Zevachim 29b — the Talmud in English

From now on, should its law be

like that of disqualified consecrated offerings, and should it become disqualified

because of its delay, as though a blemish had occurred in it?

The verse says [Deuteronomy 14], “

Deuteronomy 14] “

And you shall eat before the Lord

your God the tithe of your grain, and the firstborn of your cattle.”

The verse juxtaposes

the

firstborn with the tithe

of grain:

Just as the tithe

of grain

does not become disqualified

when it remains

from one year

to

its fellow,

for the time of removal for all the tithes is after the third year,

so too, the firstborn does not become disqualified from one year to its fellow,

even though he delays bringing it. And we have learned from this that delay in bringing an offering does not disqualify it. If so, why do we need the exposition of ben Azzai to learn this law from “it”?

And we answer:

It was necessary

to have the teaching of “it,” for if we were to learn from the firstborn,

it might enter your mind to say: This applies

only in that it does not become disqualified through delay specifically to the

firstborn, which is not fit for presentation,

as it does not come to atone.

But with consecrated offerings, which are fit for presentation,

as the burnt offering comes to atone, and peace offerings come as a gift,

say that they should not be presented

if he delayed bringing them.

It teaches us

ben Azzai from the exposition of “it” that they too do not become disqualified.

And we raise an objection:

And still,

this law that with other consecrated offerings they do not become disqualified through delay,

from there

from the end of the verse “You shall not delay in fulfilling it,”

is derived,

as it is stated there [Deuteronomy 23], “

And there will be a sin in you,”

and we expound:

But there will not be a sin in your offering!

For the offering does not become disqualified even though he delayed it!?

And we answer: Ben Azzai does not derive this matter from “And there will be a sin in you,” because

we have established that for ben Azzai, that

verse

is needed

to expound from it: “

And there will be a sin in you,”

but there will not be a sin in your wife.

It might enter your mind to say: Since Rabbi Elazar said—and some say Rabbi Yohanan: A man’s wife dies only when they demand money from him

that he stole

and he does not have it

to return,

as it is stated [in the Book of Proverbs 22], “

in the book of Proverbs [

If you have nothing with which to pay, why should he take your bed,”

your wife,

from beneath you,”

and if so, I would have thought to say that

because of this sin of ‘You shall not delay,’ she too dies

his wife.

It teaches us

that because of this sin she does not die.

And now the Gemara discusses what the

Others say,

that from “It shall not be reckoned” we learn that

through thought it becomes disqualified, but it does not become disqualified through

eating on

the third day.

And we raise an objection:

And Rabbi Eliezer,

who learns this law from the word “the one who offers,”

what does he do with

this “It shall not be reckoned

не будет сочтено»,

?

And we answer:

He needs it for that which Rabbi Yannai said.

For Rabbi Yannai said: From where is it derived that thoughts

of disqualification

remove one another,

so that if he entertained an additional disqualifying thought alongside the thought of pigul, this thought removes the offering from the status of pigul, and one is not liable to karet for eating it?

As it is stated

in the verse concerning pigul, “

It shall not be reckoned,”

and we expound this:

He shall not combine other thoughts with it!

And Rav Mari teaches it

as follows:

Rabbi Yannai said: From where is it derived that one who thinks

a disqualifying thought

with consecrated offerings is flogged? The verse says [Leviticus 7], “

Leviticus 7] “

It shall not be reckoned,”

and its meaning is a warning to the priest not to think a disqualifying thought.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Mari,

but how can one say that one who thinks a disqualifying thought is flogged? Surely a disqualifying thought is

a prohibition for which there is no deed, and for every prohibition for which there is no deed, one is not flogged!

И отвечаем:

And we answer:

He said to him,

Rav Mari said to Rav Ashi: What Rabbi Yannai said, that one who thinks is flogged, is according to the view of

Rabbi Judah, who said: For a prohibition for which there is no deed, one is flogged.

Mishna:

This is the general rule: Anyone who slaughters, and one who receives

the blood,

and one who walks

with the blood to the altar,

and one who sprinkles

the blood on the altar with the thought

to eat

from the sacrifice

something whose manner is to be eaten,

namely, the flesh,

and to burn

from it

something whose manner is to be burned

on the altar, namely, the sacrificial portions, in the measure of

an olive-bulk

of them,

outside its place

fit for burning or eating, the offering is

disqualified, and there is no

liability of

karet

for eating it.

And if he thought to eat or to burn

outside its time

fit for eating or burning, it is

pigul, and one is liable for it to karet

for eating it, even if he ate it within its time.

Provided that he offers

the blood, which is

the permitting-agent

of the offering for burning and eating,

according to its mitzva,

as though it were a valid offering. But if, during the rites of the blood, he thought another disqualifying thought in addition to the thought of outside its time, the offering leaves the status of pigul and is disqualified alone, for a disqualifying thought removes it from the status of pigul.

And the Mishna explains:

How is it that the permitting-agent was offered according to its mitzva?

He slaughtered silently,

without any disqualifying thought, and afterward

he received, walked, and sprinkled

with the thought

of outside its time,

or he

slaughtered

with the thought of

outside its time, and afterward

received, walked, and sprinkled silently,

or he slaughtered, received, walked, and sprinkled,

and all of them were with the thought of

outside its time—

This is one who offers the permitting-agent according to its mitzva,

for there was no disqualifying thought in it other than the thought of outside its time.

How is it that the permitting-agent was not offered according to its mitzva?

He slaughtered

with the thought of

outside its place,

which is a disqualifying thought and not a thought of pigul, and afterward

received

or

walked

or

sprinkled

with the thought of pigul,

outside its time;

or he slaughtered

with the thought of

outside its time, and afterward

received

or

walked

or

sprinkled

with the thought of

outside its

place;

or he slaughtered, received, walked, and sprinkled,

and in one of them he thought

outside its place,

and in the other rites he thought outside its time .

Likewise,

the Paschal offering and the sin offering that he slaughtered

with the thought

not for their sake,

which is a disqualifying thought since they become disqualified through it, and afterward

received

or

walked

or

sprinkled

with the thought of

outside its time, or he slaughtered

with the thought of

outside its time,

and afterward

received

or

walked

or

sprinkled not for their sake, or he slaughtered, received, walked, and sprinkled their blood,

and in one of them he thought

not for their sake,

and in the others he thought outside its time—

this is one in which the permitting-agent was not offered according to its mitzva.

For another thought became mixed into it besides the thought of pigul. As for other offerings in which he thought not for their sake, they do not remove them from the status of pigul, for this is not a disqualifying thought, since they are valid even when not for their sake; the thought not for their sake disqualifies only in the case of the Paschal offering and the sin offering.

Likewise, one who thinks in one of these four rites

to eat an olive-bulk

of the flesh of the sacrifice

outside,

and in that same rite he also thought to eat

an olive-bulk

of another portion

tomorrow,

or he first thought to eat

an olive-bulk tomorrow

and afterward, in that same rite, thought to eat

an olive-bulk outside,

or he thought to eat

half an olive-bulk outside

and

half an olive-bulk tomorrow,

or

half an olive-bulk tomorrow

and

half an olive-bulk outside—

the offering is

disqualified, and there is no

liability of

karet

for eating it.

This clause comes to teach us that even when he combined the two thoughts in the same rite, Rabbi Judah later disagrees and holds that only when the thought of place precedes the thought of time does it leave the status of pigul.

And according to Ilfa in the Gemara, this clause too deals with two rites, and the principal reason it was repeated is to teach us the final clause, that thoughts concerning two half-olive-bulks combine.

Rabbi Judah said [he comes to disagree with the first tanna, and to say that a disqualifying thought does not remove an offering from the status of pigul in every case, but rather:]

he comes to disagree with the first tanna and say that a disqualifying thought does not always remove an offering from the status of piggul:]

This is the general rule: Whenever the thought of time,

outside its time,

preceded the thought of place,

outside its place, the later thought of outside its place does not remove it from the earlier thought of outside its time; rather, it is

pigul, and one is liable for it to karet.

But

if the thought of place preceded the thought of time,

the offering is

disqualified, and there is no karet,

since it had already become disqualified before he thought the thought of time, and from that point onward the rites of the blood are not performed as the presentation of a valid offering.

And the Sages say,

like the first tanna: Both this and that, whether the thought of place preceded or the thought of time preceded, are

disqualified, and there is no karet.

What we said above, that two thoughts concerning two half-olive-bulks combine with one another to disqualify the offering, applies only if in both of them he thought a thought of eating, or in both of them a thought of burning. But if he thought

to eat half an olive-bulk

and

to burn half an olive-bulk,

and both were with the thought of outside its time or outside its place, the offering is

valid.

For

the thought of

eating and

the thought of

burning do not combine

to disqualify the offering, since there is no measure of an olive-bulk either in the burning or in the eating .

Gemara:

Ilfa said: The dispute

between the first tanna and Rabbi Judah in the Mishna is only when the two thoughts were

in two rites,

such as when he thought during slaughtering outside its time and during carrying outside its place , for in this Rabbi Judah holds that once it has been established as pigul through the thought of outside its time in one rite, a disqualifying thought in a subsequent rite can no longer remove it from the status of pigul . And what is stated in the Mishna, “an olive-bulk outside, an olive-bulk tomorrow,” over which Rabbi Judah disagrees, concerns two rites, as in the first clause, which concerns two rites .

But

if the two intentions were

in one service

, even if the intention concerning time preceded

according to everyone it is an intermingling of intentions

. And there is no piggul here, since the service was not performed with the thought of piggul alone.

And Rabbi Yohanan said: Even in one service there is a dispute.

And if the intention concerning time preceded the intention concerning place, Rabbi Judah holds, “hold the first expression,” and it was established as piggul, and no other intention, even in that same service, removes it from the status of piggul.

And we raise a difficulty:

Granted according to Ilfa

, since

the beginning

of the Mishna deals

with two services

, for the Mishna explicitly wrote, “How is it that the permitting act was not brought near in accordance with its mitzva? He slaughtered outside its place, he received [the blood], and so forth; outside its time,”

the end likewise

which says, “to eat an olive-sized portion outside, an olive-sized portion tomorrow,” and concerning this Rabbi Judah disagrees, it is reasonable that it deals

with two services

, and if so, we find that Rabbi Judah disagrees only in two services.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan

, who holds that Rabbi Judah disagrees even in one service, and necessarily the end deals with this manner, the difficulty is:

The beginning is in two services, and the end is in one service!?