Zevachim 15a (טו.) — the Talmud in English

According to the view of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that transport not performed on foot is not considered transport, the Gemara discusses the status of transport performed not on foot by a kohen, or even by a non-kohen who is disqualified from performing transport: whether

it can be rectified by returning the blood to its previous location and transporting it anew by a kohen who walks,

by returning the blood to its previous location and then carrying it again by a kohen who walks,

or it cannot be rectified,

because the service of transport has already been performed in a disqualified manner.

Come and hear: A qualified person received

the blood

and gave

it

to a disqualified person.

The blood did not become disqualified when the qualified person passed it to the disqualified person, even though that passing constitutes transport not performed on foot; rather, there is a way to rectify it:

the disqualified person should return

it

to the qualified person,

and the qualified person should transport it to the altar.

The Gemara infers:

And even if you say that the qualified person should return and receive it

from the disqualified person,

if it enters your mind

that transport not performed on foot

cannot be rectified,

then

it has become disqualified

the transport when the qualified person passed it to the disqualified person, because that passing is considered transport not performed on foot, and it can no longer be rectified. Necessarily, then, it can be rectified.

And we reject this:

Do you think that the

same

non-kohen

to whom they passed the blood was standing

inside,

on the side of the altar, so that the passing to him constituted disqualified transport?

No,

that is not the case. Rather, it is a case

where the non-kohen was standing

on the side of

the outside,

on the opposite side from the altar and beyond it. Consequently, that passing was not transport at all, since he was taking the blood farther from the altar; the service of transport applies only when he brings the blood toward the altar by transporting it. Since no transport at all took place here, it is possible to rectify the matter by taking the blood from the disqualified person and transporting it anew to the altar by a qualified kohen.

Another version

It was stated: Ulla said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Transport not performed on foot is disqualified!

According to this version, there is no place to discuss whether it can be rectified, since Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the transport is “disqualified,” [rather than “it is not considered transport”].

Apparently, it cannot be rectified!

Rav Naḥman raised an objection to Ulla:

We learned below [32a]:

If

the blood [after it had been received in a vessel]

spilled from the vessel onto the floor, and they gathered it up—

it is valid!

Rav Naḥman assumed that this applies even when, as the blood spilled onto the ground, it spread in the direction of the altar, thereby constituting transport not performed on foot; nevertheless, we learned that it is valid by returning it to a vessel and transporting it anew from the place where it initially spilled onto the ground. This presents a difficulty to Ulla’s alternative version. And we answer:

The case here is

What are we dealing with here? With a case in which

the blood

went outward,

so that when it spilled from the vessel onto the ground, the blood spread farther away from the altar. Since it moved away from it, this is not considered transport having been performed with the blood.

And we challenge this: Does blood that spills onto the ground

go outward

only,

and

does it

not enter inward?

It is impossible that clear blood spilled onto the ground would not spread both outward and inward.

And we answer: It is a case in which it spilled in

a sloping place,

and therefore it spread only outward.

Alternatively, it spilled

in

a depression,

and did not spread either outward or inward; therefore it did not become disqualified on account of transport not performed on foot.

Alternatively, it is a case involving thick blood,

blood that is thick and about to clot, which does not spread toward the outside or toward the inside of the Temple courtyard.

And we challenge this:

D

o

the tanna take the trouble to teach all these

cases, until he teaches you that it is valid only in these circumstances—when the blood spilled outward, when it spilled into a depression, or when it was thick—but not when it spilled inward?

Furthermore,

if the tanna’s intention was that spilling is valid specifically in these circumstances,

why, when he teaches in the other chapter [below 25a],

[below, 25a],

if

the blood spills from the animal’s neck

onto the floor, and they gather it up—

it is disqualified,

because it was not initially received in a vessel—

should he not distinguish within that case itself,

in what we learned in the third chapter [in the Mishna cited by Rav Naḥman], and state that when the blood was initially received in a vessel and afterward spilled from the vessel onto the floor, the blood is valid, and state as follows:

When are these words said,

that it can be gathered up and will be valid?

When it went

out and spread

outward; but

if it spread and

entered inward,

then it is

disqualified

on account of transport not performed on foot.

Since this distinction was not taught, it follows that whether the blood spread inward or whether it spread outward, it can be gathered up and there is a remedy for it, even though transport not performed on foot occurred with it. It follows that this Mishna constitutes

a refutation

of Ulla, who said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan that transport not performed on foot is disqualified.

It was stated: Transporting without walking –

the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis

is this. Their dispute in the Mishna, whether an intention invalidates the offering during the act of transporting, is not a dispute as to whether transporting is considered an avoda, since

with extensive transporting,

when one transports from a place distant from the altar,

everyone agrees

that the transporting is considered an avoda, and therefore all agree that if he formulated an invalidating intention during it,

it is invalid

—that transporting, like any invalid avoda.

They disagree with regard to limited transporting,

when one slaughters close to the altar and extends the blood in his hand to the altar, without walking with his feet.

The Rabbis hold that transporting without walking is an avoda, and therefore an intention invalidates the offering during it. Rabbi Shimon, by contrast, holds that transporting without walking is not considered transporting, and therefore he deems the offering fit even when one formulates an invalidating intention during it .

And the Lechem Mishneh [ Maimonides, Laws of Disqualified Offerings 1:23] explained this passage in three ways. The first is like Rashi, with the addition that the term “limited” was used to indicate that the dispute is specifically in a case where he slaughtered close to the altar. In that case the Rabbis disagree with Rabbi Shimon and hold that it is considered transporting even when he performs it without walking, because that is its normal manner. But when he slaughtered far away, even the Rabbis agree that transporting without walking is not transporting. The explanation of Rav Pappa’s difficulty from the Mishna is like the difficulty of the Shita Mekubetzet: The Mishna implies that he disputes the matter of “walking.” The second is like the above explanation of the Shita Mekubetzet. Accordingly, he explained that although the initial assumption understood the Mishna as referring to a case in which one slaughtered beside the altar and transported the blood by walking even though this was unnecessary, Rav Pappa nevertheless found difficulty in the plain wording of the Mishna, whose implication is that he slaughtered far from the altar and Rabbi Shimon deemed the offering fit because he could have dispensed with the transporting by slaughtering close to the altar. [This is also the view of the Shita Mekubetzet, section 7.] The third is that both “extensive” and “limited” transporting refer to transporting without walking. The issue is not whether an intention invalidates the offering during the transporting, but the intrinsic invalidity of transporting itself when done without walking. Extensive transporting is invalid according to everyone, because it is not normally performed without walking. With regard to limited transporting they disagree: According to Rabbi Shimon, even if one slaughtered beside the altar, if he did not walk, it is invalid, because transporting is important only when done by walking; according to the Rabbis it is valid, since it is normally performed in this manner, and even when done without walking it is considered transporting. He rejected this explanation because, if so, there is no explanation for Rav Pappa’s difficulty: In the Mishna they did not dispute transporting without walking, since Rabbi Shimon deemed the offering fit because he could have slaughtered beside the altar. The implication is that he slaughtered far away and transported the blood by walking. In the West they laughed at this [

in Eretz Yisrael they disputed this statement]: If limited transporting without walking, when one is standing near the altar, is not considered transporting according to Rabbi Shimon, even though it cannot be dispensed with, the following difficulty arises:

Rather, in the case of a bird sin-offering,

whose blood is sprinkled on the altar by the priest holding its body and spraying its blood from its slaughtered neck onto the altar, and it is established

that an intention invalidates the offering during it,

during that sprinkling [even though he does not transport the blood by walking, but stands close to the altar and sprinkles it from the bird’s body],

according to Rabbi Shimon, how can this be found?

For its sprinkling can be invalidated by an intention only because it is limited transporting, and it follows that he is formulating an intention during transporting.

For whichever way one looks at it,

if he formulated an intention concerning it before the blood emerges,

when he moves the body of the bird sin-offering so that its blood will be sprayed, and this movement has the status of transporting, you have said that limited transporting

is nothing at all

according to Rabbi Shimon.

And if

he formulated an intention concerning it

after the blood emerged,

at the time when it is sprayed from the neck toward the altar,

its mitzva has already been performed for him [

the questioner understood that the sprinkling ends at the moment the blood is sprayed from the bird’s neck], and an intention can no longer invalidate the offering through it?

And

we ask:

What is the difficulty

here?!

Perhaps

the reference is to a case in which he formulated an intention

from the moment it emerged

the blood of the sin-offering from the bird’s neck

until it reaches the altar,

and from the moment the blood leaves the bird’s neck, the avoda of transporting ends and the avoda of sprinkling begins, continuing until the blood reaches the altar. Therefore, one who formulates an invalidating intention at that time is formulating it during the avoda of sprinkling and not during transporting, and Rabbi Shimon agrees that one who formulates an intention during sprinkling invalidates the offering.

The proof that the sprinkling of the blood is considered a continuous sprinkling, from the time it is sprayed until it reaches the wall of the altar, is as follows:

For Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If one was sprinkling

from the blood of a bird sin-offering on the outer altar, or if he was sprinkling the blood of the bull in the Sanctuary opposite the curtain,

and the hand of the one sprinkling was severed before the blood reached the airspace of the altar, what is the law?

Is the sprinkling of the blood considered an avoda until the blood reaches the altar, so that the avoda was performed while the priest was physically blemished and is therefore invalid? Or was the avoda of sprinkling already completed when the priest sprinkled, so that he became physically blemished only after the avoda had been completed?

And he said to him,

Rabbi Zeira: It is

invalid.

What is the reason?

Because, with regard to a bird sin-offering, it is stated:

“And he shall sprinkle

from the blood,” and immediately afterward it is stated:

“And he shall place

the priest from the blood.” And we derive:

“And he shall sprinkle”

is required to be analogous to

“and he shall place”;

we require

that, as long as the blood has not been placed on the altar, the avoda of sprinkling is still continuing. Consequently, even according to Rabbi Shimon there is a case in which an intention formulated during sprinkling invalidates a bird sin-offering—for example, when he formulated the intention between the spraying and the blood’s reaching the altar!

When Rav Pappa and Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, came from the house of study, they said: This is the very laughter

“in the West”:

And

when it is

extensive transporting,

far from the altar,

they do not disagree,

Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis?!

But when they disagree, they disagree with regard to extensive transporting!

For Rabbi Shimon’s reason that walking does not invalidate the offering is that “it is possible without walking,” which proves that he means even extensive transporting, but he deems the offering fit because it could have been performed through limited transporting!

Rather,

it must necessarily be said that

with regard to limited transporting, everyone agrees that it invalidates the offering,

because it cannot be dispensed with.

They disagree with regard to extensive transporting,

as the Rabbis invalidate the offering, while Rabbi Shimon deems it fit because it can be dispensed with.

Carried it

a non-priest [for the blood] on foot,

and a priest returned it

to the place of slaughter,

and he again carried it

the priest to the altar,

the sons of Rabbi Ḥiyya and Rabbi Yannai disagree about it

and what they said above, that carrying by a non-priest is invalid, refers to a case where the priest did not return it]:

one says it is valid, and one says it is invalid.

And the Gemara explains the basis of their disagreement:

One Master holds that it can be rectified

the carrying performed by an invalid person. The reason it is impossible to return and rectify slaughter, receiving, or sprinkling performed by an invalid person is that one cannot return and slaughter or return and sprinkle, because there is no blood remaining. But if the blood of the soul remains, it is indeed possible to return and receive it through a fit person and to sprinkle the blood.

And one Master holds that it cannot be rectified!

Once the service was performed in an invalid manner, the offering became disqualified and is no longer fit for rectification.

A priest carried it

first to the blood,

and returned it

to its place without sprinkling its blood on the altar,

and a non-priest again carried it

to the altar—

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: According to the one who declares valid

a case where a non-priest carried it first, the priest returned it, and the priest then carried it again,

he declares invalid

this case, because according to him the second carrying is primary, for through it he rendered the service valid, as in the case where the priest returned it and carried it again. Therefore, in a case where the priest carried it first, returned it, and the final carrying was performed by a non-priest, he will declare it invalid.

But

according to the one who declares invalid

a case where a non-priest carried it first, because the first carrying is primary, here he necessarily

declares valid,

because in his view the first carrying determines the status of the carrying. Here, since it was performed by a priest, it is irrelevant that it was returned to its original place and that a non-priest carried it at the end.

Rava said: Even according to the one who declares invalid

a case where a non-priest carries it first,

it is invalid

here, even though the priest carried it first.

What is the reason? —

For

after he returned the blood to its original place,