Zevachim 36b (לו:) — the Talmud in English

And we challenge the statement of the beraita, which says that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a prohibition was stated against slaughtering a sin-offering in the south:

and

because

Rabbi Yehuda holds that a sin-offering that was slaughtered in the south

should be liable

for lashes for its slaughter?

But was it not taught in a beraita: Rabbi Yehuda says: Could it be that one who slaughtered a sin-offering in the south should be liable

for lashes for its slaughter?

The verse states: “You shall not slaughter for the Lord your God an ox or a sheep

that has a blemish,

any bad thing” [Deuteronomy 16].

And we learn from this that only

for

slaughtering

a bad thing,

that is, an animal with a visible blemish, which is disgraceful,

do you render him liable

for lashes.

But you do not render him liable for a sin-offering that he slaughtered in the south.

It is therefore explicit that, according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is not liable for lashes for slaughtering a sin-offering in the south!?

And we answer:

Two tannaim

taught this beraita and the earlier Mishna, and they disagreed about this

according to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion.

Rabbi Abba said: And

Although Rabbi Yehuda holds that a machshevet hinuaḥ, the intention to leave the offering for later, invalidates the offering, nevertheless

Rabbi Yehuda concedes that

if one formed a machshevet hinuaḥ during one service, and during the subsequent service formed a machshevet piggul, intending to eat the meat beyond its prescribed time, we do not say that since it had already been invalidated by the machshevet hinuaḥ, piggul can no longer take effect, as is the law with all thoughts that remove an offering from the status of piggul. Rather, he returns and establishes it

as

for the offering

as piggul.

Rava said: Know

that a machshevet hinuaḥ is not like an intention to take the offering outside its designated area or an intention שלא לשמה, which remove the offering from the status of piggul:

for

behold,

piggul before the sprinkling

for example, if during the slaughter one intended to sprinkle its blood on the following day,

is nothing,

for his intention is not effective in making the offering piggul until the blood is sprinkled on that day, since piggul takes effect only after all the permitting rites of the offering have been performed, namely, the sprinkling of its blood. And although the intention he formed during the slaughter to sprinkle the blood on the following day includes a machshevet hinuaḥ, as he intends to leave it until the following day and sprinkle it then, nevertheless, we do not say that since the piggul did not initially take effect, the offering is invalidated on account of the machshevet hinuaḥ, and piggul will then be unable to take effect when he sprinkles its blood. Rather,

the sprinkling comes and establishes it

for the offering

as piggul.

It is therefore evident that a machshevet hinuaḥ differs from the other invalidating thoughts, as it does not remove the offering from the status of piggul. Accordingly, the same applies when one initially forms only a machshevet hinuaḥ and subsequently forms a machshevet piggul: the invalidation caused by the machshevet hinuaḥ does not prevent piggul from taking effect.

And the Gemara rejects Rava’s proof:

It is not so!

This is not comparable to that, because

there,

when he intended during the slaughter to sprinkle its blood on the following day,

it

is what prevents the offering from leaving the status of piggul, because

it is one thought,

formed with the intent of piggul, and he did not alter this intention by means of another invalidating thought that would remove his first intention from the status of piggul. But

here,

when he initially formed a machshevet hinuaḥ and afterward formed a machshevet piggul,

they are two thoughts

one of which has the designation of invalidation and not the designation of piggul, and it removes the offering from the status of piggul.

Rav Huna raised an objection to Rava

from

what

we learned in a beraita: If one intended

to place the

blood

that is to be placed above below,

or the blood that is to be placed

below above,

if he intended to do this

immediately,

the offering is

valid,

but if afterward he

returned and intended

to place the blood

outside its designated area,

the offering is

invalid, and there is no liability for karet

for eating it, as is the law with an offering invalidated by an intention to take it outside its designated area. But if he formed an intention

to take it beyond its prescribed time,

it is

piggul, and one is liable to karet

for eating it.

However, if he intended to place the blood meant for above

on the following day below, or intended to place on the following day the blood that is to be placed below above,

the offering is invalid

by virtue of this intention. This is not because such an act is considered sprinkling beyond its prescribed time—for if that were so, the offering would become piggul—but because his intention to sprinkle on the following day in the wrong place includes a machshevet hinuaḥ. And this beraita follows Rabbi Yehuda, who invalidates an offering in this case [and the reason it does not become piggul is that he intended to perform a sprinkling in the wrong place, which is a sprinkling that does not permit the meat to be eaten, and therefore it does not bring about piggul].

And if he

returned

afterward

and formed an intention, whether

the intention of

taking it beyond its prescribed time or

the intention of

taking it outside its designated area,

it is

invalid, and there is no liability for karet

for eating it. Since it had already been invalidated by the intention to sprinkle it on the following day, which is a machshevet hinuaḥ, piggul can no longer take effect in this offering. Therefore, there is no liability for karet even when he formed an intention to take it beyond its prescribed time.

It is therefore explicit that once an offering has been invalidated by a machshevet hinuaḥ, piggul can no longer take effect in it.

This is a refutation of Rava,

who said that he returns and establishes it as piggul!

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

this is a refutation.

Rav Ḥisda said that Ravina bar Sila said: If one intended

during the service of the offering

that impure people should eat

the meat of the offering

on the following day,

that is, beyond its prescribed time, we do not say that since the eating of impure people is not a proper eating, this is not considered an intention. Rather, it is piggul, and

he is liable

for it.

