Zevachim 30b (ל:) — the Talmud in English

Abaye said to Rav Dimi:

But

didn’t

Rabba bar bar Ḥana say in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan:

When you reach them—

if you wish to bring Rabbi Meir’s and Rabbi Yosei’s statements in Temura closer and equate them

with those of Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

in Temura

with one another,

their statements are found to be close to being equal, and

they do not disagree?

Rather, both maintain that we do not say: “Grasp the first expression.” If so, it follows that Rabbi Meir also does not hold in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda of our Mishna.

Rav Dimi said to Abaye:

But

is it possible to say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

do not disagree!? Yet they certainly disagree

explicitly in the Mishna in tractate Temura, regarding one who says: “This is the exchange-offering of an olah, the exchange-offering of a shelamim,” for according to Rabbi Meir it is an olah, whereas according to Rabbi Yosei half is an olah and half a shelamim!?

He said to him

Abaye: Indeed, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree, but they do not disagree in every matter. Rather,

they disagree in the matter in which they disagree,

namely, what was the intention of the person effecting the exchange when he uttered this expression. Both maintain that the sanctity takes effect in accordance with the intention of the one consecrating the animal, and they disagree concerning the interpretation of his intention. But

they do not disagree in the matter in which they do not disagree,

namely, whether we say: “Grasp the first expression.” Both do not hold that one grasps the first expression.

The Gemara explains:

As Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Everyone agrees,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei,

where one said,

the person effecting the exchange:

“Let this take effect

as the exchange-offering of an olah

and afterward let that take effect

as the exchange-offering of a shelamim,” in this case, according to

everyone, the sanctity

of a shelamim does not take effect. Once the sanctity of an olah has already taken effect, sanctity cannot take effect upon sanctity. But if he said:

“Let this not take effect

as an olah

unless that takes effect

as a shelamim,” in this case,

according to everyone, the sanctity

of both takes effect, since he made the sanctity of the olah conditional upon that of the shelamim, and that was his intention. And once both sanctities have taken effect, its status is that it must be left to graze until it becomes blemished, then sold; with half of its value he brings an olah, and with the other half he brings a shelamim.

They disagree

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei in a case where he

said: “This animal shall be

the

exchange-offering of an olah, the exchange-offering of a shelamim.”

Rabbi Meir holds: Since he should have said—

if he wanted both to take effect—

“the exchange-offering of an olah and a shelamim,” but he said, “the exchange-offering of an olah, the exchange-offering of a shelamim,” infer from this

that initially he intended that the sanctity of an olah take effect, but afterward he

retracted and went back on it,

wanting the sanctity of a shelamim to take effect. Since the sanctity of an olah had already taken effect, his retraction is ineffective, and the sanctity of a shelamim does not take effect.

And Rabbi Yosei

holds that the words “the exchange-offering of a shelamim” do not constitute a retraction of his first statement. Rather, he wants both to take effect. This person reasoned that

if he had said, “the exchange-offering of an olah and a shelamim,” I would have thought

that his words indicate that he intended to impose

half as the exchange-offering of an olah and half as the exchange-offering of a shelamim.

In that case it could not be offered, since a sacrifice is not offered in halves.

Therefore he said:

“the exchange-offering of an olah, the exchange-offering of a shelamim,”

to indicate

that his words should indicate

that the whole

animal was consecrated with the sanctity of an

olah, and the whole

animal was consecrated with the sanctity of a

shelamim.

However, this person erred in thinking that he could thereby offer his animal.

But since his intention was that both sanctities take effect, his words stand. The animal must be left to graze until it becomes blemished, then sold; with half of its value he brings an olah, and with the other half a shelamim. In any event, we have learned that when one says, “the exchange-offering of an olah and a shelamim,” both sanctities take effect even according to Rabbi Meir, and we do not say: “Grasp the first expression.” This is contrary to Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion in our Mishna, who holds that if one intended an olive-bulk outside its designated time and an olive-bulk outside its designated place, we say: “Grasp the first expression,” even though his intention was for both, and his second intention was not a retraction of the first [as in the case of “the exchange-offering of an olah and a shelamim”].

Rav Dimi said to Abaye: Did you come to challenge me

on the basis of Rabba bar bar Ḥana’s statement?

He,

Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

said

that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

do not disagree

concerning the law of “Grasp the first expression.”

But

if

I say:

They do disagree!

And even when one says “the exchange-offering of an olah and a shelamim,” Rabbi Meir holds “Grasp the first expression.”

Ulla—or, some say, Rabbi Oshaya—said: Is it possible that our Babylonian colleagues know

whether they have the correct version of our Mishna: do

we learn “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk”

or do

we learn “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk”

?

The Gemara explains the uncertainty: Is the Mishna teaching that if one intended to eat

an olive-bulk

outside

an olive-bulk

the next day [without the connecting word “and”],

we learn

that specifically in this manner Rabbi Yehuda holds that, since these are two intentions, one grasps the first expression and piggul takes effect?

But

if he intended

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

this is one utterance, and

according to everyone it is a mixture of intentions,

with both intentions taking effect simultaneously even according to Rabbi Yehuda, and there is no piggul here.

Or perhaps we learn “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” for according to Rabbi Yehuda

even this expression

is a specification,

and each olive-bulk constitutes an independent intention. Therefore, even in this case he holds “Grasp the first expression,” and piggul takes effect.

And all the more so

would Rabbi Yehuda hold this way when he said

“an olive-bulk

outside its designated time,

an olive-bulk

outside its designated place,” since these are two separate specifications.

The Gemara resolves the matter:

Come and hear

from this:

Levi asked Rabbi: “If one intended to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, what is

the law?” Is it that since he had both intentions concerning the same olive-bulk, this is one act of eating, and therefore even Rabbi Yehuda concedes that it is a mixture of intentions? Or perhaps the law is always “Grasp the first expression,” and since he first intended to eat it outside its designated time and afterward intended to eat it outside its designated place, the earlier intention takes effect?

He said to him

Rabbi to Levi:

“This is a question!”

That is, you have asked an excellent question. The answer to your question is that when he intended both acts of eating concerning the same olive-bulk, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes, because

“it is a mixture of intentions!”

Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi, said before him:

But

“is it not our Mishna?”

Why did you praise his question? The answer you gave can be inferred from the words of the Mishna, which says:

“To eat an olive-bulk outside, an olive-bulk the next day,”

“an olive-bulk the next day, an olive-bulk outside,”

“half an olive-bulk outside, half an olive-bulk the next day,”

“half an olive-bulk the next day, half an olive-bulk outside,”

it is invalid and there is no liability for karet.

This indicates that specifically when he intended two acts of eating, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and holds “Grasp the first expression.”

As for the other case,

where he intended an olive-bulk the next day outside, which is one act of eating, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that

it is a mixture of intentions.

Rabbi said to Rabbi Shimon, his son:

He,

Levi, according to what I taught him,

asked me a profound halakhic question.

And you say, “Is it not our Mishna!?”

For you, since you taught him

in the Mishna

two

cases—

that Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree both in “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk” and in “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk”—

Levi’s question

does not present a difficulty to you. You correctly inferred from the Mishna, which taught only these cases and did not teach the case of one who intended to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, that in that case Rabbi Yehuda concedes.

But

for him,

Levi,

who was not taught

in the Mishna

except one

of these two cases, namely “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,”

and Levi heard them,

the other students of Rabbi

the Rabbis,

the other students of Rabbi in the study hall,

who were reciting two

cases—“an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,” and also “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk”—

he was uncertain,

wondering,

and said:

Is the version that Rabbi taught

to me,

which is “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,”

specifically, and

the version

of them, who added “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” is incorrect? Rather, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes in this case, because

it is a mixture of intentions. They mistakenly added it on their own and did not receive it from Rabbi. If so, all the more so, when one intended to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, it is a mixture of intentions.

it is a mixture of thoughts, and they erred and added it on their own and did not receive it from Rabbi. If so, all the more so, when he thought to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, it is a mixture of thoughts.

Or perhaps

their version,

their version specifically, was heard from Rabbi, while

and they heard it from Rabbi,

for me,

Rabbi did not teach both cases, but

left the second one over for me,

the case in which Rabbi Yehuda also disagrees. If so, I cannot infer from the fact that Rabbi omitted the third case from the version he taught his students in the Mishna—the case of one who intended to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside—that he holds that Rabbi Yehuda also disagrees in that case, because

since he left this one over for me,

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

he likewise left that one over for them, the case of an olive-bulk the next day outside, and did not teach it to them, even though he holds that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees in that case as well.

The Gemara explains:

And what is this?

In which case

did he teach it

Rabbi to Levi, such that Levi could not derive from it the law concerning eating an olive-bulk the next day outside?

If we say that he taught him “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

teaching him that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees in this case, then

this is not an omission!

For if Rabbi Yehuda disagrees in this case, all the more so he disagrees in the case of “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,” and Rabbi would not need to teach this law at all. Since there would be no omission in his statement, Levi should have inferred from the fact that Rabbi did not teach him the case of one who intended to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside that Rabbi also disagrees in that case—where Rabbi in fact concedes that it is considered a mixture of intentions.

Rather, Rabbi taught Levi “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,”

and Levi could not derive from this what the law is in the case of “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.” When he heard the students reciting in Rabbi’s words also the case of “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” he was uncertain whether his version was specific or theirs was specific.

The Gemara challenges: If so,

he should have asked him

Levi should have asked Rabbi what the law is concerning

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

since he was uncertain whether Rabbi had taught this matter or not. He should have asked him this directly!?

The Gemara answers:

Levi reasoned

that

he should ask him

Rabbi one question,

and hear

in his answer to it

two

rulings: both the law concerning “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” and the law concerning “an olive-bulk the next day outside.”

For if I ask him

only about

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” it is satisfactory if he tells me

that in this case it is

a general rule,

that it is a mixture of intentions. I will know that

all the more so, an olive-bulk the next day outside

is a mixture of intentions.

But if he tells me

that in this case it is

a specification,

and even in this case Rabbi Yehuda holds “Grasp the first expression,”

I will still have to ask about an olive-bulk the next day outside,

and I will not have resolved whether Rabbi also holds in this case “Grasp the first expression,” or whether in this case he concedes that it is considered a mixture of intentions.

The Gemara challenges:

If so, now too,

when he asked about an olive-bulk the next day outside, it should not be clear that he would thereby resolve the question concerning “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.”

It would be satisfactory if Rabbi told him

that

“an olive-bulk the next day outside” is a specification,

and Rabbi Yehuda also disagrees in this case; Levi could infer from this that

all the more so

in the case of

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

which involves two acts of eating, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees.

But if he told him

that “an olive-bulk the next day outside” is

a general rule,

meaning that it is a mixture of intentions,

he would still have to ask about “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

which involves two acts of eating:

he should ask him!

Perhaps Rabbi holds in that case “Grasp the first expression.”

The Gemara answers: Levi reasoned that he could understand both cases from Rabbi’s words. If Rabbi told him that “an olive-bulk the next day outside” is a specification, then all the more so “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” is likewise a specification. But if Rabbi calmly, without anger, told him that it is a general rule, Levi would understand that this applies only in that case, whereas in the case of “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” it is a specification, as the Rabbis hold. For

if so,

that this too is a general rule,

he would become angry,

and Rabbi would respond angrily: “Why are you uncertain?”