Zevachim 14b — the Talmud in English

Rav Sheshet raised an objection: An alien and an acute mourner, ![](pamud.bmp "

exact column location")

a drunk and one with a blemish, —

whether

in receiving,

whether

in conveying,

whether

in casting,

he is

invalid.

And likewise,

one who performs the service while

sitting invalidates the service,

and likewise one who performs his service with his

left

hand.

left hand.

Tiyuvta

against Rav Hisda, who declared conveying valid when performed by an alien! And we ask:

But Rav Hisda cited a verse?!

And we answer: This verse is not dealing with conveying, but

that they would perform

the alien slaughterers

merely an “auction-platform procedure,”

for the slaughterers would stand beside the priest who had received the blood, and the priest would hand them the vessel containing the blood so that they would hold it in their hands and wait in their place until one of the priests took it from their hands and conveyed it for casting, and it was thus found that those aliens had performed no act of conveying at all.

Rabba and Rav Yosef both said —

conveying by an alien,

whether it is valid or invalid, is a dispute between

Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis:

Rabbi Shimon, who said

in our Mishna that a thought does not invalidate in conveying, holds that

a service that can be dispensed with is not a service.

It follows that in his view conveying is

valid

even

when performed by an alien.

But

according to the Rabbis,

who said that a thought invalidates in conveying, it necessarily follows that even a service that can be dispensed with is considered a service, and in their view conveying by an alien is

invalid.

Abaye said to them,

to Rabba and Rav Yosef:

But slaughtering, which is a service that cannot be dispensed with,

is, and nevertheless it is

valid when performed by an alien

according to everyone. If so, it is not necessary that, according to the Rabbis, conveying by an alien should be invalid because it is considered a service.

They said to him: Slaughtering is not a service!

The proof that slaughtering is not called a service is that all invalid persons are valid for slaughtering. But conveying, in which the invalid persons were not rendered valid, is called a service. Therefore an alien is invalid in it according to the Rabbis, and only according to Rabbi Shimon is an alien valid in it, because he held that every service that can be dispensed with is not called a service.

And we ask:

And

slaughtering

not

considered a “service”?

But Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav: The slaughtering of a red cow

red

by an alien —

is invalid, and Rav said concerning it [in explanation of the invalidity of an alien in the slaughtering of a red cow]:

why does slaughtering by an alien invalidate? Because

“Elazar”

and “

statute”

are written concerning it,

and everywhere that “statute” is stated, it teaches that the law is indispensable: this service must be performed precisely as stated in the passage, namely, that the slaughterer be like “Elazar,” who is a priest, and not an alien. But if slaughtering is not called a service, and therefore an alien is valid for it, how can the slaughtering of a red cow be invalid when performed by an alien?

And it might have been thought that the slaughtering of a red cow is governed by the law of slaughtering offerings, and if slaughtering of offerings is not considered a service, then in the case of the cow too it should not be considered a service; if so, why should an alien be invalid in it?

And we answer:

The slaughtering

of a

red cow

is different, for it is not like the slaughtering of offerings, and an alien is not invalid in it because

it belongs to the offerings of the treasury of the Temple.

It has no sanctity of the altar, and it is not applicable to regard it as a “service.” Rather, it is a scriptural decree that its slaughtering be invalid when performed by an alien, even though it is not included among the services of offerings; and one cannot infer from it concerning the slaughtering of an offering.

And we ask:

Is it not all the more so

that slaughtering is considered a “service”? The red cow, which

is an offering of the treasury of the Temple,

its slaughtering is

a service

since an alien is invalid in it;

offerings of the altar,

which are more stringent than it,

are they not

all the more so such that their slaughtering

is a service?!

And we answer:

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said:

There is room to say that the slaughtering of a red cow must be performed by a priest even though it is an offering of the treasury of the Temple and is not a service,

just as with the examination of afflictions, which is not a service,

and nevertheless

requires priesthood — only a priest can declare the affliction impure or pure. The same applies to the slaughtering of a red cow: the Torah rendered only a priest fit for it, even though it is not included among the services of offerings. Therefore one cannot infer from it that the slaughtering of offerings is a service.

And we ask:

But what of conveying the limbs

of the offering

to the ramp

of the altar,

which is a service that can be dispensed with

since it is possible to flay and dismember the limbs near the altar without needing to convey them,

and it is invalid when performed by an alien, as it is written, “

And the priest shall bring all of it, and burn it on the altar,”

and the Master said —

this is conveying the limbs to the ramp

of the altar! What is the distinction between conveying the limbs and conveying the blood, which Rabbi Shimon rendered valid when performed by an alien?

And we answer:

Where the verse explicitly states

that a kohen must perform it, even though it is a service that can be dispensed with,

it explicitly states this;

therefore, carrying the limbs requires a kohen.

But where it does not explicitly state this

—for example, in carrying the blood—

it does not explicitly state this,

and logically it is valid for a non-kohen to perform it, because it is a service that can be dispensed with and is therefore not considered a service!

And we challenge this:

Is this not all the more so

that carrying the blood should be considered a service?

