Zevachim 30b — the Talmud in English

Abaye said to him

to Rav Dimi:

But

Rabba bar bar Ḥana

said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: When you bring them

if you wish to bring closer and compare to the words of

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

in tractate Temura

with one another,

then their words are close to being equal, and

they do not disagree,

but both hold that one does not say, “Seize the first expression.” If so, it turns out that Rabbi Meir also does not hold like Rabbi Yehuda of our Mishna.

Rav Dimi said to Abaye:

And

is it possible to say that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

do not disagree?! But they explicitly do disagree

in the Mishna in tractate Temura, concerning one who says, “This is the substitute of an olah, the substitute of a shelamim”: according to Rabbi Meir, it is an olah, whereas according to Rabbi Yosei, half of it is an olah and half of it is a shelamim?!

He said to him,

Abaye: Indeed, Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei disagree, but they do not disagree in every matter. Rather—

they disagree in what they disagree,

that is, what was the intention of the one making the substitution when he used this expression: both hold that the sanctity takes effect according to the intention of the one who consecrates, and they disagree in interpreting his intention; but

they do not disagree in what they do not disagree,

that is, whether one says, “Seize the first expression” or not. Both do not hold of “Seize the first expression.”

And the Gemara explains:

For Rabbi Yitzḥak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: Everyone agrees,

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei,

where he said,

the one making the substitution:

“Let this take effect

as the substitute of an olah

and afterward let this take effect

as the substitute of a shelamim,” in this case

according to everyone, it does not take effect

the sanctity of a shelamim. Since the sanctity of an olah has already taken effect, sanctity cannot take effect upon sanctity! And if he said:

“Let this not take effect

as an olah

unless this takes effect

as a shelamim,” in this case

according to everyone, it does take effect

the sanctity of both, since he made the sanctity of the olah conditional upon the shelamim, and this was his intention. And since the sanctity of both has taken effect, its law is that it grazes until it becomes blemished, and it is sold, and with half its value he brings an olah and with the other half a shelamim.

They disagree

Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei in the following situation:

where he said: “This animal shall be

the

substitute of an olah, the substitute of a shelamim.”

Rabbi Meir holds: Since he should have said—

if he wanted both to take effect—

“the substitute of an olah and a shelamim,” but he said “the substitute of an olah, the substitute of a shelamim,” we learn from this

that initially his intention was that the sanctity of an olah take effect, except that afterward

he retracted, he retracted from it,

and wanted the sanctity of a shelamim to take effect. But since the sanctity of an olah had already taken effect, his retraction is ineffective, and the sanctity of a shelamim does not take effect.

And Rabbi Yosei

holds that saying “the substitute of a shelamim” does not constitute a retraction from his first statement. Rather, he wants both to take effect. And this person held that

if he had said “the substitute of an olah and a shelamim,” I would have said

that his words would imply that his intention was to cause

half to be the substitute of an olah and half to be the substitute of a shelamim,

in which case it may not be offered, since a sacrifice is not offered in halves. Therefore

for this reason he said

“the substitute of an olah, the substitute of a shelamim,”

to indicate

that his words should imply

that all of it

was consecrated with the sanctity of

an olah, and all of it

was consecrated with the sanctity of

a shelamim.

It is only that this person erred in thinking that by doing so he could offer his animal.

But since his intention was that both sanctities should take effect, his words stand, and the animal grazes until it becomes blemished, and it is sold, and with half its value he brings an olah and with the other half a shelamim. In any event, we have heard that when he said, “the substitute of an olah and a shelamim,” both sanctities take effect even according to Rabbi Meir, and one does not say, “Seize the first expression.” This is contrary to the view of Rabbi Yehuda in our Mishna, who holds that if he thought of an olive-bulk outside its time and an olive-bulk outside its place, one says, “Seize the first expression,” even though his intention was for both, and his second thought was not a retraction from the first [as in “the substitute of an olah and a shelamim”].

Rav Dimi said to him,

to Abaye: Did you come to challenge me from the words of Rabba bar bar Ḥana?

He,

Rabba bar bar Ḥana in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan,

said

that Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yosei

do not disagree

with regard to the law of “Seize the first expression.”

And

if

I say—

they do disagree!

Even when he says “the substitute of an olah and a shelamim,” Rabbi Meir holds “Seize the first expression.”

Ulla said, and some say Rabbi Oshaya: Is it possible that our Babylonian colleagues know

whether they know the version of the text in our Mishna—whether

“an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk”

we learned, or

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk”

we learned?

And the Gemara explains the uncertainty: Is it that he thought to eat

an olive-bulk

outside

an olive-bulk

the next day [without the conjunctive “and”]

we learned,

and specifically in this manner Rabbi Yehuda holds that since these are two thoughts, one says “Seize the first expression,” and pigul takes effect;

but

when he thought

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

this is one utterance, and

according to everyone it is a mixture of thoughts,

and both thoughts take effect together, even according to Rabbi Yehuda, and there is no pigul here.

Or perhaps we learned “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” for according to Rabbi Yehuda

even this expression

is a specification,

and each olive-bulk is a thought in its own right. Therefore even in this case he holds “Seize the first expression,” and pigul takes effect.

And all the more so

will Rabbi Yehuda hold this way when he said

“an olive-bulk

outside its time,

an olive-bulk

outside its place,” for these are two separate specifications.

And the Gemara resolves it:

Come and hear

from this:

Levi asked Rabbi: “If he thought to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, what is

its law? Is it said that since he thought of both acts of eating in the same olive-bulk, and this is like one act of eating, Rabbi Yehuda also concedes that it is a mixture of thoughts? Or perhaps it is said that the law is always “Seize the first expression,” and since he first thought of eating outside its time and afterward of eating outside its place, the earlier pigul takes effect?

He said to him,

Rabbi to Levi:

“This is a question!”

That is, you have asked a great question, and the answer to your question is: In this case, where he thought of both acts of eating in the same olive-bulk, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes, because

“it is a mixture of thoughts!”

Rabbi Shimon, son of Rabbi, said before him:

And is this

not our Mishna?

Why did you praise his question? For this answer that you gave can be inferred from the words of the Mishna, which said:

“To eat an olive-bulk outside, an olive-bulk the next day,”

“an olive-bulk the next day, an olive-bulk outside,”

“like half an olive-bulk outside, like half an olive-bulk the next day,”

“like half an olive-bulk the next day, like half an olive-bulk outside,”

it is disqualified, and there is no liability for excision.

And it implies that specifically in this case, where he thought of two acts of eating, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees and holds “Seize the first expression”;

but the other,

where he thought of an olive-bulk the next day outside, which is one act of eating, Rabbi Yehuda concedes that

it is a mixture of thoughts.

He said to him,

Rabbi to Rabbi Shimon, his son:

He,

Levi, according to what I taught him,

asked me a matter of wisdom.

And you say, “It is our Mishna”?!

According to you, since you taught him

in the Mishna

two

cases—both “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk” and “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” are subject to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis—

his question is not difficult for you. And you properly inferred from the Mishna, which taught only these cases and did not teach the case of one who thought to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, that in this case Rabbi Yehuda concedes.

does not present a difficulty to you. You correctly inferred from the Mishna, which taught only these cases and did not teach the case of one who intended to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, that in that case Rabbi Yehuda concedes.

But

according to him,

Levi,

since he did not teach it to him

in the Mishna

except one

of these two cases, namely “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,”

and Levi heard them

Levi

from the Rabbis,

the other students of Rabbi who were in the

beyt-midrash, who were studying two

cases: “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,” and also “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk—

it was uncertain for him,

he was uncertain,

and he said:

Is the version that Rabbi taught

to me,

which is “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,”

specifically, and

the version

of them,

who added “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” is incorrect? Rather, even Rabbi Yehuda concedes in this case, because

it is a mixture of thoughts, and they erred and added it on their own and did not receive it from Rabbi. If so, all the more so, when he thought to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, it is a mixture of thoughts.

Or perhaps

their version,

their version specifically,

and they heard it from Rabbi,

whereas for me,

Rabbi did not teach the two cases, but

he left over for me

the second case, in which Rabbi Yehuda also disagrees. If so, I cannot infer from the fact that Rabbi omitted from his version for the students in the Mishna the third case, one who thought to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside, that Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree in this case, because

since he left this for me, for me,

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

he likewise left that for them in this

case, an olive-bulk the next day outside, and did not teach it to them, although he holds that Rabbi Yehuda also disagrees in this case.

And the Gemara explains:

And what is it,

in which manner

did he teach it to him,

Rabbi taught Levi, so that he could not learn from it concerning eating an olive-bulk the next day outside?

If you say he taught him “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

that he disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda in this case, then

this is not an omission!

For if Rabbi Yehuda disagrees in this case, all the more so he disagrees in the case of “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,” and Rabbi would not have needed to teach this law at all. Since there is no omission in his words, Levi should have inferred from the fact that Rabbi did not teach him the case of one who thought to eat an olive-bulk the next day outside that Rabbi also disagrees in this case; for in truth Rabbi concedes in this case that it is considered a mixture of thoughts.

Rather, he taught him “an olive-bulk, an olive-bulk,”

Rabbi taught Levi, and he could not learn from this what the law is in the case of “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.” And when he heard the students versioning his words as including also the case of “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” he was uncertain whether his version was specific or their version was specific.

And we challenge: If so,

he should have asked him

Levi should have asked him what the law is concerning

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

for he was uncertain whether Rabbi had taught this matter or not, and he should have asked him this explicitly!?

And we answer:

Levi thought,

Levi,

“I shall ask him

I shall ask Rabbi one question,

and I will hear

from his answer to it

two

matters: both the law of “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” and the law of “an olive-bulk the next day outside.”

For if I want

from him only

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,” it is satisfactory if he says to me

concerning this

a general rule,

that it is a mixture of thoughts; I will know that

all the more so, “an olive-bulk the next day outside,”

is a mixture of thoughts.

But if he says to me

concerning this

a specification,

and even in this case Rabbi Yehuda holds “Seize the first expression,”

I still have “an olive-bulk the next day outside” as a question,

and I will not have a resolution whether Rabbi Yehuda also holds “Seize the first expression” in this case, or whether he concedes in this case that it is considered a mixture of thoughts.

And we challenge:

If so, now also,

when he asked concerning “an olive-bulk the next day outside,” it is not clear that he will have a resolution concerning “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk.” For

this is satisfactory if he says to him

Rabbi

“an olive-bulk the next day outside” is a specification,

and Rabbi Yehuda also disagrees in this case; he can infer from this that

all the more so

in the case of

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

which are two acts of eating, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees.

But if he says to him

that “an olive-bulk the next day outside” is

a general rule,

that it is a mixture of thoughts,

“an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk,”

which are two acts of eating,

he still needs to ask him!

Perhaps Rabbi holds in this case “Seize the first expression.”

And we answer: Levi thought that he would be able to understand both cases from Rabbi’s words. For if he says to me that “an olive-bulk the next day outside” is a specification, all the more so “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” is so. And if he says to me calmly, without anger, that it is a general rule, I will understand from this that it is so only in this case, but in the case of “an olive-bulk and an olive-bulk” it is a specification and follows the view of the Rabbis, because

if so,

that this too is a general rule,

he would become angry,

Rabbi would answer angrily: “Why are you uncertain?”