Zevachim 42a (מב.) — the Talmud in English

However, with regard to the blood whose applications are performed on the inner altar, such as the forty-three

applications

of Yom Kippur

which are sprinkled toward the space between the staves: from the blood of the bull, one sprinkling upward and seven downward, and corresponding to them, from the blood of the goat, for a total of sixteen; and corresponding to them, he sprinkles sixteen applications on the curtain, making thirty-two; and in addition, four applications on the four corners of the inner altar, applying the blood of both together, making thirty-six; and seven additional sprinklings on the top of the altar, making forty-three applications in four places: between the staves, on the curtain, on the corners of the inner altar, and on the top of the altar.

And

likewise,

eleven

applications

of the bull of the anointed priest, and

likewise,

eleven

applications

of the bull for the unwitting communal sin;

in all these cases, if he

formulated a piggul intention during the first

that is, the applications performed inside and inward, between the staves,

or during the second

on the curtain,

or during the third

on the golden altar,

Rabbi Meir says: It is piggul

and

one is liable to receive karet for

eating it.

And the Sages say: There is no

liability of

karet until he formulates a piggul intention with regard to the entire permitting factor;

and if he had an intention concerning only part of the applications, it is not piggul.

In any event, it teaches: If he formulated a piggul intention during the first, or during the second

and not during the first,

or during the third, and he disputes

Rabbi Meir disputes this and holds that it is piggul, even though there was no initial intention here; rather, he formulated an intention during the second alone. This must necessarily be because he holds that one can formulate a piggul intention with regard to half of the permitting factor, and not in accordance with the statement of Reish Lakish!?

And we answer:

Rav Yitzhak bar Avin said:

What Rabbi Meir said—that if he formulated a piggul intention during the second alone it is piggul—

with what are we dealing here? With a case where he formulated a piggul intention during the slaughter

in a case where the blood was spilled after he had completed applying its applications, and they slaughtered another goat with the intention of beginning to sprinkle from its blood in the Sanctuary namely, the second application, and at the time of its slaughter he formulated a piggul intention. With regard to this Rabbi Meir said that it is piggul, since

it is one permitting factor

and he formulated the intention during a complete rite.

And we challenge this:

If so

it is obvious that it is piggul. But

what is the reason of the Rabbis

who hold that it is not piggul? And we answer:

Rava said: Who are

these

Sages

?

It is Rabbi Eliezer

who holds that even with regard to the prohibition against sacrificing outside the Temple, one is not liable for offering half of a permitting factor. Although burning an olive-bulk is considered burning, nevertheless, anything that is not the completion of the rite is not considered significant with regard to liability for offering outside the Temple.

As we learned: The handful

that he removed from the meal-offering,

and the frankincense

belonging to it,

and the incense

used every day, half of which was offered in the morning and half toward evening,

and the priests’ meal-offering

which is burned in its entirety,

and the meal-offering of the anointed priest

namely, the griddle-cake offering of the High Priest, which he offers every day from his own funds and which is burned in its entirety,

and the libation-offering

that accompanies an offering requiring libations, and which contains no frankincense, and which is also burned in its entirety,

if he offered an olive-bulk from one of them

which is the measure for burning

outside, he is liable; but Rabbi Eliezer exempts him until he offers all of them

outside, because as long as he has not offered all of them, this is not the burning that fulfills the owners’ obligation. If so, the same applies in the case before us: Although slaughter is a complete rite, nevertheless, since the rite was not completed with this goat alone—for it comes only to complete the first goat—and this is one rite performed through two slaughters, its slaughter is not considered a significant rite with regard to piggul.

And we challenge this:

But Rava said, and Rabbi Eliezer concedes with regard to blood

that one who casts some of the blood of the inner sin-offerings outside is liable. Although all the applications of the sin-offering constitute one rite with regard to completing the atonement—and it might have been reasonable to say that with one application there is only half a rite, comparable to the handful and the frankincense—nevertheless, he is liable for it as an offering outside the Temple. The reason is that Rabbi Eliezer holds that if he performed one application corresponding to the inner applications, it is accepted. For if he performed one application inside and the blood was spilled, that application was accepted, and he need not repeat it; rather, he slaughters another animal and begins applying its blood from the point at which he stopped.

As we learned: Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Shimon say: From the point at which he stopped

when the blood was spilled,

from there he begins

to apply the blood of the other goat. And they disagree in this regard with the first tanna, who holds that if he performed some of the inner applications and the blood was spilled, he must bring another blood and begin again from the start, since he did not complete that atonement. If you compare the law of piggul to the law of liability for offering outside, then not only if he formulated a piggul intention during one slaughter is it piggul; even if he formulated the intention during one application, it should likewise be piggul according to Rabbi Eliezer!?

Rather, Rava said:

Actually, the beraita of Rabbi Meir is dealing with one who formulated the intention during the sprinklings, and not during the slaughter. As for the difficulty raised from the statement “whether during the second or during the third,” since you thought that it referred to a case where he remained silent during the first, this is not so. Rather,

it is a case where he formulated a piggul intention during the first, remained silent during the second, and then again formulated a piggul intention during the third

and Rabbi Meir’s reason for ruling that it is piggul is that the second application is performed with the first intention in mind, since anyone who performs a rite does so with the first intention in mind, as Reish Lakish said. And the fact that it states that he again formulated an intention during the third is stated for the sake of the novelty: Although he again formulated an intention during the third, nevertheless, the second application, during which he remained silent, was performed with the first intention in mind. For

it might enter your mind

if it enters your mind that

the second application

is performed with the first intention in mind,

then

why do I need him to repeat the piggul intention during the third?

He should have performed that application silently as well. From the fact that he formulated an intention during the third, it would appear that he did not perform the second with the first intention in mind. Nevertheless,

it teaches us

that we do not say this.

Rav Ashi raised an objection

to Rava: How did you establish the Mishna as referring to a case where he remained silent during the second?

Does it teach “he remained silent”

in the beraita?

Rather, Rav Ashi said: With what are we dealing here? With a case where he formulated a piggul intention

and expressed the piggul intention verbally

during the first, the second, and the third.

That is, both during the applications between the staves, during the applications on the curtain, and during the applications on the corners of the inner altar. But he did not formulate a piggul intention during the fourth, on the top of the altar. Rabbi Meir’s reason, then, is still that anyone who performs a rite does so with the first intention in mind. Therefore, even the fourth application becomes piggul. And we learn a novelty from this: Although he remained silent only during the fourth, nevertheless, we say in this case that he performed it with the first intention in mind. For

it might enter your mind that if it enters your mind that anyone who performs a rite does so with the first intention in mind

and that is why piggul takes effect in the fourth application, which was performed in silence, then

why do I need him to repeat the piggul intention during each and every one?

Why did he not remain silent during the second and the third as well, thereby demonstrating that he did not perform them with the first intention in mind?

It teaches us

that we do not say this.