Zevachim 41b — the Talmud in English

But

the law of burning the

diaphragm and the two kidneys, which are not written explicitly in its body,

is explicit;

one might say

that with regard to this matter

the

goats brought for idolatry were not included. Therefore,

it teaches us

.

Earlier [40a], Rav Pappa said that the inclusion “for the bull,” which serves to juxtapose the bull of Yom Kippur with the bull for an unwitting communal sin and the bull of an anointed priest, is necessary to teach its laws of “the,” “with the blood,” and “immersion.”

Rav Huna, son of Rav Natan, said to Rav Pappa: But the tanna

of the beraita above [40b], when juxtaposing

the bull of Yom Kippur

with the bull for an unwitting communal sin,

stated everything that he said concerning

the bull for an unwitting communal sin;

he said

that it includes the bull of Yom Kippur. If so, it was included even with regard to this matter, that failure to perform its sprinklings properly prevents fulfillment, and not only with regard to “the,” “with the blood,” and “immersion”!?

And we answer:

It is a dispute between tannaim

who disagree about this matter.

The tanna of the school of Rav,

that is, the Sifra,

includes this

with regard to “the,” “with the blood,” and “immersion,” whereas he derives the law that failure to perform the sprinklings properly prevents fulfillment from the fact that “statute” is stated with regard to it. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, it is derived from “And he shall complete and effect atonement for the Sanctuary”: if he completed it, he effected atonement.

Whereas

the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael does not include this,

but includes everything stated in the passage.

The tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Why are the diaphragm and the two kidneys stated with regard to the bull of an anointed priest, but not stated with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin?

And we therefore had to learn them from one another.

This is analogous to a flesh-and-blood king who became angry with his beloved and minimized his offense because of his affection for him;

so too, the Holy One, blessed be He, abbreviated the wording with regard to His beloved, namely, the community.

And the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael

taught a similar matter in another context:

Why is “the curtain of the Sanctuary” stated

[Leviticus 4] with regard to the bull of an

anointed priest, but not stated

so

with regard to the bull for an unwitting communal sin,

but there it says only “before the curtain”?

This is analogous to a flesh-and-blood king whose province rebelled against him: If only a minority

of that province

rebelled,

then

his entourage

—the group of his advisers who agree with his view and to whom he reveals his secrets—

continues to exist; but if the majority rebelled, his entourage does not continue to exist,

for he distances himself from their affection and from admitting them partially, and he is no longer as familiar with them as he was at first. So too, when the majority of the community sins and brings the bull for an unwitting communal sin, it is as though there is no sanctity here.

We learned in our Mishna, with regard to blood applied on the inner altar:

Therefore, if he applied

the

entirety of them in their proper manner,

but one not in its proper manner, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet.

In the burning of the meal-offering, there are two permitting components: the burning of the kometz and the burning of the frankincense.

We learned there: If he formed a piggul intention with regard to the kometz,

that he contemplated during its burning eating its remainder outside its allotted time,

but not with regard to the frankincense,

which he burned without such a thought; or if he formed a piggul intention

with regard to the frankincense but not

with regard to

the kometz.

Rabbi Meir says:

It is

piggul, and one is liable to karet

.

And the Sages say: There is no

liability for

karet until he forms a piggul intention with regard to the entire permitting component,

and forms the intention with regard to both of them.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Do not say that the reason of Rabbi Meir

is

that he maintains that one can form a piggul intention with regard to half a permitting component,

and that even if he did not form the intention during all the acts that permit the offering, it is piggul.

Rather,

Rabbi Meir too agrees that one cannot form a piggul intention with regard to half a permitting component. And

here, with what are we dealing? For example, he placed the kometz with the intention

of doing so outside its allotted time,

and

placed

the frankincense

without an intention,

in silence,

without an invalidating intention. Or he first placed the frankincense with an intention, and afterward placed the kometz in silence; and for that reason it is piggul.

He maintains

that Rabbi Meir holds:

Anyone who performs

his act of service

on the basis of his initial intention

formed at the outset

performs it

and it follows that he formed a piggul intention with regard to the entire permitting component.

The Sages do not agree with this; rather, one must form the intention during the second act of service as well. However, if he was silent during the first act of service and formed an intention during the second, Rabbi Meir too agrees that it is not piggul, but merely disqualified, since one must form a piggul intention with regard to the entire permitting component.

The Gemara clarifies:

From where

do you know that this is Rabbi Meir’s reason?

As it teaches

«

Therefore, if he applied

the

entirety of them in their proper manner,

that is, in silence,

and one not in its proper manner,

that is, with the intention of doing so outside its allotted time,

the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet.

This implies that it is specifically in this case—he first applied the blood in silence and afterward applied it with an intention—that, since he did not form the intention with regard to all of them, there is an intention concerning only half a permitting component. Since each application prevents fulfillment of the others, each one is half a permitting component; therefore, he did not render it piggul.

But

if he first applied

one not in its proper manner, and

afterward applied

all of them in their proper manner, it is piggul.

Now,

whose

view does this Mishna follow?

If you say it follows the Sages, the Sages say that one cannot form a piggul intention with regard to half a permitting component.

For with regard to the kometz they said, “There is no liability for karet until he forms a piggul intention with regard to the entire permitting component,” implying that this is so even if he placed the first application with an intention and the second in silence. If so, the same should apply to the blood applications; there is no basis to distinguish between a case in which he first applied it with an intention and one in which he first applied it in silence.

Rather,

necessarily,

it is Rabbi Meir

who taught this matter.

And if

you say that

Rabbi Meir’s reason

with regard to the meal-offering is

that one can form a piggul intention concerning half a permitting component,

then

even

as the Mishna teaches, that he first applied all of them in their proper manner and afterward applied one not in its proper manner,

also

it should be piggul, since he formed a piggul intention concerning half a permitting component.

Rather,

no,

Rabbi Meir’s reason is not that; rather, it is

that he maintains that anyone who performs an act of service does so on the basis of his initial intention,

and therefore it is piggul only when the piggul intention was formed at the outset.

But the Gemara rejects this:

Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said: Actually,

the Mishna follows

the Sages. And what is meant by “in their proper manner”

as stated in the Mishna? It does not mean that he applied them in silence; rather, it means

in their proper manner for piggul.

That is, he applied the first applications with the intention of doing so outside their allotted time, and one not in its proper manner, not for the sake of piggul. The Mishna teaches us that even in such a case it is not piggul, and we do not say that anyone who performs an act of service does so on the basis of his initial intention.

And we raise an objection:

But from the fact that it teaches

«

Therefore, if he applied all of them in their proper manner, and one not in its proper manner, the offering is disqualified, but there is no liability for karet,”

and it did not say, “He applied all of them in their proper manner except one of them,” or “He applied all of them in their proper manner and one in silence,”

by inference

you learn

that “

he applied all of them in their

proper manner” is stated in order to validate it!

For if “in its proper manner” refers to an intention of piggul, how can the Mishna call silence “not in its proper manner”? He formed no intention concerning it and did not thereby undermine his initial intention, so why should it be considered “not in its proper manner”!?

And we answer:

Rava said:

Actually, the Mishna means “he applied the first applications in their proper manner,” referring to an intention of piggul, as Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzḥak said.

And what is meant by “not in its proper manner”

as stated in the Mishna with regard to the one application, implying that it was not in its proper manner for piggul? It is referring to a case in which he applied it with the intention

of doing so outside its proper place,

an intention that removes the offering from the status of piggul.

Rav Ashi said:

the final thought that was not proper, that is, the thought of

not for its sake,

which removes one from the thought of piggul, for the Mishna is dealing with a sin-offering, in which a thought of not for its sake invalidates it.

And we raise an objection to both explanations:

from the fact

that the tannai did not call this offering “invalid,” except in a case where he thought a final thought that was not proper, that is, outside its place or not for its sake, you learn

that when he does not make it

with the thought of the final application of

outside its place

or

not for its sake, he is liable

for piggul on eating this offering, even though he did not think so at all the applications. Necessarily, this is because the final application is performed with the awareness of the first applications. If so, you can no longer establish the Mishna according to the Rabbis, for they do not hold that everyone who performs [an act] does so with the awareness of the first [act]?!

And we answer: actually, as we said, that “not proper” means outside its place or not for its sake. And what the tannai stated, “invalid, and there is no liability for excision,” in this matter, is not precise, for even without this the offering is not piggul, since he did not think so during all his acts, but

since he taught in the opening clause

concerning external sin-offerings, whose applications do not prevent one another, “he gave the first outside its time, and the second outside its place,

it is piggul, and one is liable for it by excision,” where he specifically stated “outside its place” with the second application in order to innovate that a thought of outside its place at the second application does not remove one from the piggul that took effect at the first application, since the first application permits on its own; for that reason

the tannai also taught in the final clause,

“the tannai likewise taught in the final clause

concerning one who gave the final application with a thought,

“it is invalid, and there is no liability for excision,”

for the second thought removes one from piggul, even though even without this the offering is not piggul.

We raise an objection

to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who holds that the reason for Rabbi Meir is not because one makes piggul with half of a permitting act, but because everyone who performs [an act] does so with the awareness of the first [act], from what we learned in the Tosefta:

In what case are these words said

when, if he thought [the thought] at one application, he made piggul?

With the bloods given on the outer altar,

for one application of them permits the offering and makes piggul through them.