Zevachim 14a (יד.) — the Talmud in English

Every

sacrifice

whose

blood application

is not on the outer altar, like a peace-offering

[from which the law of pigul is derived],

does not involve pigul

at all!?

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the baraitot did not disagree as to whether one can create pigul through conveyance or not; in fact,

both this and that,

the two baraitot, follow the opinion of

the Rabbis,

who hold that one can create pigul through conveyance.

And it is not difficult—

Here, it is referring to external sin-offerings,

the immersion of the finger does not create pigul in them, because the service of immersing the finger in the blood does not apply to them. For it is stated with regard to them: “And he shall take,” and not, as with internal sin-offerings, “And he shall immerse.” Since, with external sin-offerings, there is no law of “immersing the finger” in the blood, but only of “taking the blood” with the finger in order to apply it to the altar, the thought of pigul during the immersion of the finger does not create pigul in them.

Here, it is referring to internal sin-offerings,

where immersion of the finger in the blood is part of the service prescribed for them, as it is stated with regard to them: “And he shall immerse.” Therefore, immersion of the finger accompanied by a thought of pigul creates pigul in them, just as a thought of pigul during conveyance does.

And we challenge this: How can it be said that the baraita which holds that immersion of the finger does not create pigul is referring to external sin-offerings? With regard to external sin-offerings,

it is obvious

that immersion of the finger does not create pigul,

as it is not written concerning them

“And he shall immerse,”

and since immersion of the finger is not included among the services prescribed for them, there would be no need to teach us that it does not create pigul.

And we answer: Although “And he shall immerse” was not stated with regard to external sin-offerings,

it was necessary

for the tanna to teach us that it does not create pigul, because

it might enter your mind to say: Since it is written

with regard to external sin-offerings:

“And the priest shall take some of its blood with his finger,”

this indicates that the priest himself must take some of the blood with his finger.

And if a monkey were to come

and take some of the blood

and place it on his hand

[and place it upon the priest’s finger], the priest could not apply it upon the altar. Rather,

the priest would need

himself

to take

some of the blood

another time,

so that the taking would be performed with the priest’s finger. Since the priest’s taking with his finger is impossible without immersing his finger in the blood,

say that it is considered as though it were written

“And he shall immerse,”

that is what it amounts to,

for the immersion is an inseparable part of the taking. Therefore,

it teaches us

that the baraita does not regard the immersion as included in the taking, and consequently the law of pigul does not apply to it, because

that is why it was not written

explicitly with regard to external sin-offerings:

“And he shall immerse,”

as the verse states with regard to internal sin-offerings. Rather, it says concerning them: “And he shall take,” in order to teach us

that it implies both this and that:

there are two teachings here. One is that immersion in the blood in the case of an external sin-offering is not a service; yet, on the other hand, the priest must immerse his finger, and may not do so through a monkey. This follows from the fact that the Torah was particular, with regard to external sin-offerings, to change the wording of “immersion,” used with regard to internal sin-offerings, to the wording “taking”: It is thereby indicated that immersion is not considered a service in the case of an external sin-offering, but, on the other hand, it is also indicated that the priest must take the blood himself, and that a monkey may not take it and place it upon his hand.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon deems it valid

when one has a thought that it is not for its sake

during conveyance.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Rabbi Shimon concedes with regard to conveying the blood of internal sin-offerings that a thought

of disqualification

disqualifies them, since

it is

a service that cannot be annulled.

For Rabbi Shimon’s entire reason for holding that a disqualifying thought during conveyance does not disqualify an external sin-offering is that conveyance is a service that can be annulled, by slaughtering close to the altar. This is not possible with internal sin-offerings, since it is not customary to slaughter in the Sanctuary.

And we challenge this:

But didn’t Rabbi Shimon say: Every

blood application

that is not

performed

on the outer altar, like

the blood

of peace-offerings,

which is applied on the outer altar,

does not render one liable for it on account of pigul.

The Gemara now assumed that the same applies to a thought that it is not for its sake: It disqualifies only if one had the thought while applying the blood on the outer altar, but not if he had the thought while applying the blood inside the Sanctuary.

And we answer:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said:

What Rabbi Shimon said—that one is not liable for a thought of pigul during the application of blood inside—refers only to liability concerning eating the flesh of the sacrifice [one is not liable to receive karet for eating it, as in the case of pigul, unless he had the thought with regard to a sacrifice whose blood is applied on the outer altar]. But

Rabbi Shimon did concede

Rabbi Shimon

to disqualify

the sacrifice from being offered even if one had a thought of offering it beyond its proper time in the case of internal sin-offerings,

by means of a kal va-chomer

from the thought that it is not for its sake, which applies both outside and inside—

And just as

a thought

that it is not for its sake, for which peace-offerings are rendered valid

[since a thought that it is not for its sake does not disqualify peace-offerings],

disqualifies a sin-offering

even when it occurs inside,

a thought

of offering it beyond its proper time, which disqualifies

even

in the case of peace-offerings, should it not certainly disqualify sin-offerings,

even internal ones?

We have found

a thought

of offering it beyond its proper time

that disqualifies inside. As for a thought

of offering it outside its proper place, from where do we derive

that it disqualifies inside as well? For the thought of offering it outside its proper place is stated in the passage concerning peace-offerings; from where do we learn that it disqualifies in the case of sin-offerings inside, when peace-offerings have no internal service?

And

if

you wish to derive the disqualification of an intention regarding outside its place by means of a bameh matza analogy,

from

the intention

regarding outside its time,

there is room to refute it:

What is there about outside its time

that its disqualification is more severe,

since

one is liable for eating the flesh of a sacrifice that has become piggul

karet;

can you say the same regarding outside its place, where the sacrifice is merely rendered unfit, but one is not liable to karet for eating it?

And

if

you wish to derive the disqualification of an intention regarding outside its place by means of a kal va-chomer

from an act performed not for its sake

[just as we derived the intention regarding outside its time by means of a kal va-chomer from an act performed not for its sake], there is room to refute it: What is there about an act performed not for its sake, which is more severe

since

it

applies

even when sacrifices are offered

on a bama

[in the case of a sacrifice offered on a private bama during the period when private altars were permitted]; can you say the same regarding outside its place, which does not render a sacrifice unfit on a bama? For during the period when private altars were permitted, its place was anywhere in the world.

And we answer: The source for disqualifying carrying the blood of inner sin-offerings through the Temple by means of an intention regarding outside its place is derived by means of a kal va-chomer from an intention not for its sake: If an act performed not for its sake, which is valid in the case of peace-offerings, renders a sin-offering unfit even inside, then outside its place, which renders a peace-offering unfit, should it not certainly render a sin-offering unfit inside? And one cannot refute this by arguing that an intention not for its sake is more severe, since it applies even on a bama, because the disqualification of

an act performed not for its sake—where does it apply?

Only with regard to the Paschal offering and a sin-offering

alone. But

the Paschal offering and a sin-offering

are not offered on a bama,

and consequently the disqualification of an act performed not for its sake does not render anything unfit on a bama at all!

Alternatively, if you wish, say

indeed, the source for disqualification through an intention regarding outside its place is derived from an intention regarding outside its time; and do not refute it by arguing that, with regard to outside its time, one is liable to karet for eating it, because this derivation is not based on a ma zeh matzinu analogy, but rather

it is a juxtaposition

in which the law of outside its place is juxtaposed with that of outside its time, and a juxtaposition cannot be refuted.

And this is the juxtaposition between outside its place and outside its time: It is written: “And if it is eaten on the third day, it shall not be accepted; it is piggul.” And we expound:

“The third day”

this is

one who thinks

outside its time,

that he intends to eat it on the third day. Therefore, the sacrifice is not accepted, but is rendered unfit. The additional word

“piggul

shall be,” comes to teach us:

this is

one who thinks

outside its place,

who likewise renders it unfit.

Rava said:

What they said—that Rabbi Shimon agrees that an intention renders carrying disqualifying when the carrying cannot be nullified—applies only in certain circumstances, dependent on several details of the law:

a.

If you conclude that Rabbi Shimon agrees with

Rabbi Elazar

his son, who said:

Which area of the northern section of the Temple courtyard is fit for slaughtering sacrifices? Every area of the northern section of the courtyard that is

between the Hall and the altar

is considered

“the north,”

and is fit for slaughtering in it.

It follows that one may slaughter the inner sin-offerings in the northern section of the courtyard even adjacent to the Hall, since this area too is called “the north.” Consequently,

no intention

that is disqualifying

is effective

[that is, effective] to render disqualifying

the carrying of

the blood of

the inner sin-offerings

when he carries the blood through the courtyard, since this carrying can be nullified by slaughtering the sin-offering adjacent to the Hall.

Therefore, an intention renders carrying disqualifying only if he has the intention while walking with the blood

from the entrance of the Hall inward,

where slaughtering is not performed, and this carrying is indispensable .

b.

And if you conclude that he agrees with

Rabbi Shimon

Rabbi Yehuda, who said:

“The area within the courtyard sanctifies,”

meaning that the entire floor of the courtyard between the Hall and the altar possesses the sanctity of the altar and is fit for burning fats upon it, as on the outer altar, it follows that if he intends a disqualifying intention while carrying the bowls of the frankincense [which were placed on the table in the Sanctuary, and on Shabbat the priest would remove them and burn them on the outer altar],

no intention

of disqualification

is effective during the carrying involved in removing the bowls,

not while he is walking inside the Sanctuary, since he could place the table with the bowls near the entrance of the Sanctuary, and it follows that carrying through the Sanctuary is not indispensable; nor while he carries them through the courtyard, since carrying through the courtyard is likewise not indispensable, as he could burn them on the floor of the courtyard immediately upon emerging from the Hall between the Sanctuary and the courtyard.

Rather,

when is a disqualifying intention effective during the carrying of the bowls? Only if he had the intention while walking in the Hall, which is between the Sanctuary and the courtyard, where the table cannot be placed; likewise, its floor does not possess the sanctity of the altar. Therefore, carrying the bowls there is carrying that cannot be avoided. This carrying is

from the entrance of the Sanctuary

that opens into the Hall,

and outward,

that is, while carrying through the area of the Hall itself only. The Hall does not possess the sanctity of the altar, and it is impossible to burn offerings there; yet, conversely, it is impossible to arrange the showbread and bowls there.

c.

And if you conclude that Rabbi Shimon holds

Rabbi Shimon

that the sanctity of the Sanctuary and

the sanctity of the

Hall are one,

and it is possible to place the table in the Hall as well, it follows that carrying through the Hall itself is also not indispensable, since the table may be placed near the entrance of the Hall and outward. Therefore,

no intention is effective

during the carrying of the bowls except

from the entrance of the Hall

[which is between the Hall and the courtyard]

and outward.

That is, within the five cubits of the thickness of the wall in which the entrance between the Hall and the courtyard is located. The area within the thickness of the entrance does not possess the sanctity of the Sanctuary and is not fit for placing the table there; nor is it like the courtyard, since it is impossible to burn upon its floor. Therefore, the carrying within the thickness of the wall cannot be nullified, and a disqualifying intention is effective during it.

d.

And if you conclude

that even

the area within the entrance

between the Hall and the courtyard has the status of

the inside,

and the table may be placed there, it follows that one could take the bowls directly from the table and place them on the floor of the courtyard.

No intention is effective even

if he takes

one step, but only for the distance of extending his hand

from the table to the floor of the courtyard, because only this extension is considered carrying that cannot be nullified; therefore, only during it is a disqualifying intention effective.

e.

And if you conclude that Rabbi Shimon holds

Rabbi Shimon

that carrying without walking

such as extending the bowls with his hand

is not considered carrying,

it follows that

no intention

during the carrying of the bowls

is effective at all,

and the bowls would never be rendered unfit by a disqualifying intention while they are being carried!

Abaye said to the interpreter of Rav Hisda—

Ask Rav Hisda: What is the status of carrying by a non-priest

is it valid or disqualified?

He said to him: It is valid, and Scripture supports me,

as it is stated: “

And they slaughtered the Passover offering.

And the kohanim sprinkled

the blood they had taken

from their hands

of the slaughterers, who had conveyed the blood to the kohanim,

and the Levites flayed.”

Now, the slaughterers were non-kohanim, since slaughtering is valid when performed by a non-kohen; and it is proven from the slaughterers’ conveying that conveying is valid when performed by a non-kohen.