Zevachim 13b — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rather

there is no difficulty:

In truth, the beraita and the Mishna are both discussing a disqualifying intention [or both are discussing an intention that the offering is not for its designated purpose], and there is no contradiction between the sources. For

this

that we find in the beraita of Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva—that an intention during the receiving of the blood does not disqualify the offering—refers to a case in which he

said

at the time of slaughter:

“I am slaughtering it with the intention of receiving its blood tomorrow.”

The offering is not disqualified by the intention to receive its blood outside its permitted time, because the disqualification of piggul applies only to an intention concerning the eating of the offering by the altar or by a person, whereas receiving the blood is not considered eating.

But

this that we learned in the other beraita—that there is piggul through receiving the blood—refers to a case in which he

that we learned in the other beraita—that there is piggul through receiving the blood—refers to a case in which he

said

at the time of receiving the blood:

“I am receiving its blood with the intention of pouring the remainder tomorrow.” Even an intention concerning pouring the remainder, which is not indispensable for atonement, renders the offering piggul if he has that intention during an indispensable sacrificial service, intending to perform it outside its permitted time. This is because pouring the remainder is considered eating by the altar, and thus he had an intention during the performance of an indispensable service concerning eating by the altar outside its permitted time.

and even a thought concerning pouring the remnants, which does not prevent atonement, causes the offering to become piggul if he thinks about performing it beyond its designated time during a sacrificial service. This is because pouring the remnants is considered eating by the altar, and it follows that he thought, during the performance of an indispensable sacrificial service, about eating by the altar beyond its designated time.

The same distinction can be made between the Mishna and the beraita with regard to an intention that the offering is not for its designated purpose. The beraita is speaking of a case in which he had the intention at slaughter to receive the blood not for its designated purpose, and this does not disqualify the offering, whereas the Mishna is speaking of a case in which he had this intention during the actual act of receiving the blood, and therefore his intention disqualifies the offering.

One of the Sages said to Rava:

How can they say in the beraita that piggul applies only when one has the intention, during an indispensable sacrificial service, to perform the eating of the meat or the burning of the portions designated for the altar outside its permitted time?

And

if

pouring the remainder,

which is not an indispensable sacrificial service,

is an intention concerning it not disqualifying?

But it was taught in a beraita: “One might have thought that the intention of

piggul

is effective

only when one has an intention concerning

the eating of the meat

outside its permitted time.

From where do we include pouring the remainder [and one might have thought that this refers to having the intention, at the time of pouring, to burn the portions designated for the altar tomorrow]?

The verse states:

‘And if he surely eats it’;

the verse is speaking of two kinds of eating: one is eating by a person, and the other is eating by the altar!”

And we answer:

There is no difficulty.

This

the inclusion that an intention of piggul is effective with regard to pouring the remainder refers to a case in which he

said

at the time of the sacrificial service of sprinkling:

“I am sprinkling

the blood

with the intention of pouring the remainder tomorrow.”

The intention of piggul was present during an indispensable service, and he had an intention during that service concerning pouring the remainder, which is eating by the altar, outside its permitted time. But

this

the beraita that excludes pouring the remainder from the intention of piggul refers to a case in which he

said: “I am pouring the remainder with the intention of burning the portions designated for the altar tomorrow.”

Even though he had an intention concerning eating by the altar, the offering does not become piggul, because he did not have the intention during an indispensable sacrificial service.

Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya, said: “I heard

from my teachers

that the dipping of the finger

of the kohen—the member of the priestly family who performs the Temple service—into the blood of the inner sin-offerings [about which it is stated: “The kohen shall dip his finger in the blood, and sprinkle some of the blood seven times before the Lord”], if he dips it with the intention of burning the portions designated for the altar tomorrow, it

renders an inner sin-offering piggul.”

Ilfa heard

the novel teaching of Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya,

and repeated it before Bar Peda.

He said to him:

Bar Peda said: How can it be said that dipping the finger renders an inner sin-offering piggul?

Have we learned

that an intention of

piggul

in a

sin-offering

[in which the fundamental law of piggul is stated] is learned only from

peace-offerings?

For peace-offerings have no service involving dipping the finger, as we have never found such a service in them.

So too, a sin-offering

does not become piggul through dipping the finger.

And we challenge Bar Peda:

Have we indeed learned everything from peace-offerings?

Would you say that since we have not found finger-dipping in peace-offerings, therefore the thought of piggul during finger-dipping in an inner sin-offering likewise cannot constitute a thought of piggul? But in the Sifra, all sacrifices were included for the thought of piggul through a special inclusion, and it is reasonable that the thought of piggul disqualifies in all the rites, even in those rites that do not exist in peace-offerings, such as finger-dipping in an inner sin-offering

? And the proof that the thought of piggul must be learned from that inclusion in the Sifra, and not through an inference from peace-offerings, is from the law of a sin-offering and a Passover-offering that were slaughtered with a thought of piggul, and afterward their other rites were performed with a thought not for their sake, for one is not liable to karet for eating the piggul. For below it is expounded from a verse that liability to karet for eating piggul applies only when the thought of piggul was the sole thought that disqualified the offering; but if, in addition to the thought of piggul, he also thinks a thought not for its sake, it follows that the disqualification is also on account of not for its sake, and then there is no liability to karet for eating the piggul.

