Zevachim 34a — the Talmud in English

The verse therefore says, “You shall not touch any sacred thing, and you shall not enter the Sanctuary”; it juxtaposes

the verse

sacred thing with the Sanctuary. Just as the Sanctuary is something involving ![](pamud.bmp "

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taking of a life

for one who enters the Sanctuary in a state of impurity is liable to karet,

so too

the prohibition of

sacred things

deals with

something involving the taking of a life. But if

the verse is dealing

with touching,

and is

the taking of a life

in touching

possible!?

After all, there is no liability of karet for touching.

Rather,

necessarily, the prohibition that we learned through this juxtaposition deals

with eating.

And we challenge this:

But still, it is needed

for the verse “You shall not touch any sacred thing”

for the

law

of an impure person who ate sacred meat before the sprinkling,

to state that he is liable to lashes; and if so, how did Reish Lakish derive two teachings from this verse, both a prohibition against one who eats sacred meat and also an inclusion making one liable to lashes for eating it even before the sprinkling of the blood !?

For it was stated: An impure person who ate sacred meat before the sprinkling,

when the blood of the offering had not yet been sprinkled and the meat had not yet been permitted for consumption by pure persons:

Reish Lakish says: He is lashed. And Rabbi Yohanan says: He is not lashed.

And the Gemara explains:

Reish Lakish says: He is lashed,

because he holds that the prohibition against an impure person eating sacred meat is learned from that which is stated:

“You shall not touch any sacred thing,”

and in this verse

there is no difference between before the sprinkling and after the sprinkling.

Whereas

Rabbi Yohanan says: He is not lashed, in accordance with his reasoning,

for he holds

as Baradla taught: It is derived

that the prohibition against eating sacred things in a state of impurity is from the exposition

“His impurity, his impurity,”

stated concerning entering the Sanctuary and concerning eating sacred meat with bodily impurity, and we learned the prohibition against eating sacred things in a state of impurity from the prohibition against entering the Sanctuary in a state of impurity.

And when

the Merciful One

wrote that

verse of “his impurity,” it is specifically concerning an impure person who eats sacred meat

after the sprinkling.

For this verse deals with a matter involving the punishment of karet, which is stated only concerning an impure person who eats sacred meat after the sprinkling. And for that reason, we can derive the prohibition against eating only with regard to what is stated in that verse.

And we answer: It is possible to learn from the verse “You shall not touch any sacred thing” a prohibition both for before the sprinkling and for after the sprinkling, because

if so,

if it were said that the verse deals only with an impure person who eats sacred meat after the sprinkling,

let the verse say, “You shall not touch sacred things,”

without the word “any,” and we would know from this that the verse deals with one who eats sacred meat specifically after the sprinkling of the blood, analogous to the punishment of karet, which is stated only for one who eats after the sprinkling.

What is the meaning of “any sacred thing”? Learn from it

from the inclusion of “any sacred thing” to include

two,

both one who eats before the sprinkling and one who eats after it, that he is lashed.

The substance of the matter: An impure person who ate sacred meat before the sprinkling—

Reish Lakish says: He is lashed; Rabbi Yohanan says: He is not lashed.

Abaye said: The dispute

between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish is only

with regard to bodily impurity,

for if an impure person ate sacred meat, in this Rabbi Yohanan said that he is not lashed, as was explained above, that he derived the law of lashes for the prohibition from the law of the punishment of karet, which applies only after the sprinkling. But

with regard to meat impurity,

if a pure person ate impure sacred meat,

everyone agrees that he is lashed

even if he ate it before the sprinkling.

And although there is no liability of karet for eating sacred offerings with bodily impurity before the sprinkling of the blood, because the punishment of karet is stated only for an impure person who ate sacred meat after the sprinkling of the blood [since only then was the meat permitted for consumption], this applies specifically with regard to an impure person eating sacred meat. But with regard to eating impure meat, even if he ate it before the sprinkling, he is lashed. Because

the Master said:

It is stated in the Torah: “And the meat that touches any impure thing shall be burned with fire. And the meat, every pure person shall eat meat” [Leviticus 7]. And the word

“and the meat”

written at the end of the verse is superfluous, and it comes

to include

that even

wood

of the arrangement

and frankincense

which are burned upon the altar acquire food impurity and are disqualified for offering upon the altar, even though

the

wood and frankincense

are not fit for eating [

and therefore food impurity does not apply to wood and frankincense of non-sacred property, since they are not food ],

and even so the verse included them,

the verse included the wood of the arrangement and the frankincense that is burned, so that they acquire food impurity as though they were food. For a special elevation was stated with regard to sacred offerings, that “the affection for sacred things” renders them fit to receive food impurity even in the case of something that is not food. And we learned from this that one is lashed for eating wood and frankincense that became impure, despite the fact that they are not fit for eating. And the same law applies to impure sacred meat that one ate before the sprinkling: although it still has no permission for eating, he is lashed for eating it, because it is no inferior to wood and frankincense of sacred offerings, which are not fit for eating, and nevertheless a person who eats them when they are impure is lashed.

And Rava said: The dispute

between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish as to whether one is lashed for eating meat before the sprinkling is only

with regard to bodily impurity,

where Reish Lakish said that he is lashed. But

with regard to meat impurity, everyone agrees that he is not lashed.

And Rava explains:

What is the reason

that according to everyone he is not lashed? Since the verse warning against eating impure sacred meat was juxtaposed to the verse in which the punishment of karet is stated for entering the Sanctuary with bodily impurity, for which there is a punishment of karet, we must learn that the prohibition stated concerning eating impure meat applies only to impure meat for eating which there is a liability of karet, just as there is for entering the Sanctuary with bodily impurity. Therefore, with regard to meat before the sprinkling,

since we do not read with regard to it

in the case of an impure person who eats the meat,

“and his impurity is upon him, and he shall be cut off,”

for before the sprinkling of the blood he is excluded from the punishment of karet, likewise

we do not read with regard to it

in the case of impure meat before the sprinkling of the blood,

“and the meat that touches any impure thing shall not be eaten.”

It follows that this prohibition was not stated concerning eating meat before the sprinkling, but only after it.

And we challenge Rava’s method, who holds that with regard to impure meat before the sprinkling, everyone agrees that one is not lashed for eating it.

But the Master said: “And the meat”—

to include wood and frankincense!?

And in what way is meat before the sprinkling, which still has no permission for eating, inferior to wood and frankincense, which are never eaten, and nevertheless were included for lashes?

And we answer:

Here,

the wood and frankincense that were included for lashes—

with what are we dealing?

With

a case where they became sacred

the wood and frankincense

in a service vessel,

that is, the sanctification of wood in a service vessel occurs when the priest takes the coals from upon the altar with a coal-pan that is a service vessel. And the sanctification of frankincense occurs when he sanctifies it in bowls. Therefore one is lashed for eating them, because

it becomes like a case in which all its permitting agents have been offered,

that is, like the state of meat after the sprinkling of the blood, for one who eats it with bodily impurity is liable to karet. Here, since they are not meat but wood and frankincense, one who eats them is lashed.

For we learned: Any

thing

that has permitting agents

for eating, such as sacred meat, which has permitting agents through the sprinkling of the blood, which permits it for eating, carries a liability of karet for eating it with bodily impurity only

once its permitting agents have been offered,

and not before that. Whereas

any

thing

that has no permitting agents

carries a liability of karet for eating it only

once it has been sanctified in a vessel.

For this reason, meat before the sprinkling of the blood is inferior to wood and frankincense that were sanctified in a vessel.

It was stated: One who brings up the limbs of an impure animal

such as horses and camels

upon the altar

Reish Lakish said: He receives lashes; Rabbi Yohanan said: He does not receive lashes.

