Zevachim 35b (לה:) — the Talmud in English

Rather, this is how you should be precise:

“This indicates that if he had the intention with regard to the sacrificial portions, the sacrificial portions themselves become piggul.”

That is, the liver lobe and the kidneys. But the meat does not become piggul, since only something that causes piggul in the body of a sacrifice itself becomes piggul. And since the eating of the meat of the bulls that are burned is not considered a thought of eating with regard to causing piggul, it is likewise not considered eating with regard to becoming piggul.

Come and hear

from what we learned in tractate Me'ila:

“With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, one commits misuse of consecrated property from

the time

that they were consecrated,

and after they

were slaughtered, they became fit

and became liable

to become disqualified through one who immersed that day and one lacking atonement,

as they are disqualified if either of them touches them.

And

they likewise became fit to become disqualified

through overnight invalidation,

as, if they remained throughout the entire night without being offered, they became disqualified through overnight invalidation.”

And the Gemara understood: The statement that they became fit to become disqualified through overnight invalidation—

what, is it not

referring to

the overnight invalidation of the meat,

meaning that if they were not burned by morning, they are disqualified because of overnight invalidation, even though they are not designated for eating and this disqualification nevertheless applies to them?

And

if so,

derive from it: Just as it disqualifies through overnight invalidation, so it disqualifies through

even a

thought

of piggul, when he formulated it with regard to the sacrificial portions. That is, just as the disqualification of overnight invalidation applies to the meat even though it is not ordinarily eaten, so too the disqualification of piggul should apply to it. This proves that if one formulated a thought with regard to the sacrificial portions, the bulls became disqualified, since it is possible for the disqualification of piggul to apply to the meat even though it is not ordinarily eaten.

Indeed, this does not prove that a thought of piggul concerning the meat itself disqualifies it, since one must formulate a thought concerning something ordinarily eaten; and the earlier beraita explicitly states that a thought concerning the meat does not cause the sacrificial portions to become piggul. Nevertheless, it does prove with regard to a thought concerning the sacrificial portions that it disqualifies the meat.

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

Do not explain the intention of the beraita as being that the meat of the bulls became fit to become disqualified through overnight invalidation. Rather, its intention is with regard to

the overnight invalidation of the sacrificial portions,

meaning that if they were not placed on the altar throughout the entire night, they became disqualified through overnight invalidation. Only in this regard should you be precise: Just as the disqualification of overnight invalidation applies to the sacrificial portions, so too the disqualification of piggul applies to them.

And we raise an objection:

But since the latter clause states

of this Mishna:

“All of them are subject to misuse of consecrated property”

even after all the rites have been performed for them, and they have already been brought to the place of burning and are

on the ash heap, until

the time

when the meat will melt,

when it will be completely burned and become ashes, at which point its mitzva has been performed—

you learn

by inference

that the

first clause,

which speaks of the disqualification of overnight invalidation, also deals with

the overnight invalidation of the meat,

just like the latter clause, which speaks of the law of misuse of consecrated property with regard to the meat?!

The Gemara rejects this:

Are the matters necessarily comparable?!

Is it necessary to establish the first clause in the same manner as the latter clause? Rather,

this one is as it is

in its matter,

and that one is as it is

in its matter. That is, the

first clause

deals with

the sacrificial portions, and

whereas the

latter clause

deals with

the meat!

Rava raises an objection

against the words of Rabbi Elazar, from what we learned:

“And these neither cause piggul nor become piggul: The wool on the heads of sheep; the hair on the beards of goats; the hide; the gravy and the congealed mass; the refuse and the crop; the bones and the sinews; the horns and the hooves; the fetus and the placenta; the milk of consecrated animals; and the eggs of turtledoves. All of these neither cause piggul nor become piggul.”

With regard to the wool on the heads of sheep and the hair on the beards of goats, the novelty is that although they are part of the hide of the head, which is not included in the removal of the hide of an olah but is offered together with the head, nevertheless a thought of offering them after their allotted time is ineffective, since they are not ordinarily offered.

“And one is not liable on their account for piggul, notar, or impurity.”

“And one who offers any of them outside”

the Temple courtyard

is exempt,

since they are not fit to be offered at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.

And the Gemara infers:

What, is it not

that what they said,

“they do not cause piggul,”

means that a thought of piggul concerning them, formulated at the time of the sprinkling, to eat or offer one of these items after its allotted time, does not cause

the sacrifice

to become piggul;

and what they said,

“they do not become piggul,”

means that they do not become piggul

because of

the

sacrifice: If one formulated a thought to eat from the meat of the sacrifice or to offer its sacrificial portions after their allotted time, these items do not become piggul as a result, and one is not liable for karet for eating them. Thus, even the fetus and the crop, which are included in this law, are not caused to become piggul by the sacrifice—unlike Rabbi Elazar, who said that if one caused the sacrifice to become piggul, the fetus and placenta became piggul?!

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

Do not explain the intention of the beraita as being that the thought concerning the sacrifice does not cause them to become piggul. Rather, this is how you should explain it:

“And they do not become piggul because of themselves.”

If one formulated a thought at the time of the sprinkling to eat from these items after their allotted time, they do not become piggul through this, since a thought concerning these items does not cause piggul.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if the first clause comes only to state that they do not become piggul because of themselves,

that which the latter clause teaches: “All of them neither cause piggul nor become piggul,”

meaning likewise that they do not become piggul because of themselves, as in the first clause—for they do become piggul because of the sacrifice—

why do I need this further statement?

Why did the tanna repeat that they do not become piggul because of themselves? We already learned this in the first clause. Rather, it must be that he comes to teach that they do not become piggul even because of the sacrifice?! And we answer:

According to your reasoning,

that the intention of the first clause is to say that they do not become piggul because of the sacrifice, one could likewise raise a difficulty concerning what is taught there a third time:

“One is not liable on their account for piggul”—

why do I need this further statement?!

Is it not already stated there in the first clause that they do not become piggul? It must therefore be said that this was not stated as a new law,

but since he needed to teach

that one is not liable on their account for

notar and impurity, the tanna taught

also

piggul.

If so,

here too,

there is no difficulty for Rabbi Elazar from the fact that the statement that they do not become piggul was repeated there, because

since he needed to teach

with regard to them the law that

one who offers any of them outside

is exempt,

the tanna also taught: “And all of them neither cause piggul nor become piggul.”

Rava said

to prove the position of Rabbi Elazar:

“We too have learned”

in our Mishna:

“One who slaughters a consecrated animal in order to eat the fetus or placenta outside does not cause piggul” [

and this implies, whether with regard to the sacrifice or with regard to the items themselves],

“and one who performs melika on turtledoves in order to eat their eggs outside does not cause piggul!”

And it then teaches: “With regard to the milk of consecrated animals and the eggs of turtledoves, one is not liable on their account for piggul, notar, or impurity!”

This implies that specifically the milk of consecrated animals and the eggs of turtledoves have the law that one is not liable on their account for piggul;

but with regard to the fetus and placenta, one is liable

on their account for piggul.

This is contradictory, since we previously learned that a thought concerning the fetus and placenta does not cause piggul. If so, why is one liable on their account?

Rather, can one not derive from this: Here,

in the latter clause, the reference is to piggul

because of the sacrifice,

and therefore the law is that even the fetus and placenta become piggul because of his thought concerning the sacrifice. Whereas

here,

in the first clause, the reference is to piggul

because of themselves,

meaning that a thought concerning them themselves does not cause piggul.

Thus, the fetus and placenta are excluded from the category of items that cause piggul, but not from the category of items that become piggul, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar.

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

derive from it!

We learned there:

With regard to disqualified offerings that went up onto the altar, Rabbi Shimon said: If their disqualification occurred in the sacred domain—that is, if the disqualification occurred after they had entered the Temple courtyard—they do not come down;

and

among those whose disqualification did not occur in the sacred domain, Rabbi Shimon included

animals with a permanent blemish,

which, if they went up, come down.

Rabbi Akiva deems animals with permanent blemishes fit,

so that if they went up, they do not come down.

Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit not

animals with

all types of blemishes, but only those with a film over the eye,

which is a blemish that is not so conspicuous,

since

those with a film over the eye are

fit

as an initial matter

in the case of birds,

because the passage concerning blemishes was not stated with regard to them, and only a bird lacking a limb is disqualified, as it is stated: “Offer it now to your governor.” Therefore, even in the case of an animal disqualified because of a film over the eye, the law is that if it went up, it does not come down.

And this

—the law concerning animals with permanent blemishes, that if they went up they do not come down—applies only when

its blemish preceded its consecration,

meaning that the animal had already acquired the sanctity of the altar before the blemish occurred to it. But if its blemish preceded its consecration, it did not acquire sanctity of the body at all, but only sanctity of value. Since the altar sanctifies all disqualified offerings only when they were fit for the altar before they became disqualified, it does not sanctify an animal that from the outset did not acquire sanctity of the body and was never fit for the altar.

And Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female olah,

which is disqualified because it is female, so that if it ascended the altar it must be brought down, because

it is considered as though its blemish preceded its consecration,

for you have no greater blemish in an olah than its being female, and this condition existed in it from the very beginning of its creation. Therefore, although in the case of a bird olah even a female is fit, in the case of an animal it is disqualified.

Rabbi Zeira raised an objection

from the words of the beraita cited above:

One who offers any of them

—the fetus and the afterbirth—

outside is exempt.

This implies that the reference is to offering flesh from them. Rabbi Zeira infers that one is exempt for offering only these, since they are not part of the body of the offering and are unfit for offering; their offering was excluded by analogy from the fat and kidneys stated with regard to a guilt-offering: Just as a guilt-offering excludes a fetus, so too everything excludes a fetus.

But

if one offered

flesh from their mother

outside, he is

liable.

And how can you find

a case in which one is liable for offering flesh outside? Only

in the case of a female olah,

for if one offered the flesh of a peace-offering outside, he is exempt, because it is not something that is accepted inside, as it is eaten by the owners.

Now,

granted, if you say that Rabbi Akiva holds that if a female olah ascended, it need not be brought down,

then the flesh of a female olah is something fit to be offered inside, and therefore one is liable for offering it outside. And we can establish this beraita as referring to

whose opinion is it? Rabbi Akiva’s,

who holds that blemished animals that ascended need not be brought down, and the same applies to a female animal.

But if you say

that even Rabbi Akiva concedes with regard to a female olah that

if it ascended, it must be brought down,

the following difficulty arises:

This

beraita—

whose opinion is it!?

Even according to Rabbi Akiva, one should not be liable for offering the flesh of a female olah outside, since it is unfit to be offered inside!?

The Gemara rejects this: Do not infer from the words of the beraita that one who offers flesh from their mother outside is liable. Rather,

say

that it should be understood as follows:

One who offers any of them outside is exempt.

And infer from this:

But

if one offered

the sacrificial portions of their mothers—he is

liable.

The beraita is dealing with the sacrificial portions of a sin-offering or a peace-offering, which may come even from a female animal, and therefore, if one offered them outside, he is liable.

The Gemara asks:

But the expression “

the one who offers

any of them

”—which implies flesh from them—

is minor.

And

you should infer that the law of their mothers is

analogous to theirs.

Just as, with regard to them, the beraita speaks of offering their flesh, so too, with regard to their mothers, you should infer that if one offered flesh from them, he is liable. If so, the original difficulty returns: According to Rabbi Akiva, one can be liable for offering flesh only in the case of an olah, since he permits blemished animals to remain on the altar!?

The Gemara rejects this: Do not interpret the words of the beraita concerning the fetus and afterbirth themselves as referring to offering their flesh.

Rather, say

as follows:

One who offers their sacrificial portions outside is exempt.

And infer:

But one who offers the sacrificial portions of their mothers is liable.

This refers to a sin-offering or a peace-offering. But in the case of an olah, even according to Rabbi Akiva he is exempt, because it is unfit to be offered inside, since if it ascended, it must be brought down.

Mishna:

a.

If one slaughtered it

for the offering with the thought

of leaving its blood or its sacrificial portions until the next day,

that is, to delay the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the sacrificial portions until after the time allotted for them;

or

he thought

to take them

—the blood or the sacrificial portions—

outside,

which would disqualify them if he actually did so,

Rabbi Yehuda declares it disqualified, but the Sages declare it valid.

Their dispute concerns whether any thought to perform an act that disqualifies the offering disqualifies it, or whether only the thought of performing the sacrificial service beyond its proper time or place disqualifies it.