Zevachim 34a (לד.) — the Talmud in English

The verse states: “You shall not touch any sacred thing, and you shall not enter the Sanctuary,” thereby juxtaposing

the verse

the sacred to the Sanctuary. Just as with regard to the Sanctuary, there is something that entails

taking of life,

as one who enters the Sanctuary while impure is liable to karet,

so too

the prohibition concerning

sacred objects

concerns

something that entails taking of life. But if

the verse is

speaking of touching,

does

taking of life

apply to touching?

Is that possible!?

After all, there is no liability of karet for touching.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the prohibition derived through this juxtaposition concerns

eating.

And we challenge this:

But still, it is needed

by the verse, “You shall not touch any sacred thing,”

for

the law of

an impure person who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood,

to teach that he is liable to lashes. If so, how did Reish Lakish derive two teachings from this verse: both a prohibition against eating sacrificial meat and an extension that imposes lashes for eating it even before the sprinkling of the blood ?

As it was stated: An impure person who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling of the blood,

when the blood of the offering had not yet been sprinkled and the meat had not yet been permitted for consumption by those who are pure:

Reish Lakish says: He receives lashes. And Rabbi Yohanan says: He does not receive lashes.

And the Gemara explains:

Reish Lakish says: He receives lashes,

because he holds that the prohibition against an impure person eating sacrificial meat is derived from the statement

“You shall not touch any sacred thing,”

and with regard to this verse,

there is no difference between before the sprinkling and after the sprinkling.

Whereas

Rabbi Yohanan says: He does not receive lashes, in accordance with his reasoning,

as he holds

in accordance with that which Bardela taught: It is derived

that the prohibition against eating sacred meat while impure is from the derivation

“its impurity, its impurity,”

which is stated with regard to entering the Sanctuary and with regard to eating sacrificial meat while impure through bodily impurity; and we derive the prohibition against eating sacred meat while impure from the prohibition against entering the Sanctuary while impure.

And when

the Merciful One

wrote that

verse concerning “its impurity,” it applies specifically to an impure person who eats sacrificial meat

after the sprinkling.

As that verse concerns the punishment of karet, which is stated only with regard to an impure person who eats sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood. Therefore, we can derive the prohibition against eating only with regard to the case mentioned in that verse.

And we answer: It is possible to derive from the verse, “You shall not touch any sacred thing,” a prohibition applying both before the sprinkling and after the sprinkling, because

if so,

if it were said that the verse concerns only an impure person who eats sacrificial meat after the sprinkling,

let the verse say: “With sacred meat

you shall not touch,” without the word “any.” From this we would know that the verse concerns one who eats sacrificial meat specifically after the sprinkling of the blood, analogous to the punishment of karet, which applies only to one who eats after the sprinkling.

What, then, is the meaning of “any sacred thing”? Learn from it

that the extension in the expression “any sacred thing” comes

to include two cases:

both one who eats before the sprinkling and one who eats after it receives lashes.

With regard to the matter itself: An impure person who ate sacrificial meat before the sprinkling—

Reish Lakish says: He receives lashes; Rabbi Yohanan says: He does not receive lashes.

Abaye said: The dispute

between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish is only

with regard to bodily impurity,

as, if an impure person ate sacrificial meat, Rabbi Yohanan said in this case that he does not receive lashes, as explained above: he derives the law of lashes from the prohibition associated with the punishment of karet, which applies only after the sprinkling. But

with regard to the impurity of the meat,

if a person who is pure ate sacrificial meat that was impure,

everyone agrees that he receives lashes,

even if he ate it before the sprinkling.

Although there is no liability of karet for eating sacrificial meat while bodily impure before the sprinkling of the blood, since the punishment of karet is stated only with regard to an impure person who ate sacrificial meat after the sprinkling of the blood [because only then was the meat permitted for consumption], this applies specifically to an impure person who eats sacrificial meat. But with regard to eating impure meat, even if he ate it before the sprinkling, he receives lashes. This is because

the Master said:

The Torah states: “And the meat that touches any impure person shall be burned in fire. And the meat, whoever is pure may eat meat” [Leviticus 7]. The word

“and the meat”

written at the end of the verse is superfluous, and it comes

to include

that even

wood

of the arrangement

and frankincense

that are burned on the altar acquire susceptibility to food impurity and become disqualified for sacrifice on the altar, even though

the

wood and frankincense

are not fit for consumption [and therefore food impurity does not apply to ordinary wood and frankincense, since they are not food].

