Zevachim 26a — the Talmud in English

However, if

he slaughtered

the animal

and afterwards cut

its legs, it is

invalid!

For the blood of the legs is rendered invalid because of yotzei, and since the blood of the legs rises and exits through the place of slaughter, it becomes mixed with the blood in the bowl and invalidates it.

And we raise a difficulty: If

he cut and afterwards slaughtered,

why is it

valid?

For since he cut it, it turns out that

he is offering a blemished animal!?

And we answer:

Rather, say

this is what Rabbi Elazar said:

He cut

its legs after the slaughter

and afterwards received

the blood;

it is valid.

Since, through cutting them, the blood of the legs no longer rises to the place of slaughter.

However, if he

received

the blood

and afterwards

cut its legs, it is

invalid.

Since at the time of receiving, the blood of the legs became mixed with the rest of the blood in the vessel.

But the Gemara wonders: Is it so that if he

cut

its legs after the slaughter

and afterwards received [the blood], it is valid!?

But at the time of receiving, the offering was blemished;

yet Rabbi Zeira said: One who makes a blemish in the ear of a bull of firstborn status

after slaughter

and afterwards received its blood—it is invalid, as it is stated: “

And he shall take of the blood of the bull,”

a bull that already was!?

And we answer:

Rav Hisda said in the name of Avimi:

What Rabbi Elazar deemed valid when he cut before receiving was in a case where he

cuts the limb until he reaches the bone,

and thereby it does not become blemished. In any event, this cutting prevents the blood from rising to the neck of the animal.

The Gemara now proves from Rabbi Elazar’s very statement, who said:

“He received and afterwards cut [them]—it is invalid!”

You can learn from it

from this ruling that the blood of the legs that were outside the Temple courtyard is invalidated because of yotzei, that

blood embedded in the limbs

before it separated

is blood!

Therefore it is invalidated because of yotzei even when it is embedded in the animal’s limbs. For if it is not considered blood, why should it be invalidated? The invalidity of yotzei applies only to blood or to meat. It follows that one should be liable for karet for eating blood embedded in the limbs. But this is difficult, for the law is that there is no liability for karet for eating blood that has not separated!

And we answer:

Perhaps

what was invalidated in the bowl was not because of the blood of the leg, which in truth is not considered blood, but

because of fat

mixed into it, which is fit to eat and has the status of meat, to be invalidated because of yotzei. When the fat exits together with the blood of the leg that becomes mixed with the blood in the bowl, it invalidates it .

You can learn from it

from this ruling that we stated, that the fat in the leg that exited beyond the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood was invalidated because of yotzei:

meat of lesser sanctity that exited

beyond the courtyard

before the sprinkling of the blood is invalid!

Although it is ultimately destined to exit the courtyard after the sprinkling in order to eat it there, for meat of lesser sanctity may be eaten throughout the entire city, nevertheless, if it exited before sprinkling, the meat is invalidated, since its time to exit had not yet arrived. It follows that Rabbi Elazar disagrees with Rabbi Yohanan, who holds [below, 89b] that meat of lesser sanctity that exited before the sprinkling of its blood is valid!? And we answer: And we answer:

Perhaps

what Rabbi Elazar said—that fat that exited outside is invalidated because of yotzei and invalidates the blood of the offering—he was speaking

of offerings of the highest sanctity,

with regard to which, according to everyone, that which exits before sprinkling is invalidated, since it is not ultimately destined to exit the courtyard even afterwards.

The Sages taught: Offerings of the highest sanctity—

their slaughter

must be performed

in the north

of the courtyard,

and the receiving of their blood in a service vessel

also has its law

in the north.

And if

the slaughterer stood

in the

in the south

of the courtyard, near its middle,

and extended his hand to the north and slaughtered

the animal standing there,

his slaughter is valid,

for it is not necessary that the slaughterer stand in the north, but only the animal.

But if

the one standing

in the south received the blood,

his receiving is invalid,

for in the service of receiving, the recipient must stand in the north [and below, on page 48, all this will be learned from verses].

If the recipient brought

his

head and the greater part of his body

into the north and received the blood, it is valid

as though he had entered entirely

into the north, since throughout the Torah the law is that the greater part is like the whole.

If the animal thrashed

after slaughter

and went out to the south and returned

to the north,

it is valid.

Since the invalidity of “yotzei” within the courtyard applies only outside its boundaries. The same law applies even if it did not return to the north: it is valid. Rather, “it returned” was stated because of the latter clause, which deals with its having exited beyond the courtyard and returned .

Offerings of lesser sanctity—

their slaughter is inside

the courtyard,

and the receiving of their blood in a service vessel is inside

and they do not require the north.

If he stood outside

the courtyard

and brought his hand inside

the courtyard

and slaughtered, his slaughter is valid.

Since it is not necessary for the slaughterer to stand in the courtyard, but only the animal.

But if the one standing outside received the blood,

his receiving is invalid,

for the recipient must stand inside.

If the recipient brought

his

head and the greater part of his body

into the courtyard and received, his receiving is invalid

as though he had not entered.

And below it will be explained from the verse that he must be entirely inside.

If the animal thrashed

after the slaughter,

and went outside

the courtyard

and returned, it is invalid

because of “yotzei.”

And the Gemara infers:

Learn from it

from this law, that it thrashed and exited and is invalid, that

meat of offerings of lesser sanctity that exited

from the courtyard

before the sprinkling of the blood is invalid!?

And we answer:

Perhaps

what is stated here, that it is invalid, refers

to the tail, the lobe of the liver, and the two kidneys,

which are the sacrificial portions offered upon the altar, and they are offerings of the highest sanctity; therefore they were invalidated by yotzei.

Shmuel’s father asked Shmuel:

An animal standing in such a manner that

it is inside

the courtyard

and its legs are outside—what is the law

with regard to slaughtering it initially?

He said to him,

Shmuel

said: It is written [A0198]](Leviticus 17), “

“Leviticus 17”

And you shall bring them to it,”

and we expound this:

until it is entirely inside.

Therefore, one may not slaughter it initially while its legs are outside.

They further asked: If he

suspended

the animal in the air of the courtyard

and slaughtered it, what is the law?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

It is valid.

His father said to him:

“You are mistaken!”

You are mistaken!

We require

that the

slaughter be upon the flank

of the altar,

but there is none,

since “upon the flank” means beside the flank, on the ground.

They further asked: If the

slaughterer was suspended

in the air of the courtyard

and slaughtered it, what is the law?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

It is invalid.

For he held that just as when he suspended the animal and slaughtered it, it is invalid, so too when the slaughterer was suspended.

His father said to him:

You are mistaken!

For only the

slaughter

must be

upon the flank,

but it is not necessary for the

slaughterer

to be

upon the flank.

They further asked: If the

koen was suspended

in the air

and received

the blood in this manner,

what is the law?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

It is valid,

as in the case of one who was suspended and slaughtered.

His father said to him:

“You are mistaken!

You are mistaken! There is no manner of service in this!

Receiving the blood is “service,” unlike slaughter.

They further asked: If he

suspended

the animal in the air

and received

its blood,

what is the law?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

It is invalid,

as in the case of suspending and slaughtering.

His father said to him:

You are mistaken!

Slaughter

must be performed

upon the flank, but receiving need not be upon the flank.

Abaye said:

These cases above, if performed

with offerings of the highest sanctity, are all invalid!

Suspending and slaughtering is invalid because of the absence of “upon the flank”; suspending oneself and receiving is invalid because this is not the manner of service. And even suspending the animal and receiving is invalid, for although the law of the flank was not stated with regard to receiving, the law of the north was stated with regard to it, and the air of the north is not considered the north. In this, Abaye disagrees with Shmuel’s father, who deemed suspending the animal and receiving valid.

Except

outside

the one who suspended

the slaughterer

and slaughtered,

which is valid in this case, in accordance with the words of Shmuel’s father.

Whereas

with lesser sanctity offerings

in which these procedures were performed,

all are valid,

even when he suspended [the animal] and slaughtered, since with lesser sanctity offerings no law of slaughtering at the side of the altar was stated, nor was there a law of the north; and therefore even when he suspended [the animal] and received [the blood], it is valid.

Except for [the case of] the suspended

priest

who received [the blood],

which is invalid even with lesser sanctity offerings, since this is not the manner of service.

Rava said

concerning Abaye’s words:

What is different about [the case where] he suspended [the animal] and received [the blood] with lesser sanctity offerings, that it is valid,

even though their receiving must necessarily be performed inside, because

the airspace of inside is considered as inside;

for otherwise the receiving was not performed inside. And since Abaye concedes that the airspace of inside is considered as inside, then

with most holy offerings as well

he should validate [the offering] when he suspended the animal and received [the blood], because

the airspace of the north is considered as the north.

And why does Abaye disagree with Shmuel’s father, who validated this?

Rather, Rava said: Both with most holy offerings and with lesser sanctity offerings,

all the procedures

are valid,

even when he suspended the animal and received [the blood], because the airspace of the north is considered as the north, and there is no deficiency of the manner of service in this matter, and the law of “at the side” was not stated concerning receiving. And likewise, when the slaughterer suspended himself and slaughtered, it is valid, because slaughtering is not service, and the law of “side” was not stated concerning the slaughterer, but only concerning the animal,

except

outside

[the case where] he suspended

the animal

and slaughtered [it] with most holy offerings,

which is invalid because slaughtering must be at the side of the altar. This is not so with lesser sanctity offerings, with which this law was not stated. And likewise, when

the

priest

suspended himself and received

the blood, it is invalid

both with most holy offerings

and

with lesser sanctity offerings,

since receiving is service, and this is not the manner of service.

It follows that Rava holds like Shmuel’s father in all the laws, except that Shmuel’s father did not speak of lesser sanctity offerings, and therefore he did not validate [the case where] he suspended the animal and received [the blood].

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira:

The priest receiving the blood was standing while

he was inside

the courtyard,

and his lock

the hair of his head

was outside—what is [the law]?

He said to him,

Rabbi Zeira:

Did you not say

concerning an animal that is inside while its legs are outside, that it may not be slaughtered in this manner, since it is stated in the verse,

“And you shall bring them to it”,

and this is expounded:

until all of it comes inside [as

Shmuel likewise said above],

here too,

concerning the priest performing the service, it is stated [Exodus 28],

“When they come into the Tent of Meeting,”

and this is expounded:

until all of him comes into the Tent of Meeting.

And whenever the hair of his head is outside, it follows that he did not come entirely into the Tent of Meeting. [And from here we learned the law of the beraita above, that when he brought in his head and the greater part of his body, it is as though he did not enter.]

Mishna:

The placing of blood performed not in its proper place, such as:

they placed

the blood

upon the ramp,

which is not the place for placing blood.

Or they placed it on the altar itself

not opposite the base,

namely, on the southeastern corner, which had no base [and the blood of the burnt offering must be placed on the wall of the altar opposite the base beneath it].

Or if

he placed the

blood whose law is to be

placed

below

the scarlet line

above

the scarlet line. And likewise, if

the

blood whose law is to be

placed above,

he placed [it]

below.

Or if the blood of

those placed

inside

the Sanctuary he placed

outside,

on the outer altar.

Or if the blood of

those placed

outside

he placed

inside

the Sanctuary.

The offering is

invalid, and there is no excision

for eating it [and the Gemara explains what the tanna of the Mishna comes to teach by stating that there is no excision for eating it].