Zevachim 46b (מו:) — the Talmud in English

One occurrence of karet

for the general category,

and one occurrence of karet

for the specific case,

in order to expound the verses by one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles through which the Torah is expounded: a matter that was included in a general category [shelamim] and was then singled out from the general category [from all sacrificial offerings] in order to teach something— it was not singled out to teach only about itself, but to teach about the entire general category. The fact that the Torah specified karet for an impure person who ate shelamim teaches us: Just as shelamim are unique in that they are sacrificial offerings of the altar and one is liable to karet for them, so too, all sacrificial offerings of the altar are included. Sacrificial offerings for the maintenance of the Temple were excluded, as they were excluded by the verse, and one is not liable to karet for them.

And one occurrence of karet

one

additional occurrence was written to include

items that are not eaten.

For example, wood and frankincense: if one eats them while impure through bodily impurity, he is liable to karet.

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says

in the Mishna,

for items that are not eaten one is not liable on their account for impurity,

what does the third occurrence of karet

come to include?

It comes to include the inner sin-offerings,

whose blood is sprinkled in the Sanctuary, for eating them while impure through bodily impurity entails liability to karet.

It might have entered your mind to say: Since Rabbi Shimon said

above in the Mishna,

every

sacrifice

whose

blood is not sprinkled on

the outer altar, as with shelamim, one is not liable for it on account of pigul,

I might have said

with regard to impurity as well

that we should say

that he is not liable.

Just as with regard to pigul there is exemption in the case of the inner sin-offerings, so too, with regard to impurity there should be exemption. Therefore

it teaches us

the surplus wording of the third verse that for eating while impure through bodily impurity one is liable to karet even in the case of the inner sin-offerings.

We learned in the Mishna:

These are the words of

[he said]

Rabbi Shimon:

For that which is normally eaten, one is liable on its account; but for wood, frankincense, and incense, one is not liable on their account for impurity.

Two amoraim disagreed concerning the meaning of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. It is not known with certainty which amoraim are the ones who disagree; it is known only that each amora is one of a pair of amoraim. Therefore, the Gemara mentions all four names of the two pairs of amoraim [with each amora belonging to one of the two pairs].

It was stated:

Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish [one pair],

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina

[the second pair].

One

amora

from this side

[pair],

and one

amora

from this side

disagreed concerning the meaning of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages.

One said:

The dispute concerns impurity of the flesh,

meaning that impurity came into contact with the wood and frankincense;

but with regard to bodily impurity,

when the person eating was impure,

everyone agrees that he does not receive lashes

for eating wood and frankincense.

And one said: Just as the dispute applies to this,

to impurity of the wood and frankincense,

so does the dispute apply to this,

to impurity of the person eating them, whether he is liable to karet or not.

Rava said

[this is the version of the Shita Mekubetzet; see the notes later in the discussion]:

It is reasonable according to the one who says: Just as the dispute applies to this, so does the dispute apply to this. What is the reason?

Since we can apply to it,

with regard to wood and frankincense,

“the flesh that comes into contact with any impure thing,” we can apply to it

also with regard to the impure person who eats them,

“and its impurity is upon it.”

For the impurity of the item and the impurity of the person eating it are written adjacent to one another. Just as it was included that eating is prohibited when the item [that is, the wood and frankincense] became impure, so too, the prohibition against eating them when the person is impure was included.

Rav Taviyomi taught it as follows,

as it was stated above.

Rav Kahana taught it as follows:

One from this pair

[pair]

and one from that pair

disagreed concerning the meaning of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages,

with regard to the latter clause

of Rabbi Shimon’s statement, concerning one who eats wood and frankincense:

One said: The dispute concerns bodily impurity

of the person eating them,

but with regard to impurity of the flesh

[that is, of the wood and frankincense],

everyone agrees that he receives lashes.

And one said: Just as the dispute applies to this, so does the dispute apply to this.

Rava said: It is reasonable according to the one who says: Just as the dispute applies to this, so does the dispute apply to this.

What is the reason?

Since we cannot apply to it

with regard to bodily impurity,

“and its impurity is upon it, and it shall be cut off,” we cannot apply to it

also with regard to impurity of the wood and frankincense,

“and the flesh that comes into contact with any impure thing shall not be eaten.”

And we challenge this:

But the Master said: “And the flesh”

comes to include wood and frankincense!?

And we answer: That verse is merely an asmakhta, and this is only a rabbinic prohibition; they based it

merely as a disqualification,

on the verse, meaning that it is only a rabbinic stringency.

Mishna:

For the sake of six matters the sacrifice is sacrificed:

a.

For the sake of the sacrifice.

The one performing the slaughter must slaughter the sacrifice for the sake of this type of sacrifice, and not for the sake of another sacrifice.

b.

For the sake of the one bringing the sacrifice.

The one performing the slaughter must slaughter the sacrifice for the sake of its owner, and not for the sake of someone else.

c.

For the sake of the Name.

The slaughterer must slaughter it for the sake of the One who spoke and brought the world into being.

d.

For the sake of the fires.

He must slaughter it with the intention of burning it on the altar as a fire-offering, and not with the intention of making it roasted meat over coals.

e.

For the sake of fragrance.

He must slaughter it so that it will be burned in a manner that produces fragrance, and not so that he will roast it first and burn it afterward.

f.

For the sake of satisfaction.

He must slaughter it so that it will be burned for the sake of bringing satisfaction before the Holy One, blessed be He, who commanded that offerings be brought, and His will is fulfilled.

And the sin-offering and the guilt-offering

have an additional requirement: they must be slaughtered

for the sake of

that

sin

for which they were set aside.

Rabbi Yosei said: I heard that even one who did not have in mind

to slaughter

for the sake of any one of these,

but slaughtered it without specifying an intention, it is

valid,

because

it is a stipulation of the court

that the priests slaughter sacrifices without specifying an intention, without saying that they are slaughtering them “for its sake,” so that they will not come to err and say that they are slaughtering them not for its sake. Although the owners think that the slaughter will be performed for the sake of all these matters, their intention is ineffective, because

intention follows only the one performing the rite,

and if he errs and says that he is slaughtering it not for its sake, the owners’ intention cannot correct his error.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

The statement in the Mishna that the sacrifice is sacrificed for the sake of six matters requires us to derive four of them [apart from deviation in the type of offering and deviation in the ownership, which are derived above, in the first chapter, from other verses] from the wording of the verse concerning an olah, as it is stated: “An olah, a fire-offering, a pleasing fragrance, to the Lord”—

Olah

—that he should slaughter it

for the sake of an olah. To exclude

that he should not slaughter it

for the sake of a shelamim, for that

would not be in accordance with its mitzva.

Fires

—that he should slaughter it

for the sake of

kavava

[roasted meat over coals],

for that

would not be in accordance with its mitzva.

Fragrance

—that he should slaughter it with the intention of burning it in such a manner that it will produce fragrance while it is burned,

to exclude limbs that he roasted

first somewhere other than on the arrangement of wood on the altar,

and brought them up

afterward onto the arrangement of wood. Since they were roasted, they no longer produce fragrance while being burned on the altar;

for that

would not be in accordance with its mitzva. This is as

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav

[in tractate Menahot 21a]:

Limbs that he roasted

somewhere other than on the arrangement of wood, and then

brought them up

onto the arrangement of wood,

do not have fragrance.

Satisfaction

—that he should slaughter it for the sake of

bringing satisfaction

before the Holy One, blessed be He, who commanded that offerings be brought, and His will is fulfilled.

To the Lord

—that he should slaughter it

for the sake of the One who spoke and brought the world into being.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: A sin-offering that he slaughtered for the sake of an olah is invalid.

But if he

slaughtered it for the sake of an unconsecrated animal,

it is

valid.

Rabbi Ilai said: What is the reason of Rav,

who said that a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of an olah is invalid, whereas a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of an unconsecrated animal is valid? It is as it is written [Leviticus 22]:

“And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel.”

And we expound this verse as follows: Nothing else can profane sacred offerings except sacred offerings themselves; that is, when one changes one sacred offering into another. Therefore they said that only

sacred offerings profane sacred offerings,

when one slaughters one sacrifice for the sake of another sacrifice, as we learn above, in the first chapter, from “and he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering,”

but unconsecrated animals do not profane sacred offerings.

If one slaughters a sacrifice for the sake of an unconsecrated animal, his intention is not considered an intention, and the sacrifice remains valid.

Rabba raised an objection

from what we learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei said: I heard that even one who did not have in mind to slaughter for the sake of any one of these is valid, because it is a stipulation of the court.

And Rabba infers:

The reason

that it is valid is because

he had nothing at all in mind,

but slaughtered it without specifying an intention, and consequently the sacrifice is brought for its proper purpose.

Had he had in mind to slaughter it for the sake of an unconsecrated animal, it would be invalid!

Abaye said to him: Perhaps

one should infer as follows: If

he had nothing at all in mind,

the sacrifice is

valid and

also

effects acceptance

for its owners as though he had intended it for its proper purpose.

Had he had in mind to slaughter it for the sake of an unconsecrated animal, it is valid,

but

it does not effect acceptance.

Thus there is no difficulty for Rav, who says that a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of an unconsecrated animal is valid.

Rabbi Ilai said: A sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of an unconsecrated animal is valid

because he knows that it is a sin-offering, but slaughters it for the sake of an unconsecrated animal. However, if he slaughtered the sin-offering

“because of an unconsecrated animal,”

because he thought it was an unconsecrated animal, it is

invalid,

because according to his intention he is not engaged in sacred offerings at all; due to his lack of knowledge, he thinks he is dealing with an unconsecrated matter.

And this disqualification of acting without focused intent with regard to sacred offerings is

as Samuel asked Rav Huna: