Zevachim 35b — the Talmud in English

Rather, this is how you should be precise:

“But if he had the intention with regard to the sacrificial portions, the sacrificial portions themselves become piggul.”

That is, the lobe of the liver and the kidneys. But the meat does not become piggul, for only something that causes the piggul becomes piggul in the body of the offering; and since the eating of the meat of the bulls that are burned is not considered a thought of eating with regard to causing piggul, therefore, also with regard to becoming piggul, it is not considered eating.

Come and hear

from what we learned in tractate Me’ila:

“With regard to bulls that are burned and goats that are burned, one commits misuse of them from

the time

that they were consecrated,

and after they

were slaughtered, they became fit

to become fit

to be rendered unfit by one who immersed that day and by one lacking atonement,

for if they touched them, they rendered them unfit;

and

they likewise became fit to be rendered unfit

by overnight lodging,

for if they remained all night without being offered, they became invalid through overnight lodging.”

And the Gemara reasoned: This statement that they became fit to be rendered unfit by overnight lodging,

what, is it not

referring to

the overnight lodging of the meat,

meaning that if they were not burned by morning, they are invalid because of overnight lodging, and even though they are not designated for eating, this invalidation takes effect upon them?

And

if so,

infer from it: Since it renders it unfit through overnight lodging, it renders it unfit through

even

the thought

of piggul, when he thought concerning the sacrificial portions. That is, just as the invalidation of overnight lodging takes effect upon the meat even though it is not normally eaten, so too the invalidation of piggul should take effect upon it. From here there is proof that if one thought concerning the sacrificial portions, the bulls became invalid, since it is possible for the invalidation of piggul to take effect upon the meat even though it is not normally eaten.

Indeed, it cannot be proved from here that a thought of piggul concerning the meat itself renders it unfit, for one must think about something that is normally eaten; and even in the earlier beraita it is explicitly stated that a thought concerning the meat does not cause the sacrificial portions to become piggul. Nevertheless, it can be proved from here with regard to a thought concerning the sacrificial portions, which renders the meat unfit.

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

do not explain the intention of the beraita as being that the meat of the bulls became fit to be rendered unfit through overnight lodging. Rather, its intention is

the overnight lodging of the sacrificial portions,

that if he did not place them upon the altar all night, they became invalid through overnight lodging. Only in this respect should you be precise: Just as the invalidation of overnight lodging takes effect upon the sacrificial portions, so too the invalidation of piggul takes effect upon them.

And we raise an objection:

But since the latter clause states

of this Mishna:

“All of them are subject to misuse of sacred property”

even after all the procedures had been performed with them and they had already been brought to the place of burning and are found

on the ash heap, until

the time

that the meat is reduced to ashes,

that it is burned completely and becomes ashes, whereby its mitzva is completed.

It follows

from

this that

the first clause,

which spoke of the invalidation of overnight lodging, also deals with

the overnight lodging of the meat,

like the latter clause, which speaks of the law of misuse of sacred property with regard to the meat?!

The Gemara rejects this:

Is that necessarily so?!

Is it necessary to establish the first clause like the latter clause? Rather,

this is as it is

with regard to its matter,

and this is as it is

with regard to its matter. That is,

the first clause

deals with

the sacrificial portions, and

whereas

the latter clause

deals with

the meat!

Rava raised an objection

against the words of Rabbi Elazar, from what we learned:

“And these do not cause piggul and do not become piggul: The wool on the heads of lambs, the hair in the beards of goats, the hide, the gravy and the congealed mass, the refuse and the crop, the bones and the sinews, the horns and the hooves, the fetus and the placenta, the fat of consecrated animals and the eggs of turtledoves—all of these neither cause piggul nor become piggul.”

With regard to the wool on the heads of lambs and the hair in the beards of goats, the novelty is that even though they are part of the skin of the head, which is not included in the removal of the skin of an olah but is offered together with the head, nevertheless, a thought of burning them outside their designated time is ineffective with regard to them, since they are not normally burned.

“And one is not liable on their account for piggul, notar, or impurity.”

“And one who offers any of them outside”

the Temple courtyard

is exempt,

since they are not fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.

And the Gemara analyzes:

What, is it not

what they said,

“they do not cause piggul,”

meaning that a thought of piggul concerning them, when he thought at the time of the sprinkling to eat or burn some of these outside their designated time, does not cause

the offering to become piggul;

and what they said,

“they do not become piggul,”

means

because of

the

offering,

for if he thought of eating from the meat of the offering, or of burning its sacrificial portions, outside their designated time, these do not become piggul because of this, and one is not liable to karet for eating them. It follows that even the fetus and the crop, which are included in this law, are not made piggul by the offering. This is therefore not in accordance with Rabbi Elazar, who said that if one caused piggul in the offering, the fetus and the placenta became piggul?!

The Gemara rejects this:

No,

do not explain the intention of the beraita as saying that the thought concerning the offering causes them to become piggul. Rather, this is how you should explain it:

“And they do not become piggul because of themselves.”

If he thought at the time of the sprinkling to eat some of these outside their designated time, they do not become piggul through this, for the thought concerning these does not cause piggul.

And we raise an objection:

If so,

if the first clause comes only to say that they do not become piggul because of themselves,

this that the latter clause states, “all of them neither cause piggul nor become piggul,”

also means that they do not become piggul because of themselves, as in the first clause, for they do become piggul because of the offering;

what need is there for this again?

Why did the tanna repeat and teach this matter, that they do not become piggul because of themselves? We already learned this in the first clause. Rather, it necessarily follows that it comes to introduce the novelty that they do not become piggul even because of the offering. And we answer:

And according to your reasoning,

that the intention of the first clause is to say that they do not become piggul because of the offering, one can likewise raise a difficulty concerning what we learned there a third time,

“One is not liable on its account for piggul”—

what need is there for this again?!

Was it not already stated there in the first clause that they do not become piggul? Necessarily, you must say that this statement was not stated as a new law,

but since he needed to teach

that one is not liable on their account for

notar or impurity, the tanna

also taught

piggul.

If so,

here too,

there is no difficulty for Rabbi Elazar as to why it was taught there a second time that they do not become piggul, for

since he needed to teach

with regard to them the law that

one who offers any of them outside

is exempt,

the tanna also taught: “And all of them neither cause piggul nor become piggul.”

Rava said

to prove the view of Rabbi Elazar:

We too have learned

in our Mishna:

“One who slaughters consecrated animals in order to eat the fetus or the placenta outside has not caused piggul”

[and this implies both the offering and the fetus or placenta themselves];

“and one who pinches the heads of turtledoves in order to eat their eggs outside has not caused piggul!”

And afterward it teaches: “With regard to the fat of consecrated animals and the eggs of turtledoves, one is not liable on their account for piggul, notar, or impurity!”

This implies that specifically the fat of consecrated animals and the eggs of turtledoves have the law that one is not liable on their account for piggul;

but with regard to the fetus and the placenta, one is liable

on their account for piggul.

And this is a contradiction, for we previously learned that a thought concerning the fetus and the placenta does not cause piggul. If so, why is one liable on their account?

Rather, infer from it: Here,

in the latter clause, the matter concerns piggul

because of the offering,

and therefore the law is that even the fetus and the placenta became piggul because of his thought concerning the offering. Whereas

here,

in the first clause, the matter concerns piggul

because of themselves,

meaning that the thought concerning them themselves does not cause piggul.

It follows that the fetus and the placenta were excluded from the category of things that cause piggul, but were not excluded from the category of things that become piggul, in accordance with Rabbi Elazar.

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

infer from it!

We learned there:

Regarding invalid offerings that went up onto the altar, Rabbi Shimon said: If their invalidity occurred in the sacred area—that is, the invalidity occurred after they came into the courtyard—these do not descend.

And

among those whose invalidity did not occur in the sacred area, Rabbi Shimon enumerated

animals with blemishes,

which, if they went up, descend.

Rabbi Akiva deems animals with blemishes fit,

so that if they went up, they do not descend.

Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Abba said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Rabbi Akiva deemed fit

not all blemishes,

but only a thin film over the eye,

which is a blemish that is not so noticeable,

since

a thin film over the eye is

fit

from the outset

in birds,

for the section concerning blemishes was not stated with regard to them, and only one lacking a limb is invalid in their case, as it is stated: “Present it now to your governor”; for this reason, even in the case of an animal that is invalid because of a thin film over the eye, the law is that if it went up, it does not descend.

And this,

the law concerning animals with blemishes, that if they went up they do not descend, applies only in a case

where the consecration preceded its blemish,

where the sanctity of the altar had already taken effect upon the animal before a blemish occurred in it. But if its blemish preceded its consecration, the sanctity of the body did not take effect upon it at all, but only sanctity of value. Since the altar does not consecrate all invalid offerings, but only those that were fit for the altar before they became invalid, it does not consecrate this one, upon which the sanctity of the body did not originally take effect and which was never fit for the altar.

And Rabbi Akiva concedes regarding a female burnt-offering,

which is disqualified because it is female, so that if it went up, it must come down, because

it is as though its blemish preceded its consecration,

for you have no greater blemish than femaleness in a burnt-offering, and it exists in it from the beginning of its creation. Therefore, even though in a bird burnt-offering a female is also fit, in an animal it is disqualified.

Rabbi Zeira raises an objection

from the words of the beraita brought above:

One who offers up any of them

from the fetus and the placenta

outside is exempt.

And it implies that the exemption for offering up outside applies only to them, since they are not of the body of the sacrifice and are not fit for offering, and their offering was excluded by the fat and kidneys stated with regard to the guilt-offering: just as a guilt-offering is excluded from the category of a fetus, so everything is excluded from the category of a fetus.

But

if he offered up

from the flesh of their mother

outside, he is

liable.

And how do you find it

that he is liable for offering up flesh outside? Only

in a female burnt-offering,

for if he offered up the flesh of a peace-offering outside, he is exempt, because it is not something that is accepted inside, since it is eaten by the owners.

And now,

if you say, it is well, Rabbi Akiva holds that a female burnt-offering, if it went up, need not come down,

it follows that the flesh of a female burnt-offering is something fit to be offered inside, and therefore he is liable for offering it up outside; and we will establish this beraita as

whose view is it? Rabbi Akiva’s,

who holds that blemished animals that went up do not come down, and the same law applies to a female animal.

But if you say

that even Rabbi Akiva concedes regarding a female burnt-offering that

if it went up, it must come down,

the following difficulty arises:

this,

this beraita,

whose view is it!?

For even according to Rabbi Akiva, one should not be liable for offering up the flesh of a female burnt-offering outside, since it is not fit to be offered inside!?

And the Gemara rejects: Do not infer from the words of the beraita that one who offers up from the flesh of their mother outside is liable; rather,

say,

say this:

One who offers up any of them outside is exempt.

And infer from this:

but

if he offered up

from the sacrificial portions of their mother, he is

liable.

And the beraita is dealing with the sacrificial portions of a sin-offering or peace-offering, which also come from a female animal, and therefore, if he offered them up outside, he is liable.

And we raise a difficulty:

but “

the one who offers up

from them,”

which implies from their flesh, is

minor.

And

you should infer that the law of their mother is

in the likeness of them.

Just as with regard to them the beraita spoke of offering up their flesh, so too with regard to their mother you should infer that if he offered up from her flesh, he is liable. If so, the original difficulty returns: there is no case in which Rabbi Akiva can hold one liable for offering up flesh except a burnt-offering, since he permits blemished animals not to come down!?

The Gemara rejects: Do not interpret the words of the beraita concerning the fetus and the placenta themselves as referring to offering up their flesh;

rather, say

as follows:

One who offers up from their sacrificial portions outside is exempt.

And infer:

but from the sacrificial portions of their mother he is liable.

And this refers to a sin-offering or peace-offering. But in the case of a burnt-offering, even according to Rabbi Akiva he is exempt, because it is not fit for inside, since if it went up, it must come down.

Mishna:

a.

He slaughtered it

for a sacrifice with the thought

of leaving its blood or its sacrificial portions until the next day,

to delay the sprinkling of the blood or the burning of the sacrificial portions until after their appointed time.

Or

he thought

to take them out

the blood or the sacrificial portions

outside,

for if he were to do so in practice, they would thereby become disqualified,

Rabbi Judah invalidates, and the Sages validate

And their dispute is whether every thought of performing an act that disqualifies the sacrifice disqualifies it, or only the thought of an offering performed outside its time or outside its place.