Zevachim 34b (לד:) — the Talmud in English

And the Gemara concludes:

Tiyuvta against Reish Lakish, tiyuvta.

We learned in the Mishna: And all of them,

all those unfit for Temple service

who received

the blood with an invalid intention of

not in its appointed time or not in its appointed place, did not

cause the offering to become disqualified on account of this, since this is not service at all. Therefore,

if the lifeblood remains, a

priest

fit

for service

should receive

other blood from the animal and sprinkle it.

Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yohanan:

If one who is

unfit

for service received and sprinkled the blood,

what is the status of

the blood remaining in the neck of the animal

—does it become leftovers?

Should we say that, since one unfit for service sprinkled the blood, the remaining blood assumes the status of blood left over after the sprinkling has been performed, and it is no longer fit for sprinkling, because it is considered that service has already been performed with this blood; consequently, it will not help for a fit priest to return and receive and sprinkle it? Or should we say that the sprinkling of one unfit for service is not considered sprinkling at all, and consequently the remaining blood does not acquire the status of leftovers, and a fit priest should return and receive

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

There is no

invalid sprinkling that

creates

the status of

leftovers

for the remaining blood

except

a sprinkling performed with an intention of pigul or with an intention by which he thought to eat the meat of the offering

not in its appointed time

or

not in its appointed place,

which, despite being an invalid sprinkling, is considered an actual act of sprinkling. The reason

is that it effects acceptance

this sprinkling

for its pigul.

That is, with regard to establishing pigul and disqualification in an offering, we find that it has the designation of sprinkling: Even when one formulated an intention of pigul during services preceding the sprinkling, the pigul does not take effect in the offering until the time of sprinkling the blood, and it is the sprinkling that establishes the designation of pigul in the offering. And since it has the designation of sprinkling with regard to pigul, the remaining blood is considered the leftovers of the sprinkling, and it may no longer be received and sprinkled.

But a sprinkling that is invalid because it was performed by one unfit for service is not considered sprinkling at all. A fit priest may return and receive and sprinkle the blood, thereby rendering the offering fit.

Rav Zevid taught

Reish Lakish’s doubt

as follows: Reish Lakish asked Rabbi Yohanan: A cup

of

disqualified

blood—for example, it left the Temple courtyard and became disqualified because of leaving—and a fit priest sprinkled it:

what is the status of

the blood remaining in the neck of the animal

—does it become leftovers

of this sprinkling, so that there is no longer a remedy for the offering through returning and receiving and sprinkling the blood? Or should we say that the sprinkling of disqualified blood is not considered sprinkling, and the remaining blood does not have the status of leftovers, and the offering can be rectified by a fit priest returning and receiving and sprinkling it?

He said to him,

Rabbi Yohanan:

With regard to the disqualification itself

of the one who sprinkled the blood,

what is your view

concerning this with regard to the law of leftovers?

If

you hold that the sprinkling of one

unfit

for service

causes

the blood remaining to acquire the status of

leftovers,

the same law applies:

a disqualified cup also causes leftovers.

And

if

you hold that the sprinkling of one

unfit does not cause leftovers,

the same law applies:

a disqualified cup also does not cause leftovers,

and the two cases have the same law.

Rav Yirmeya of Difti taught

the doubt

as follows: Abaye asked Rabba:

If he received the blood in two cups and performed all the presentations of the blood from only one of them,

this cup

rejected or remnants?

what is the status of its fellow,

the second cup—

is it rejected or leftovers?

Should we say that, since he did not present any of it on the altar’s corners, it is considered as though he actively rejected it, and it may not be poured onto the base of the altar as the leftovers of blood presented on the altar; rather, its law is like that of blood from which none of the altar’s presentations was performed, which is not poured onto the base but is poured into the drainage channel in the Temple courtyard, from where it flows to the Kidron Valley? Or perhaps we should say that the first cup, from which he performed the presentation, causes even the blood in the second cup to acquire the status of leftovers, with the result that the blood of the second cup has the law of the leftovers of the presentation, which are poured onto the base.

He said to him,

Rabba: This matter is

the dispute between Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the Rabbis. As it is taught

the verse

above,

at the beginning of the passage concerning sin offerings, which discusses the ruler’s goat,

states

with regard to the leftovers of the blood from the presentations:

“Its blood shall be poured

onto the base of the altar of the burnt offering” [Leviticus 4]. It does not say that “all” of its blood should be poured. Whereas the verse

below,

later in the passage concerning sin offerings, which discusses the sin offering of an individual,

states: “And all its blood shall be poured

onto the base of the altar.” This is apparently a contradiction between the verses as to whether all the blood or only part of it should be poured. Necessarily, these two verses concern two different circumstances, with one of them coming to teach

from where do we know that a sin offering whose blood he received in four cups, and performed one presentation from

one cup

and one presentation from another,

and likewise from all of them, that their law is

that all of them are poured onto the base? The verse states: “And all its blood shall be poured.”

