Zevachim 35a (לה.) — the Talmud in English

I also said only

that the koen gathers the blood from the floor

but when it was received

the blood

in a vessel

initially, before it spilled onto the ground.

And we challenge this:

But he,

Rabbi Yehuda

himself, from where did he know

that the blood being gathered had indeed been received in a vessel?

And we answer:

Kohanim are diligent

in their service, and therefore we are certain that they received all the blood, but

they work quickly,

they perform their service rapidly

and

therefore, at times

the blood spills

from the vessel onto the ground. If so, it is clear that the blood on the floor had been received in a vessel.

But there is still a difficulty: In any event, how can he sprinkle this blood?

Is it not the “blood of exudation,”

which is the blood that oozes and emerges from the animal’s body after the sacrificial animal’s lifeblood has flowed out

mixed with it,

with the lifeblood spilled onto the ground? And the blood of exudation is unfit for sprinkling; only the lifeblood, which flows first, is fit. Since most of the blood on the floor is blood of exudation and only a minority is lifeblood, if he gathers the blood from the floor into a vessel, the vessel will contain a mixture of a minority of lifeblood and a majority of blood of exudation, and the minority of lifeblood will be nullified by the majority of blood of exudation!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own reasoning, as he said

with regard to the prohibition against eating blood, that

the blood of exudation

also

is called [

is called ] “

blood,”

and one is liable to karet for eating it.

As it was taught in a beraita,

eating

the blood of exudation

is not punishable by karet, but only

by a prohibition,

as a specific prohibition was added with regard to eating the blood of exudation; this is the statement of the Sages.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

Eating the blood of exudation is also

punishable by

the punishment of

karet.

And just as with regard to the prohibition against eating blood Rabbi Yehuda holds that the blood of exudation is called blood, like the lifeblood, so too with regard to sprinkling it on the altar, it is considered like lifeblood.

The Gemara rejects this answer:

But Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Yehuda concedes [

who holds that the blood of exudation is called blood with regard to the prohibition against eating it, like the lifeblood ] that

with regard to atonement,

meaning the sprinkling of the blood of exudation on the altar for atonement,

it does not effect atonement. As it is stated: “For the blood, it is that which effects atonement by means of the soul” [

Deuteronomy 12 ]. The verse teaches that only

blood through which the soul departs,

which is the blood that flows first,

is called blood

with regard to atonement. But the blood of exudation

through which the soul does not depart is not called blood.

It follows that even according to Rabbi Yehuda, the blood of exudation is unfit for sprinkling!? Therefore, the Gemara offers another answer:

Rather, Rabbi Yehuda

follows

his own reasoning, as he said: Blood does not nullify blood.

For he holds that “a species does not become nullified in its own species,” and therefore, although most of the blood in the vessel is blood of exudation, the lifeblood mixed with it is nevertheless not nullified, and the sprinkling is performed with the lifeblood contained in the mixture.

The Gemara continues to explain the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages concerning sprinkling from the mixture of blood on the floor of the Temple courtyard.

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda said

to the Sages:

According to your words,

that the blood of the mixture is not sprinkled,

why

and for what purpose did they

stop up

the openings of

the courtyard

on the eves of Passover, preventing the blood from flowing through the channel into the Kidron Valley?

It was necessarily done so that they could gather the blood from the floor and sprinkle it on the altar! They said to him: There was another reason for this, because

it is a praise for the descendants of Aaron

that they should walk up to their knees

in blood

of the sacrifices.

And we challenge this: How were the kohanim permitted to serve when the blood was spilled on the ground?

But it is blood;

the blood on

the floor of the courtyard constitutes an interposition

between the feet of the kohanim performing the service and the floor of the courtyard! The koen performing the service must stand directly on the floor of the courtyard, without an interposition, as explained in the earlier Mishna [15b]: If he was standing on top of utensils, his service is invalid!?

And we answer: Blood

is moist, and it does not constitute an interposition.

And likewise

it was taught

in the Tosefta to tractate Mikvaot [chapter 7], regarding the laws of interposition during immersion:

Blood, ink, honey, and milk

that were on the body of a person immersing himself, if they were

dry, they constitute an interposition,

but if they were

moist, they do not constitute an interposition.

And we challenge this: In any event, how did the kohanim serve under such circumstances?

But their garments became soiled

they became dirty

from their garments,

the garments of the kohanim, because of the large amount of blood on the floor.

And we learned in a Mishna: If his garments were

of the koen performing the service

stained,

soiled,

and he performed the service, his service is invalid!?

And should you say that they lifted them,

perhaps you would say that the case is one in which the kohanim lifted their garments so that they would not become soiled, this cannot answer the difficulty, because the service is not valid when performed in this manner!

For

it was taught in a beraita:

It is stated with regard to the priestly garments: “And the koen shall wear

his measure

of linen” [Leviticus 6]. We learn from here that the garments of the kohanim must be

according to his measure,

that of each and every koen,

neither lacking nor exceeding it!

Yet when the koen lifts his garments so that they will not become soiled by the blood spilled on the floor, he is reducing them from their required measure!?

And we answer: What we said—that it is a praise for the descendants of Aaron that they walk in blood up to their knees even though their garments become soiled with blood—applies only

at the

time of

carrying the limbs

of the sacrifice

to the ramp

of the altar,

which is not a service,

and it is not disqualified when performed in soiled garments.

The Gemara wonders:

Is it not?

Is carrying the limbs to the altar ramp not a service?

But it was taught in a beraita:

It is stated:

“And the koen shall bring all of it

and burn it on the altar” [Leviticus 1]. The bringing mentioned here

is the carrying of the limbs to the ramp

of the altar.

It follows that this too is a service!?

And we answer:

Rather,

what we said—that it is a praise for the descendants of Aaron that they walk in blood—applies only

at the

time of

carrying wood to the arrangement, which is not a service,

and it is not disqualified when performed in soiled garments.

And we challenge this:

And

in any event, since the courtyard was full of blood,

how did they go for the service,

how did the kohanim walk through the courtyard for the purpose of their service without soiling their garments?

And we answer:

They went on platforms,

they walked on platforms that were there, and these were high, stone-built platforms. The reason they did not constitute an interposition between the kohanim and the floor of the courtyard is that they were built as part of the floor and were considered part of it.

Mishna:

The thought of pigul that renders a sacrifice pigul applies only when the person performing the service intended to eat the flesh of the sacrifice or to offer it outside its prescribed time or outside its prescribed place, with regard to substances fit to be eaten or offered, and in the measure fit for offering.

This Mishna explains the details of the laws included in this general principle.

1.

One who slaughters the sacrifice

and, during the slaughter, intended

to eat

from it outside its prescribed time or outside its prescribed place

something that is not ordinarily eaten

because it is unfit, or because it is not designated for eating [such as something designated to be burned on the altar

and

likewise if he intended

to burn

from it outside its prescribed place or outside its prescribed time

something that is not ordinarily burned, the sacrifice is fit.

The offering.

And Rabbi Eliezer invalidates it.

2. Likewise, if he intended

to eat

outside its prescribed time or outside its prescribed place

something that is ordinarily eaten, and

likewise if he intended

to burn

it outside its prescribed time or place

something that is ordinarily burned,

but he intended to eat or burn

less than an olive-bulk, the sacrifice is fit,

and it is rendered invalid only by the intention to eat or burn an olive-bulk.

3. Even if he intended

to eat half an olive-bulk

outside its prescribed time or place

and to burn half an olive-bulk

in this manner,

the sacrifice is fit

because

the

thoughts of

eating and burning do not combine

to reach an olive-bulk and thereby invalidate the sacrifice.

4.

One who slaughters the sacrifice

with the intention

of eating an olive-bulk of the hide, the gravy, the kefita

meaning spices and the fine particles of meat lying at the bottom of the pot,

and the allel,

the neck sinew, which is hard and unfit to eat,

and the bones, sinews, horns, and hooves,

all of which are unfit to eat, and he intended to eat them

outside its prescribed time

or

outside its prescribed place, the sacrifice is fit.

If they came from a sacrifice that became piggul because of an intention to eat or burn it outside its designated time, and one ate them, he is not liable to excision, as one who eats piggul is.

And

for all these things,

one is not liable on their account for pigul.

If they came from a sacrifice that became pigul because of an intention to eat or burn it outside its prescribed time, and he ate some of them, he is not liable to karet like one who eats pigul;

and

not on account of

notar,

if they came from the flesh of a sacrifice whose time for eating had passed and he ate some of them, he is not liable to karet as one who eats notar;

and

not on account of

ritual impurity,

if they came from a fit sacrifice and a ritually impure person ate them, he is not liable to karet like a ritually impure person who ate consecrated food.

5.

One who slaughters consecrated animals

such as a sacrifice that is a pregnant female animal, and intends

to eat

from it the

fetus [

the fetus in its womb ],

or

the

placenta [

the membranous sac surrounding the fetus in its mother’s womb ]

outside, does not render the sacrifice pigul,

since the fetus and the placenta are not part of the sacrifice itself. Likewise,

one who performs melika on turtledoves

with the intention

of eating their eggs

that are inside them

outside, does not render the sacrifice pigul,

because they are not part of the sacrifice.

6.

Milk

found in the udders of the animal

of consecrated property

at the time it is slaughtered,

and the eggs of turtledoves

found inside the bodies of the turtledoves when melika is performed,

one is not liable on their account,

for eating them,

for pigul or notar, and

a

ritually impure person

who eats them is not liable,

because they are not part of the sacrifice.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said:

1.

If he rendered the sacrifice pigul

by slaughtering it with the intention of eating or burning it outside its prescribed time,

the fetus too became pigul

through this,

the fetus,

the fetus in the womb of the sacrificial animal, and one who eats it is liable to karet for eating pigul. Rabbi Elazar holds that since the fetus is “the thigh of its mother,” the fetus too is considered part of the sacrifice, and one is liable for it on account of pigul. By contrast, if he rendered

the fetus pigul,

by slaughtering the sacrifice with the intention of eating the fetus outside its prescribed time,

the sacrifice did not become pigul,

nor did the fetus itself. Since it is something that is not ordinarily eaten, as most people do not eat it, the intention to eat it is ineffective in rendering the sacrifice pigul.

And likewise, if at the time of melika of the bird he

rendered piggul through the alal (the neck sinew), by thinking to eat it beyond its designated time, the bird becomes piggul, since the bird’s alal is not as tough as the alal of an animal and is fit for consumption because of its softness. And once the bird became piggul through the thought concerning the alal,

—by thinking to eat it outside its prescribed time—the bird became piggul, since the bird’s neck sinew is not as hard as the sinew of an animal, and it is fit for eating because of its softness. And since the bird became piggul through the thought concerning the neck sinew

the

also

mora'ah

(the bird’s crop) becomes piggul. Although it is not fit for consumption, one is nevertheless liable for eating it, since there are people who eat it. However, if he rendered piggul

through the mora'ah, the alal does not become piggul,

nor does the rest of the bird. Since the mora'ah is not fit for consumption, a thought of piggul concerning eating it beyond its designated time cannot render it piggul.

b.

He rendered piggul through the sacrificial portions

of bulls that are burned, by slaughtering them with the thought of burning their sacrificial portions beyond their designated time;

the bulls became piggul,

and one who eats their flesh is liable to karet. But if he rendered piggul

through the bulls

that are burned, by slaughtering them with the thought of eating their flesh beyond its designated time,

the sacrificial portions do not become piggul,

and one who eats their kidneys or their lobe of the liver [which are not burned] is not liable to karet; all the more so, one who eats their flesh is exempt. This is because the flesh of bulls that are burned is something that is not ordinarily eaten, as the law of this flesh is that it must be burned. Therefore, a thought of eating it is ineffective in rendering it piggul. And as for the wording, “the sacrificial portions do not become piggul,” this does not mean that only the sacrificial portions do not become piggul. Rather, since it stated, “He rendered piggul through the sacrificial portions, the bulls became piggul,” it likewise stated the converse: “He rendered piggul through the bulls, the sacrificial portions do not become piggul.”

The Gemara discusses this:

Can one say that this supports him,

that there is a beraita supporting Rabbi Elazar’s view, that a thought of piggul that is effective renders piggul even those things concerning which the thought is ineffective in rendering them piggul, such as an unborn animal, a mora'ah, and the flesh of the bulls?

As it was taught:

The Sages and Rabbi Shimon disagree concerning the law of bulls that are burned. The Sages maintain that the law of piggul applies to them, while Rabbi Shimon maintains that the law of piggul does not apply to them, because any offering that is not offered upon the external altar does not entail liability for piggul.

And they agree

the Sages and Rabbi Shimon

that if one had the thought

during one of the blood rites of the bulls

of eating the bulls

the next day,

and

he likewise thought

of burning them

the next day in the place of ashes [which is where they are burned],

he has accomplished nothing,

and the bulls do not thereby become piggul. The reason is that there is no thought of eating here, since he thought of eating something that is not ordinarily eaten, as the law of the bulls’ flesh is that it must be burned. A thought of burning is likewise ineffective in rendering it piggul, because in the law of piggul the Torah insisted upon a thought of altar consumption, whereas burning is not expressed as eating. [As for what was stated above [31a], that if one thought that the fire of an ordinary person would consume it the next day, it is piggul, the reason is that he expressed his thought in the language of eating ].

The Gemara infers:

Is it not

specifically when he had a thought of piggul concerning eating the bulls that are burned that the Sages agree that he does not render them piggul?

But if he had the thought concerning the sacrificial portions

of the bulls that are burned, to burn them beyond their designated time, in this case the Sages disagree and maintain that

they became piggul,

even

the bulls.

Since the thought of burning the sacrificial portions was effective in rendering the offering piggul, because it is a thought of altar consumption, the entire offering became piggul, including the flesh, and one is liable to karet for eating it. And although a thought concerning eating the flesh is not fit to render it piggul, nevertheless, the flesh itself does become piggul. This is in accordance with the view of Rabbi Elazar, who maintains that although the thought is ineffective in rendering them piggul, they are nevertheless capable of becoming piggul.

The Gemara rejects this:

No.

Do not infer from here that if one had the thought concerning the sacrificial portions, the bulls became piggul.