — the Talmud in English

And we raised this objection: Is

this

verse speaking of an offering of

voluntary offering

for which the owner bears no responsibility? But surely

it is a vow, as it is explicitly stated in the verse, “as you vowed”; and with regard to a vow, he bears responsibility for it

?

Rather,

this is what the verse comes to teach us:

if you performed it as you vowed

and performed the sacrificial rites for its sake, that offering shall be deemed a

vow,

and you fulfill through it your obligation arising from your vow.

But if you did not

perform it as you vowed, but performed its rites not for its sake,

it shall be a voluntary offering,

and you do not fulfill through it your obligation arising from your vow.

And

since we have learned that it is treated as a voluntary offering, then one should not deviate in its subsequent rites by performing them not for its sake, since even an offering that is

a voluntary offering—

is it permitted to deviate in its performance?

But the prohibition against having an improper thought with regard to consecrated objects is derived below [29b] from “he shall not intend it,” and it applies to all consecrated offerings, whether a vow or a voluntary offering!

Ravina said to Rav Pappa:

It is a pity

that you were not with us

for your place of lodging was not in our vicinity

last night,

on the eve of Shabbat as Shabbat was beginning,

within the Shabbat boundary of

“Bei

Ḥarmekh”

[a place that was within the Shabbat boundary], and you could not come and hear what

Rava raised as substantive points against one another and resolved them.

.

What

are the

substantive points

through which Rava challenged one matter with another?

For

we learned in a Mishna: All offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid, except that they do not count for their owners for their obligation.

And Rava inferred:

The reason

is that they were slaughtered

not for their sake,

meaning that in his thought he uprooted them from being slaughtered for their sake by slaughtering them for the sake of another offering.

But

if he slaughtered them

without specific intent,

without directing his intent toward their sake, but also without uprooting them or changing them to the designation of another offering,

they count

for those offerings

also for the owners for their obligation.

Apparently,

one who slaughters

without specific intent is likewise considered as though he had slaughtered them for their sake.

.

And we raise a contradiction: Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of this woman

but was written for the sake of another woman with the same name

is invalid

for divorcing this woman.

And

it follows that this is not specifically the case when it was written for the sake of another woman; rather, even if it was written

without specific intent,

where the scribe wrote a particular name in the bill of divorce but did not intend it for a particular woman, writing it only so that it would be ready when necessary, should a husband come to divorce a woman with such a name,

it is also invalid

for a bill of divorce of this kind. [Below it will be explained how it is inferred from this Mishna that even an unqualified act renders it invalid.]

It is thus proven that a bill of divorce prepared without specific intent is not considered as though it were prepared for her sake. This is difficult: What is the difference between an unqualified act in the case of a bill of divorce and an unqualified act in the case of an offering? Why, in the case of an offering, is performing it for the sake of consecrated offerings effective, even though he does not think of the particular offering that he consecrated, whereas in the case of a bill of divorce, it is not effective to write it “for the sake of divorce” until he knows for whom it is being written?

And Rava answered

Rava:

Offerings performed without specific intent are presumed to be for their sake;

they

are designated,

and therefore, even when he did not explicitly intend during their rites to perform them for the sake of a particular offering, they are performed for their sake. Since every offering, by virtue of being an offering with a particular designation, is intended to be performed for the sake of that offering and for the sake of its owner who brought it, it is uprooted from its designation only when he changes it in his thought to another designation; but when he acts without specific intent, it is as though it was performed for its sake.

But

an ordinary woman is not presumed to stand for divorce,

and therefore, if he writes a woman’s name in a bill of divorce without specific intent, and does not intend it for the divorce of a particular woman, and likewise if he does not write the bill of divorce at the husband’s command, the writing is not considered an unqualified act that is for her sake, because a married woman does not, by herself, stand unqualifiedly for divorce.

And we examine Rava’s words:

And the offerings

whose rites were performed

without specific intent, concerning which Rava said that they are

“

valid

and count for the owners for their obligation”—

from where do we know this,

from where did Rava derive this law?

If you say that it is from this, as we learned in a Mishna: All offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake, and so on,

but it did not teach: “All offerings

that were slaughtered

not for their sake are valid, except that they do not count for the owners for their obligation.” This wording would also refer to offerings slaughtered without specific intent, since they too were not slaughtered for their sake; and since their unqualified status is not considered for their sake, they would not count toward the obligation. The fact that we did not learn it in this formulation proves that, with regard to offerings, an unqualified act is considered for their sake, and they count for the owners toward their obligation.

are valid, except that they do not count for the owners for fulfillment of their obligation”—for this wording would also refer to offerings slaughtered without specification, which likewise were not slaughtered for their sake; and since their unspecified status is not for their sake, they would not count for fulfillment of the obligation. Since we did not teach in this wording, it is proven that with offerings an unspecified act is considered as an act for their sake, and they count for the owners for fulfillment of their obligation.

If so,

regarding a bill of divorce as well, it states: “Any bill of divorce that was written not for the sake of

the

woman

in question

is invalid,” and it does not state “

Any bill of divorce

that was not written for the sake of

the

woman

in question

is invalid.”

Although the latter formulation would teach us that writing without specification is also invalid, here too one could infer from the fact that it was not formulated in this manner that a bill of divorce written without specification is valid, and that it is invalid only when it was explicitly written not for its sake. If so, it necessarily follows that Rava did not prove from this inference that an unspecified act is valid in the case of offerings. Thus, it is still difficult: From where did he derive that it is valid?

Rather, from this

Rava inferred that an unspecified act in the case of offerings is valid, as we learned below: “The Paschal offering and the sin-offering that one slaughtered for their sake and not for their sake are invalid.”

What does it mean: ‘for their sake and not for their sake’? —

For the sake of a Paschal offering and for the sake of a peace-offering!

And Rava inferred:

The reason

that the Paschal offering is invalid when it is slaughtered for its sake and not for its sake is that at the beginning of the slaughter he said that his slaughter was

for the sake of a Paschal offering,

and he continued the slaughter and said,

“I am slaughtering for the sake of a peace-offering.”

This implies:

but

if at the beginning of the slaughter he said

“for the sake of a Paschal offering,”

and afterward he said nothing, but merely continued slaughtering

without specification, the offering is valid

. Apparently, an unspecified intention is considered like an intention for its sake; for if an unspecified intention were not considered like an intention for its sake, the offering would be invalid when its slaughter began with an intention for its sake and ended with no specific intention.

And we ask: From where was it apparent to Rava that this inference could be made? Perhaps

there it is different,

because the slaughter began with an intention for its sake,

as

we say:

Anyone who performs an act acts according to his initial intention,

and the entire continuation is considered to have been performed for its sake . But when the slaughter was performed without specification from the outset, from where do you know that it is valid?

Rather, from the latter clause

of the cited Mishna Rava inferred this. For we learned there in the latter clause: “How do we find invalidity in a sin-offering and a Paschal offering that one slaughtered

not for their sake and for their sake?”

This is the case in which he slaughtered initially

for the sake of a peace-offering

and afterward continued slaughtering

for the sake of a Paschal offering!

And Rava inferred:

The reason

that the Paschal offering and the sin-offering become invalid is

that he said

at first

“for the sake of a peace-offering”

and afterward

“for the sake of a Paschal offering”; but

if he began slaughtering

without specification

and afterward continued

for the sake of a Paschal offering—

it is valid, and it is thereby proven that one who slaughters without specification produces a valid offering, because an unspecified intention is considered like an intention for its sake.

And we reject this: That is not Rava’s proof, since

there it is different

in the case in which he slaughtered initially without specification and continued for the sake of a Paschal offering, for it is valid because

we say: the end demonstrates

that he slaughtered for the sake of a Paschal offering

with regard to the beginning,

meaning with regard to the beginning of the slaughter, which had been without specification; it too was performed for the sake of a Paschal offering . But when the entire slaughter, from beginning to end, was performed without specification, from where do we know that the offering is valid for its owners?

