Zevachim 36a (לו.) — the Talmud in English

b. If he slaughtered the offering with the intention

of placing them

as the blood presentations

upon the ramp,

which is not the place for presenting the blood, or upon the altar

not opposite the יסוד,

namely, on the southeastern horn, which did not have a יסוד [and the blood of the burnt offering must be presented on the altar wall opposite the יסוד beneath it],

and to place the

blood presentations

that are presented above

above the scarlet line, he intended to place them

below. And those presented below

he intended to place

above. And those presented

inside,

in the Sanctuary, he intended to present

outside,

on the outer altar,

and those presented outside

he intended to present

inside.

And likewise, if he intended

that impure people eat it, and

likewise, if he intended

that impure people sacrifice it,

or he intended

that uncircumcised people eat it, or that uncircumcised people sacrifice it,

and likewise, if he intended

to break the bones of the Paschal offering,

or

to eat from it

from the Paschal offering

raw,

partially cooked and not roasted,

and

likewise, if he intended

to mix its blood

of the offering

with the blood

of

disqualified offerings.

In all these intentions,

the offering is valid.

Because

an intention invalidates

all offerings

only when

one intends

to eat or burn it outside its designated time or outside its designated area, or in the case of the Paschal offering and the sin offering,

which he slaughtered with the intention

not for their sake.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses this:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda

in our Mishna, who invalidates an offering when one intended to leave its blood until the next day or to take it outside, although the verse concerning the disqualification of piggul deals only with the intention to eat or burn the offering outside its designated time, and not with leaving the blood!?

Rabbi Elazar said: Two verses are written concerning the

disqualification of

notar: One verse

stated concerning the Paschal offering

says: “You shall not leave any of it until morning”

[Exodus 12].

And one verse

stated concerning the thanks offering

says: “He shall not leave any of it until morning”

[Leviticus 7]. Thus, one verse is superfluous. Therefore, it is expounded according to the principle that when a verse has no need to teach its lesson in its apparent context, it is applied to teach a lesson elsewhere:

If

the superfluous verse concerning the prohibition of notar

has no need

to state that there is a prohibition

to leave

[or to leave over] the sacrificial meat,

apply it to the matter of the intention to leave,

meaning that if, during the sacrificial service, he intended to leave the blood or the sacrificial fats until the next day, outside their designated time, the superfluous verse came to teach that even such an intention to leave invalidates the offering.

And we raise an objection:

And

does

Rabbi Yehuda

hold that

this verse,

the superfluous verse,

came for this purpose,

to address the intention to leave the blood outside its designated time,

indeed?

But

this

superfluous verse

is needed for that which was taught in a beraita:

It is stated there:

“And the flesh of the sacrifice of his thanks-offering

on the day of its sacrifice shall be eaten; he shall not leave any of it until morning” [ibid.].

We learn

from this

that a thanks offering is eaten for one day and one night

only!

But from here we have learned only about the thanks offering itself. What about

its substitutes,

meaning that if his thanks offering was lost and he designated another in its place, and before he sacrificed the second the first was found, the second is to be sacrificed according to the law of “the substitute of a thanks offering,”

and

likewise

the offspring

of a thanks offering, and

the substitutes

of a thanks offering, where he exchanged his thanks offering for another animal, and both are to be sacrificed—

from where

do we know that these too are eaten for one day and one night?

The verse states: “And the flesh.”

That is, this verse contains superfluous words, for it could have stated, “And his thanks offering shall be eaten on its day”; the word “flesh” serves to include these offerings.

The sin offering and guilt offering—from where

do we know that their meat too is eaten only for one day and one night?

The verse states: “Sacrifice,”

which comes to include additional sacrifices.

And from where do we include the nazirite’s peace offerings,

the nazirite’s ram, which requires the bringing of bread like the thanks offering,

and the Paschal peace offerings,

the festival offering of the fourteenth, brought together with the Paschal offering, which are also eaten only for one day and one night? [With regard to the other festival offerings, it is stated explicitly that they are eaten for two days and one night]?

The verse states: “His peace offerings.”

The thanks-offering loaves, and the loaves and wafers of the nazirite—from where? The verse states: “His offering.”

All of them,

which were included here,

I apply to them the phrase, “He shall not leave any

of it until morning.”

It follows that this verse is not superfluous, for it comes to teach the time during which the sacrifice may be eaten. If so, how did we say that Rabbi Yehuda expounds it as referring to the disqualifying intention to leave the blood!?

And we answer:

If so,

if it were said that this verse came only to teach the time during which the offering may be eaten,

the verse should have said, “You shall not leave

any of it until morning,” as it does with all other cases of notar, where the term “left over” is used.

What is the meaning of “he shall not leave”?

Why did the Torah express it in this manner? Rather, the verse came to teach:

If it has no application to

the prohibition and disqualification of

leaving, apply it to the intention to leave,

which invalidates the offering.