Reish Lakish said: He receives lashes

because it is stated, “From the cattle and from the flock you shall offer,” and we learned in this verse that an animal

that is pure—yes. But

an animal

that is impure—not

do we offer upon the altar.

And

Reish Lakish holds that

a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment

a positive commandment [such as this one, in which no warning was stated explicitly, but from the positive commandment to offer a pure animal we learned that an impure one is not offered]],

one receives lashes for it.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: One does not receive lashes for it,

for the prohibition against placing the limbs of an impure animal [upon the altar], because he holds that

one does not receive lashes for a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised an objection

to the words of Reish Lakish, who holds that one receives lashes for a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment, from what we learned in a beraita: It is stated in the verse, “Every animal that has a hoof and is cloven-footed, that brings up its cud among the animals, that you may eat” [Leviticus 11], and from the superfluous word “it” we expounded: This one, which has the signs of purity stated in the verse,

“that you may eat”—

but not an impure animal,

which does not have the signs of purity.

And a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment.

And therefore we did not learn here an obligation of lashes, but only a prohibition of a positive commandment; and we required an additional verse that warns against eating an impure animal, from which we learned the law of lashes. And from here there is a proof not in accordance with the words of Reish Lakish, who holds that one receives lashes for a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yaakov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I shall explain it to you

in what Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan disagree,

with regard to the limbs of an impure animal

that one placed upon the altar—

everyone agrees

that it is not a prohibition, but a prohibition of a positive commandment, and one does not receive lashes for it.

They disagree

Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan

with regard to a wild animal

that is pure, whose limbs one placed upon the altar, whether he transgresses a prohibition of a positive commandment.

And so it was stated: Rabbi Yohanan said: He transgresses

one who places the limbs of a pure wild animal upon the altar

a positive commandment; Reish Lakish said: He transgresses nothing at all. Rabbi Yohanan said: He transgresses a positive commandment

because he expounded the verse, “From the animal, from the cattle and from the flock,” that specifically

an animal, yes.

But

a wild animal, no. Reish Lakish said: He does not transgress it at all,

because

that

verse

was written as a mitzva

it was written to teach that only an animal has a mitzva in its offering, whereas the offering of a wild animal is optional, but there is no prohibition in offering it. Indeed, an impure wild animal is certainly forbidden, for the Gemara in Menahot [6a] expounded from the verse, “From that which is permitted to Israel for the meal-offering,” that only something permitted for an Israelite to eat is permitted to be offered.

Rava raised an objection

to Reish Lakish from what we learned in a beraita:

If

there

were stated, “An animal as an offering to the Lord,”

and the verse had not specified flock and cattle,

I would say

that there is a mitzva also in offering a wild animal, because

a wild animal is included within animal, as it is stated, “This is the animal that you may eat: an ox, a sheep of the flock, and a sheep of the goats; a ram and a gazelle,” and so forth.

For from here we learned that a wild animal is included within animal. And therefore

the verse states, “Cattle and flock.”

From the fact that the verse specified cattle and flock, we learned that specifically

“cattle and flock I told you

to offer,

but not a wild animal.”

One might have thought that he should not bring

a wild animal, for there is no mitzva in bringing it,

and

nevertheless,

if he brought it, it is valid,

and it would be said as follows:

To what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher said to him, “Bring me wheat!” and he brought him wheat and barley. He is not one who transgresses his words, but one who adds to his words—and it is valid?

The verse states, “Cattle and flock”

a second time, as it is stated, “If his offering is an elevation-offering from the cattle,” and later, “And if his offering is from the flock, from the sheep.” And the Sages expounded from the fact that the Torah specified this matter a second time: only

“cattle and flock I told you

to offer,

and not a wild animal!”

For one who offers a wild animal transgresses a prohibition, because

“To what is this comparable? To a student whose teacher said to him, ‘Do not bring me anything but wheat!’ and he brought him wheat and barley. He is not one who adds to his words, but one who transgresses his words,”

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and it is disqualified.