Zevachim 42a — the Talmud in English

But as for the blood applications that are given upon the inner altar, such as forty-three

applications

of Yom Kippur

when he applies upon between the staves from the blood of the bull, one above and seven below, and corresponding to them from the blood of the goat—here there are sixteen; and corresponding to them he applies sixteen applications upon the curtain—here there are thirty-two; and in addition, four gifts upon the four horns of the inner altar, giving from the blood of both of them mixed together—here there are thirty-six; and seven additional applications upon the top of the altar—here there are forty-three applications upon four places: between the staves, upon the curtain, upon the horns of the inner altar, and upon the top of the altar.

And

so too

eleven

gifts

of the bull of the anointed priest, and

so too

eleven

gifts

of the bull for the community’s unwitting matter,

in all these cases, if he

rendered it piggul, whether in the first

namely, the gifts within and farther within, between the staves,

or in the second

upon the curtain,

or in the third

upon the golden altar,

Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul

it

and one is liable to karet

for eating it,

and the Sages say: There is no

liability of

karet until he renders it piggul in all that permits

and if he calculated concerning some of the gifts, it is not piggul.

It is taught, in any event: “He rendered it piggul whether in the first, whether in the second”

and not “in the first,”

whether in the third,” and he disputes

Rabbi Meir in this, and holds that it is piggul, even though there was here no initial intention, but he calculated concerning the second alone. This must necessarily be because he holds that one can render piggul through half of that which permits, and not like the words of Reish Lakish?!

And we answer:

Rav Yitzhak bar Avin said:

What Rabbi Meir said, that if he rendered it piggul in the second alone it is piggul,

here with what are we dealing? For example, he rendered it piggul at the slaughter

in a case where the blood was spilled after he had finished giving its gifts, and they slaughtered another goat with the intention of beginning to apply from it in the Sanctuary namely, the second gift, and at the time of its slaughter he calculated a piggul intention; and concerning this Rabbi Meir said that it is piggul, since

it is one permitting act

and he rendered piggul through a complete service.

And we object:

If so

it is obvious that it is piggul; and

what is the reason of the Rabbis

who hold that it is not piggul? And we answer:

Rava said: Who

are

these Sages

?

It is Rabbi Eliezer

who holds that even concerning the prohibition against bringing an offering outside the Sanctuary, one is not liable for bringing out half of that which permits. And although burning an olive’s bulk is burning, nevertheless anything that is not the completion of the service is not considered significant with regard to liability for bringing it outside,

as we learned: The handful

which he scooped from the meal-offering,

and the frankincense

belonging to it,

and the incense

of every day, half of which is [burned] in the morning and half between the evenings,

and the priests’ meal-offering

which is entirely burned,

and the meal-offering of the anointed priest

namely, the griddle-cake meal-offering of the High Priest, which he offers every day from his own [funds] and which is entirely burned,

and the libation meal-offering

which comes with an offering requiring libations, and which has no frankincense, and it too is entirely burned,

if he offered an olive’s bulk from one of them

which is the measure of burning

outside, he is liable; but Rabbi Eliezer exempts until he offers all of them

outside, because as long as he has not offered all of them, this is not the burning that completes the owners’ obligation. If so, the same is true in the matter under discussion: Even though slaughter is a complete service, nevertheless, since the service was not completed through this goat alone—for it comes only to complete [the first goat]—this is one service performed through two slaughters, and its slaughter is not considered a service with regard to piggul.

And we object:

But Rava said, and Rabbi Eliezer concedes concerning blood

that one who throws some of the blood of the inner sin-offerings outside is liable, even though all the gifts of the sin-offering constitute one service with regard to preventing the atonement, and it might have been said that with one gift there is only half a service here, analogous to the handful and the frankincense. Nevertheless, he is liable for it on account of [bringing it] outside. The reason is that Rabbi Eliezer holds that if he gave one gift corresponding to it within and farther within, it is accepted, for if he gave one gift inside and the blood was spilled, that gift was accepted, and he need not return and give it; rather, he slaughters another [animal] and begins giving from the place where he stopped. And

as we learned: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon say: From the place where he stopped

when the blood was spilled,

from there he begins

to give from the blood of the other goat. And they disagree in this with the first tanna, who holds that if he gave some of the gifts inside and the blood was spilled, he brings other blood and begins at the beginning, since he did not complete that atonement. And if you would compare the law of piggul to the law of liability for bringing outside, it follows that not only if he rendered it piggul at one slaughter is it piggul, but even if he calculated at one gift, it is likewise, according to Rabbi Eliezer?!

Rather, Rava said:

Actually, Rabbi Meir’s beraita deals with one who calculates during the applications, and not during the slaughter. And what you found difficult from that which is stated, “whether in the second or whether in the third,” because you thought to establish it in a case where he was silent during the first, is not so; rather,

for example, he rendered it piggul in the first, was silent in the second, and then rendered it piggul in the third

and Rabbi Meir’s reason that it is piggul is because the second gift is performed with the intention of the first, for everyone who performs [a service] performs it with the intention of the first, as Reish Lakish said. And that it states that he then calculated in the third was stated for the sake of the novelty: Even though he then calculated in the third, nevertheless the second giving, during which he was silent, was performed with the intention of the first, because

lest you say

if it should enter your mind that

the second giving

is performed with the intention of the first,

if so,

why do I need him to return and render [it] piggul in the third?

For even that one he should have given silently; and from the fact that he calculated in the third, it follows that he did not perform the second with the intention of the first. Even so,

it teaches us

that we do not say this.

Rav Ashi challenged it

to Rava: How did you establish the Mishna as referring to a case where he was silent in the second?

Does it teach “he was silent”

in the beraita?

Rather, Rav Ashi said: Here with what are we dealing? For example, he rendered it piggul

and expressed the piggul with his lips

in the first, in the second, and in the third.

That is, both in the gifts upon between the staves, both in the gifts upon the curtain, and both in the gifts upon the horns of the inner altar. But in the fourth, upon the top of the altar, he did not render it piggul, and actually Rabbi Meir’s reason is that everyone who performs [a service] performs it with the intention of the first; and because of this, even the fourth rendered it piggul. And we heard a novelty in this: Even though he was silent only during the fourth, nevertheless we say in this case that he performed it with the intention of the first, because

lest you say, if it should enter your mind that everyone who performs [a service] performs it with the intention of the first

and because of this piggul takes effect in the fourth, which was performed in silence, if so,

why do I need him to repeat and render [it] piggul in each and every one,

and why was he not silent even during the second and the third, thereby proving that he did not perform [them] with the intention of the first?

It teaches us

that we do not say this.