For if carrying the limbs to the ramp, which does not prevent atonement,

since even if the limbs of the offering are not burned on the altar, the owner of the offering achieves atonement through the sprinkling of the blood, and nevertheless

requires

the carrying of the limbs

to be performed by a kohen,

because it is considered a service;

carrying the blood,

which is more stringent than it,

because it prevents atonement,

as without carrying the blood, the blood cannot be properly accepted through sprinkling and the owner of the offering cannot achieve atonement,

all the more so

should be considered a service and must specifically be performed by a kohen!?

This a-fortiori inference proves that the view of Rabba and Rav Yosef is not correct. They thought that, according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that an improper intention does not invalidate the carrying, a non-kohen is likewise valid to perform the carrying because it is not considered a service. Rather, carrying is considered a service even according to Rabbi Shimon, and therefore it must be performed by a kohen.

The reason that an improper intention does not invalidate the carrying is that an intention invalidates only a service upon which the offering’s becoming permitted to be eaten depends. Although carrying is a service, it does not prevent the offering from becoming permitted to be eaten, because it is a service that can be dispensed with.

It was also stated: Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said—

carrying performed by a non-kohen is invalid even according to

the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon,

who holds that an improper intention during the carrying does not invalidate the offering, for the reason explained above.

They raised a question: If the carrying was not

performed by the kohen through walking

on foot,

but he carried the blood in his hand and brought it closer to the altar while he himself remained standing in his place—does this

have the status of carrying,

so that it must be performed by a kohen [according to both the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon], and according to the Rabbis an improper intention invalidates the offering during it ,

or does it not have the status of carrying,

and an improper intention does not invalidate the offering during it [and it is valid when performed by a non-kohen], although according to the Rabbis he must carry the blood again?

Come and hear a proof:

We learned the following:

“And likewise one who is sitting, and likewise one who uses his left hand,

is invalid both for carrying and for sprinkling.” Seemingly, the invalidity of one who carries while sitting is due to the disqualification of “sitting,” and not because he is not carrying the blood with his feet. It follows that

if

he carries while

standing, in the same manner as one who is sitting—

that is, he does not carry the blood while walking on his feet, but stands in his place and carries it in his hand—

he is valid. This is because only the disqualification of “sitting” is a deficiency in carrying, whereas one who stands and carries the blood in his hand is not disqualified. It therefore follows that handing over the blood is considered carrying!

And we reject this: Even when he stands in his place and carries the blood in his hand, it is never considered carrying. As for what we learned, that one who is “sitting” is invalid,

perhaps it is referring to a case where he moves his body while sitting,

for perhaps

he moves his body while remaining seated,

dragging himself along,

rubbing and scraping himself against the ground and thereby bringing the blood closer to the altar. Therefore, his only disqualification is that of “sitting.” Indeed, if he were

standing

in the same manner as

one who is sitting,

that is, if he did not walk but merely

moved a little

by dragging and rubbing his feet against the ground, his carrying would be valid. But when he does not move himself at all, and merely stands in his place and hands over the blood, this is not carrying .

Come and hear a proof:

For we learned in the order of the offering of the Paschal offering:

“A Jew slaughtered

the Paschal offering,

and a kohen received

the blood;

the kohen who received it gave it

to

his fellow

the kohen;

and his fellow gave it to his fellow,”

and so on. There were rows of kohanim standing from the place of slaughter to the altar, until the blood reached the kohen nearest the altar, who sprinkled it. This proves that handing the blood over by hand is considered carrying .

And we reject this: There too, the case is one where they move a little

with their feet, and the service of carrying is thereby fulfilled .

And what does this teach us?

If that is how they performed it, is it not obvious that this is carrying? The novelty is that it is proper to arrange many kohanim for the Paschal offering, because

the greater the number of people performing a mitzva, the greater the honor of the King!

Come and hear a proof: A valid kohen received

the blood

and gave

it by extending his hand

to an invalid person—

he must return

the blood,

and the invalid person must hand it

to a valid kohen,

who returns it

to the place where the valid kohen had stood when he gave the blood to the invalid person. The valid kohen then carries it again from his original place to the altar. If handing the blood by hand were considered carrying, and it were unnecessary to carry specifically on foot, why can the valid kohen not proceed and take it from the invalid person and carry it from the invalid person’s place to the altar? After all, the valid kohen had already handed the blood as far as the invalid person’s place. Rather, it must be that the handing over performed by the valid kohen when he gave the blood by hand to the invalid person is not considered carrying, because it was not performed on foot !

the disqualified person and extends it

to one who is valid,

to the place where the valid kohen had stood when he gave the blood to the disqualified person, and the valid kohen carries it again from his original place of standing to the altar. If extending it by hand were considered carrying, and it were not necessary to carry specifically on foot, why can the valid kohen not advance, take it from the disqualified person, and carry it from the disqualified person’s place to the altar? After all, the valid kohen had already extended the blood to the place of the disqualified person. Rather, it must be that the extension by which the valid kohen gave the blood by hand to the disqualified person is not considered carrying, because it was not performed on foot !

And we reject this:

say—

the fit one should return and receive it

from the place of the disqualified one, for the handing over that the first fit one handed over to the disqualified one is considered conveyance. [And this refers to a case in which the disqualified one does not hand the blood over to the fit one, but merely holds it in his hand, and the fit one takes it from him] .

It was stated: Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: Conveyance not on foot is not deemed conveyance;

and therefore an invalid thought does not invalidate it or make it piggul.