And we raise an objection:

Granted,

that this exposition teaches about the intention

to leave

the blood until the next day, which invalidates the offering. But the intention

to take

the blood outside, which also invalidates the offering—

what can be said,

from where did Rabbi Yehuda derive this?

And furthermore,

there is another difficulty:

Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is logical,

and he did not learn it from Scripture!

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda said

to the Sages: Is it not true that

you agree that if one left it

the blood

until the next day, it is disqualified,

because the blood becomes disqualified at sunset? Surely you agree on this point. Therefore,

also

if

he intended to leave it until the next day—

it is disqualified!

Thus, Rabbi Yehuda did not learn his ruling from the verse, but from logical reasoning.

The Gemara concludes:

Rather,

indeed,

Rabbi Yehuda’s reason is logical,

for it is logical to say that any act which, if actually performed, would invalidate the offering, is likewise invalidated when, during the sacrificial services, one merely intends to perform that act. This reasoning applies also to the intention to take the blood outside, since if he actually took it outside the offering would be invalidated; therefore, if he intended to take it outside, the offering is likewise disqualified.

And we raise an objection: Since Rabbi Yehuda derived his ruling through logic, why does he invalidate only an intention to leave the blood or take it outside,

and should Rabbi Yehuda not also disagree

with the Sages

in all

the intentions mentioned in the Mishna, in cases where, if one formed those intentions, the offering is valid, and invalidate the offering in those cases as well, on the basis of the principle that intention is like action!?

And we answer:

With regard to what should he disagree?

Should he disagree

with regard to breaking the bones of the Paschal offering,

where he intended at the time of slaughter to break its bones, which is prohibited,

and

likewise, if

he intended to eat some of it raw?

For if he were actually to do so,

would the offering itself become disqualified?

Since it would not, an intention concerning this act likewise does not invalidate it.

And likewise, if you wish to say that he should disagree in a case where he intended

that impure people eat it,

the meat of the offering,

and that impure people sacrifice it,

the sacrificial fats,

for this too is impossible. If the sacrificial fats were actually offered or the meat were eaten by such people,

would the offering itself become retroactively disqualified

after it had already been rendered fit and the offering accepted through the presentation of the blood!?

And if you wish to say that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees when he had the intention

that uncircumcised people would eat it and uncircumcised people would offer it

this too is impossible, because

would the sacrifice itself become disqualified

if they actually did so? And since the sacrifice is not disqualified by these actions, the thought likewise does not disqualify it in these cases.

Another formulation:

in explanation of the reason for Rabbi Yehuda, who does not disqualify a sacrifice through the thought that impure people would offer it or that uncircumcised people would offer it:

Is this within his power!?

That is to say, does he have the power to cause impure and uncircumcised people actually to offer it? After all, the impure priests will not heed him and offer it in a disqualified manner, and likewise the uncircumcised will not heed him and offer it, because for them it is a transgression; therefore this thought does not disqualify the sacrifice, since it is not within his power to do so in practice.

Lest you say: if one has the thought

of mixing its blood with the blood of disqualified offerings,

he should disqualify the sacrifice, since even if he actually did so, the sacrifice would become disqualified because its blood had not been sprinkled!?

This is not so, because

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning, as he says: Blood does not nullify blood.

And this blood that became mixed is also fit for sprinkling; the sacrifice is not disqualified because its blood became mixed with the blood of disqualified offerings.

And we raise a difficulty: if one had the thought

to place the

bloods

that are placed above below,

and those placed

below above,

so that if he actually did so the sacrifice would become disqualified, why does Rabbi Yehuda not disagree and say that the thought likewise disqualifies it in this case? And we answer:

There are two tannaim who taught these Mishna and

according to Rabbi Yehuda

they taught them, and these tannaim disagreed concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s position.

And we raise a difficulty:

Why does Rabbi Yehuda not disagree

with the Mishna’s statement concerning

those whose blood is placed inside, which he placed outside, and those whose blood is placed outside, which he placed inside?

That is to say, why, in the case where he had the thought of placing inside the blood that is to be placed outside, does he not disqualify the sacrifice? After all, an external sin-offering whose blood he placed inside the Sanctuary is disqualified,

as it is stated: “Any sin-offering whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting shall be burned in fire.” Since if he actually did so he would disqualify the sacrifice, according to Rabbi Yehuda the thought should likewise disqualify it!? [The Gemara’s question does not refer to blood that is to be placed inside but was placed outside].

And we answer: a thought of placing external blood inside does not disqualify according to Rabbi Yehuda, because

Rabbi Yehuda holds that we require a place that is “threefold”—with regard to the blood, the flesh, and the sacrificial fats.

That is to say, according to Rabbi Yehuda, a thought of placing the blood outside its proper location disqualifies only if he had the thought of placing the blood outside, in a place possessing all three of these conditions: it was fit, during the period when private altars were permitted, for the blood to be sprinkled there; it was permitted to eat sacrificial flesh there; and it was possible to burn the sacrificial fats there. Only such a thought of placing the blood outside its proper location disqualifies, but not a thought of placing the blood inside, since that place is never fit for placing external blood.

And this is a scriptural decree, derived from the fact that Scripture states “third” with regard to a thought of placing the blood outside its proper location, thereby indicating a “threefold place.”

Since it is a scriptural decree that a thought of placing the blood outside its proper location disqualifies only when he had the thought of placing it outside the Temple courtyard, and not inside the Temple, a thought of placing external blood inside the Sanctuary is not a thought that disqualifies the sacrifice.

And we raise a difficulty:

Does Rabbi Yehuda indeed hold this reasoning,

that a thought of placing the blood outside its proper location must concern a threefold place?

And it was taught in a

beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says:

concerning what is stated: “You shall not sacrifice to the Lord your God an ox or a sheep in which there is a blemish, any

evil thing” [Deuteronomy 17],

the verse

included here

two matters. The first is

a sin-offering slaughtered in the south,

that is, a warning not to do so,

and

the second is a warning concerning

a sin-offering whose blood entered inside, which is disqualified.

The verse was not speaking of bringing the blood inside in practice, since it is discussing slaughter, but rather it warns against slaughtering with the intention of bringing its blood inside.

Since the verse calls this “an evil thing,” it necessarily means that the sacrifice becomes disqualified through it. It follows that even according to Rabbi Yehuda, a thought of placing the blood outside its proper location need not concern a threefold place!?

And we raise a difficulty concerning this question: And

is it possible to say that

Rabbi Yehuda does not have

the scriptural exposition of

“third,”

which teaches that one must have the thought of taking the blood to a threefold place?

And we learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yehuda said:

if he

brought

the blood of an external sin-offering inside

unintentionally, it is fit.

We inferred from here:

this

means that if he brought it

intentionally, it is disqualified. And it is established

that in the intentional case it is disqualified only

when he atoned

through it—that is, when he placed some of it on the inner altar. But if he brought it inside without placing it there, even intentionally, it is not disqualified.

And

if so,

now, what is the case there?

Although he actually

brought the blood inside, nevertheless, only

if he atoned, yes,

is it disqualified; but

if he did not atone, it is not

disqualified.

If so,

here, where he performed no action, but merely

had the thought

of bringing it inside,

all the more so

it should not thereby become disqualified!?

It follows that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a thought of bringing the blood inside does not disqualify the sacrifice.

And we answer: Two tannaim taught these Mishna and beraita in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, and these tannaim disagreed concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s position.

Keren Orah wrote to explain the Gemara’s question: since Rabbi Yehuda holds that bringing it in unwittingly does not disqualify, and bringing it in intentionally disqualifies only when he effected atonement, meaning that there is no disqualification in the bringing itself, all the more so mere thought will not disqualify, for it is not possible to say here that a thought is like an act, since the act itself has no intrinsic disqualification, but only when done intentionally and with atonement. And in

explained the Gemara’s question differently: since Rabbi Yehuda holds that bringing the blood inside unintentionally does not disqualify, and that even bringing it inside intentionally disqualifies only when he effected atonement, this means that bringing it inside is not intrinsically disqualifying. All the more so, then, a mere thought should not disqualify, since “thought as action” cannot be invoked here: the action itself is not intrinsically disqualified, but only when performed intentionally and followed by atonement. The

Avi Ezri [Disqualifications of Consecrated Offerings 2:16] rejected his words, and wrote: a. This carrying is not considered carrying, and the thought does not disqualify through it, for the entire law of unnecessary carrying that is nevertheless carrying was stated only where there is carrying toward the altar, but it is unnecessary—for example, he received the blood inside and took it outside in order to bring it in, which is an unnecessary taking out, but nevertheless there is here an act of carrying toward the altar in this manner. However, where he took the blood out in order not to return it inside, this is not carrying at all. Therefore, when he carries the external bloods inside in order to effect atonement with them, this is not carrying, for he is not carrying it toward the altar, but inside in order not to take it out and to effect atonement with it there. b. A thought disqualifies only when, during one of the services, he thought of performing the entire disqualifying act. Here, however, bringing the blood inside is part of the disqualifying act, and concerning this act there was no thought, for he carries the blood in practice and thinks only in order to effect atonement. It follows that during the service there was no thought concerning a disqualifying act. And we answer: two tannaim taught this Mishna and beraita, and according to Rabbi Yehuda they taught them; these tannaim disagreed concerning Rabbi Yehuda’s position. Two tannaim taught these Mishna and beraita if so,

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning,

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