Zevachim 42b (מב:) — the Talmud in English

And we raise an objection:

But it teaches “between and between” in the beraita, implying that he had an invalid intention either with regard to this or with regard to that; whereas according to your explanation, it is speaking of one who had an invalid intention with regard to all three!? And the Gemara concludes:

This is difficult!

The Gemara now comes to challenge the approach that sought to establish that Rabbi Meir’s reason is that one can render an offering piggul through an intention concerning half of that which permits it.

The Master said: Rabbi Meir says

with regard to one who has an intention concerning some of the sprinklings, or concerning the kometz alone,

it is piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it.

And we raise an objection: It is possible to say that, with regard to the kometz and the frankincense, one can render an offering piggul through an intention concerning half of that which permits it. But with regard to half of the sprinkling, how can this be said?

Since karet

for eating piggul meat

does not apply until all of that which permits it has been offered,

that is, until all the blood-services of the sacrifice have been completed, and as

the Master said: Just as the acceptance of the blood of a valid sacrifice

is not considered acceptance

until all of that which permits it has been offered,

it is not considered acceptance

until all of that which permits it has been offered,

after the completion of the four blood-services,

so too, the acceptance of an invalid offering

when one seeks to render it piggul does not take effect

until all of that which permits it has been offered.

And now,

but with regard to the internal sin-offerings,

once he has formulated an intention concerning it

an intention of piggul

inside,

during the sprinklings between the staves,

he has invalidated it

and

it is as though he did not bring

its blood

—is that so?

And if so,

when he subsequently brings

its blood

in the Sanctuary,

is it merely water that he is bringing?

Thus, it turns out that he has not sprinkled its blood, and yet one application prevents atonement in the case of internal sin-offerings? Indeed, when one formulates an invalid intention at the time of slaughter, although the sacrifice thereby becomes invalid, and afterward he sprinkles its blood with an intention or in silence, and this sprinkling is performed with invalid blood, one may say that since the Torah extended the law of an intention of piggul to an intention formulated at the time of slaughter, the Torah must necessarily have spoken of a case in which there is piggul in this manner, and this sprinkling serves as acceptance for its piggul status. The same applies to the Rabbis, who hold that one cannot render an offering piggul through an intention concerning half of that which permits it, or to Rabbi Meir according to the approach that his reason is that he performs the service on the basis of his initial intention: Since it is necessary to formulate the intention with regard to the entire sprinkling-service, and we do not find that piggul takes effect except in this manner, the Torah must necessarily have been speaking of this when it stated the law of piggul with regard to sprinkling—that sprinkling in which he formulated the intention of piggul serves as acceptance for its piggul status. But according to the approach that one can render an offering piggul through an intention concerning half of that which permits it, there is no sprinkling here at all, because since he did not complete the sprinkling with an intention of piggul, but completed it with a valid intention, it follows that there is half a sprinkling of piggul and half a valid sprinkling, and there is no sprinkling that serves as acceptance for its piggul status.

And we answer:

Rabba said: The case in which Rabbi Meir said that there is piggul through the sprinklings

is found

with four bulls and four goats.

This is when he rendered the sprinklings between the staves piggul with regard to all the applications of the first bull, and its blood was spilled; he then slaughtered another bull and sprinkled its blood on the curtain, and likewise, one bull was used for the corners and another for the purification of the Altar. The reason piggul takes effect here is that each one constitutes a separate atonement, and if he had performed them properly without an intention of piggul, his service would have been valid. The same applies with regard to piggul, since all of that which permits each one was offered, and the service was completed through the other one. And even according to the Rabbis, who hold that if the blood is spilled in the middle of the service, he must begin the second blood-application from the beginning, this applies only when it was spilled in the middle of the applications. But when he completed one application, he need not repeat the applications that he had already completed. However, in the case of a single bull, Rabbi Meir concedes that piggul does not take effect, since he never completed its sprinkling.

Rava said: You may even say that Rabbi Meir was speaking of one bull and one goat.

He was not speaking of four. And as for what you asked—that half a service is of no consequence with regard to piggul—I will say to you:

It serves as acceptance for its piggul

through this sprinkling of blood. Just as when he formulated an intention of piggul at the time of slaughter, the sprinkling of its invalid blood is considered “all of that which permits it has been offered,” with regard to its serving as acceptance for its piggul, so too, when he formulates an intention during half of the sprinkling and remains silent during the other half, his sprinkling is considered “all of that which permits it has been offered,” as long as he did not mix another intention into it.

We raise an objection: Why did the beraita state with regard to the applications on Yom Kippur

“forty-three,” but it was taught

in another beraita:

forty-seven?

And we answer:

This

beraita, which taught forty-three, is

in accordance with the one who says that one mixes

the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat

to

apply some of each

to the corners

of the inner Altar. It follows that the applications to the corners of the Altar consist of only four applications. In tractate Yoma, Rabbi Yoshiya and Rabbi Natan disagreed concerning what is stated: “And he shall take from the blood of the bull and from the blood of the goat and place it on the corners of the Altar.” One said that they must be mixed, and the other said that he applies each one separately.

But

this beraita, which taught forty-seven, is

in accordance with the one who says that one does not mix

their blood

for

the application to the

corners.

It follows that he applies four applications from each one, and there are therefore four additional applications beyond the forty-three.

We raise an objection:

But it was taught

in another beraita:

forty-eight?

And we answer:

This

beraita, which taught forty-eight, is

in accordance with the one who says that the remainder is essential.

If he did not pour the remainder of the blood onto the base of the outer Altar, he did not achieve atonement, and therefore one additional application is required. And

this

refers to the beraitot that taught forty-seven and forty-three,

in accordance with the one who says that the remainder is not essential,

and even if he did not pour it, he achieved atonement.

The Gemara now challenges Reish Lakish, who holds that Rabbi Meir’s reason is not that one can render an offering piggul through an intention concerning half of that which permits it:

Meytivi:

It was stated in a beraita in Menahot:

When is this statement said,

that the meal-offering becomes piggul even if he formulated the intention during only one service? It is specifically when he formulated the intention

at

the time of

taking the kometz,

or

when placing it in a vessel,

or

during the carrying,

since these are services performed with only one element that permits the offering, as they are performed with the kometz but not with the frankincense; therefore, there is a complete service that has been rendered piggul.

But

when

he comes

the koen

to burn

the offering, which is a service performed with two elements that permit it—the burning of the kometz and the burning of the frankincense—if

he placed the kometz with an intention

of piggul

and the frankincense in silence, or he placed the kometz in silence and the frankincense with an intention, Rabbi Meir says,

it is

piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it

if he eats from it,

but the Sages say: It does not carry

liability for

karet until he renders it piggul through the entire element that permits it.

In any event, it teaches:

He placed

the kometz

first

in silence and

afterward

the frankincense with an intention

of invalidity,

and Rabbi Meir disagrees

with this, and it is thereby indicated that he holds that one can render an offering piggul through an intention concerning half of that which permits it, contrary to what Reish Lakish said!?

And we answer:

Say that the beraita should read: “Or he placed the kometz in silence and

had already placed

first

the frankincense with an intention,”

and for this reason, the second placement, which was performed in silence, is done on the basis of the initial intention.

We raise two objections to this answer:

First, this is the initial case itself,

for we already taught this manner of performing the placement, with the intention formulated during the first placement, when the beraita said: “He placed the kometz with an intention and the frankincense in silence.” Why do I need it to teach again, “Or he placed the kometz in silence and had already placed the frankincense with an intention”? What difference is there whether the kometz was placed first or the frankincense was placed first?

And furthermore, it was taught

in another beraita: “Or he placed the kometz in silence

and afterward

placed the frankincense with an intention.” In this version, it is impossible to interpret the text as saying, “and had already placed it”!?

The Gemara concludes:

This is difficult!

In the passage concerning the sacrifice of a peace-offering, the law of piggul is explained: If, during the blood-services [slaughter, receiving, carrying, and sprinkling], one formulates an intention that a person will eat it, or that the Altar will consume it [the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the sacrificial fats], outside its designated time, he renders the sacrifice piggul through his invalid intention, and one is liable to receive karet for eating its meat.

This law of piggul is derived from the sacrifice of shelamim with regard to the other sacrifices, provided that they resemble shelamim: Just as shelamim have a matir—something that renders permissible—both for a person and for the altar, as the sprinkling of the blood renders the flesh of the shelamim permissible for human consumption and renders the burning of its portions permissible on the altar, so too, among the other sacrifices, only an item that has a matir becomes piggul. However, an item that renders other items permissible does not become piggul, nor does an item that itself has no other matir become piggul.

On this basis, the Mishna says:

Mishna:

1.

And these are the items for which one is not liable

for karet for eating them

on account of piggul: The kometz.

If one took the kometz from the meal-offering with the intention of eating its remainder on the following day, the meal-offering thereby became piggul. But one who eats the kometz is not liable for karet, because piggul applies only to an item that has other matirim, whereas the kometz renders the remainder of the meal-offering permissible and is not itself rendered permissible by another item.

And the incense

which is not rendered permissible by another item.

And the frankincense

which is burned together with the kometz, through which it renders the remainder permissible, like the kometz; but it itself has no other matir.