Zevachim 27a (כז.) — the Talmud in English

And if

he again formulated an intention

during another service that he would eat it ,

outside its designated place,

meaning outside the Temple courtyard,

the offering is disqualified

by the law of an intention concerning outside its designated place,

but there is no karet

for eating it.

However, if during that same service he formulated an intention of piggul concerning

outside its designated time,

that he would sprinkle the blood or eat the offering not at its proper time, it is

piggul, and one is liable to karet for it

for eating it.

And if, while performing the first service, he formulated an intention to place those blood applications that are to be performed above below, and those that are to be performed below above, and that the particular application should be

tomorrow,

meaning outside its designated time, the offering is

disqualified,

but it is not piggul, such that one is liable to karet for eating it, as will be explained.

He again formulated an intention

during the second service, an intention that disqualifies the offering, after during the first service he had formulated an intention to place the blood on the altar tomorrow, not in its designated place. In that case,

whether

he formulated an intention

concerning outside its designated time, or concerning outside its designated place—

it is disqualified, and there is no karet for it.

Since the offering was disqualified during the first service with a disqualification that is not piggul, the status of piggul cannot take effect upon it. For one is liable to karet for piggul only if all of its permitting factors were performed validly, without any additional disqualifying intention beyond the intention that renders it piggul.

And if

you say that placing blood on the altar

not in its designated place is considered like placing it in its designated place,

and the owners have achieved atonement, with only the meat remaining prohibited, then when one formulates an intention concerning blood applications that are to be performed above, to perform them below tomorrow, there is an intention concerning sprinkling outside its designated time. Why, then, did the beraita use the expression “disqualified”? Is

this “

disqualified”

merely disqualified, with no liability to karet for eating it? It is

piggul,

and according to your statement, one is liable to karet for eating it, since placing the blood not in its designated place is considered like placing it in its designated place!

However, if placing it not in its designated place is not considered like placing it in its designated place, then he did not formulate an intention concerning sprinkling at all, and therefore this does not constitute piggul.

The Gemara answers:

Mar Zutra said:

Indeed, placing the blood not in its designated place is considered like placing it in its designated place. The reason that when one formulates an intention to place the blood not in its designated place tomorrow the offering is not piggul is that

it is the sprinkling that permits the meat to be eaten,

meaning sprinkling in its designated place and at its designated time, that

brings

the meat

to the status of piggul.

But

sprinkling that does not permit the meat to be eaten,

if it were performed at its proper time,

does not bring it to the status of piggul,

whether one formulated an intention concerning that sprinkling or whether, while performing it, one formulated another intention of piggul. And since this sprinkling, which he intended to perform not in its designated place, does not permit the meat to be eaten, the offering does not become piggul through it, despite the fact that he formulated an intention concerning outside its designated time.

Rav Ashi said to Mar Zutra: From where do you derive this

that the offering does not become piggul through sprinkling that does not permit the meat, although the owners achieve atonement through it?

He said to him:

Mar Zutra said: It is as it is stated [Leviticus 7]: “

And if he eats, he shall eat of the flesh of his sacrifice of peace-offerings

on the third day—

it is piggul

and the person who eats of it shall bear his iniquity.” And it is expounded as follows:

The one whose piggul caused it

to become prohibited for consumption—the person who eats of it becomes liable to karet.

This one is excluded,

the sprinkling on the altar not in its designated place,

whose piggul did not cause it

to become prohibited for consumption,

but another prohibition did,

namely, that it was sprinkled not in its designated place; that is what

caused it

to become prohibited. The offering therefore does not become piggul through that sprinkling even if one formulates an intention concerning outside its designated time.

From this law—that sprinkling outside its designated place is not sprinkling that renders an offering piggul—we learn that even if, during receiving or carrying the blood, one formulated an intention concerning outside its designated time with regard to sprinkling not in its designated place, the offering does not become piggul through this.

The Gemara raises an objection:

If so, it should not become disqualified either!

For this sprinkling is not considered sprinkling with regard to intention. The Gemara answers:

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: It is analogous to an intention to leave it,

since in any event he intended to leave the blood until tomorrow,

and this is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda,

who holds that even if one did not formulate an intention to sprinkle the blood tomorrow, but only to leave it without sprinkling, his intention disqualifies the offering.

Resh Lakish said:

Our Mishna, which states concerning sprinkling not in its designated place that the offering is disqualified, means

actually disqualified,

and even the owners have not achieved atonement; this is unlike Shmuel, who interpreted the Mishna as referring to the meat, since the Mishna did not state specifically that the meat is disqualified. Nevertheless, he agrees with Shmuel concerning the fundamental law:

placing it not in its designated place is considered like placing it in its designated place

with regard to atonement, as derived earlier from the verse.

And it is not difficult

that the Mishna states that the offering is entirely disqualified, because

here,

where we derived from the verse that the owners achieve atonement, it is speaking of a case in which he

placed

the blood not in its designated place

silently.

Whereas

here,

our Mishna, is dealing with a case in which he

placed

the blood not in its designated place

with a statement,

meaning that while sprinkling he formulated an intention to eat the meat outside its designated time. The offering is therefore disqualified, since sprinkling not in its designated place is considered like sprinkling in its designated place, and there is an intention that disqualifies the offering concerning the sprinkling. But there is no liability to karet for it, since this is not sprinkling that permits meat to be eaten, as explained above.

And we raise an objection against Reish Lakish from that which

we learned:

If one intended to place those bloods that are to be placed below above, or those that are to be placed above below, as we raised the objection against Shmuel, since Reish Lakish agrees with him. The second question as well, and the entire discussion above,

until the words of the Gemara:

“

It is comparable to the intention to leave, and according to Rabbi Yehuda.”

Rabbi Yohanan said: Both this:

our Mishna, which says that when the blood is placed not in its designated place it is “disqualified,”

and this:

the Mishna cited above, which says that if he placed it on the ramp, then, if there remains blood of the life-blood, a qualified priest should return and receive it—both deal with a case in which he

placed [the blood]

a qualified priest

silently, without a disqualifying intention. In both cases, the offering is fit to become disqualified because of the application itself, which was not in its designated place, since

of disqualification. In both cases, the offering is fit to be disqualified because of the act of sprinkling itself, which was not performed in its proper place, since

an application not in its designated place is not considered as though it were in its designated place

and is entirely invalid.

But this:

the Mishna that says, “if there remains blood of the life-blood, a qualified priest should return and receive it,” deals with a case in which

there is blood of the life-blood,

and therefore it did not say “disqualified,” because it can still be rendered valid through the receiving and application of other blood.

This:

our Mishna deals with a case in which

there is no blood of the life-blood,

and therefore it says “disqualified,” because there is no further remedy for it.

And we raise an objection:

we learned

in our Mishna:

“Disqualified, but there is no karet for it.”

Granted, according to Reish Lakish,

who interpreted our Mishna as dealing with a case in which he applied the blood with a piggul intention,

this is why it teaches

in the Mishna

“disqualified, but there is no karet for it”: to teach us a novel point concerning an application not in its designated place. Although it is considered as though it were in its designated place, nevertheless, since it does not render the meat permitted, it does not cause piggul.

to teach us a novel law concerning a זריקה not in its proper place: although it is considered as though it were in its proper place, nevertheless, since it does not permit the meat, it does not produce piggul.

But according to Rabbi Yohanan,

who holds that our Mishna deals with a case in which he applied the blood silently, and that the statement “disqualified” is because an application not in its designated place is not considered as though it were in its designated place,

what does it mean by “

there is no karet for it”?

It is obvious that there is no karet for it!

And we conclude:

The difficulty remains.

And we raise a further objection:

And according to Shmuel,

who likewise interpreted the Mishna as dealing with a case in which he applied the blood silently,

what does it mean by “

there is no karet for it”?

And we answer:

This is what

the tanna of the Mishna

said:

If he applied the blood not in its designated place

with the intention

of eating the meat or burning the offering beyond its allotted time,

it is disqualified, but there is no karet for it.

The novel point is the same as according to Reish Lakish. But according to Rabbi Yohanan, this answer cannot be given, since according to him the tanna disqualified this application because an application not in its designated place is not considered as though it were in its designated place. It is obvious that this application cannot cause piggul, since it is like placing the blood on the floor, and there is nothing novel in the fact that there is no karet for it.

We raise a further objection:

And Rabbi Yohanan, if

the application

not in its designated place is not considered as though it were in its designated place,

and is not an application at all, why did our Mishna say “disqualified,” leaving it without a remedy? We did indeed establish that the Mishna deals with a case in which no blood of the life-blood remains, but nevertheless,

let it be like blood that was spilled

the blood

from the vessel

after it had been received into it

onto the floor,

the law of which is that it should be gathered from the floor into the vessel,

and

even in the case of an application not in its designated place,

let him gather it

from atop the altar and return and apply it in its designated place, since the first application was of no consequence.

[According to Shmuel and Reish Lakish, who hold that an application not in its designated place is an application with regard to the atonement of the owners, there is no difficulty, because since the application was effective with regard to atonement, the blood has already been rejected and gathering it in order to render the meat permitted for eating will not be effective.]

And we answer: The tanna of our Mishna

holds in accordance with the one who says

that once the blood

has been applied, it may not be gathered,

because even an invalid application, once the blood has reached the altar, is seized by the altar, which removes it from any further capacity to effect atonement.

For Rav Yitzhak bar Yosef said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Everyone agrees

all the tannaim who dispute below

with regard to

the bloods

that are to be placed above

the red line,

that if he placed them above,

and likewise with regard to those that are to be placed

below

the red line,

that if he placed them below,

if he placed them

not in accordance with their mitzva,

for example, with a disqualifying intention or with the left hand,

he may not gather it

in order to return and apply it, because once it was applied in its designated place, the status of an application has been removed from it.

They disagree

the tannaim

only with regard to those that are to be placed above, which he placed below,

and likewise with regard to those that are to be placed

below, which he placed above; for Rabbi Yose says

even in this case

he may not gather it

from the altar into a vessel,

whereas Rabbi Shimon says: He may gather it!

One cannot say that Rabbi Yose’s reason is that he holds that an application not in its designated place is considered as though it were in its designated place, for if so, he should have said that the owners achieved atonement through this application; he should not have disputed Rabbi Shimon over the issue of whether it may be gathered, but rather over whether the owners achieved atonement. Since he did not dispute Rabbi Shimon on this matter, it is necessarily the case that he holds that an application not in its designated place is not considered as though it were in its designated place, and nevertheless, it may not be gathered.