Zevachim 47a (מז.) — the Talmud in English

From where is it derived that one who is merely occupied with sacred matters,

who slaughters them without intending to perform the slaughter of sacred offerings, but rather as one occupied with other matters [Rashi's wording. And in tractate Hullin, Rashi explained that the lack of intention concerns the slaughter: he held a knife in his hand and did not intend to slaughter, but nevertheless the slaughter was effected through him. Here, however, it appears that the lack of intention means a lack of intention to be occupied with sacred matters],

that it is disqualified?

Rav Huna said to him: From here:

as it is stated: “And he shall slaughter the bovine before the Lord”—

the slaughter must be for the sake of a bovine.

Shmuel said

to Rav Huna:

We already have this in our possession;

we already knew that, ideally, it is a mitzva for the slaughter to be for the sake of a bovine. But this is what we asked—

from where is it derived that it invalidates the offering?

Rav Huna said to him:

From here we learn it, as it is written:

“According to your will you shall slaughter it”—

slaughter it with your awareness,

and not when you are occupied with another matter. And the verse repeated the matter to indicate that it invalidates.

We learned in the Mishna:

Thought follows only the one performing the service.

And the Gemara explains:

Our Mishna

is

not in accordance with this tanna,

as it was taught: R. Elazar, son of R. Yosei, said:

I heard

that the owners

can render the priest's service piggul

when the priest performs the service silently, while they formulate a thought of piggul.

Rava said: What is the reason of R. Elazar, son of R. Yosei? The verse says: “And the one who brings his offering

to the Lord.” Since it calls it “his offering,” it indicates that the reference is to the owners, and it calls him “the one who brings.” This proves that the owners too are called “the one who brings,” and the verse “the one who brings—it shall not be considered” applies to them: Their disqualifying thought invalidates the offering, just like the thought of the priest who performs the service.

Abaye said: R. Elazar, son of R. Yosei, R. Eliezer, and R. Shimon ben Elazar all hold: This one,

the owner of the offering,

formulates

a thought of piggul,

and this one,

the priest,

performs the service; is

his disqualifying thought

a thought?!

R. Elazar, son of R. Yosei—

that is the matter we stated.

R. Eliezer—

as we learned:

An Israelite

who slaughters an animal for an idolater

whose animal it is,

his slaughter is valid;

the animal is permitted to be eaten, since the slaughterer is an Israelite, and we are not concerned with the thought of the owner, who intends that the Israelite's slaughter should be for idolatry.

But R. Eliezer deems it invalid

and forbids it to be eaten, like one who slaughters for idolatry, since the thought of the owner is effective in invalidating the Israelite's slaughter.

R. Shimon ben Elazar—

as we learned: R. Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle

with regard to Shabbat and the measure for liability for the labor of carrying:

Any

object that has no importance,

which is not fit to be set aside,

that is, it is not fit to be set aside and guarded, such as menstrual blood or an object from which it is prohibited to derive benefit,

and

likewise an object that would be fit to be set aside had it been of the requisite measure, but this one, because of its small size,

is not set aside

—a small object

like it—

one is not liable for carrying it out on Shabbat.

But

if it was made fit for this purpose,

meaning that someone deemed it important and set it aside, despite its lacking the measure of importance, since for him it is important even in a smaller measure,

and another person came and carried it out,

that same object that had been made fit,

the latter becomes liable

the other person who carried it out

through the thought of the former

who had set it aside.

The Gemara now explains that although R. Elazar, son of R. Yosei, R. Eliezer, and R. Shimon ben Elazar stated the same principle, they do not all accept one another's ruling. Rather, R. Eliezer and R. Shimon ben Elazar

both accept the view of R. Elazar, son of R. Yosei

that the owners, through their thought, can render the priest's service piggul.

For

now, outside,

outside the Temple, such as when one slaughters an idolater's animal or carries something out on Shabbat,

we say

that this person's thought determines the status of the person performing the act.

If so,

inside,

that is, with regard to offerings,

is it necessary

to say that this person's thought invalidates that person's service? For the entire law concerning thought was stated with regard to offerings.

But R. Elazar, son of R. Yosei, does not accept the view of both of them.

For

perhaps it is only inside,

where the law of thought was stated,

that he said

that this person's thought invalidates that person's service. But

outside, we do not say so.

R. Shimon ben Elazar,

who considers the thought of one person significant in order to make another liable for the labor of carrying,

accepts the view of R. Eliezer

concerning an Israelite who slaughters an animal while its gentile owner thinks of idolatry.

For

now, with regard to Shabbat, we say

that one thinks and the other becomes liable.

With regard to idolatry, is it necessary to say so?!

For liability for idolatry applies to those services that resemble the services performed in the Temple; therefore, with regard to thought as well, they resemble the services performed in the Temple.

But

R. Eliezer,

who said that the gentile owners' thought invalidates the Israelite's slaughter,

does not accept the view of R. Shimon ben Elazar,

who said that when one sets aside an object that is not fit to be set aside, his fellow becomes liable for carrying it, for

perhaps it is with regard to idolatry

which resembles the services performed in the Temple,

that you said

that it is invalid

in a manner analogous to the Temple. But with regard to Shabbat,

there is no liability for this person's action on account of another person's thought,

because the Torah prohibited purposeful labor,

meaning that the labor must be significant to the one performing it. How, then, can the thought of the other person who set aside an object smaller than the measure for setting aside make this person, who did not deem it important, liable? For, with regard to him, carrying an object of such a measure is not considered purposeful labor, and he does not intend to perform a labor through it.

We have completed chapter Beit Shammai.

Mishna:

What are their places,

where is the place for their slaughter, the receiving of their blood, the sprinkling of their blood, and their consumption

of the offerings?

a.

All offerings that are

offerings of the highest sanctity

(sin-offering, guilt-offering, burnt-offering, and communal peace-offering)

their slaughter

is in the north

of the Temple courtyard.

b.

The bull and the goat of Yom Kippur,

which are sin-offerings—

their slaughter is in the north, and their blood is received in a service vessel in the north.

And their blood,

of the bull and the goat of Yom Kippur,

requires sprinkling

in the innermost place

between the staves

of the Ark; and likewise, it requires sprinkling in the Sanctuary,

on the Curtain and on the golden altar.

If he omitted

one of these applications,

it

prevents

atonement, and he must bring another offering.

The remainder of the blood

of the bull and the goat

was poured onto the western base of the outer altar. And if he did not place

the remainder of the blood on the base,

it did not prevent

atonement.

c.

The bulls that are burned

(the bull for the unwitting ruling of the community and the bull of the anointed priest)

and the goats that are burned

(the goats offered for communal idolatry), which are sin-offerings and are not eaten but burned—

their slaughter is in the north, and their blood is received in a service vessel in the north.

And their blood,

of the bulls and goats that are burned,

requires sprinkling

in the Sanctuary,

on the Curtain and on the golden altar.

He omitted

one of these applications;

it

prevents

atonement.