Zevachim 36a — the Talmud in English

b. If he slaughtered the sacrifice with the thought

to place them

as the blood gifts

upon the ramp

which is not the place of the giving of the blood, or upon the altar

not opposite the base

that is, at the southeastern horn, which did not have a base [and the blood of the burnt offering must be given on the wall of the altar opposite the base beneath it],

and to give the

blood gifts

that are given above,

above the scarlet line, he thought to give them

below. And those that are given below

he thought to give

above. And those that are given ![](pamud.bmp "

exact column position")

inside

the Sanctuary, he thought to give

outside,

upon the outer altar,

and those that are given outside

he thought to give

inside.

And likewise if he thought

that impure persons would eat it, and

likewise if he thought

that impure persons would offer it,

or he thought

that uncircumcised persons would eat it, and that uncircumcised persons would offer it,

and likewise if he thought

to break the bones of the Passover sacrifice,

or

to eat from it

of the Passover sacrifice

raw,

partially cooked and not roasted,

and

likewise if he thought

to mix its blood

of the sacrifice

with the blood

of

disqualified sacrifices.

In all these thoughts,

the sacrifice is valid

because

thought invalidates

in all the sacrifices

only when he thinks

of thinking

outside its time and outside its place, and the Passover sacrifice and the sin offering

that he slaughtered with the thought

not for their sake.

Gemara:

And the Gemara discusses it:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda

in our Mishna, who invalidates one who thought to leave its blood until tomorrow, or to take it outside, whereas the verse concerning the disqualification of pigul deals only with the thought of eating or burning outside its time, and not with leaving the blood!?

Rabbi Elazar said: Two verses are written concerning the

disqualification of

remaining: One verse

stated concerning the Passover sacrifice

says: “You shall not leave any of it until morning”

[Exodus 12].

And one verse

stated concerning the thanksgiving offering

says: “He shall not leave any of it until morning”

[Leviticus 7]. And one verse is found to be superfluous. Therefore it is to be expounded according to the principle that if a verse has no matter in which to teach in this place, assign it a matter in which to teach in another place:

If

the superfluous verse concerning the prohibition of remaining

has no matter

to say that there is a prohibition

to leave

[to leave over] the flesh of the sacrifice,

assign it to the matter of the thought of leaving,

if he thought during his service to leave the blood or the fats until tomorrow, outside their time, and the superfluous verse comes to teach that even such a thought of leaving invalidates.

And we challenge this:

And

does

Rabbi Yehuda

hold that

this verse,

this superfluous verse,

for this

for the thought of leaving outside its time,

did it come?

But

this

superfluous verse

is needed for that which was taught:

It is stated in that verse

“And the flesh of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offerings

on the day of his offering shall be eaten. He shall not leave any of it until morning” [there].

We learn

from this

that a thanksgiving offering is eaten for a day and a night

only!

And still we have learned from here only regarding the thanksgiving offering itself, but

substitutes,

if his thanksgiving offering was lost and he designated another in its place, and before he offered the second the first was found, so that the law of the second is to be offered as the law of “a substitute for a thanksgiving offering,”

and

likewise

offspring

of a thanksgiving offering, and

substitutes

of a thanksgiving offering, where he substituted his thanksgiving offering with another animal, and the law is that both are to be offered,

from where

do we know that even these are eaten for a day and a night?

The verse says: “And the flesh.”

That is, there are extra words in this verse, for it could have written, “And his thanksgiving offering shall be eaten on its day,” and by the word “flesh” these were included.

A sin offering and a guilt offering, from where

do we know that even their flesh is eaten only for a day and a night?

The verse says: “Sacrifice,”

and it comes to include additional sacrifices.

And from where to include the nazirite peace offerings,

the ram of the nazirite, which requires the bringing of bread like a thanksgiving offering,

and the Passover peace offerings,

the festival offering of the fourteenth that comes with the Passover sacrifice, that even these are eaten only for a day and a night? [Regarding the other festival offerings it is stated explicitly that they are eaten for two days and one night]?

The verse says: “His peace offerings.”

The thanksgiving breads, and the loaves and wafers of the nazirite—from where? The verse says: “His offering.”

All of them,

that were included here,

I call concerning them: “He shall not leave

any of it until morning.”

It follows that this verse is not superfluous, because it comes to teach about the time for eating the sacrifice; if so, how did we say that Rabbi Yehuda expounds from it the disqualification of the thought of leaving!?

And we answer:

If so,

if it were said that this verse came to teach only about the time for eating the sacrifice,

let the verse say: “You shall not leave

any of it until morning,” as with all other remnants, concerning which the language of remaining is stated.

What is “he shall not leave”?

Why did the Torah express it in this language? Rather, the verse comes to teach:

if it has no matter concerning

the prohibition and disqualification of

leaving, assign it to the matter of the thought of leaving,

which invalidates the sacrifice.

And we challenge this:

That works

for this exposition, to teach about the thought

to leave

its blood until tomorrow, which invalidates. However, the thought

to take out

its blood outside, which also invalidates,

what is there to say,

from where did Rabbi Yehuda derive this?

And furthermore,

there is a difficulty, for

the reason of Rabbi Yehuda is logical reasoning,

and he did not learn it from Scripture!

As it was taught: Rabbi Yehuda said to them

to the Sages: Do

you not concede that if they left it

the blood

until tomorrow it is disqualified,

because the blood becomes disqualified at sunset? Surely you certainly agree in this matter; therefore

even

if

he thought to leave it until tomorrow—

it is disqualified!

It follows that Rabbi Yehuda did not learn his law from the verse, but from logical reasoning.

And the Gemara concludes:

Rather,

indeed

the reason of Rabbi Yehuda is logical reasoning,

for it is logical to say that every act which, if he performed it in practice, would invalidate the sacrifice through it, likewise the thought [during the sacrificial services] concerning the performance of this act invalidates. And this reasoning also applies to the thought of taking the blood outside, since if he took it out in practice it would be disqualified, so too if he thought the thought of taking it out, it is disqualified.

And we challenge this: Since Rabbi Yehuda learned his law from logical reasoning, why does he invalidate only through the thought of leaving the blood or taking it out,

and should Rabbi Yehuda not also disagree

with the Sages

in all of them

the thoughts stated in the Mishna, that if he thought them the sacrifice is valid, and invalidate the sacrifice even through these, for this reason that thought is like an act!?

And we answer:

With which should he disagree?

Should he disagree

concerning breaking the bones of the Passover sacrifice,

where he thought at the time of slaughtering to break its bones, which is a prohibited matter,

and

likewise if

he thought to eat from it raw?

For if he actually did so,

would the sacrifice itself be disqualified?

And if so, even the thought concerning this act does not invalidate.

And likewise, if you wish to say, let him disagree concerning one who thought

that impure persons would eat it

the flesh of the sacrifice,

and that impure persons would offer it

the fats,

this too is impossible, for if in practice the fats were offered or the flesh were eaten by these persons,

would the sacrifice itself be disqualified

retroactively, after it had already become fit and the offering had been accepted through the sprinkling of the blood!? And the Sefat Emet wrote to resolve the contradiction in the words of Tosafot above: Since the principal purpose of the sprinkling is to effect atonement, and even when it is not in its proper place it effects atonement, although it does not permit the flesh, we do not apply here the principle of thought as act to invalidate. This is unlike burning, whose principal purpose is to permit the flesh for eating: since, if he performed the act and left it, the flesh would not be permitted and the act of burning would be disqualified, the same applies to a thought, which invalidates in this case. And the Kehilot Yaakov [21b] wrote to resolve this: The intent of Tosafot there is that an act of sprinkling not in its proper place is not an act that invalidates the atonement, and it does not “disqualify” the flesh either; it merely does not permit it for eating. For this, thought as act is not applicable, since thought as act was said only concerning an act that disqualifies. Therefore, regarding the thought of leaving the fats, since through the act of leaving the fats the disqualification of remaining takes effect upon the fats and the flesh, Rabbi Yehuda holds that through his thought too this disqualification takes effect. This is unlike the thought of sprinkling not in its proper place, which is not an act that disqualifies, and it is also possible that afterward the flesh can be permitted through a valid sprinkling; concerning this Rabbi Yehuda did not say that thought is like an act.

And if you wish to say that Rabbi Yehuda disputes in the case of one who had the thought

that uncircumcised persons would eat it and that uncircumcised persons would offer it

—this too is not possible, because

is the sacrifice itself disqualified

if they actually do this? And since the sacrifice is not disqualified through these acts, the thought likewise does not disqualify through them.

Another formulation

in explaining the reason of Rabbi Yehuda, who does not disqualify through the thought that impure persons would offer it and that uncircumcised persons would offer it:

Is it within his power!?

That is to say, does he have the power to cause them actually to offer it—impure persons and uncircumcised persons? The impure priests will not heed him to offer it in a disqualified manner, and the uncircumcised persons likewise will not heed him to offer it, because it is a transgression for them; and therefore this thought does not disqualify, since it is not in his power to do so in practice.

Perhaps you will say: if he thinks

to mix its blood with the blood of disqualified offerings,

he will disqualify the sacrifice, since even if he actually did so, the sacrifice would be disqualified because its blood was not sprinkled!?

This is not so, because

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood.

And this blood that became mixed is also fit for sprinkling, and the sacrifice is not disqualified because its blood was mixed with the blood of disqualified offerings.

And we raise a difficulty: if he thought

to place the

bloods

that are placed above below,

and those that are placed

below above,

so that if he actually did this the sacrifice would be disqualified, why does Rabbi Yehuda not dispute, saying that the thought likewise disqualifies in this case? And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning,

as he says:

the placing of the blood

not in its proper place is also called its proper place,

and the sacrifice is valid. Therefore, the thought concerning this likewise does not disqualify.

And we raise a difficulty:

let Rabbi Yehuda dispute

Rabbi Yehuda

in

the words of the Mishna concerning

those placed inside that he placed outside, and those placed outside that he placed inside.

That is, why, in this case, where he thought to place inside the bloods that are placed outside, does he not disqualify the sacrifice? An external sin-offering whose blood he placed inside the Sanctuary is disqualified, as it is stated: “And every sin-offering whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting shall be burned in fire”; and since if he actually did so he disqualified it, the thought should likewise have the status of disqualifying in this case, according to Rabbi Yehuda!? [And the Gemara’s question does not refer to those placed inside that he placed outside]. And we answer: the thought of placing the external bloods inside does not disqualify according to him, because

Rabbi Yehuda holds: we require a place that is “threefold,” with regard to the blood, the flesh, and the sacrificial fats.

That is, according to Rabbi Yehuda, a thought of outside its proper place disqualifies only if he thought to place the blood outside, in a place possessing these three conditions: it is fit, at the time when private altars were permitted, for sprinkling the blood upon it; it is permitted to eat sacrificial flesh there; and it is possible to burn the sacrificial fats there. Only such a thought of outside its proper place disqualifies, but not a thought to place the blood inside, for that place is never fit for placing the external bloods there.

And this matter is a scriptural decree, and it is derived from what Scripture said concerning the thought of outside its proper place, “third,” which comes to indicate a “threefold place.”

And since it is a scriptural decree concerning the thought of outside its proper place that it disqualifies only if he thought to place it outside the Temple courtyard and not inside the Temple, the thought of placing the external bloods inside the Sanctuary is not a thought that disqualifies the sacrifice.

And we raise a difficulty:

does Rabbi Yehuda indeed hold this reasoning,

that a thought of outside its proper place must concern a threefold place?

And it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says:

concerning what is stated, “You shall not slaughter for the Lord your God an ox or a sheep in which there is a blemish, any

evil thing” [Deuteronomy 17],

the verse included here

two matters: the first,

a sin-offering that he slaughtered in the south,

that is, a warning not to do so,

and

the second, a warning concerning

a sin-offering whose blood entered inside, which is disqualified.

And Scripture did not speak of the actual bringing inside, for it is dealing with slaughter, but rather a warning not to slaughter with the intention of bringing its blood inside.

And since Scripture called it “an evil thing,” necessarily it is disqualified through this. Thus, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, a thought of outside its proper place need not concern a threefold place!?

And we raise a difficulty concerning this question: and it is possible to say that

Rabbi Yehuda does not have

the scriptural exposition from

“third,”

which teaches that one must think of taking it to a threefold place?

And did we not learn: Rabbi Yehuda said: if he brought the blood of an external sin-offering inside, unwittingly, it is valid.

if he did not effect atonement, it does not

become disqualified.

And we inferred from here:

this—

if he brought it

intentionally, it is disqualified. And we have an established principle

that when done intentionally it is disqualified only

in

the case

that he effected atonement

through it, that is, he placed some of it upon the inner altar; but if he brought it in and did not place it, even intentionally it is not disqualified.

And

if so,

now, and how much more so there,

where

it was brought in, it was indeed brought in

inside, nevertheless only

if he effected atonement, yes,

then it is disqualified, but

if he did not effect atonement, no,

it is not disqualified.

If so,

here,

where he performed no act, but

he merely thought a thought

to bring it inside,

is it not all the more so

that it is not disqualified through this!?

It follows that Rabbi Yehuda holds that the thought of bringing it inside does not disqualify.

And we answer: two tannaim taught this Mishna and beraita, and according to Rabbi Yehuda they taught them; these tannaim disagreed concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s position.