And even so, the verse included them,

the verse included the wood of the arrangement and the frankincense that is burned, so that they acquire susceptibility to food impurity as though they were food. For a special distinction was stated with regard to sacrificial objects: the sacred status renders them susceptible to impurity

to acquire food impurity even when they are something that is not food. And we learn from this that one receives lashes for eating wood and frankincense that became impure, despite the fact that they are not fit for consumption. The same applies to impure sacrificial meat that one ate before the sprinkling: although it still lacks permission for consumption, one receives lashes for eating it, since it is no less than the wood and frankincense of sacrificial objects, which are not fit for consumption, and nevertheless a person who eats them while they are impure receives lashes.

And Rava said: The dispute

between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish as to whether one receives lashes for eating meat before the sprinkling is only

with regard to bodily impurity,

in which case Reish Lakish said that he receives lashes. But

with regard to impurity of the meat, everyone agrees that he does not receive lashes.

Rava explains:

What is the reason

that according to everyone he does not receive lashes? Since the verse that warns against eating impure sacrificial meat was juxtaposed with the verse that states the punishment of karet for entering the Sanctuary while bodily impure, for which there is a punishment of karet, we must learn that the prohibition stated with regard to eating impure meat applies only to impure meat for whose consumption there is liability of karet, just as there is for entering the Sanctuary while bodily impure. Therefore, with regard to meat before the sprinkling,

since we cannot apply to it

in the case of an impure person who eats the meat,

“and his impurity is upon him, and he shall be cut off,”

since before the sprinkling of the blood he is excluded from the punishment of karet, likewise

we cannot apply to it,

with regard to impure meat before the sprinkling of the blood,

“And the meat that touches any impure person shall not be eaten.”

It follows that this prohibition against eating meat before the sprinkling was stated only with regard to eating it after the sprinkling.

And we challenge Rava’s method, according to which, with regard to impure meat before the sprinkling, everyone agrees that one does not receive lashes for eating it.

But the Master said: “And the meat”—

to include wood and frankincense!?

And in what way is meat before the sprinkling, which still lacks permission for consumption, inferior to wood and frankincense, which are never eaten, and nevertheless were included as subject to lashes?

And we answer:

Here,

the wood and frankincense that were included as subject to lashes—

with what are we dealing?

With

a case in which they were consecrated

the wood and frankincense

in a service vessel.

The consecration of wood in a service vessel occurs when the priest takes coals from the altar with a coal pan, a service vessel. The consecration of frankincense occurs when he consecrates it in the bowls. Therefore, one receives lashes for eating them, because

they have become like something whose permitting factors have all been offered,

that is, like the status of meat after the sprinkling of the blood, for eating which while bodily impure one is liable to karet. Here, since they are not meat but wood and frankincense, one who eats them receives lashes.

As we learned in a Mishna: Any

matter

that has permitting factors

for consumption, such as sacrificial meat, which has permitting factors in the sprinkling of the blood, which permits it for consumption, entails liability of karet for eating it while bodily impure only

once its permitting factors have been offered,

and not beforehand. Whereas

any

matter

that has no permitting factors

entails liability of karet for eating it only

once it has been consecrated in a vessel.

Consequently, meat before the sprinkling of the blood is inferior to wood and frankincense that were consecrated in a vessel.

It was stated: One who places the limbs of an impure animal

such as horses and camels

upon the altar

Reish Lakish says he is flogged; Rabbi Yohanan says he is not flogged.

Reish Lakish says he is flogged

because it is stated: “From the cattle and from the flock you shall bring them,” and we learn from this verse that an animal

that is pure—yes. But

an animal

that is impure—not

is brought upon the altar.

And

Reish Lakish holds that

a prohibition derived by implication from a positive mitzva

—as in this case, where no prohibition was stated explicitly, but rather, from the positive mitzva to offer a pure animal we learn that an impure animal may not be offered—

is subject to lashes.

And Rabbi Yohanan says that one is not flogged for it,

for the prohibition against offering the limbs of an impure animal, because he holds that

a prohibition derived by implication from a positive mitzva is not subject to lashes.

Rabbi Yirmeya raises an objection

to the words of Reish Lakish, who holds that a prohibition derived by implication from a positive mitzva is subject to lashes, from what we learned in a beraita: It is stated in the verse, “Every animal that parts the hoof and is cloven-footed, that brings up its cud, among the animals, that you may eat” [Leviticus 11]. From the superfluous word “it” we expound: An animal possessing the signs of purity stated in the verse,

“it you may eat”—

but not an impure animal,

which does not possess the signs of purity.

And a prohibition derived by implication from a positive mitzva is a positive mitzva.

Therefore, we do not learn here an obligation of lashes, but only a prohibition grounded in a positive mitzva; and we require an additional verse that warns against eating an impure animal, from which we learn the law of lashes. This is therefore a proof contrary to Reish Lakish, who holds that a prohibition derived by implication from a positive mitzva is subject to lashes.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yaakov said to Rabbi Yirmeya bar Taḥlifa: I will explain to you

the dispute between Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan:

With regard to the limbs of an impure animal

that one placed upon the altar—

everyone agrees

that it is not a prohibition, but only a prohibition grounded in a positive mitzva, and one is not flogged for it.

They disagree

—Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan—

with regard to a wild animal

that is pure, whose limbs one placed upon the altar: Does one violate a prohibition grounded in a positive mitzva?

And this is how it was stated: Rabbi Yohanan said: One who places

the limbs of a pure wild animal upon the altar

violates a positive mitzva; Reish Lakish said: He violates nothing at all. Rabbi Yohanan said that he violates a positive mitzva

because he expounded the verse, “From the animal, from the cattle, and from the flock,” to mean specifically:

“Cattle—yes.”

But

“a wild animal—not.” Reish Lakish said that he violates nothing at all,

because

that

verse

was written as a mitzva

to teach that only with regard to cattle is there a mitzva to offer it, whereas offering a wild animal is permitted. But there is no prohibition against offering it. However, an impure wild animal is certainly prohibited, for the Gemara in Menahot [6a] expounded from the verse, “From what is fit for Israel as food for an offering,” that only something permitted for an Israelite to eat may be offered.

Rava raises an objection

to Reish Lakish from what we learned in a beraita:

If

it

had been stated, “An animal as an offering to the Lord,”

and the verse had not specified flock and cattle,

I would have said

that there is a mitzva to offer a wild animal as well, because

“a wild animal is included within the category of animal,” as it is stated: “This is the animal that you may eat: an ox, a sheep of sheep, and a sheep of goats; a ram and a deer,” and so on.

For from here we learn that a wild animal is included within the category of animal. Therefore,

the verse states: “Cattle and flock.”

Since the verse specified cattle and flock, we learn that specifically

“cattle and flock I have told you”

to offer,

but not a wild animal.

One might have thought that he should not bring

a wild animal, since there is no mitzva in bringing it,

but

nevertheless,

if he brought it, it is valid,

and it could be said as follows:

“To what is this analogous? To a student whose teacher said to him: ‘Bring me wheat!’ And he brought him wheat and barley. He has not violated his teacher’s words, but rather added to his teacher’s words—and it is valid?”

The verse therefore states: “Cattle and flock”

a second time, as it is stated: “If his offering is an olah from the cattle,” and later: “And if his offering is from the flock, from the sheep.” The Sages derived from the fact that the Torah specified this matter a second time: Only

“cattle and flock I have told you”

to offer,

but not a wild animal!

For one who offers a wild animal violates a prohibition, because

“To what is this analogous? To a student whose teacher said to him: ‘Do not bring me anything but wheat!’ And he brought him wheat and barley. He has not added to his teacher’s words, but violated his teacher’s words,” !(pamud.bmp "Precise page location")

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and it is disqualified.