The verse teaches that in this circumstance, when he performed a presentation from all four cups, the blood remaining in all of them has the status of leftovers, and therefore it is poured onto the base.

One might

say that even if he

performed

all

four presentations

only

from one cup, all of them should be poured onto the base. The verse states: “And its blood

shall be poured,” indicating that only part of the blood is poured.

How so? It is

the blood of the cup from which he performed the presentations that

is poured onto the base,

because it is the leftovers of the blood of the presentations.

And they,

the bloods in the other cups,

are poured into the drainage channel,

because they were rejected from being presented on the altar. Thus, one cup causes its fellow to become rejected, and the contradiction between the verses is resolved. The verse indicating that all the blood is poured concerns a case in which he performed a presentation from all the cups, whereas the verse indicating that only part of the blood is poured concerns a case in which the presentation on the altar was performed from only one cup.

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

disagrees and

says: From where is it derived concerning a sin offering whose blood he received in four cups and performed all four presentations from one cup

that their law is

that all of them are poured onto the base

and are not rejected?

The verse states: “And all its blood shall be poured.”

Thus, Rabbi Elazar holds that one cup causes its fellow to acquire the status of leftovers. Consequently, this matter is the subject of a dispute between Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, and the Rabbis.

And we raise an objection against Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon:

But it is written: “And its blood shall be poured,”

indicating that there are circumstances in which only part of the blood is poured onto the base. This apparently supports the statement of the Rabbis, who distinguish between a case in which he presented from all of them and one in which he presented from only one of them!?

And we answer:

Rav Ashi said: That

verse, “And its blood shall be poured,” comes to teach

to exclude the leftovers in the neck of the animal,

which became leftovers of the blood received in the vessel; they are not poured onto the base but are poured into the drainage channel.

We learned in the Mishna:

“If a fit person received [the blood] and gave it to an unfit person, he should return it to a fit person,”

and we further learned there: If he received it with his right hand and gave it to his left hand, he should return it to his right hand. If he received it in a sacred vessel and gave it into an ordinary vessel, he should return it to a sacred vessel. If it spilled from the vessel onto the floor, and he collected it, it is fit.

And it is necessary

for the Mishna to specify all these rulings, which have a remedy through returning [the blood] to its previous state, even though the principle underlying them is one: Blood that was received validly does not become invalid even if afterward it remained in a state in which it was unfit to be there.

For had it taught

only the law of one who received [the blood] while fit and gave it to an

unfit person,

and that it is rendered fit by returning it,

I would have said: What unfit person

did the Mishna speak of? A

ritually impure

kohen. Therefore, giving it into his hands does not invalidate it, since

it is fit

for an impure kohen

to perform communal service

from the outset; and for that reason, in the case of an individual offering, it has a remedy through returning it. But giving it into the

left hand,

which is not valid for service even in the case of an individual offering, one might have said that

it would not

be helped by returning it. Therefore, the Mishna had to teach the law that if he gave it to his left hand, it is fit.

And had it taught

the Mishna the law of giving it to the

left hand,

but had not taught the law of giving it into an ordinary vessel, one might have said that the reason giving it to the left hand does not invalidate it is

because it has

a left hand

that is valid on Yom Kippur,

when the kohen takes the censer in his right hand and the spoon in his left. But an

ordinary vessel,

which is never valid in any manner,

would not

be rendered valid by returning it. Therefore, the Mishna teaches that in this case too it is fit.

And had it taught

the Mishna the law of giving it into an

ordinary vessel,

I would have thought that the reason such vessels do not invalidate it is

because ordinary vessels are fit

for

being consecrated,

by consecrating them and thereby making them fit for the sanctification of the blood. But

these,

where the blood spilled onto the floor, which is not fit for the sanctification of the blood,

perhaps it would not

have a remedy. Therefore,

it is necessary

for the tanna to state all these laws in our Mishna.

And we raise an objection to the fundamental ruling that the blood does not become invalid because it was placed in an unfit location:

Let it be

that this blood is

rejected,

as is the law with anything that was destined to be offered and was rejected because of invalidity or another impediment: Even after the invalidating factor has been removed, it does not again become fit to be offered. The same should apply to this blood, which was fit for the service and was rejected from it when it was placed in a location that invalidates it for service; once it was rejected, it should no longer become fit after the rejection. Why, then, did the Mishna say that this blood has a remedy through returning it?

And we answer:

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Rav Yirmeya of Difti said in the name of Rava as follows: Whose opinion is this?

The tanna of the Mishna is

Ḥanan the Egyptian, who does not hold

the law of

rejected items.

As it was taught

with regard to the two goats of Yom Kippur, which prevent one another: If the scapegoat dies, the sin-offering goat may not be offered unless another goat is brought in place of the one that died. The tannaim disputed this matter. Some hold that even if the scapegoat dies before the sin-offering goat is slaughtered, the sin-offering goat is rejected from being offered, and two other goats must be brought. Others hold that in such a case the sin-offering goat is not rejected, because living animals are not subject to rejection; only if the scapegoat dies after the slaughter, when the blood of the slaughtered goat has been received in the cup, is that blood rejected from its services, and two other goats must be brought. However,

Ḥanan the Egyptian says: Even if the blood

of the slaughtered goat is already

in the cup,

because its blood has already been received, he

brings

its

companion,

the other goat paired with the slaughtered goat,

and pairs it with it,

making the two of them a single pair, and they are fit. Thus, Ḥanan the Egyptian holds that there is no law of rejection at all: Even if, after something was fit to be offered, it entered a state that invalidated it, it has a remedy through returning it to its previous fit state.

Rav Ashi said

in explanation of why the law of rejection does not apply in our Mishna:

Anything that is in his power

to rectify and return to its fit status

is not considered rejected

because of the period during which it was unfit. Therefore, the blood was not rejected, since it is in his power to rectify it and return it to its former status. This is unlike the case of the scapegoat that died: It is not in his power to bring another one, for who says that another goat will be given to him?

Rav Shaya said: Rav Ashi’s opinion is more plausible,

that something which is in his power to rectify is not rejected. For

who is it that you hear holding

this law of

rejected items,

which do not return and become fit?

It is Rabbi Yehuda

who holds so.

As we learned: And Rabbi Yehuda further said: If the blood

of the slaughtered goat

is spilled,

the

scapegoat shall die,

and two other goats shall be brought in their place, because once the blood of the slaughtered goat was spilled, the scapegoat was rejected, since its partner can no longer be offered. And likewise, if

the scapegoat dies, the blood shall be spilled

of the slaughtered goat, since it has been rejected from being offered. Thus, Rabbi Yehuda holds the law of rejected items.

And

on the other hand,

we hear that Rabbi Yehuda says: Anything that is in his power —

is not considered rejected.

As it was taught,

with regard to the blood of the Pesaḥ offerings that was on the floor [after its reception in a cup]: Since very many Pesaḥ offerings were slaughtered, and they hurried to perform the service, the blood of some of the offerings would spill onto the floor of the Temple courtyard, and the bloods would become mixed together:

Rabbi Yehuda says: One cup would be filled

by one of the kohanim

from the mixed blood,

after all the bloods on the floor of the courtyard had become mixed with one another,

and one sprinkling would be performed opposite the base.

For, as stated, since there were many offerings and the service was performed in haste, if the blood of one of the offerings spilled onto the floor before the sprinkling, this cup, which contained a mixture of all the blood that was there, would render the offering fit through its sprinkling. Although Rabbi Yehuda holds the law of rejected items, this spilled blood was nevertheless not rejected, because it was in his power to collect it. Thus,

infer from this

that Rabbi Yehuda holds that

anything that is in his power is not considered rejected.

And the Gemara concludes:

Infer from this!

The text itself: It was taught: Rabbi Yehuda says: One cup would be filled from the mixed blood, for if one of them spilled, it would render it fit. They said to Rabbi Yehuda

: How can it be fit because they collect it and sprinkle it,

but surely

this spilled blood

was not received in a vessel,

and we learned in the earlier Mishna [25a] that if the blood flowed from the animal’s neck onto the floor and was not received in a vessel, it is invalid!?

And we raise an objection concerning the Sages:

How did they know

that the blood was not received in a vessel? Surely Rabbi Yehuda was not speaking of an actual incident; rather, he stated a theoretical concern, lest the blood of one of them spill! And we answer:

Rather,

the Sages’ question is:

Perhaps

this blood

was not received in a vessel,

and one would thereby be sprinkling invalid blood!?

He said to them

Rabbi Yehuda: