Zevachim 35a — the Talmud in English

I too said:

that the kohen should collect the blood from the floor,

but only when it was received

the blood

in a vessel

at the outset, before it was spilled onto the ground.

And we ask:

and he—

Rabbi Yehuda

himself, from where did he know

that the blood being collected had indeed been received in a vessel?

And we answer:

the kohanim are diligent

in their service, and therefore it is certain to us that they received all the blood, but

they perform the service here,

they perform their service quickly,

and

therefore, at times

the bloods spill

from the vessel onto the ground. And if so, it is clear that the blood on the floor was received in a vessel.

But it is still difficult: in any event, how does he sprinkle this blood?

But surely “the blood of exudation,”

which is the blood that drains and emerges from the body of the animal after the blood of the life of the offering has emerged,

is mixed into it,

with the blood of the life spilled onto the ground. And the blood of exudation is not fit for sprinkling; only the blood of the life, which flows first, is fit. And since most of the blood on the floor is the blood of exudation and only a minority of it is the blood of the life, if he collects the blood from the floor into a vessel, there will be in the vessel a mixture of a minority of the blood of the life with a majority of the blood of exudation, and the minority of the blood of the life will be nullified in the majority of the blood of exudation!?

And we answer:

Rabbi Yehuda follows his own position, for he says

with regard to the prohibition against eating blood, that

the blood of exudation

also

is called [

called ] “

blood,”

and one is liable to karet for eating it.

For it was taught:

eating

the blood of exudation

does not entail the punishment of karet, but only

a warning,

for a special prohibition concerning eating the blood of exudation was derived; these are the words of the Sages.

Rabbi Yehuda says:

even eating the blood of exudation is

subject to

the punishment of

karet.

And just as with regard to the prohibition against eating blood Rabbi Yehuda holds that the blood of exudation is called blood like the blood of the life, so too with regard to sprinkling on the altar it is considered like the blood of the life.

And the Gemara rejects the answer:

But Rabbi Elazar said: Rabbi Yehuda concedes [

who holds that the blood of exudation is called blood with regard to the prohibition of eating, like the blood of the life, ] that

with regard to atonement,

that is, sprinkling the blood of exudation on the altar for atonement,

it does not effect atonement. As it is stated: “For it is the blood that effects atonement through the life” [

Deuteronomy 12 ]. The verse teaches that only

blood through which the life departs,

which is the blood that flows first,

is called blood

with regard to atonement. But the blood of exudation,

through which the life does not depart, is not called blood.

And it follows that even according to Rabbi Yehuda the blood of exudation is not fit for sprinkling!? Therefore the Gemara gives another answer:

Rather, Rabbi Yehuda

follows

his own position, for he says: blood does not nullify blood.

For he holds that “a species mixed with its own species is not nullified,” and therefore, although most of the blood in the vessel is blood of exudation, nevertheless the blood of the life mixed into it is not nullified, and the sprinkling is fulfilled with the blood of the life within the mixture.

And the Gemara continues to explain the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages concerning sprinkling from the blood of the mixture on the floor of the Courtyard.

We learned in a beraita:

Rabbi Yehuda said to them

to the Sages:

according to your words,

that the blood of the mixture is not sprinkled,

why,

for what purpose did they

stop up

closing the openings of

the Courtyard

on the evenings of Passover, and prevent the blood from exiting through the water channel to the Kidron Valley?

It follows necessarily that they did this so that they could collect the blood from the floor and sprinkle it on the altar! They said to him: There was another reason for this matter, for

it is praise for the descendants of Aaron

that they should walk up to their knees

in blood

of the offerings.

And we ask: How were the kohanim permitted to serve when the blood was spilled on the ground?

But it is blood,

for the blood on

the floor of the Courtyard constitutes an interposition

between the feet of the serving kohanim and the floor of the Courtyard! And the serving kohen must stand on the floor of the Courtyard without an interposition, as explained in the Mishna above [15b]: If he was standing on vessels, he is disqualified!?

And we answer: Blood—

it is moist, and it does not constitute an interposition.

And as

it was taught

in the Tosefta in tractate Mikvaot [chapter 7], concerning the laws of interposition in immersion:

blood, ink, honey, and milk

that were on the body of the person immersing, if they were

dry, they constitute an interposition,

but if they were

moist, they do not constitute an interposition.

And we ask: In any event, how did the kohanim serve in such a manner?

But they became soiled

they became dirty

with their garments,

the garments of the kohanim from the great quantity of blood on the floor.

And we learned: if his garments were

of the serving kohen

stained,

soiled,

and he served, his service is invalid!?

And if you would say that they lifted them up,

perhaps you wish to say that the case is one in which the kohanim lifted their garments so that they would not become soiled, but it is impossible to answer in this manner, because the service is not valid in such a way!

For

it was taught:

it is stated concerning the priestly garments: “And the kohen shall wear

his measure

linen” [Leviticus 6]. And we learn from here that the garments of the kohanim must be

according to his measure

of each and every kohen,

that he must neither lack nor add!

And when the kohen lifts his garments so that they will not become soiled by the blood spilled on the floor, he thereby makes them deficient from his measure!?

And we answer: What we said, that it is praise for the descendants of Aaron that they should walk in blood up to their knees despite their garments becoming soiled from the blood, applies only

at the

time of

carrying the limbs

of the offering

to the ramp

of the altar,

for it is not service,

and it is not disqualified by being performed in soiled garments.

And the Gemara wonders:

Is it not!?

Is carrying the limbs to the altar not service?

But it was taught:

it is stated

“And the kohen shall bring all of it

and burn it on the altar” [Leviticus 1]. The bringing mentioned here

is the carrying of the limbs to the ramp

of the altar.

It follows that this too is service!?

And we answer:

Rather,

what we said, that it is praise for the descendants of Aaron that they should walk in blood, refers only

at the

time of

carrying wood to the arrangement, for it is not service,

and it is not disqualified when performed in soiled garments.

And we ask:

and

in any event, since the Courtyard was full of blood,

how did they go for service,

how did the kohanim walk in the Courtyard for their service without their garments becoming soiled?

And we answer:

they walked on platforms,

they walked on platforms that were there, and these were high platforms built of stone. And the reason they did not constitute an interposition between the kohanim and the floor of the Courtyard is that they were built from the floor and were part of it.

Mishna:

The pigul thought that renders the offering pigul applies only when the person performing the service thought to eat the flesh of the offering or to offer it outside its time or outside its place, with regard to things fit for eating or offering, and in the measure fit for offering.

In this Mishna, the details of laws belonging to this general principle will be explained.

A.

One who slaughters the offering

and thought at the time of slaughter

to eat

from it outside its time or outside its place

a thing that is not ordinarily eaten

because it is unfit, or because it is not designated for eating [such as a thing designated for burning on the altar],

and

likewise, if he thought

to burn on the altar

from it outside its place or outside its time

a thing that is not ordinarily burned, the offering is fit.

The offering.

And Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies it.

B. And likewise, if he thought

to eat

outside its time or outside its place

a thing that is ordinarily eaten, and

likewise, if he thought

to burn on the altar

outside its time or place

a thing that is ordinarily burned on the altar,

but he thought about eating or burning on the altar

less than an olive-bulk, the offering is fit,

the offering, and it is disqualified only through a thought of eating or burning on the altar an olive-bulk measure.

C. And even if he thought

to eat half an olive-bulk

outside its time or place

and to burn half an olive-bulk

in such a manner,

the offering is fit

the offering, because

the

thoughts

of eating and burning on the altar do not combine

to form an olive-bulk measure in order to disqualify the offering.

D.

One who slaughters the offering

with the thought

to eat an olive-bulk of the hide, of the gravy, and of the kippah,

that is, seasoning and the fine substance of the meat situated at the bottom of the pot,

and of the allel,

the neck sinew, which is hard and unfit for eating,

and of the bones, and of the sinews, and of the horns, and of the hooves,

all of which are unfit for eating, and thought to eat them

outside its time

or

and outside its place, the offering is fit

the offering.

And

all these

one is not liable for them on account of pigul.

For if they came from an offering that became pigul because of a thought of eating or burning on the altar outside its time, and he ate from them, he is not liable to karet, as is one who eats pigul,

and

not on account of

leftover,

for if they came from the flesh of an offering whose eating time had passed and he ate from them, he is not liable to karet as is one who eats leftover,

and

not on account of

ritual impurity,

for if they came from a fit offering and an impure person ate them, he is not liable to karet as is an impure person who eats sacred food.

E.

One who slaughters consecrated animals

such as an offering that is a pregnant female animal, and thought

to eat

from it the

fetus [

the fetus in its womb ],

or

the

placenta [

the membranous sac surrounding the fetus in its mother's womb ]

outside, he has not rendered it pigul,

since the fetus and the placenta are not the body of the offering. And likewise

one who pinches the necks of turtledoves

with the thought

to eat their eggs

that are inside them

outside, he has not rendered it pigul,

because they are not the body of the offering.

F.

Milk

found in the udders of the animal of

consecrated animals

at the time of its slaughter,

and the eggs of turtledoves

found in the bodies of the turtledoves at the time of their neck-pinching,

one is not liable for them,

for eating them

on account of pigul or leftover, and

a person is not liable

as an impure person

who eats them, ,

because they are not an offering.

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said:

A.

If he rendered the offering pigul

by slaughtering it with a thought of eating or burning on the altar outside its time,

it became pigul

through this, also

the fetus,

the fetus in the womb of the offering, and one who eats from it is liable to karet on account of eating pigul. For Rabbi Elazar holds that since a fetus is “the thigh of its mother,” the fetus too is considered the body of the offering, and one is liable for it on account of pigul. But, by contrast, if he rendered

the fetus pigul

by slaughtering the offering with the thought of eating from the fetus outside its time,

the offering did not become pigul,

and not even the fetus itself. For since it is a thing that is not ordinarily eaten, which most people do not eat, the thought of eating it is not effective to render anything pigul.

And likewise, if at the time of pinching the bird

he rendered it piggul through the neck sinew

—by thinking to eat it outside its prescribed time—the bird became piggul, since the bird’s neck sinew is not as hard as the sinew of an animal, and it is fit for eating because of its softness. And since the bird became piggul through the thought concerning the neck sinew

it became piggul

also

the crop

—the bird’s gullet. And although it is not fit for eating, nevertheless one is liable for eating it, since there are people who eat it. However, if he rendered it piggul

through the crop, he did not render the neck sinew piggul,

and not even the rest of the bird. For since the crop is not fit for eating, a thought of piggul concerning eating it outside its prescribed time does not render it piggul.

b.

If he rendered piggul through the emurim

of the bulls that are burned, by slaughtering them with the thought of burning their emurim outside their prescribed time,

the bulls became piggul,

and one who eats from their flesh is liable to karet. But if he rendered piggul

through the bulls

that are burned, by slaughtering them with the thought of eating from their flesh outside its prescribed time,

the emurim did not become piggul,

and one who eats from their kidneys or from the lobe of their liver [which are not burned] is not liable to karet, and all the more so one who eats from their flesh is exempt. For the flesh of the bulls that are burned is something that is not normally eaten, since the law of this flesh is that it be burned; therefore a thought of eating does not cause piggul in it. And when it states, “the emurim did not become piggul,” the intent is not that only the emurim did not become piggul. Rather, because it stated, “He rendered piggul through the emurim, the bulls became piggul,” it also stated in the opposing case, “He rendered piggul through the bulls, the emurim did not become piggul.”

And the Gemara discusses:

Let us say that it supports him,

that there is support from a beraita for Rabbi Elazar’s position, who maintains that a thought of piggul that is effective renders piggul even matters concerning which the thought is not effective in causing piggul, such as a fetus, the crop, and the flesh of the bulls:

For it was taught:

The Sages and Rabbi Shimon disagreed concerning the law of bulls that are burned. The Sages maintain that piggul applies to them, and Rabbi Shimon maintains that piggul does not apply to them, because with regard to every offering that is not offered upon the outer altar, one is not liable for it on account of piggul.

And they agree

—the Sages and Rabbi Shimon—

that if he thought

during one of the blood services of the bulls

concerning eating the bulls

tomorrow,

and

likewise thought

concerning burning them

tomorrow at the place of ashes [which is the place of their burning],

he has accomplished nothing,

and the bulls did not thereby become piggul. The reason is that there is no thought of eating here, because he thought to eat something that is not normally eaten, since the law of the bulls’ flesh is that it be burned. And a thought of burning likewise is not effective in causing piggul, because in the law of piggul the Torah was particular about a thought of altar eating, and burning is not an expression of eating. [And that which was said above [31a], that if he thought that the fire of an ordinary person would consume it tomorrow, it is piggul, is because he expressed his thought in the language of eating].

And the Gemara infers:

Is it not so

that specifically if he thought a thought of piggul concerning eating the bulls that are burned, the Sages agree that he does not render [them] piggul?

But if he thought concerning the emurim

of the bulls that are burned, to burn them outside their prescribed time, in this the Sages disagree and maintain that

they became piggul,

even

the bulls

. For since the thought of burning the emurim was effective in causing piggul, because it is a thought of altar eating, the entire offering became piggul, and the flesh too is included, and one is liable to karet for eating it. And although a thought concerning eating the flesh is not fit to cause piggul, nevertheless the flesh itself does become piggul. And this is in accordance with Rabbi Elazar’s position, who maintains that although the thought is not effective in causing piggul in them, nevertheless they are fit to become piggul.

And the Gemara rejects:

No,

do not infer from here that if he thought concerning the emurim, the bulls became piggul.