Alternatively,

there is another reason why one cannot make Rava’s inference from the latter clause, “for the sake of a peace-offering and for the sake of a Paschal offering”: The reason for the invalidity may be that he mentioned “for the sake of a peace-offering” at the beginning of his statement. But in fact, it is possible that even “without specification and for the sake of a Paschal offering” is invalid. The reason that the latter clause does not state “without specification and for the sake of a Paschal offering” is that

since the tanna taught

in the first clause

“for their sake and not for their sake,”

which is invalid [but “for their sake and without specification” is valid, since anyone who acts does so according to his initial intention],

he also taught

in the latter clause

“not for their sake and for their sake,”

which is invalid. But it is possible that “without specification and for their sake” is also invalid.

Rather,

we conclude that Rava’s inference—that an unspecified intention is considered like an intention for its sake—is from what we learned:

“For the sake of six matters the offering is slaughtered”:

1.

For the sake of the offering—

that it be slaughtered for the sake of the offering for which the animal was consecrated, and not for the sake of another offering.

2.

For the sake of the one who offers—

that it be slaughtered so that its owner will achieve atonement through it, meaning that it should not be slaughtered for the sake of another person’s atonement.

3.

For the sake of the Name—

that it be slaughtered for the sake of the Всевышний.

4.

For the sake of the fires—

that it be slaughtered with the intention of burning it in the manner in which it will be consumed by fire, and not of preparing it as roasted meat.

5.

For the sake of the fragrance—

that it be slaughtered with the intention of burning the limbs so that they will emit a fragrance when burned, and not with the thought that they should first be roasted and afterward burned, because once they have been roasted they no longer emit a fragrance when burned.

6.

For the sake of contentment—

for the sake of bringing contentment to the Всевышний, who commanded and whose will was fulfilled.

And the sin-offering and the guilt-offering

have an additional requirement: They must be slaughtered

for the sake of sin.

Rabbi Yosei said: Even one whose heart was not directed

for the sake of any one of these matters—his offering is

valid,

because it is a stipulation of the court that they slaughter without specification and not mention the name of the offering for which they are slaughtering. For so

the court stipulated: He should not say

that he is slaughtering

for its sake, lest he come to say

in error that he is slaughtering

not for its sake [

meaning, lest he mistakenly mention the name of another offering].

And Rava inferred:

And if it should enter your mind that an unspecified intention is invalid,

how could it be that

the court would stand and stipulate a matter by which

the offering would be invalidated? Rather, this proves that an unspecified intention is valid. Therefore, to prevent people from coming to stumble, the Sages enacted that they should say nothing, and through this they fulfill their obligation, because an unspecified intention is considered like an intention for its sake .

And

it still remains to clarify

regarding a bill of divorce, where an unspecified intention is invalid—

from where do we know this?

From where did Rava learn that a bill of divorce made without specification is invalid ? For he raised a difficulty from the law of an unspecified bill of divorce concerning the law of an unspecified offering:

Is it so? From this, as we learned: If the

husband

was passing through the marketplace and heard scribes reciting

to the students studying with them how to write the standard forms of bills of divorce—

“So-and-so divorced so-and-so from such-and-such a place,” and he said

the husband:

“This is my name and this is my wife's name!”—

it is unfit to divorce with it

because it was not written for the sake of his wife, but merely without specific intent; and it is evident from here that a get written without specific intent is unfit.

We reject this proof: Actually, it is possible that a get written without specific intent is fit for use in divorce, and the reason that we learned here that it is unfit

may be

that this Mishna is speaking

in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa, as Rav Pappa said: Here we are dealing with scribes who write in order to study

and they do not write the get for the sake of divorce,

and it was not written for the sake of severance at all

and therefore it cannot be considered a get written without specific intent, whose status is like that of one written lishma. But when one writes it for the sake of divorce, so that he will have a get ready in case a husband and wife bearing these names should happen to come to him, it is possible to say that this get is considered to have been written without specific intent but lishma, and it is fit.

Rather, from this

Rava learned that a document written without specific intent in matters of bills of divorce does not have the status of one written lishma,