Zevachim 14b (יד:) — the Talmud in English

Rav Sheshet raised an objection: An unauthorized person and an onein,

a drunkard and one with a physical defect,—

whether

in receiving

whether

in conveying

whether

in sprinkling,

he is

disqualified.

And likewise,

one who performs the service while

sitting

invalidates the service,

and likewise,

one who performs his service with his

left hand.

Tiyuvta

against Rav Ḥisda, who deemed conveying by an unauthorized person valid! And we challenge this:

But Rav Ḥisda cited a verse?!

And we answer: This verse is not referring to conveying; rather,

they performed

the unauthorized slaughterers

merely an “act of a platform”,

as the slaughterers would stand beside the koen who had received the blood, and the koen would hand them the vessel containing the blood so that they would hold it in their hands and wait in their place until one of the other kohanim took it from them and conveyed it for sprinkling , and it turned out that those unauthorized persons had performed no act of conveying at all.

Rabba and Rav Yosef both say—

conveying by an unauthorized person,

whether it is valid or invalid, is the subject of a dispute between

Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis:

Rabbi Shimon, who says

in our Mishna that an improper intention does not invalidate conveying, maintains that

a service that can be dispensed with is not considered a service.

It follows that in his view conveying is

valid

even

when performed by an unauthorized person.

But

according to the Rabbis,

who say that an improper intention invalidates conveying, a service that can be dispensed with must also be considered a service, and in their view conveying by an unauthorized person is

invalid.

Abaye said to them,

to Rabba and Rav Yosef:

But slaughtering is a service that cannot be dispensed with,

and nevertheless it is

valid when performed by an unauthorized person

according to everyone. If so, it is not necessarily the case that according to the Rabbis conveying by an unauthorized person is invalid because it is considered a service.

They said to him: Slaughtering is not a service!

The proof that slaughtering is not called a service is that all those disqualified for the service are valid for slaughtering. But conveying, for which those disqualified are not valid, is called a service. Therefore, according to the Rabbis, an unauthorized person is invalid for it; only according to Rabbi Shimon is an unauthorized person valid, because he holds that a service that can be dispensed with is not called a service.

And we challenge this:

And

slaughtering

not

considered a “service”?

But Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav: The slaughtering of the red heifer

is

by an unauthorized person—

is invalid, and Rav said concerning it [

in explaining why an unauthorized person’s slaughtering of the red heifer is invalid]: Why does the slaughtering of an unauthorized person invalidate it? Because

“Elazar”

and

“a statute”

are written with regard to it. Every place where “a statute” is stated teaches that the matter is indispensable: This service must be performed precisely as stated in the passage, meaning that the slaughterer must be like “Elazar,” who was a koen, and not an unauthorized person. But if slaughtering is not called a service, and therefore an unauthorized person is valid for it, how can the slaughtering of the red heifer be invalid when performed by an unauthorized person?

and everywhere that “statute” is stated, it teaches that the law is indispensable: this service must be performed precisely as stated in the passage, namely, that the slaughterer be like “Elazar,” who is a priest, and not an alien. But if slaughtering is not called a service, and therefore an alien is valid for it, how can the slaughtering of a red cow be invalid when performed by an alien?

And it might have been assumed that the slaughtering of the red heifer is governed by the law of slaughtering offerings; if slaughtering offerings is not considered a service, then slaughtering the heifer should likewise not be considered a service. If so, why should an unauthorized person be invalid for it?

And we answer:

The

slaughtering of the

red heifer

is different from the slaughtering of offerings, and an unauthorized person is not invalid for it because

it belongs to the consecrated property for Temple maintenance.

It does not possess the sanctity of the altar, and it is therefore not appropriate to consider it a “service.” Rather, it is a scriptural decree that its slaughtering is invalid when performed by an unauthorized person, even though it is not included among the services of offerings; one cannot derive from it anything concerning the slaughtering of an offering.

And we challenge this:

Is this not all the more so

that slaughtering should be considered a “service”? For if the red heifer, which

is consecrated property for Temple maintenance,

its slaughtering is

a service [

as evidenced by the fact that an unauthorized person is invalid for it], then offerings consecrated for the

altar,

which are more stringent than it,

is it not

all the more so that their slaughtering

is a service?!

And we answer:

Rav Shisha, son of Rav Idi, said:

There is room to say that the slaughtering of the red heifer must be performed by a koen even though it is consecrated property for Temple maintenance and is not a service,

just as with the examination of skin afflictions, which is not a service,

and nevertheless

requires kehunah—only a koen may declare the affliction impure or pure. The same applies to the slaughtering of the red heifer: Scripture made only a koen fit for it, even though it is not included among the services of offerings. Therefore, one cannot derive from it that the slaughtering of offerings is a service.

And we challenge this:

But what of conveying the limbs

of the offering

to the ramp

of the altar,

which is a service that can be dispensed with [

for one may flay and dismember the limbs near the altar, without needing to convey them]

and is invalid when performed by an unauthorized person, as it is written:

“And the koen shall bring all of it and burn it on the altar,”

and the Master said—

this refers to conveying the limbs to the ramp

of the altar! What, then, is the distinction between conveying the limbs and conveying the blood, which Rabbi Shimon rendered valid when performed by an unauthorized person?

And we answer:

Where the verse reveals

that a kohen must perform it, even though it is a service that can be dispensed with,

it reveals this;

therefore, the carrying of the limbs requires a kohen.

But where it does not reveal this [for example, in the carrying of the blood],

—for example, in carrying the blood—

it does not reveal this,

and logically it renders it valid for a non-kohen to perform it, since it is a service that can be dispensed with and is not considered a service!

And we challenge this:

Is this not all the more so

that the carrying of the blood should be considered a service?

And if the carrying of the limbs to the ramp, which does not prevent atonement,

since even if the limbs of the offering are not burned on the altar, the owner of the offering achieves atonement through the sprinkling of the blood, nevertheless

requires

the carrying of the limbs

to be performed by a kohen,

because it is considered a service;

the carrying of the blood,

which is more stringent than it,

as it prevents atonement,

since without carrying the blood, the blood cannot effect acceptance through sprinkling and the owner of the offering does not achieve atonement,

does it not follow all the more so

that it should be considered a service and must specifically be performed by a kohen!?

This kal va-chomer proves that the view of Rabba and Rav Yosef is incorrect. They held that according to Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that an improper intention does not invalidate the carrying, the same law applies that a non-kohen is valid to perform the carrying, because it is not considered a service. Rather, the carrying is considered a service even according to Rabbi Shimon, and therefore it must be performed by a kohen.

The reason that an improper intention does not invalidate the carrying is that an intention invalidates only a service upon which the offering’s permission to be eaten depends. Although the carrying is a service, it does not prevent the offering from becoming permitted for consumption, because it is a service that can be dispensed with.

It was likewise stated: Ulla said that Rabbi Elazar said:

The carrying performed by a non-kohen is invalid even according to

the opinion of

Rabbi Shimon,

who maintains that an improper intention at the time of carrying does not invalidate the offering, for the reason explained above.

They raised a dilemma before them: The carrying that was not performed

by the kohen through walking

on foot,

but he carried the blood in his hand and brought it closer to the altar [while he himself remained in his place]—does this

constitute carrying

and therefore must be performed by a kohen [both according to the Rabbis and according to Rabbi Shimon], and is an improper intention invalidating according to the Rabbis ,

or does it not constitute carrying ,

and an improper intention does not invalidate it [and it is valid when performed by a non-kohen], although according to the Rabbis he must carry the blood again?

Come and hear:

We learned:

“And likewise one who is sitting, and likewise the left hand

is invalid, both for carrying and for sprinkling.” Seemingly, the disqualification of one who carries while sitting is due to the disqualification of “sitting,” and not because he does not carry the blood with his feet. This implies that

if

he carries while

standing, analogous to sitting—

that is, he does not carry the blood while walking with his feet, but remains in his place and carries it by hand—

it is valid,

because only the disqualification of “sitting” constitutes a deficiency in carrying, but not when he is standing and carries it by hand. This proves that extending the blood by hand is considered carrying!

We reject this: Even when he stands in his place and carries it by hand, this is not considered carrying. And as for what we learned, that one who is “sitting” is invalid,

perhaps

it is referring to a case in which he moves his body while sitting,

for he scrapes himself along,

dragging and rubbing himself against the ground and thereby bringing the blood closer to the altar. Therefore, his entire disqualification is due to “sitting.” Indeed, had he been

standing,

analogous to

sitting

in such a manner, that he did not walk but merely

moved slightly

by dragging and rubbing his feet against the ground, his carrying would have been valid. But when he does not move himself at all, and merely stands in his place and extends the blood by hand, this is not carrying .

Come and hear:

For we learned concerning the order of offering the Paschal offering:

“A Jew slaughtered

the Paschal offering,

and the kohen received

the blood;

he gave it

the receiving kohen

to his fellow

the kohen;

and his fellow to his fellow

and so on. Rows of kohanim stood from the place of slaughter to the place of the altar, until the blood reached the kohen standing nearest to the altar, who sprinkled it. This proves that extending the blood by hand is considered carrying .

And we reject this:

There too,

the case is one in which they

moved slightly

with their feet, and the service of carrying was thereby fulfilled .

And what does it teach us,

for if this is how they acted, is it not obvious that this is carrying? The novelty is that it is appropriate to station many kohanim for the service of the Paschal offering, because

“the greater the number of people, the greater the honor of the King!”

Come and hear: A

kohen

who is valid

received the blood

and gave

it by extending his hand

to one who is disqualified—

he returns

the disqualified person and extends it

to one who is valid,

to the place where the valid kohen had stood when he gave the blood to the disqualified person, and the valid kohen carries it again from his original place of standing to the altar. If extending it by hand were considered carrying, and it were not necessary to carry specifically on foot, why can the valid kohen not advance, take it from the disqualified person, and carry it from the disqualified person’s place to the altar? After all, the valid kohen had already extended the blood to the place of the disqualified person. Rather, it must be that the extension by which the valid kohen gave the blood by hand to the disqualified person is not considered carrying, because it was not performed on foot !

And we reject this:

say instead:

the qualified person should return and receive it

from the place of the disqualified person, since the handing over that the first qualified person handed to the disqualified person is considered transport. [This is speaking of a case in which the disqualified person does not hand the blood to the qualified person, but merely holds it in his hand, and the qualified person takes it from him] .

It was stated: Ulla said that Rabbi Yohanan said: Transport without the feet is not considered transport

and therefore an invalidating thought does not disqualify the offering or render it piggul.