Zevachim 46b — the Talmud in English

Karet

one for the general category,

and karet

one for the particular case,

to expound the verses through one of the thirteen hermeneutical principles by which the Torah is expounded: a matter that was included in the general category [of peace-offerings] and went out of the general category [of all sacrificial offerings] in order to teach—did not go out to teach about itself, but went out to teach about the entire general category. This teaches us that the Torah specified karet for an impure person who ate peace-offerings, to say to you: just as peace-offerings are distinctive in that they are sacrificial offerings and one is liable to karet for them, so too all sacrificial offerings are included. The sacrificial offerings for the repair of the Temple went out, having been excluded, and one is not liable to karet for them.

And karet

one

additional occurrence was written to include

things that are not eaten.

For example, wood and frankincense: if one ate them while impure through bodily impurity, he is liable to karet.

And according to Rabbi Shimon, who says

in the Mishna,

“for things that are not eaten one is not liable on their account because of impurity,”

the third karet

comes to include what?

It comes to include the inner sin-offerings,

whose blood is sprinkled in the Sanctuary, for eating them while impure through bodily impurity one is liable to karet.

For it might enter your mind to say: since Rabbi Shimon said

above in the Mishna,

“every

sacrifice

that does not have its blood sprinkled on

the outer

altar, like a peace-offering, one is not liable for it because of piggul,”

I might say

also because of impurity

let us say

that one is not liable.

Just as with regard to piggul one is exempt in the case of the inner sin-offerings, so with regard to impurity too one would be exempt. Therefore

it teaches us

the surplus of the third verse that for eating while impure through bodily impurity one is liable to karet even in the case of the inner sin-offerings.

We learned in the Mishna:

“I heard” [said

Rabbi

Shimon]:

“For that which is ordinarily eaten one is liable on its account, but for wood, frankincense, and the incense one is not liable on their account because of impurity.”

Two amoraim disputed the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. It is not clearly known who the disputing amoraim are; it is known only that each amora is one of a pair of amoraim. Therefore the Gemara states all four names of the two pairs of amoraim [with each amora being one of the two pairs].

It was stated:

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish [one pair],

Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina [the second pair].

One

of this side

amora

of this pair

[the pair],

and one

amora

of this side

disputed the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages.

One said:

The dispute concerns impurity of the flesh,

meaning that impurity touched the wood and frankincense,

but with regard to bodily impurity,

when the person eating was impure,

everyone agrees that he does not receive lashes

for eating wood and frankincense.

And one said: Just as the dispute concerning this,

concerning the impurity of the wood and frankincense,

so is the dispute concerning this,

concerning the impurity of the person eating them, whether he is liable to karet or not.

Rava said [this is the reading of the Shitta Mekubbetzet; see the notes later in the passage]

it is more logical according to the one who says, ‘Just as the dispute concerning this, so is the dispute concerning this.’ What is the reason?

It is more reasonable according to the one who says that just as the disagreement concerns this, so too, the disagreement concerns that. What is the reason?

Since we can apply to it,

with regard to wood and frankincense, “‘And the flesh that touches any impure thing,’ we can apply to it

also

with regard to the impure person eating them, “‘and its impurity is upon it.’”

For the impurity of the object and the impurity of the person eating it were written adjacent to one another; and just as it was included that there is a prohibition of eating when the object [that is, the wood and frankincense] became impure, so was the prohibition of eating them when the person is impure included.

Rav Tavyomi taught it in this manner,

as it was stated above.

Rav Kahana taught it in this manner:

One of this pair

[the pair]

and one of this pair

disputed the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages,

concerning the latter clause

of Rabbi Shimon’s statement, with regard to eating wood and frankincense:

One said: The dispute concerns bodily impurity

of the person eating them,

but with regard to impurity of the flesh

[that is, of the wood and frankincense],

everyone agrees that he receives lashes.

And one said: Just as the dispute concerning this, so is the dispute concerning this.

Rava said: It is more logical according to the one who says, ‘Just as the dispute concerning this, so is the dispute concerning this.’

What is the reason?

—

Since we cannot apply to it

with regard to bodily impurity

“and its impurity is upon it, and it shall be cut off,” we cannot apply to it

also with regard to the impurity of the wood and frankincense

“and the flesh that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten.”

And we raise a difficulty:

But the Master said, “And the flesh”

comes to include wood and frankincense!?

And we answer: That verse is merely a supporting indication, and this is only rabbinic; they based it upon the verse

as a mere disqualification,

rabbinically, which is only a rabbinic elevation.

Mishna:

For the sake of six matters the sacrifice is slaughtered:

a.

For the sake of the sacrifice.

The slaughterer must slaughter the sacrifice for the sake of this sacrifice, and not for the sake of another sacrifice.

b.

For the sake of the slaughterer.

The slaughterer must slaughter the sacrifice for the sake of its owner, and not for the sake of someone else.

c.