Rava said: Know

that an intention involving invalid eating does not remove an offering from the status of piggul:

for

behold,

meat before the sprinkling

of the blood

is not fit

for eating, and eating it at that time is invalid eating.

And

nevertheless,

when one forms an intention concerning it

during the slaughter, with a machshevet piggul to eat it on the following day, we do not say that this is like forming an intention involving invalid eating. Rather,

the offering becomes invalid.

The same applies to one who intends that impure people should eat it.

And the Gemara rejects this:

It is not so!

This comparison is incorrect, because

there,

when one forms an intention to eat during the slaughter,

the blood will be sprinkled

on the blood

and the meat will be fit

for eating were it not for the piggul that took effect in it. But

here,

when he intended that impure people should eat it,

it is not fit

for eating

at all,

even if it had not been invalidated on account of piggul.

Rav Ḥisda said: It was a common statement in the mouth of Rav Dimi bar Ḥinnana: Unroasted Paschal meat

which is still not permitted for eating,

and the loaves of

a thanksgiving-offering

from which the four loaves have not been separated

which are separated for the koen from the four types of loaves of which they consist, and which are still forbidden for eating,

one is liable for them

to karet

on account of ritual impurity,

if he eats them while impure. And although the general rule is that as long as something has not been permitted for eating by pure people, one is not liable for it on account of impurity, these items are permitted for pure people since the blood of the offering has already been sprinkled, even though they are not yet permitted for eating.

Rava said: Know

that this is so,

as it was taught:

The verse states: “And the person who eats the meat of the sacrifice of peace-offerings that belongs to the Lord, while his impurity is upon him, that soul shall be cut off from its people” [Leviticus 7]. And from the superfluous words

“that belongs to the Lord”

we derive

to include

something that ascends to the Most High, namely,

the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity, with regard to impurity.

One who eats them while impure is liable to karet.

And Rava proves:

Apparently, even though

these sacrificial portions

are not fit for eating,

as their law is that they must be offered on the altar, nevertheless

one is liable for them on account of impurity.

If so,

here too,

in the case of unroasted Paschal meat and thanksgiving-offering loaves from which the loaves have not been separated,

even though they are not fit for eating, one is liable for them on account of impurity!

And the Gemara rejects this:

It is not so!

This comparison is incorrect, because

there, the sacrificial portions of lesser sanctity,

although they are not fit for human consumption, nevertheless

are fit for the Most High

to be offered on the altar. This is not so

here, in the case of unroasted Paschal meat and thanksgiving-offering loaves from which the loaves have not been separated, which are fit neither for the Most High nor for ordinary human consumption.

We will return to you, chapter “All Those Disqualified.”

Mishna:

1.

Beit Shammai say: With regard to all

the bloods

that are presented on the outer altar,

most of which require two presentations that constitute four, nevertheless, once

he has presented one presentation

alone,

he has achieved atonement!

But in the case of a sin-offering,

he has not achieved atonement until he presents

two presentations

with his finger.

And Beit Hillel say: Even in the case of a sin-offering whose blood was presented in one presentation

alone,

he has achieved atonement!

Therefore, if he presented the

presentation

first [

of the other offerings according to Beit Shammai, and according to Beit Hillel even that of the sin-offering],

in accordance with its law,

silently, without an invalidating intention,

and the

presentation

second

he presented with the intention that the meat be eaten

beyond its designated time,

it has

achieved atonement

and the offering is valid. It does not become invalid through the intention accompanying the second presentation, because once the offering had already been rendered fit to be sacrificed through the first presentation, and the second presentation does not render the meat permitted for eating, the intention accompanying it cannot cause piggul.

But if he presented the first

with the intention that it be eaten

beyond its designated time, and the second

he presented with the intention that it be eaten

beyond its designated place,

the intention of beyond its place that he entertained during the second presentation does not remove the offering from the status of piggul, as an invalidating intention would. Rather, it is

piggul, and one is liable to receive karet

for eating it, since it was established as piggul through the first presentation, once all of its permitting rites had already been performed.

2.

All

the bloods

that are presented on the inner altar:

if it happened

that he omitted one of all the presentations,

it is

as though he had not achieved atonement,

because the atonement of these offerings depends upon presenting all the presentations.

Therefore, if he presented

the

entirety of them in accordance with their law, and one

of them

not in accordance with its law,

for example, he entertained an intention of beyond its designated time during it, it is

invalid,

and the offering was not rendered permitted through the first presentations, which were performed silently,

and there is no liability for karet

for eating it. Since all the presentations are what permit the offering, and this one does not permit it without the others, each of them is half of the permitting rite; and piggul occurs only if he entertained the intention during the entire permitting rite.

Gemara:

The Sages taught: From where is it derived that, with regard to those bloods presented on the outer altar, if one presented them in a single presentation, he has achieved atonement? The verse states: “And the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out

on the altar of the Lord your God, and you shall eat the meat.” Since it does not say, “It shall be poured around the altar,” this indicates that a single pouring alone achieves atonement.

And we challenge this:

A

is

this

verse

really coming for this purpose,

to teach us that one presentation achieves atonement? Surely

it is needed for that which was taught in a beraita: