Zevachim 26b — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

Shmuel said:

What we learned in our Mishna, that when he gave the blood not in its place it is

invalid,

was stated with regard to the

flesh

of the offering,

but the owners attained atonement

through this offering!

What is the reason

that the owners attained atonement although the flesh became disqualified

? For the verse says

[Leviticus 17], “

And I have given it to you upon the altar to effect atonement” —

once the blood reached the altar,

wherever it may be,

the owners attained atonement.

That is, with regard to atonement, all places of the altar are equal, despite the fact that the mitzva of giving it is in a particular place and on a particular altar.

And we challenge this:

If so,

that the entire altar is equal for atonement,

the flesh too

should become fit, since the sprinkling of the blood was effective for the atonement of the owners?

And we answer:

The verse says,

“upon the altar,”

“to effect atonement,”

I gave it for atonement

in every place on the altar,

but not

that the sprinkling should be considered significant

with

regard to permitting

another matter.

And since the permission of the flesh for eating is through the sprinkling [as stated, “and the blood of your sacrifices shall be poured out,” and afterward, “and you shall eat the flesh” ], whenever the mitzva of giving the blood in the place designated for it was not fulfilled, it does not permit the flesh, because the mitzva of sprinkling was not performed according to its law .

It follows that he holds,

Shmuel, that with regard to the atonement of the owners, the sprinkling of the blood

not in its place is

considered as in its place.

And we challenge this:

We learned in another chapter: He gave it

for the giving of the blood

on the ramp,

or he gave it on the altar but

not opposite the base,

or

he gave those that are given —

below, above, and those that are given —

above,

he gave

below,

or

those that are given —

inside,

he gave

outside, and those that are given —

outside,

he gave

inside —

if there remains the life-blood,

which is still flowing from the neck of the slaughtered offering,

the fit priest shall return

and

receive

from the life-blood the amount required for the giving of the blood, and sprinkle it according to its law upon the altar!

And if it should enter your mind

that the sprinkling of the blood

not in its place

effects atonement for the owners

as in its place,

it is difficult:

why must the fit priest return and receive,

for the owners have already attained atonement!?

And if you would say

that the reason he must return and receive is in order

to permit the flesh for eating,

it is difficult: how can the second sprinkling make the flesh fit for eating?

Is there such a thing as sprinkling that does not effect atonement,

such as this second sprinkling, which does not effect atonement, since the owners already attained atonement through the first sprinkling,

and permits the flesh for eating

through this sprinkling?

And we answer:

If a

priest

fit

for the service

gave it for the first giving of the blood,

so too, there would be no reason to return and receive from the life-blood, since the owners attained atonement through the first, and the second cannot permit the flesh because it does not effect atonement. Rather,

here, in the Mishna where we learned that he shall return and receive from the life-blood,

в отношении Мишны, где мы учили, что он должен вернуться и принять кровь души,

with what are we dealing? —

He gave it for the first giving

a priest

disqualified

who was not effective at all, and his giving is not considered a giving at all, and therefore he must return and receive the blood, in order to fulfill the mitzva of giving that effects atonement for the owners and permits the flesh.

And we challenge this: if the case is one in which a disqualified person gave it, why is it not considered sprinkling at all? There is here a disqualified sprinkling; just as sprinkling in its place by a disqualified priest is disqualified sprinkling, so too the law applies to sprinkling not in its place, since it is considered as in its place [for had it been performed by a fit priest, it would have effected atonement]. If so,

let

the entire blood

be rejected,

according to the law of disqualified sprinkling, which gives the remaining blood the status of “remainder” and rejects it from being received again!

And the proof that the throwing of an invalid person overrides the blood is from this:

as we learned

below [32a] concerning pigul:

and all of them,

all the invalid persons,

who received

the blood with an invalid intention, to eat the flesh

beyond its time and beyond its place—

if there is

still

the blood of the soul, let him return

the

valid priest and receive,

and throw it without an invalid intention, and the offering will become valid, because the invalid intention of the first priest who received [the blood] is not an intention with regard to invalidating the service, since he is not fit for the service!

And it implies that specifically when

they received

the invalid persons with an invalid intention and did not throw [the blood]—

no,

by this it is possible to return and make it valid through the giving of additional blood by a valid priest; but if

they threw

the blood, the invalid persons,

not

is it possible any longer to make the offering valid through the giving of additional blood.

What is the reason? Is it not because it is

that the offering was made through the throwing of the blood by the person invalid for the offering,

rejected,

since through the throwing the service of atonement is completed, and it was performed invalidly; therefore the offering is rejected and it is no longer possible to make it valid?

And we answer:

not

because the throwing was performed by an invalid priest is the offering rejected and therefore without remedy, but rather

because he invalidates

the invalid priest [who is invalid] for the offering

through an intention

that is invalid, for he intended to eat it beyond its time and beyond its place.

And we raise an objection:

if so,

if the intention of an invalid priest invalidates the offering, why is it invalid only in a case where he threw the blood with an invalid intention? Surely the intention of the invalid priest at the time of

receiving, also

should invalidate it!?

And further

it is difficult:

does it invalidate

the intention of an invalid priest?

But Rava said: An intention

that is invalid

is effective

[is effective] to invalidate the offering

only through one who is fit for the service,

that is, a valid priest,

and with regard to something fit for the service,

to exclude the omer meal-offering, which comes from barley, which is not fit for any other service but this one alone, and which comes to permit the eating of the new grain, and it does not come on account of an offering,

and in a place fit for the service,

to exclude an altar that was damaged, for if, during the service of the offering, they conceived a pigul intention at a time when the altar was damaged, the offering is not invalidated; and if its damage was repaired on that same day, it is possible to offer it!

And we answer:

do not say

to infer from the Mishna that if

they threw

the invalid priest with an invalid intention,

not

is it possible to return and receive the blood and throw it, because in truth the invalid intention of the invalid person does not make the offering pigul, and it is possible that the valid [priest] should return and throw it;

rather, say: he slaughtered

an invalid person with an invalid intention,

not

is it possible to make it valid again, since all are valid for slaughtering, and even those who are invalid for other services—their intention is considered an intention to invalidate.

And we raise an objection:

what does it teach us

with this,

that an intention invalidates

in the slaughtering of an invalid person? Surely

we learned

this law in the first clause of that same Mishna, as we learned: all the invalid persons who slaughtered—their slaughtering is valid—

therefore they invalidate through an intention!?

And we answer:

this

is what was written in the latter clause: “And all of them [the invalid persons] who received [the blood] beyond its time and beyond its place—if there is the blood of the soul, let him return and receive,”

teaches us that from receiving onward an intention does not invalidate

of an invalid priest, even though in slaughtering it does invalidate.

What is the reason?

As Rava

said: an intention is effective only through one fit for the service. And since he is not fit for the service, his intention does not invalidate. And the same is true with throwing: his intention does not invalidate. And what the Mishna stated, “they received,” is because it is the first service after slaughtering, in which the intention of the invalid person does not invalidate.

We raise an objection

to the words of Shmuel, that the giving of the blood not in its place is considered as in its place, from this, as it was taught in a beraita: A valid priest who

intended

at the time of slaughtering, or receiving, or conveying,

to give the

blood of those

whose blood is given

above, below,

and the blood of those

whose blood is given

below, above,

that is, he intended to give the blood of the offering on the altar not in its place, if his intention was to throw it

immediately

on that same day, and in the end he gave the blood in its proper place, the offering is

valid,

for the offering is invalidated only through an intention of beyond its time or beyond its place, that is, outside the Temple courtyard. This is not so in this case, where he intends to give the blood on the altar, only not in its place on the altar, for even if throwing not in its place were invalid, an intention concerning such throwing does not invalidate!