But if the disqualification of the thought of piggul in a sin-offering is learned through an inference from peace-offerings, it would be said:

Just as with peace-offerings

where he rendered them piggul at their slaughter and afterward conceived a thought

not for their sake

during the other rites,

the

thought not for their sake

does not remove

those peace-offerings that became piggul

from

liability to karet for eating

piggul,

because a thought not for their sake does not disqualify peace-offerings, and it follows that the presentation of the piggul of these peace-offerings is performed as the presentation of a valid offering, despite the thought not for its sake; from this it would be learned that

even a sin-offering

that he rendered piggul at slaughter and afterward conceived, during the other rites, a thought

not for its sake—

does not remove it from piggul,

even though in a sin-offering a thought not for its sake is a disqualifying thought, for, according to your words, all the laws of piggul are learned from peace-offerings.

Rather, what can you say—

that the thought of piggul in the other sacrifices was not learned from peace-offerings, but

comes from the inclusion of the verse; so too here

the thought of piggul during finger-dipping in an inner sin-offering

comes from the inclusion of the verse!

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

Here,

in this upper chamber, I heard from Rabbi Sh

that a thought of piggul during

finger-dipping

in the blood of an inner sin-offering

renders it piggul!

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish objected: Have we learned

the law of the thought of

piggul only from peace-offerings?

If so, it would be said:

Just as peace-offerings are not rendered piggul by finger-dipping

because peace-offerings do not have a rite of finger-dipping,

so a sin-offering

inner

is not rendered piggul by finger-dipping

with a thought of piggul

in it?!

The Gemara is astonished at the astonishment of Resh Lakish, just as it was astonished above at Rav Pappa’s words:

Have we indeed learned everything from peace-offerings?

For all sacrifices were included for piggul through the inclusion required in the Sifra. For if all the laws of piggul were learned from peace-offerings, it would have been appropriate to say:

Just as peace-offerings,

which he rendered piggul during slaughter and afterward conceived a thought during the other rites

not for their sake—the

thought not for their sake

does not remove them from piggul,

but he is liable to karet for eating it,

so a sin-offering

that he rendered piggul during slaughter and afterward conceived, during the other rites,

a thought not for its sake—

the

thought not for its sake

does not remove it from piggul. But this is not correct, for we learned below that a thought not for its sake in a sin-offering removes it from the law of piggul!? [And necessarily, the law of piggul in a sin-offering is learned from an inclusion, and likewise the thought of piggul during finger-dipping must be learned from an inclusion].

And we answer:

We answer:

Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina said: Yes, everything was learned from peace-offerings

and therefore the law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that a thought of piggul during finger-dipping in the blood of an inner sin-offering does not disqualify, since peace-offerings do not have such a rite, and consequently it is impossible to learn it from them with regard to a sin-offering. Nevertheless, a thought not for its sake during the other rites of a sin-offering removes it from piggul performed at slaughter, because it can be learned as follows:

Since

one who conceives, during a rite in a peace-offering, the thought of eating it

outside its place

thereby

disqualifies the peace-offering,

and likewise one who conceives a thought

not for its sake

in a sin-offering thereby

disqualifies the sin-offering,

and it is learned through an inference:

Just as outside its place, which disqualifies peace-offerings,

removes them

from piggul

because the presentation of the piggul was not like the presentation of a valid offering,

so too not for its sake, which disqualifies a sin-offering, removes it from piggul!

However, all this applies specifically when he conceives a thought not for its sake during the four rites, which can be learned with regard to a sin-offering from peace-offerings—that a disqualifying thought removes it from piggul. But one who renders it piggul during finger-dipping, which is a rite that does not exist in peace-offerings, cannot learn it with regard to a sin-offering from peace-offerings, and a thought of piggul does not take effect in it.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: From its side, refute it [the refutation of Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina’s manner of learning is found alongside it], for the disqualification of a thought not for its sake is not comparable to the disqualification of a thought outside its place, because

what is there in outside its place, which disqualifies peace-offerings,

which disqualifies peace-offerings

is a severe disqualification, and by virtue of its severity it can remove an offering from piggul,

for it applies to all sacrifices; can you say this concerning not for its sake,

which is a lenient disqualification,

which applies only to a Passover-offering and a sin-offering

? From where do you know that such a lenient disqualification likewise removes an offering from piggul?

Rather,

if you came to learn from peace-offerings that every disqualification in every offering prevents piggul,

what can you say,

necessarily, that this is the manner of the learning:

Just as with peace-offerings—

something that disqualifies them,

a thought outside its place,

removes them from piggul, and something that prevents them,

namely, the four rites,

brings them to piggul.

So too

with a sin-offering—

something that disqualifies it,

a thought not for its sake or outside its place, not for its sake,

removes it from piggul, and something that prevents it,

even finger-dipping,

brings it to piggul.