For the sake of the Name.

The slaughterer must slaughter it for the sake of Him who spoke and brought the world into being.

d.

For the sake of fires.

He must slaughter it with the intention of burning it on the altar for fires, and not with the intention of making it roasted meat over coals.

e.

For the sake of fragrance.

He must slaughter it in order to burn it in a burning from which fragrance will emerge, and not in order to roast it first and afterward burn it.

f.

For the sake of satisfaction.

He must slaughter it in order to burn it for gratification before the Most High, who commanded, and whose will we fulfill.

And the sin-offering and the guilt-offering

have an additional law in them: they must be slaughtered

for the sake of

that

sin

for which they were set apart.

Rabbi Yosei said: I heard that even one who did not have in his heart

to slaughter

for the sake of any one of these,

but slaughtered it without specification, it is

valid,

because

it is a stipulation of the court

that the priests slaughter without specification, without saying that they are slaughtering it “for its sake,” so that they should not come to error, saying that they are slaughtering it not for its sake. Although the owners think that the slaughter will be for the sake of all these, their thought is ineffective, because

the thought follows only the one performing the service,

and if he errs and says that he is slaughtering not for its sake, the thought of the owners cannot correct his error.

Gemara:

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav:

What we say in the Mishna, that the sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six matters, we must derive four of them [apart from a change of sacred designation and a change of owners, which are learned above, in the first chapter, from other verses] from the wording of the verse concerning a burnt-offering, as it is stated: “A burnt-offering, a fire-offering, a pleasing fragrance to the Lord”—

“Burnt-offering”

—that he should slaughter it

for the sake of a burnt-offering. To exclude

that he should not slaughter it

for the sake of a peace-offering, for it

would not be according to its mitzva.

“Fires” —

that he should slaughter it for the sake of fires. To exclude

that he should not slaughter it for the sake of

kavava

[meat roasted over coals],

for it

would not be according to its mitzva.

“Fragrance” —

that he should slaughter it with the intention of burning it in such a manner that fragrance will emerge from it at the time of its burning,

to exclude limbs that he roasted

first not upon the altar,

and brought them up

afterward upon the altar; since they were roasted, fragrance no longer emerges from them at the time of their burning upon the altar,

for it

would not be according to its mitzva. And as

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav

[in tractate Menahot 21a]:

Limbs that he roasted

not upon the altar, and afterward

brought them up

upon the altar,

do not have fragrance in them.

“Satisfaction” —

that he should slaughter it for the sake of

satisfaction

before the Most High, who commanded that sacrifices be offered, and we fulfill His will.

“To the Lord” —

that he should slaughter it

for the sake of Him who spoke and brought the world into being.

Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: A sin-offering that he slaughtered for the sake of a burnt-offering is invalid.

But if he

slaughtered it for the sake of non-sacred property,

it is

valid.

Rabbi Ilai said: What is the reason of Rav,

Rabbi Ilai said: What is Rav’s reason

who said that a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of a burnt-offering is invalid, whereas a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of non-sacred property is valid? For it is written [Leviticus 22],

“And they shall not profane the sacred things of the Children of Israel.”

And we expound this verse as follows: Nothing else can profane sacrificial offerings except sacrificial offerings themselves; that is, when one changes one sacred offering into another sacred offering. Therefore they said that only

sacrificial offerings profane sacrificial offerings,

when one slaughters one sacrifice for the sake of another sacrifice, as we learn above, in the first chapter, from “and he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering,”

but non-sacred property does not profane sacrificial offerings;

for if one slaughters a sacrifice for the sake of non-sacred property, his thought is not a thought, and the sacrifice is valid.

Rabba raised an objection

from what we learned in our Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei said, “I heard that even one who did not have in his heart the sake of any one of these is valid, because it is a stipulation of the court.”

And Rabba infers:

The reason

for its being valid is because

he had nothing at all in his heart,

but slaughtered it without specification, and consequently the sacrifice was offered for its sake;

but if he had in his heart the sake of non-sacred property, it is invalid! Abaye said to him: Perhaps

one should infer as follows: if

he had nothing at all in his heart,

the sacrifice is

valid and

also

effects acceptance

for its owners as though he had thought for its sake.

But if he had in his heart the sake of non-sacred property, it is valid,

but

it does not effect acceptance.

And Rav, who says that a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of non-sacred property is valid, will not be difficult.

Rabbi Ilai said: A sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of non-sacred property is valid

because he knows that it is a sin-offering, but slaughters it for the sake of non-sacred property. But if he slaughtered the sin-offering

“because of non-sacred property,”

because he thought it was non-sacred property, it is

invalid,

because according to his thought he is not engaged at all with sacrificial offerings; rather, he thinks [through lack of knowledge] that he is engaged with non-sacred matters.

And this disqualification of an “unintentional act” in sacrificial offerings is

as Shmuel asked Rav Huna: