Zevachim 27a — the Talmud in English

And if

he again thought

during an additional service that he would eat it

outside its place,

that is, outside the Temple courtyard,

the offering is invalid

by reason of the thought of outside its place,

and there is no karet for it

when eating it.

But if he thought during that same service the thought of pigul of

outside its time,

that he would sprinkle the blood or eat the offering not at its proper time, then it is

pigul, and one is liable to karet for it

for eating it.

And if, while performing the first service, he thought to give those [blood-gifts] whose place is above below, and those whose place is below above, and that that giving should be

the next day,

that is, outside its time, then the offering is

invalid,

but it is not pigul, so as to make one liable to karet for eating it, as will be explained.

He again thought

in the second service a thought of invalidity, after in the first service he had thought to give the blood on the next day on the altar not in its place, then

whether

he thought

outside its time or outside its place—

it is invalid, and there is no karet for it.

Since the offering became invalid during the first service with an invalidity that is not pigul, the law of pigul cannot take effect upon it, for one is liable to karet for pigul only if all its permitting elements were performed validly, without an additional thought of invalidity beyond the thought that makes it pigul.

And if

you say that giving blood on the altar

not in its place is considered as in its place,

and the owners achieved atonement, while only the meat was not permitted, it follows that when he thinks, concerning those [blood-gifts] whose place is above, to give them on the next day below, there is here a thought of sprinkling outside its time. Why, then, did the beraita use the expression “invalid”? Is

this “

invalid”

alone, and is one not liable to karet for eating it? It is

pigul,

and one is liable to karet for eating it, according to your words, that giving not in its place is considered as in its place!?

However, if giving not in its place is not considered as in its place, then he did not think at all a thought of sprinkling, and therefore there is no pigul in this.

And we answer:

Mar Zutra said:

Indeed, giving the blood not in its place is considered as in its place. And the reason that when he thought on the next day to give the blood not in its place the offering is not pigul is that

the sprinkling that permits the meat for eating,

that is, sprinkling in its place and at its proper time,

brings

only it brings the meat

to the status of pigul.

But

sprinkling that does not permit the meat for eating

if he were to perform it at its proper time

does not bring it to the status of pigul,

whether he thought concerning it a thought of pigul or whether, while performing it, he thought another thought of pigul. And since this sprinkling, concerning which he thought to perform it not in its place, does not permit the meat for eating, the offering does not become pigul through it, even though he thought in it a thought of outside its time.

Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: From where do you have this

that the offering does not become pigul through sprinkling that does not permit the meat, although the owners achieve atonement through it?

He said to him

Mar Zutra: Since it is stated [Leviticus 7]: “

And if he surely eats of the flesh of his peace-offering

on the third day,

it shall be pigul,” and “the soul that eats of it shall bear its iniquity.” And this is expounded as follows:

and the person who eats of it shall bear his iniquity.” And this is expounded as follows:

That whose pigul caused it

to prohibit the meat for eating—the soul that eats of it is liable to karet.

This one is excluded,

sprinkling on the altar not in its place,

whose pigul did not cause it

to be prohibited for eating,

but another prohibition did,

the fact that it was sprinkled not in its place, that is what

caused it; therefore the offering does not become pigul through that sprinkling even if they think in it a thought of outside its time.

And from this law—that sprinkling outside its place is not sprinkling that makes pigul—we learned that even if, at the time of receiving or conveying, he thought a thought of outside its time concerning sprinkling not in its place, the offering does not become pigul through this.

From this law—that a sprinkling outside its designated place is not a sprinkling that makes an offering piggul—we learn that even if, during the receiving or carrying of the blood, one formulated a thought of outside its designated time concerning a sprinkling not in its designated place, the offering does not become piggul through this. He explained this on the basis of what Rabbi Chaim said: The reason that a thought concerning a sprinkling makes an offering piggul is not that this is a thought concerning altar consumption outside its designated time. Rather, it is because the service itself becomes piggul when he thinks that the service will be performed outside its designated time. Accordingly, one can say that since the reason a sprinkling not in its designated place does not permit the meat is that, with regard to permitting the meat, the sprinkling itself is deficient—when it is performed not in its designated place, it is not a sprinkling with regard to permitting the meat—the verse “And if he indeed eats, etc., it is piggul” teaches that every sprinkling that is not considered a sprinkling with regard to the meat, although it provides atonement, is not considered a sprinkling with regard to the offering itself and therefore does not make it piggul. Once we have learned that this is not considered a sprinkling with regard to the offering itself, even if one thinks about such a sprinkling, he does not make the offering piggul, since he has not formulated a thought concerning a service that permits the offering itself.

And we raise an objection:

If so, it should not become invalid either!

For this sprinkling is not considered sprinkling with regard to a thought. And we answer:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is analogous to the thought of leaving,

for in any event he thought to leave the blood until the next day,

and in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that even if he did not think to throw the blood on the next day, but only to leave it without sprinkling, his thought invalidates the offering.

Resh Lakish said:

Our Mishna, which wrote concerning sprinkling not in its place that the offering is invalid,

means genuinely invalid,

and the owners likewise did not achieve atonement, and not as Shmuel interpreted the invalidity in the Mishna as applying to the meat—for the Mishna did not write that the invalidity applies specifically to the meat; but concerning the fundamental law he agrees with Shmuel,

that not in its place is considered as in its place

with regard to atonement, as was derived from the verse above.

And it is not difficult

with regard to the Mishna, which we learned says that it is entirely invalid, because

here,

where we derived from the verse that the owners achieved atonement, it is speaking of a case in which he

gave

the blood not in its place

in silence.

Whereas

here,

our Mishna, is dealing with a case in which he

gave

the blood not in its place

with a statement, in that he thought while sprinkling to eat the meat outside its time. Therefore the offering became invalid, since sprinkling not in its place is considered as in its place, and there is here a thought of invalidity concerning sprinkling.

But there is no karet for it, because this is not sprinkling that permits meat for eating, as was explained above.

And we raise an objection against Reish Lakish from that which

we learned:

He thought to place those whose placement is below above, and those whose placement is above below—as we raised the objection against Shmuel, since Reish Lakish holds like him. And likewise the second objection and all the discussion above

until

the words of the Gemara: “

as is the case with a thought of leaving it, and according to Rabbi Judah.”

Rabbi Yohanan said: both this,

our Mishna, which says that when it is placed not in its proper place it is “disqualified,”

and this,

the Mishna brought above, which says that when he placed it upon the ramp, if there is the blood of the life, the fit person should return and receive it—both deal with a case in which he

placed [a fit kohen!]

by a qualified priest

without intent,

without a disqualifying thought, and in both cases the offering is fit to be disqualified because of the very זריקה, which was not in its proper place, since

a זריקה not in its proper place is not considered as though it were in its proper place,

and is entirely invalid.

But this,

the Mishna that says, “if there is the blood of the life, the fit person should return and receive it,” deals with a case in which

there is the blood of the life,

and therefore it did not write “disqualified,” because it can still be made valid through the receiving and זריקה of other blood.

But this, our Mishna, deals with a case in which

our Mishna—deals with a case where

there is no blood of the life,

and therefore it wrote “disqualified,” because there is no longer any remedy for it.

And we raise an objection:

we learned

in our Mishna:

“disqualified, and there is no excision for it.”

Granted, according to Reish Lakish,

who established the statement of our Mishna as dealing with a case in which he placed it with a thought of piggul,

this is what it teaches

in the Mishna:

“disqualified, and there is no excision for it,”

to teach us a novel law concerning a זריקה not in its proper place: although it is considered as though it were in its proper place, nevertheless, since it does not permit the meat, it does not produce piggul.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that our Mishna deals with a case in which he placed it without intent, and that what is written, “disqualified,” is because a זריקה not in its proper place is not considered as though it were in its proper place,

what is the meaning of “

there is no excision for it”?

But surely it is obvious that there is no excision for it!?

And we conclude:

the matter is difficult.

And we raise an objection:

and according to Shmuel,

who likewise established the Mishna as dealing with a case in which he placed it without intent,

what is the meaning of “

there is no excision for it”?

And we answer:

this is what it is saying,

the tanna of the Mishna:

if he placed

the blood not in its proper place

with the thought

that he would eat the meat or burn the incense outside its designated time,

it is disqualified, and there is no excision for it.

And the novel point is as according to Reish Lakish. But according to Rabbi Yohanan, this cannot be answered in this manner, for according to him the reason that the tanna disqualified this זריקה is because a זריקה not in its proper place is not considered as though it were in its proper place; and it is obvious that it is impossible to produce piggul through this זריקה, since it is like placing the blood upon the floor, and there is no novelty in the fact that there is no excision for it.

And we raise an objection:

and as for Rabbi Yohanan, if

not in its proper place is not considered as though it were in its proper place,

and it is not a זריקה at all, why did our Mishna write “disqualified,” with no remedy for it? We established the Mishna as dealing with a case in which no blood of the life remained, but nevertheless,

let it be like when it was spilled

the blood

from the vessel

after it had been received into it,

onto the floor,

in which case its דין is that they collect it from the floor into the vessel,

and

also in the case of a זריקה not in its proper place,

let them collect it

from atop the altar and return and perform a זריקה in its proper place, for the first זריקה is nothing. [

And according to Shmuel and Reish Lakish, who hold that a זריקה not in its proper place is a זריקה with regard to the atonement of the owners, there is no difficulty, because since the זריקה was effective with regard to atonement, the blood has already been rejected and collecting it will not be effective to permit the meat for eating.]

And we answer: the tanna of our Mishna

holds in accordance with the one who says that once the blood has been זרק,

the blood

they may not collect it,

for even an invalid זריקה, once the blood has reached the altar, the altar has received it and removed it from any further effecting of atonement through it.

For Rav Yitzhak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: everyone agrees,

all the tannaim who dispute below,

with regard to

the bloods that

are placed above

the red line,

that he placed them above,

and likewise those that are placed

below

the red line,

that he placed them below,

if he placed them

not according to their mitzva,

such as with a disqualifying thought or with the left hand,

they may not collect it

in order to return and perform a זריקה, because once it was זרק in its proper place, the דין of זריקה has departed from it.

They disagree

the tannaim

only with regard to those whose placement is above, which he placed below,

and likewise those whose placement is

below, which he placed above, for Rabbi Yose says

even in this case

they may not collect it

from the altar into a vessel,

but Rabbi Shimon says: they may collect it!

And one cannot say that Rabbi Yose’s reason is because he holds that a זריקה not in its proper place is considered as though it were in its proper place, for if so, he should have said that the owners attained atonement through this placing, and he should not have disputed with Rabbi Shimon over this matter of whether they may collect it or not, but rather over whether the owners attained atonement or not. And since he did not dispute with Rabbi Shimon over this matter, it is necessarily the case that he holds that a זריקה not in its proper place is not considered as though it were in its proper place, and nevertheless, they may not collect it.