Rav Mari said: We too have learned this—

that finger-dipping renders an offering piggul,

as we learned

in tractate Menahot: What is the law of piggul with regard to a meal-offering?

This is the principle:

Anyone who takes the handful

from the meal-offering and conceived, at the time of taking the handful, a thought of piggul to eat the remainder or to burn the handful outside its time, and likewise if he

places

the handful

in a vessel

of service with a thought of piggul, and likewise if he

carries

the handful

and burns

it with a thought of piggul, he renders the meal-offering piggul, and anyone who eats it becomes liable to karet, because a meal-offering was likened to peace-offerings for the law of piggul, just as all sacrifices were likened to the law of piggul of peace-offerings.

And Rav Mari analyzed:

Granted, the handful; that is

the rite of the meal-offering corresponding to the rite of the

slaughterer

in an animal sacrifice, for the slaughterer removes from the offering the blood, which is the portion belonging to the Most High, while the taking of the handful removes the handful, which is the portion belonging to the Most High, from the meal-offering; and the comparison between rendering piggul through taking the handful and rendering piggul through slaughtering a peace-offering is understood.

And likewise, granted,

carrying

the meal-offering,

that is corresponding to

the

carrying

of the animal sacrifice; and likewise

burning too, that is casting

the blood. Thus it is properly likened: one who renders a meal-offering piggul through the four rites to one who renders a peace-offering piggul through the four rites.

But placing

the handful

in a vessel—what is it,

the rite in the rite of an animal sacrifice that is similar to it and to which it was likened?

If you say that it is similar to receiving

the blood of the animal sacrifice—

Are they similar?

There,

the blood falls into the vessel on its own, and therefore holding the vessel is considered the rite of receiving, whereas

here, he himself takes

the handful

and places

it with his hand into the vessel. The placing by hand is not considered receiving until the handful comes to rest in the vessel.

But necessarily, since it is not sufficient unless he places the handful in the vessel, for it is impossible to burn the handful before sanctifying it by placing it in a vessel of service, against his will the placing of the handful in the vessel is an important rite, and is considered receiving, and a thought of piggul renders it piggul. Here too

with regard to finger-dipping in a sin-offering,

since it is not sufficient unless he performs it, against his will

it is an important rite; and since he brings the blood with his finger toward the altar,

that is carrying, and therefore a thought of piggul renders it piggul!

And we reject this:

No—it is impossible to prove from the Mishna in Menahot that finger-dipping renders an offering piggul, because

actually

it is possible to explain

that the placing

of the handful in the vessel

is similar

to receiving

the blood, and therefore a thought of piggul renders it piggul. But finger-dipping is not considered carrying, and therefore we have no source from which to learn that a thought of piggul renders it piggul. And if you say

that there is a distinction between placing the handful in the vessel and receiving the blood in an animal sacrifice, for

here,

in the blood,

automatically

it casts itself into the vessel, whereas

there,

in placing the handful,

he himself takes it

with his hand

and gives it

to the vessel—one may say that

since both this and that are placing in a vessel, what difference is it to me whether automatically or whether he takes and gives? Let us say

that this issue, whether finger-dipping renders inner sin-offerings piggul, is

a dispute between tannaim:

there,

with placing the handful,

he himself takes

it with his hand

and places

it in the vessel—it may be said that

since both are placing something in a vessel, what difference is there whether it happens automatically or whether he takes and places it? Let us say

that this question of whether finger-dipping renders inner sin-offerings piggul is

subject to a dispute among tanna’im:

One taught: the dipping of the finger renders a sin-offering piggul!

And another baraita was taught:

the dipping of the finger

does not render [it] piggul,

if he dipped with the thought of burning the sacrificial portions tomorrow,

and does not become piggul,

if he thought at the time of slaughter or receiving that he would dip with the finger tomorrow.

Is it not that it is a dispute among tannaim,

who disagreed whether the dipping of the finger is considered conveyance and renders [the offering] piggul, or is not considered conveyance and therefore does not render [it] piggul?

And we reject:

No,

it is not a dispute among tannaim; rather, everyone held that the dipping of the finger is conveyance, and the dispute between the baraitot is the dispute in which Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis disagreed regarding conveyance itself, whether the thought of piggul renders [the offering] piggul through it. And it follows that

this

baraita in which we learned that the dipping of the finger renders a sin-offering piggul

is the Rabbis, whereas

the other

this

baraita in which we learned that it does not render [it] piggul

is Rabbi Shimon,

whose view is that even conveyance does not render [the offering] piggul!

And we raise an objection:

If

you established the baraita that held that the dipping of the finger does not render [the offering] piggul according to the view of

Rabbi Shimon, why specifically

did the baraita state specifically the service of

the dipping of the finger

that it does not render [the offering] piggul , for since in an inner sin-offering there is no placing of blood upon the outer altar, it follows that even if he thinks the thought of piggul at slaughter or at sprinkling, he would not render [the offering] piggul according to Rabbi Shimon, because

Rabbi Shimon said:

: