Zevachim 30a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Yes!

The first clause is in two services.

The latter clause is both in one service and in two services.

And in both of them Rabbi Yehuda disagrees.

We learned:

“If the thought of time preceded the thought of place,

it is

pigul, and one is liable for it to receive karet,”

because the thought of time takes effect by itself.

Granted according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees in every case, even in one service,

this is why it teaches

“This is the general rule,”

and Rabbi Yehuda comes to include that even in one service this rule applies.

But according to Ilfa,

who holds that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees only in two services,

what is

“This is the general rule”?

After all, this rule does not apply in every case; what does it come to include?

And the Gemara concludes: indeed,

it is difficult!

We learned there:

in tractate Temura [25b]: If one placed an unconsecrated animal beside two animals, one a burnt-offering and one a peace-offering, and said:

“Behold,

this

animal

shall be

the substitute of a burnt-offering, the substitute of a peace-offering!”

“This is the substitute of a burnt-offering,” the words of Rabbi Meir.

Since the first expression that he uttered was “the substitute of a burnt-offering,” the animal is seized by this sanctity, and the sanctity of a peace-offering does not take effect upon the sanctity of the burnt-offering.

Rabbi Yose said: If this was his original intention,

that from the outset his intention was to impose two sanctities, then

since it is impossible to utter two designations at once,

for he cannot utter the two words “burnt-offering” and “peace-offering” at one time and was compelled to precede one sanctity to the other,

his words stand.

And both sanctities take effect in accordance with his speech. And since it is impossible to offer an animal sanctified with the sanctity of a burnt-offering and a peace-offering together, the animal grazes until a blemish occurs in it, and it is sold; he brings a burnt-offering with half its value and a peace-offering with half its value.

And if, after he said,

“This is the substitute of a burnt-offering,”

he reconsidered,

and withdrew from his desire to consecrate it as a burnt-offering,

and said,

“This is the substitute of a peace-offering,”

it is a burnt-offering.

Since his first speech took effect, and he cannot retract it; likewise, the sanctity of a peace-offering does not take effect upon the sanctity of the burnt-offering.

They raised a dilemma:

One who says

“This is the substitute of a burnt-offering and a peace-offering”—

what is the law?

And this is according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that when one says “the substitute of a burnt-offering, the substitute of a peace-offering,” it is a burnt-offering: shall we say that he holds this only in that case, because since he mentioned the word “substitute” twice, his intention in the second consecration is to retract the first consecration, and since the retraction is ineffective, the first sanctity takes effect? But where he did not say “substitute” twice, but said in one statement “the substitute of a burnt-offering and a peace-offering,” both sanctities take effect. Or shall we say that Rabbi Meir holds even in this case, “seize the first expression,” and since he mentioned the burnt-offering first, this sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal, and the sanctity that he mentioned afterward does not take effect.

And the Gemara continues to inquire: even if you wish to say that when he said “the substitute of a burnt-offering and a peace-offering,” the sanctity of the burnt-offering spreads throughout the entire animal, what is the law when he said, “Behold, this animal is

to divide

for a burnt-offering and a peace-offering” —

what is the law?

Shall we say that in this case it is certainly considered one statement for the two sanctities, and one sanctity does not take effect without the other, and therefore both take effect? Or perhaps, since the sanctity of the burnt-offering, which he mentioned first, began to take effect upon its first half, it spreads throughout the entire animal, and the sanctity of the peace-offering can no longer take effect?

Abaye said: In this,

where he said “to divide,”

Rabbi Meir certainly agrees

that both sanctities take effect.

But

Rava said: It is still a dispute!

And even in this case Rabbi Meir holds that only the sanctity of the burnt-offering takes effect.

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, who said that in this Rabbi Meir certainly agrees

that both sanctities take effect,

there is slaughter

mentioned in our Mishna, in which he thought to eat an olive-bulk tomorrow and an olive-bulk outside the place,

which, if

“to divide”

it resembles,

for his second thought is not a retraction of the first thought, since there are several olive-bulks in every offering; rather, his intention is that, in addition to the olive-bulk outside its time, he eat another olive-bulk outside its place,

and they disagree

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis even in this case, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that his second thought does not take effect; rather, we follow the first expression. And since it is explained later in the Gemara that these words of Rabbi Meir are in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda’s method in the Mishna, it is necessarily the case that even in a situation resembling the thought of “to divide,” Rabbi Meir holds “seize the first expression,” and not as Abaye said.

He said to him,

Abaye to Rava:

Do you hold

“slaughter exists only at the end”?

That the designation of slaughter takes effect only at its end, so that the two thoughts that he thought during slaughter take effect together only at its end, and this is like one statement—and would you prove from here that even in this case Rabbi Yehuda holds “seize the first expression”?

It is not so; rather,

“slaughter exists from beginning to end.”

And every stage of slaughter bears the designation of slaughter, and if he thinks two thoughts during it, they take effect one after the other according to the order in which he thought them.

And our Mishna

deals with a case

where he said,

at the time of slaughtering

the first siman

of the slaughter, “I am slaughtering with the intention of eating it

outside its time,”

and at the time of slaughtering

the second siman

he said, “I am slaughtering with the intention of eating it

outside its place.”

And although one siman in slaughter is not a complete “permitting factor” of the offering, but only half a permitting factor—for the animal is permitted only through the slaughter of both simanim—Rabbi Meir holds that it is possible to cause pigul to an offering even through a thought concerning half a permitting factor [that is, one need not think that his intention throughout the entire slaughter is for eating it improperly; it is sufficient that he thinks this concerning part of it]. Thus the two thoughts did not take effect together; rather, the thought of outside its time, which he thought during the first siman, took effect first, and this is not similar to the Gemara’s doubt concerning “to divide”—what is its law? [

[that is, one need not think throughout the entire slaughtering that his purpose is to eat it improperly; it is sufficient to have this thought concerning part of it]. Thus, the two thoughts did not take effect simultaneously. Rather, the thought concerning eating it beyond its designated time, which he formed during the first סימן, took effect first, and this is not analogous to the Gemara’s uncertainty concerning “to be divided.” [

However, if Ilfa held that one does not cause pigul through half a permitting factor, what he thought at the time of the first siman concerning the entire slaughter, for the purpose of eating it outside its time, and at the time of the second siman for the purpose of eating it outside its place, would not help; since one does not cause pigul through half a permitting factor, pigul takes effect only at the end of the permitting factor, and there is a mixture of thoughts here].

And we raise a difficulty:

there is the taking of the handful,

in which he thought two thoughts,

which, if

“to divide,”

it resembles,

for it is performed entirely in one act, and there are not two times in it for thinking [as there are in slaughter, which has two simanim]; rather, both thoughts take effect together, as in “to divide,”

and

even in this case

they disagree,

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that if, during the taking of the handful, he thought with the intention of eating outside its time and outside its place, the second thought does not take effect.

And we answer:

there too,

it is not speaking of a case in which he thought two thoughts while taking the handful; rather, it is speaking of a case

where he burned a meal-offering handful outside its time, and a frankincense handful outside its place.

That is, the meal-offering contains two burnings, and both of them are considered “permitting factors” of the meal-offering: he thought the thought of outside its time during the burning of the meal-offering, and the thought of outside its place during the burning of the frankincense.

And Rabbi Judah holds that one can establish piggul through half of the permitting element, and therefore his thought takes effect in one burning, even though it is only half of the permitting element; but when he thought the two thoughts at the time of the kemitza, which is one permitting element, Rabbi Judah does not dispute; rather, both take effect.

And we raise another objection:

Behold, the handful of the meal-offering of a sinner

—one who unwittingly rendered the Sanctuary impure or swore falsely that he did not know testimony for his fellow—,

for it has no frankincense with it,

but the handful alone is its entire permitting element,

and they dispute

Rabbi Judah and the Rabbis; and there it is not possible to establish that he thought [the two thoughts] during two burnings, and if so it is explained that even when he thought [them] in one permitting element, Rabbi Judah disputes ?!

And we answer: In the meal-offering of a sinner

they did not dispute!

For we do not find explicitly that they dispute concerning this.

Rav Ashi said: If you should say

that even in the meal-offering of a sinner

they dispute—

they dispute in steps!

That is, they did not dispute in a case in which he formed the two thoughts at the time of the kemitza, but rather in a case in which, while carrying the handful to the altar, which is a Temple service, he formed, in the first step, the thought of outside its time, and in the second step, the thought of outside its place; in this case the first thought took effect before he formed the second thought , and it was established as piggul.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi presents it according to Abaye

that with regard to “to divide,” Rabbi Meir concedes that both sanctities take effect.

Rav Huna bar Natan presents it according to Rava,

that even with regard to “to divide,” Rabbi Meir disputes and holds that only the first sanctity takes effect.

When Rav Dimi came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said: Rabbi Meir,

who said, “An animal designated as a substitute for an elevation-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering—this is a substitute for an elevation-offering",

stated it in accordance with Rabbi Judah’s method, who said

Rabbi Judah,

Grasp the first expression!

As we learned

in our Mishna,

Rabbi Judah said: This is the rule: if the thought of time

to eat outside its time

preceded the thought of place

to eat outside its place, it is

piggul, and one is liable to excision.

Thus Rabbi Judah holds, “Grasp the first expression,” and Rabbi Meir likewise holds so; therefore he said that the first sanctity that he mentioned takes effect.