Zevachim 26a (כו.) — the Talmud in English

However, if

he slaughtered

the animal

and afterward cut off

its legs, it is

disqualified!

For the blood of the legs becomes disqualified because of yotzei, and once the blood of the legs rises and exits through the place of slaughter, it becomes mixed with the blood in the bowl and disqualifies it.

And we challenge this: If he

cut off the legs and afterward slaughtered the animal,

why is it

valid?

Since he cut off its legs, it follows that

he is offering an animal with a blemish!?

And we answer:

Rather, say that this is what Rabbi Elazar said: He

this is what Rabbi Elazar said:

cut off

its legs after the slaughter

and afterward received

the blood; it is

valid.

Once he cut them off, the blood of the legs no longer rises to the animal’s neck, the place of slaughter.

However, if he

received

the blood

and afterward

cut off its legs, it is

disqualified.

For at the time of the receiving, the blood of the legs became mixed with the rest of the blood in the vessel.

But the Gemara wonders: Is it so that if he

cut off

its legs after the slaughter

and afterward received the blood, it is valid!?

But at the time of the receiving, the offering had a blemish.

But Rabbi Zeira said: If one blemishes the ear of a bull-offering

after the slaughter

and afterward receives its blood, it is disqualified, as it is stated: “

And he shall take from the blood of the bull,”

a bull that already existed!?

And we answer:

Rav Ḥisda said that Avimi said:

What Rabbi Elazar deemed valid when the legs were cut before the receiving was a case in which he

cuts the limb until he reaches the bone,

so that the animal does not thereby become blemished. Nevertheless, this cutting prevents the blood from rising to the animal’s neck.

The Gemara now proves this from Rabbi Elazar’s very statement, in which he said:

If he received the blood and afterward cut off the legs, it is disqualified!

Infer from this

that the blood of the legs, which had been outside the Temple courtyard, becomes disqualified because of yotzei:

blood embedded in the limbs

before it has separated

is blood!

Therefore, it becomes disqualified because of yotzei even when it is embedded in the animal’s limbs. For if it is not considered blood, why should it become disqualified? The disqualification of yotzei applies only to blood or flesh. It follows that one should be liable to karet for eating blood embedded in the limbs. But this is difficult, for the law is that one is not liable to karet for eating blood that has not separated!

And we answer:

Perhaps

the blood in the bowl became disqualified not because of the blood of the leg, which is in fact not considered blood, but

because of the fatty tissue

mixed with it. The fatty tissue is fit to be eaten and has the status of flesh, and therefore becomes disqualified because of yotzei. When the fatty tissue exits together with the blood of the leg and becomes mixed with the blood in the bowl, it disqualifies the blood.

Infer from this

that the fatty tissue in a leg that exited the courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood became disqualified because of yotzei:

flesh of kodashim kalim that exited

outside the courtyard

before the sprinkling of the blood is disqualified!

Although it is ultimately meant to leave the courtyard after the sprinkling in order to be eaten there, since the flesh of kodashim kalim may be eaten throughout the city, nevertheless, if it exited before the sprinkling, the flesh becomes disqualified, since the time for it to leave had not yet arrived. It follows that Rabbi Elazar disputes Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds [below, page 89b] that flesh of kodashim kalim that exited before the sprinkling of its blood remains valid. And we answer:

Perhaps

when Rabbi Elazar said that fatty tissue that exited outside becomes disqualified because of yotzei and disqualifies the blood of the offering, he was speaking

of kodshei kodashim. With regard to these, everyone agrees that something that exits before the sprinkling becomes disqualified, since it is not ultimately meant to leave the courtyard even afterward.

with regard to which everyone agrees that an object that leaves before the sprinkling is disqualified, since it is not ultimately supposed to leave the courtyard even afterward.

The Sages taught: Kodshei kodashim—

their slaughter

must be performed

in the north

of the courtyard,

and receiving their blood in a service vessel

also has its requirement

in the north.

If

the slaughterer stood

in the south

of the courtyard,

near its midpoint,

extended his hand to the north, and slaughtered

the animal standing there,

his slaughter is valid,

because it is not necessary for the slaughterer to stand in the north; only the animal must be there.

But if the person standing in the south

received

the blood,

his receiving is invalid,

because in the service of receiving, the recipient must stand in the north [as will be learned below, on page 48, from verses].

If the recipient brought

his

head and greater part

into the north and received the blood, it is valid,

as though he had entered entirely

into the north, since throughout the Torah the law is that the majority is equivalent to the whole.

If the animal struggled

after the slaughter

and exited to the south and returned

to the north, it is

valid.

For the disqualification of yotzei within the courtyard applies only outside its boundaries. The same law applies even if it did not return to the north and it remains valid; “returned” was stated because of the latter clause, which discusses an animal that exited outside the courtyard and returned.

Kodashim kalim—

their slaughter is inside

the courtyard,

and receiving their blood in a service vessel is inside

the courtyard; they do not require the north.

If he stood outside

the courtyard

and extended his hand inside

the courtyard

and slaughtered, his slaughter is valid.

For it is not necessary for the slaughterer to stand in the courtyard; only the animal must be there.

But if the person standing outside received the blood,

his receiving is invalid,

because the recipient must stand inside.

If the recipient brought

his

head and greater part

into the courtyard and received the blood, his receiving is invalid,

as though he had not entered.

It will be explained below from the verse that he must be entirely inside.

If the animal struggled

after the slaughter

and exited outside

the courtyard

and returned, it is disqualified

because of yotzei.

And the Gemara infers:

Infer from this

that from the law that if it struggled and exited it is disqualified,

flesh of kodashim kalim that exited

the courtyard

before the sprinkling of the blood is disqualified!?

And we answer:

Perhaps

the case stated here, in which it is disqualified, is one involving

the tail, the lobe of the liver, and the two kidneys,

which are the sacrificial parts offered on the altar. They have the status of kodshei kodashim, and therefore become disqualified because of yotzei.

Shmuel’s father asked Shmuel:

With regard to an animal standing such that

it is inside

the courtyard

and its legs are outside, what is the law regarding slaughtering it ab initio?

with regard to slaughtering it initially?

He said to him,

Shmuel

said:

“

And they shall bring them to Him,”

and this is expounded:

until it is entirely inside.

Therefore, one may not slaughter it ab initio while its legs are outside.

They asked further:

If he suspended

the animal in the air of the courtyard

and slaughtered it, what is the law?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

It is valid.

His father said to him:

You are mistaken!

You have erred!

We require

that the

slaughter be upon the thigh

of the altar,

and that is absent,

since “upon the thigh” means beside the thigh, on the ground.

They asked further:

If the slaughterer suspended himself

in the air of the courtyard

and slaughtered it, what is the law?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

It is disqualified.

For he reasoned that just as if one suspended the animal and slaughtered it, it is disqualified, so too, when the slaughterer suspended himself, it is disqualified.

His father said to him:

You have erred!

Only

the slaughter

must be

“upon the thigh,”

but the

slaughterer

does not need to be

“upon the thigh.”

They asked further:

If the priest suspended himself

in the air

and received

the blood in this manner,

what is the law?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

It is valid,

as in the case of one who suspended himself and slaughtered.

His father said to him:

You are mistaken!

There is no manner of service in this!

Receiving the blood is a “service,” unlike slaughter.

They asked further:

If he suspended

the animal in the air

and received

its blood,

what is the law?

He said to him,

Shmuel:

It is disqualified,

as in the case of suspending the animal and slaughtering it.

His father said to him:

You have erred!

Slaughter

must be performed

upon the thigh, but receiving does not require being upon the thigh.

Abaye said:

All the cases above, if performed

with kodshei kodashim, are all disqualified! Suspending the animal and slaughtering it is disqualified because of the absence of “upon the thigh”; suspending oneself and receiving the blood is disqualified because this is not the manner of service. And even suspending the animal and receiving the blood is disqualified, for although the requirement of the thigh was not stated with regard to receiving, the requirement of the north was stated with regard to it, and the airspace of the north is not considered the north.

In this, Abaye disagrees with Shmuel’s father, who deemed the case of suspending the animal and receiving the blood valid.

Except for

outside

the case of hanging

the slaughterer

and slaughtering,

which is valid in this manner, in accordance with the statement of Shmuel’s father.

But

with regard to lesser sanctity offerings

in which these procedures were performed,

all are valid,

including the case where he hung the animal and received the blood, since with regard to lesser sanctity offerings there is no requirement that slaughter be performed alongside the altar, nor is there a requirement of the north. Therefore, even if he hung the animal and received the blood, it is valid.

Except for the case where the priest was hung

the priest

and received

the blood, which is invalid even with regard to lesser sanctity offerings, since this is not the manner of performing the service.

Rava said

concerning Abaye’s statement:

What is different about the case where he hung the animal and received the blood with regard to lesser sanctity offerings, in which it is valid,

even though their blood must necessarily be received inside,

because the airspace inside is considered as inside,

for otherwise the blood would not have been received inside; and since Abaye concedes that the airspace inside is considered as inside, then

with regard to most sacred offerings as well

he should deem it valid when he hung the animal and received the blood, because

the airspace of the north is considered as the north.

Why, then, does Abaye disagree with Shmuel’s father, who deemed this valid?

Rather, Rava said: Both with regard to most sacred offerings and with regard to lesser sanctity offerings,

all the procedures

are valid,

including the case where he hung the animal and received the blood, because the airspace of the north is considered as the north, and there is no deficiency here in the manner of performing the service, nor is there a requirement of “alongside” with regard to receiving the blood. Likewise, when the slaughterer was hung and slaughtered, it is valid, because slaughter is not a service, and the requirement of “alongside” applies to the animal, not to the slaughterer,

except

outside

the case where he hung

the animal

and slaughtered it with regard to most sacred offerings,

which is invalid because slaughter must be performed alongside the altar. This is not the case with lesser sanctity offerings, for this requirement does not apply to them. Likewise, when

the priest was hung

the priest

and received

the blood, it is invalid

both with regard to most sacred offerings

and

with regard to lesser sanctity offerings,

since receiving the blood is a service, and this is not the manner of performing the service.

It follows that Rava agrees with Shmuel’s father with regard to all the laws, except that Shmuel’s father was not speaking about lesser sanctity offerings, and therefore he did not deem valid the case where he hung the animal and received the blood.

Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira:

If the priest receiving the blood was standing

inside

the Temple courtyard,

but his forelock

the hair of his head

was outside, what is the law?

He said to him

Rabbi Zeira:

Did you not say

with regard to an animal that is inside while its legs are outside, that it may not be slaughtered in this manner, since the verse states,

“And you shall bring them to it”

and this is expounded to mean:

until it comes entirely inside [

and Shmuel said likewise above]?

Here too,

with regard to the priest performing the service, it is stated [Exodus 28],

“When they enter the Tent of Meeting,”

and this is expounded to mean:

until he enters the Tent of Meeting in his entirety.

And whenever the hair of his head is outside, he has not entered the Tent of Meeting in his entirety. [ And from here we derive the law of the beraita cited above: that one who inserted his head and the majority of his body is considered as though he had not entered.]

Mishna:

The placement of the blood that was performed not in its proper place, for example:

if he placed

the blood

upon the ramp,

which is not the place for placing the blood.

Or if he placed it on the altar itself

not opposite the foundation,

meaning, on the southeastern corner, which had no foundation [and the blood of an olah must be placed on the wall of the altar opposite the foundation beneath it].

Or if

he placed the

blood whose proper placement is

below

above

the middle line,

above

the middle line. And likewise, if

the

blood whose proper placement is

above

he placed

below.

Or if the blood of those whose blood is

placed

inside

the Sanctuary he placed

outside,

on the outer altar.

Or if the blood of those whose blood is

placed

outside

he placed

inside

the Sanctuary.

The offering is therefore

disqualified, but there is no liability of karet

for eating it [and the Gemara explains what the tanna of the Mishna comes to teach by stating that there is no liability of karet for eating it].