Zevachim 26b (כו:) — the Talmud in English

so too, there would be no reason to return and receive from the life-blood, since the owners attained atonement through the first, and the second cannot permit the flesh because it does not effect atonement. Rather,

And the proof that the זריקה of one who is פסול overrides the blood is from this:

as we learned

below [32a], regarding פיגול:

And all of them,

all those who are פסול,

who received

the blood with a פסול מחשבה to eat the meat

beyond its appointed time or outside its designated place—

if there is

still

the lifeblood, let

the priest

who is fit return and receive it,

and he shall perform the זריקה without a פסול מחשבה, and the offering will thereby become fit, because the פסול מחשבה of the first priest who received the blood is not considered a מחשבה with regard to disqualifying the service, since he is not fit to perform the service!

This implies that specifically when

received the blood with a פסול מחשבה but did not perform the זריקה—

no,

in that case it is possible to restore the offering to fitness by having a qualified priest give additional blood; but if

the פסול performed the זריקה

of the blood,

it is not

possible to restore the offering to fitness by giving additional blood.

What is the reason? Is it not because it is

the offering that was performed through the זריקה of the blood by one who is פסול for the offering,

rejected,

since the זריקה concludes the service of atonement, and it was performed פסול; therefore, the offering is rejected and can no longer be restored to fitness?

And we answer:

No,

the offering is not rejected and rendered irreparable because the זריקה was performed by a priest who is פסול; rather,

it is because

the priest who is פסול

disqualifies the offering

with a מחשבה פסולה, as he intended to eat it beyond its appointed time or outside its designated place.

And we object:

If so,

if the מחשבה of a priest who is פסול disqualifies the offering, why is it פסול only when he performed the זריקה of the blood with a פסול מחשבה? Surely the מחשבה of the priest who is פסול at the time of

receiving also

should disqualify it!?

Furthermore,

another difficulty arises:

Does

the מחשבה of a priest who is פסול disqualify the offering?

But Rava said: A מחשבה

is effective

[is effective] in disqualifying the offering

only when held by one who is fit to perform the service,

namely, a qualified priest,

and with regard to something fit for the service,

excluding the Omer offering, which is brought from barley, which is not fit for any other service but only for this one, and is brought to permit eating the new grain; it is not brought as an offering,

and in a place fit for the service,

excluding a damaged altar, for if, while performing the service of the offering, one entertained a מחשבת פיגול when the altar was damaged, the offering is not disqualified, and if its damage was repaired that same day, it may be offered!

And we answer:

Do not say

that one should infer from the Mishna that if

the priest who is פסול performed the זריקה

it is not

possible to return, receive the blood, and perform the זריקה, because in truth the פסול מחשבה of the one who is פסול does not render the offering פיגול, and it is possible for the one who is fit to return and perform the זריקה;

rather, say: If one who is פסול slaughtered

it is not

possible to restore it to fitness, since all are fit for slaughter, and therefore the מחשבה of one who is פסול for the other services is considered a מחשבה that disqualifies the offering.

And we object:

What does this teach us

in this matter,

that a מחשבה disqualifies

during the slaughter performed by one who is פסול? Surely

we already learned

this law in the first clause of that very Mishna, as we learned: All those who are פסול who slaughtered—their slaughter is valid—

therefore they disqualify the offering through מחשבה!?

And we answer:

This

—what was written in the latter clause, “And all of them [those who are פסול] who received the blood with a מחשבה beyond its appointed time or outside its designated place, if there is lifeblood, let him return and receive it”—

teaches us that from receiving onward, a מחשבה does not disqualify

when held by a priest who is פסול, even though it does disqualify during slaughter.

What is the reason?—

As Rava said,

that a מחשבה is effective only with regard to one who is fit to perform the service. Since he is not fit to perform the service, his מחשבה does not disqualify the offering. The same applies to the זריקה: his מחשבה does not disqualify it. The Mishna mentions “received” because this is the first service after slaughter, during which the מחשבה of one who is פסול does not disqualify the offering.

The following beraita raises an objection

to Shmuel’s statement that giving the blood not in its proper place is considered as though it were given in its proper place: A qualified priest who

intended

at the time of slaughter, receiving, or conveying

to give the blood of

those whose blood is to be given

above

below, and the blood of

those whose blood is

to be given

below above,

meaning that he intended to give the blood of the offering on the altar not in its proper place, if his intention was to perform the זריקה

immediately

on that day, but ultimately he gave the blood in its proper place, the offering is

fit,

for an offering is disqualified only by a מחשבה of beyond its appointed time or outside its designated place, meaning outside the Temple courtyard. This is not the case here, where he intended to give the blood on the altar, only not in its proper place on the altar; even if a זריקה not in its proper place were פסול, a מחשבה concerning such a זריקה does not disqualify the offering!