Zevachim 30a (ל.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Indeed!

The first clause is referring to two services;

the latter clause is referring both to one service and to two services.

And in both cases Rabbi Yehuda disagrees.

We learned in the Mishna: Rabbi Yehuda said: This is the general rule—

if the thought concerning the time preceded the thought concerning the place,

it is

piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it,

because the thought concerning the time takes effect independently.

Granted, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan,

who holds that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees in every case, even when the thoughts occur during one service,

this is why it teaches “

This is the general rule”: Rabbi Yehuda comes to include the case in which the thoughts occur during one service as well, establishing that this rule applies.

and Rabbi Yehuda comes to include the case in which the two thoughts occur during one procedure as well, so that this rule applies.

But according to Ilfa,

who holds that Rabbi Yehuda disagrees only when the thoughts occur during two services,

what is the meaning of “

This is the general rule”?

The rule does not apply in every case; what, then, does this phrase come to include?

And the Gemara concludes: Indeed,

this is difficult!

We learned there

in tractate Temura [25b]: If one placed a non-sacred animal beside two animals, one an elevation-offering and one a peace-offering, and said:

Behold,

this animal,

this,

shall be

a substitute for an elevation-offering and a substitute for a peace-offering!

It is a substitute for an elevation-offering; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir.

Since the first expression he uttered was “a substitute for an elevation-offering,” the animal is seized by this sanctity, and the sanctity of a peace-offering cannot take effect upon the sanctity of the elevation-offering.

Rabbi Yosei said: If this was his original intention,

meaning that from the outset his intention was to impose both sanctities,

since it is impossible to utter two designations simultaneously,

as he cannot utter the two words “elevation-offering” and “peace-offering” at one moment and was compelled to place one sanctity before the other,

his words take effect.

Both sanctities take effect in accordance with his speech. And since an animal sanctified with the sanctity of both an elevation-offering and a peace-offering cannot be sacrificed as such, the animal remains grazing until it develops a blemish; it is then sold, and with half of its value he brings an elevation-offering, and with the other half of its value he brings a peace-offering.

But if, after he said, “

This is a substitute for an elevation-offering,” he

reconsidered,

and retracted his intention to sanctify it as an elevation-offering,

and said, “

This is a substitute for a peace-offering”—

it is an elevation-offering.

Since his first utterance took effect, he cannot retract it, and the sanctity of a peace-offering likewise cannot take effect upon the sanctity of the elevation-offering.

They raised a dilemma:

If one says,

“This is a substitute for an elevation-offering and a peace-offering”—

what is the ruling?

This is according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that when one says, “a substitute for an elevation-offering, a substitute for a peace-offering,” it is an elevation-offering. Shall we say that he holds this only in that case, because, since he mentioned the word “substitute” twice, his intention with the second sanctification is to retract the first sanctification; and since a retraction is ineffective, the first sanctity takes effect? But when he does not say “substitute” twice, rather says in one utterance, “a substitute for an elevation-offering and a peace-offering,” both sanctities take effect. Or perhaps Rabbi Meir holds even in this case that one seizes the first expression? And since he mentioned the elevation-offering first, this sanctity spreads throughout the entire animal, and the sanctity mentioned afterward does not take effect.

And the Gemara continues its inquiry: Even if you would say that when he said “a substitute for an elevation-offering and a peace-offering,” the sanctity of the elevation-offering spread throughout the entire animal, what is the law when he said, “Behold, this animal is

to be divided

between an elevation-offering and a peace-offering” —

what is the ruling?

Shall we say that in this case it is certainly considered one utterance concerning the two sanctities, and one sanctity cannot take effect without the other; therefore, both take effect? Or perhaps, since the sanctity of the elevation-offering, which he mentioned first, began to take effect upon its first half, it spreads throughout the entire animal, and the sanctity of the peace-offering can no longer take effect?

Abaye said: In this case,

when he said “to be divided,”

Rabbi Meir certainly concedes

that both sanctities take effect.

But

Rava said: It is still a dispute!

Rabbi Meir holds in this case as well that only the sanctity of the elevation-offering takes effect.

Rava said to Abaye: According to you, who said that in this case Rabbi Meir certainly concedes

that both sanctities take effect,

what about slaughtering,

mentioned in our Mishna, during which one had the thought to eat an olive-bulk the next day and an olive-bulk outside its designated place,

which,

since it resembles “

to be divided,”

should be the same? For his second thought is not a retraction of his first thought, since there are several olive-bulks in every offering; rather, his intention is that, in addition to the olive-bulk intended for consumption beyond its designated time, he wishes to eat another olive-bulk beyond its designated place.

And they disagree,

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, in this case as well. Rabbi Yehuda holds that his second thought does not take effect; rather, we follow the first expression. And since it is explained later in the Gemara that these statements of Rabbi Meir follow the view of Rabbi Yehuda in the Mishna, it is necessarily the case that Rabbi Meir holds that one seizes the first expression even in a case resembling the thought of “to be divided,” contrary to Abaye’s statement.

He said to him,

Abaye said to Rava:

Do you maintain that “

slaughtering exists only at the end,” meaning that the status of slaughtering takes effect only at its conclusion, so that the two thoughts formed during slaughter take effect simultaneously at its conclusion, and this is like one utterance? Would this prove from here that Rabbi Yehuda also holds that one seizes the first expression?

That is, that the legal designation of slaughtering takes effect only at its conclusion, so that the two thoughts entertained during the slaughter take effect simultaneously at the end, making them like one statement—and from this you would prove that even here Rabbi Yehuda holds that the first expression is taken hold of?

This is not so. Rather, “

slaughtering exists from beginning to end.”

Every stage of slaughtering has the status of slaughtering, and if one forms two thoughts during it, they take effect one after the other, in the order in which he formed them.

And our Mishna

is dealing with a case

in which he said,

while slaughtering

the first סימן,

“I am slaughtering with the intention of eating it

beyond its designated time,” and,

while slaughtering

the second סימן,

he said, “I am slaughtering with the intention of eating it

outside its designated place.”

Although one סימן of the slaughtering is not a complete “permitting factor” for the offering, but only half a permitting factor, since the animal is permitted only through the slaughtering of both סימנים, Rabbi Meir holds that it is possible to cause piggul to the offering even through a thought concerning half a permitting factor

[that is, one need not think throughout the entire slaughtering that his purpose is to eat it improperly; it is sufficient to have this thought concerning part of it]. Thus, the two thoughts did not take effect simultaneously. Rather, the thought concerning eating it beyond its designated time, which he formed during the first סימן, took effect first, and this is not analogous to the Gemara’s uncertainty concerning “to be divided.” [

However, if Ilfa held that one does not cause piggul through half a permitting factor, it would not help that during the first סימן he formed a thought concerning the entire slaughtering for the sake of eating it beyond its designated time, and during the second סימן for the sake of eating it outside its designated place. Since one does not cause piggul through half a permitting factor, piggul takes effect only at the end of the permitting factor, and there is consequently a mixture of thoughts here].

And we challenge this:

But what about the kemitza,

during which he formed two thoughts,

which,

since it resembles “

to be divided,”

is considered the same? For it is performed entirely as one act, and there are not two stages during which to form thoughts [as there are in slaughtering, which has two סימנים]; rather, both thoughts take effect simultaneously, as in the case of “to be divided,”

and

even in this case

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis disagree,

and Rabbi Yehuda holds that if, during the kemitza, he thought of eating it beyond its designated time and outside its designated place, the second thought does not take effect.

And we answer:

There too,

the case is not one in which he formed two thoughts while performing the kemitza of the handful; rather, it is a case

in which he burned the handful of the meal-offering beyond its designated time, and the handful of frankincense outside its designated place.

That is, the meal-offering involves two burnings, and both are considered “permitting factors” of the meal-offering. He formed the thought concerning eating it beyond its designated time during the burning of the meal-offering, and the thought concerning eating it outside its designated place during the burning of the frankincense.

And Rabbi Yehuda holds that piggul can be effected through half of the permitting act. Therefore, his thought takes effect through a single act of burning, even though it constitutes only half of the permitting act. But when one entertains both thoughts during the kemitza, which is a single permitting act, Rabbi Yehuda does not disagree; rather, both thoughts take effect.

And we raise another objection:

But consider the kometz of the sin-offering

of one who rendered the Sanctuary impure unintentionally, or who falsely swore that he did not know testimony concerning his fellow,

where there is no frankincense with it,

but the only permitting act in its case is the kometz alone,

and they disagree,

Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis. And there it is impossible to establish the case as one in which he entertained the two thoughts during two acts of burning. If so, it is evident that even when he entertained the thoughts during a single permitting act, Rabbi Yehuda disagrees!?

And we answer: In the case of the sin-offering,

they do not disagree!

For we do not find explicitly that they disagree in this matter.

Rav Ashi said: If you would say

that even in the case of the sin-offering

they disagree—

they disagree with regard to steps!

That is, they did not disagree in a case where he entertained both thoughts during the kemitza. Rather, while carrying the kometz to the altar, which is an avoda, he entertained, at the first step, a thought of outside its designated time, and at the second step, a thought of outside its designated place. In this case, the first thought took effect before he entertained the second thought , and it became established as piggul.

Rav Shimi bar Ashi presents the teaching in accordance with Abaye’s view,

that with regard to “for dividing,” Rabbi Meir concedes that both sanctities take effect.

Rav Huna bar Natan presents the teaching in accordance with Rava’s view,

that even with regard to “for dividing,” Rabbi Meir disagrees and holds that only the first sanctity takes effect.

When Rav Dimi came

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said: Rabbi Meir,

who said, “The substitution of an olah, the substitution of a shelamim—this is the substitution of an olah,”

stated it in accordance with the method of Rabbi Yehuda, who says:

Rabbi Yehuda says,

the first expression is decisive!

As we learned:

in our Mishna,

Rabbi Yehuda said: This is the principle: If the thought of time

to eat it outside its designated time

preceded the thought of place

to eat it outside its designated place, it is

piggul, and one is liable to receive karet for it.

Thus, Rabbi Yehuda holds that the first expression is decisive, and Rabbi Meir likewise holds this way. Therefore, he said that the first sanctity he mentioned takes effect.