Zevachim 13b (יג:) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Rather

it is not difficult:

In truth, the beraita and the Mishna are both discussing a thought of piggul [or both are discussing a thought not for its proper purpose], and there is no contradiction between the beraitot. Because

this

that we find in the beraita of Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva—that a thought during receiving the blood does not invalidate the offering—refers to a case in which he

said

at the time of slaughter:

“I am slaughtering in order to receive its blood tomorrow,”

for the offering is not invalidated by the thought of receiving its blood beyond its designated time, since the disqualification of piggul applies only to a thought concerning the eating of the altar or of a person, and receiving the blood is not considered eating.

Whereas

this

that we learned in the other beraita—that there is piggul through receiving the blood—refers to a case in which he

said

at the time of receiving the blood:

“I am receiving its blood in order to pour the remnants tomorrow,”

and even a thought concerning pouring the remnants, which does not prevent atonement, causes the offering to become piggul if he thinks about performing it beyond its designated time during a sacrificial service. This is because pouring the remnants is considered eating by the altar, and it follows that he thought, during the performance of an indispensable sacrificial service, about eating by the altar beyond its designated time.

The same distinction can also be made between the Mishna and the beraita concerning a thought not for its proper purpose: The beraita is speaking of a case in which he thought, during slaughter, to receive the blood not for its proper purpose, and this does not invalidate; whereas the Mishna is discussing a case in which he thought during the actual act of receiving the blood not for its proper purpose, and therefore it is invalidated by his thought.

One of the Sages said to Rava:

How could they have said in the beraita that piggul applies only when one thinks, during an indispensable sacrificial service, that he will perform the eating of the meat or the burning of the fats beyond its designated time?

And

because

pouring the remnants,

which is not an indispensable service,

is not invalidated by a thought concerning it?

But it was taught in a beraita: “One might have thought that the thought of piggul is not

piggul

effective

unless one thinks

about eating meat

beyond its designated time.

From where is pouring the remnants included?” [The initial assumption was that this refers to one who thinks, at the time of pouring, about burning the fats tomorrow.]

The verse therefore states:

“And if he surely eats,”

the verse is speaking of two eatings: one, the eating of a person, and one, the eating of the altar?!

And we answer:

It is not difficult.

This—the amplification teaching that a thought of piggul is effective with regard to pouring the remnants—concerns a case in which he

the inclusion that an intention of piggul is effective with regard to pouring the remainder refers to a case in which he

said

at the time of the sprinkling service:

“I am sprinkling

the blood

in order to pour the remnants tomorrow,”

for the thought of piggul occurred during an indispensable service, and he thought during it about pouring the remnants, which is eating by the altar, beyond its designated time. Whereas

this

the beraita that excludes pouring the remnants from the thought of piggul concerns a case in which he

said: “I am pouring the remnants in order to burn the fats tomorrow,”

for although he thought about eating by the altar, the offering does not become piggul, because he did not think during an indispensable sacrificial service.

Rabbi Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya, said: “I heard

from my teachers

that dipping the finger

of the priest into the blood of the interior sin-offerings [about which it is stated: “And the priest shall dip his finger in the blood, and he shall sprinkle some of the blood seven times before the Lord”], if he dips it with the thought of burning the fats tomorrow, it

causes piggul in an interior sin-offering.

Rashi, s.v. “It brings,” who says that there is no eating by the altar in the case of a bird sin-offering, because the altar receives only the blood. This requires further examination.] i [on the first side, s.v. lo kashya, and below, 27a, s.v. hai]. He explained that he dipped his finger with the intention of burning the portions designated for the altar tomorrow. It is necessary to explain why he did not state that the intention was to sprinkle the blood tomorrow. This is not only because, as discussed below, sprinkling might be considered carrying the blood, but even if it is considered sprinkling [as explained by Maimonides shortly afterward], Tosafot [10b] maintain that an intention during sprinkling from its beginning to its end renders the offering piggul. Rabbi Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz considered the possibility that sprinkling is not considered eating, because the blood need not ascend onto the altar; it is sufficient that it touch the altar [as stated below, 15a]. He discussed whether, even if sprinkling is not eating, since it is effective once the blood reaches merely the airspace above the altar, pouring the remainder should nevertheless be considered eating, since it is effective only when the blood reaches the top of the base [Laws of the Procedure of Offerings 5:6]. Or perhaps, since the remainder is not consumed on the altar, it is considered a sacrificial service like sprinkling. He concluded that this depends on the dispute between said that one must explain this according to the Raavad’s explanation of Rashi’s position [cited in note 1]: a thought of sprinkling tomorrow concerns something impossible and therefore does not cause piggul. A thought that he will sprinkle after sunset also does not cause piggul, because this is not the time of another day but rather the disqualification of night; this also appears from Tosafot below [56a]. The Rashash and Rabbi Isaac Ze'ev there, and Rabbi Yitzchak Zev in the writings of Rabbi Chaim [section 332] maintained that a specific time is established for sprinkling the blood, and one who has an intention concerning the night renders the offering piggul; see there. The Dvar Moshe offered a straightforward resolution: The sprinkling of the inner offerings does not render the offering piggul because it is not performed on the three-sided surface of the altar. However, Rashi below [29a] did not hold this view, nor does the conclusion of Tosafot support it; see there. He further suggested that this is an intention concerning an outer service in place of an inner one, which does not render the offering piggul, as stated below [44a]. But if dipping the finger is the beginning of sprinkling [as Maimonides holds], this answer is not effective, because it is considered an inner service; see note 10 below. In addition, this entire law applies only according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili below. See also notes 9–10. It is possible that Rashi held that when, while dipping the finger, one has the intention to sprinkle, the dipping is considered half of the act that permits the offering; see there. [In the version of the Gemara: In the Shita Mekubetzet, the word “inner” was deleted, because the Gemara had not yet concluded that the discussion referred specifically to an inner offering, and Rashi mentioned only that the verse concerning dipping the finger refers to an inner offering.] it is explained simply that the sprinkling of the interior offerings does not cause piggul because it is not performed on the three-sided area. However, Rashi below [29a] did not hold this, and Tosafot’s conclusion is likewise not so; see there. He further explained that it is a thought concerning the outside for the sake of the inside, which does not cause piggul, as below [44a]. But if this is the beginning of sprinkling [according to Maimonides], this answer is ineffective, because it is considered an interior service; see note 10 below. Moreover, this entire law applies only according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili below. See further notes 9–10. It is possible that Rashi held that his thought, while dipping the finger, in order to sprinkle, is considered half of the act that permits; see there. [In the Gemara’s version, the Shita Mekubetzet deleted “interior,” because we have not yet concluded that the reference is specifically to an interior offering; Rashi merely cited the verse concerning dipping the finger as one stated with regard to an interior offering.]

Ilfa heard

of Rabbi Yehuda son of Rabbi Hiyya’s novel ruling and

repeated it before Bar Peda.

He said to him,

Bar Peda said: How is it possible to say that dipping the finger causes piggul in an interior sin-offering?

Have we learned

that the thought of

piggul

in a sin-offering

except from peace-offerings

[in which the fundamental law of piggul is stated]? If so, let us say:

Just as peace-offerings do not have piggul through dipping the finger,

for we do not find in them a service of dipping the finger,

so too a sin-offering

does not have piggul through dipping the finger.

Rashi, s.v. “It brings,” who says that there is no eating by the altar in the case of a bird sin-offering, because the altar receives only the blood. This requires further examination.] i [on the first side, s.v. lo kashya, and below, 27a, s.v. hai]. [s.v. “Have we learned”] wrote: “Peace-offerings do not involve dipping the finger, because all their blood is sprinkled from the vessel onto the altar.” His words appear to follow the view of the Chazo Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz [1:14] asked: The Gemara’s conclusion below [15a] is that an intention can disqualify the offering through a minor form of carrying, and dipping the finger involves extending the hand. What is the difference between this and carrying without walking? He explained that dipping is not part of the service of carrying; rather, it is a service in its own right. The question is only whether it has the status of a service with regard to piggul, whereas it is certainly considered a service with regard to an intention that the offering is not for its designated purpose. [See his wording, section 12, subsection 13: “It is a distinct service, even if we assign it the law of carrying.”] This is also explained in the writings of [18:3] that in all offerings other than a sin-offering, if one applied their blood with the finger, it is invalid. This is apparently difficult according to Merkhevet HaMishna [Laws of the Procedure of Offerings 8:9], who holds that placing the blood with a finger is valid even in other offerings. [Laws of Sacrificial Acts 8:9], who holds that in other offerings as well, application with the finger is valid. [As Chazon Yeḥezkel proved his view [at the beginning of Zevachim and in 6:3 from Tosafot below, 26b; see Chazon Ish 8:4, which explains their intention differently]. According to him, it is difficult why dipping the finger should not render a peace-offering piggul. proved from the beginning of Zevachim and in chapter 6, halakha 3, from Tosafot below, 26b; see the Chazon Ish 8, paragraph 4, which explains their intention differently.] According to him, it is difficult why dipping the finger should not cause piggul in peace-offerings. the Chazo Avraham Yeshayahu Karelitz [1:14] asked: The Gemara’s conclusion below [15a] is that an intention can disqualify the offering through a minor form of carrying, and dipping the finger involves extending the hand. What is the difference between this and carrying without walking? He explained that dipping is not part of the service of carrying; rather, it is a service in its own right. The question is only whether it has the status of a service with regard to piggul, whereas it is certainly considered a service with regard to an intention that the offering is not for its designated purpose. [See his wording, section 12, subsection 13: “It is a distinct service, even if we assign it the law of carrying.”] This is also explained in the writings of [1:14] asked: The Gemara’s conclusion below [15a] is that a thought invalidates even in minor carrying, and dipping the finger involves extending the hand; what is the difference between it and carrying without walking? He explained that dipping is not part of the service of carrying, but is a service in its own right. The entire question is whether it has the status of a service with regard to piggul; it is certainly considered a service with regard to a thought not for its proper purpose. [See his wording, section 12, paragraph 13: “It is a special service, even if we grant it the law of carrying.”] This is likewise explained in the writings of Rabbi Isaac Ze'ev Zev that dipping the finger is essentially inserting the finger into the blood [and not removing it for sprinkling], and it cannot truly be considered carrying, since this does not bring the blood as an offering to the altar. Rather, it is genuinely a service in its own right, and it is included under carrying with regard to the thought of piggul, which is derived from peace-offerings and applies specifically to the services that permit the offering, even though there are additional indispensable services. [See Rashi, s.v. ela, at the end of his words, who says that he carries the blood with his finger to bring it near the altar, implying that it is genuinely carrying.] However, Mishna LaMelekh [cited shortly below, note 8] explains the opposite: The entire question in our passage concerns only piggul, and not an invalid intention that the offering is not for its designated purpose, because dipping the finger is not actually one of the services of the offering. It is merely considered one of the acts that permit the offering because it is indispensable and cannot be omitted. Therefore, an intention can disqualify through it only in the case of piggul. [This is likewise explained above, 2b, note 9, and in the notes above, notes 9–10. See the words of [cited below in note 8] explains the opposite: The entire discussion in our sugya concerns only piggul and not the invalidating thought of acting not for its proper purpose, because dipping the finger is not actually one of the services of the offering. It is merely considered one of the acts that permit the offering because it is indispensable and cannot be omitted; therefore, a thought invalidates through it only with regard to piggul. [This is likewise explained above, 2b, note 9, and on the first side, notes 9–10. See the words of Taharat HaKodesh on Tosafot, s.v. “Let it be.”] At first glance, one can prove that dipping the finger is not considered a service in its own right from the fact that below [42b] we find that one can render an inner sin-offering piggul through pouring the remainder, and the Gemara does not raise the argument “just as peace-offerings,” and so on. This must be because, just as it is possible to render a peace-offering piggul through sprinkling, so too it is possible to render a sin-offering piggul through pouring the remainder, since in a sin-offering pouring the remainder is considered part of the service of sprinkling [see Rashi 110b, s.v. “The remainder”]. Dipping the finger, however, is a service only because it cannot be omitted; if it is not present in peace-offerings, one cannot render an offering piggul through it. The same appears from the distinction between pouring the remainder, which effects atonement [Rashi 52a], and dipping the finger, which does not. It is therefore necessary to explain that, on the contrary, since dipping the finger is a service in its own right, and we do not find that it renders a peace-offering piggul, we have no source that it renders a sin-offering piggul. The Gemara’s objection is apparently difficult: Peace-offerings do not require dipping the finger at all, whereas in the case of inner sin-offerings it is an indispensable service. How, then, can they be compared with regard to piggul? It must be that the law of piggul is a novel legal principle, learned from peace-offerings for the other offerings, and we have only what was established in peace-offerings. The Gemara therefore discusses whether the derivation applies to each individual service, or whether only the general law was learned—that piggul applies to the other offerings—and in each offering it applies to the services that are indispensable in that offering. The Gemara’s question is apparently perplexing: Peace-offerings do not require dipping the finger at all, whereas in interior sin-offerings it is an indispensable service. How can they be compared with regard to piggul? Necessarily, the law of piggul is a novel enactment, derived from peace-offerings for the other offerings, and we have only what was established with regard to peace-offerings. The Gemara therefore discusses whether the derivation concerns each individual service, or whether they learned only that the law of piggul applies to other offerings, and in each offering it takes effect through the services that are indispensable in it. See Netivot HaKodesh, written by the rabbi of Kharkiv, who discusses this matter.\n\n\n

And we challenge Bar Padda:

Did we learn everything from shelamim?

This would be so only if you were to say that, since we do not find finger-dipping in shelamim, therefore a thought of piggul during finger-dipping in an inner sin-offering should likewise not render it piggul. But in Torat Kohanim, all offerings were included with regard to a thought of piggul through a special amplification, and it is logical that a thought of piggul invalidates during all the avodot, even during those avodot that are not performed in shelamim, such as finger-dipping in an inner sin-offering!?

The proof that the law of a thought of piggul must be learned from that amplification in Torat Kohanim, and not from shelamim by means of a binyan av, is as follows: In the case of a sin-offering and a Paschal offering that were slaughtered with a thought of piggul, and afterward the remaining avodot were performed with a thought that they were not for their sake, there is no liability for karet for eating the piggul. For they expounded below [29b] from a verse that liability for karet for eating piggul applies only when the thought of piggul was the sole thought that invalidated the offering. But if, in addition to the thought of piggul, one also entertained a thought that the offering was not for its sake, the invalidity is also on account of the thought that it was not for its sake, and there is then no liability for karet for eating the piggul.

But if the invalidity of a thought of piggul in a sin-offering is learned by means of a binyan av from shelamim, one could say:

Just as with shelamim

when one rendered them piggul during their slaughter and afterward entertained the thought

that they were not for their sake

during the remaining avodot,

the thought that they were not for their sake

does not

remove

those shelamim that became piggul

from

liability for karet for eating

piggul, because a thought that they were not for their sake does not invalidate shelamim; consequently, the acceptance of the piggul of these shelamim is like the acceptance of a valid offering, despite the thought that they were not for its sake. We would therefore learn from this that

even a sin-offering

that one rendered piggul during slaughter and afterward thought during the remaining avodot

that it was

not for its sake—

does not remove it from piggul, even though, in the case of a sin-offering, a thought that it is not for its sake is an invalidating thought; for, according to your argument, all the laws of piggul are learned from shelamim.

But what can you say—that the thought of piggul in the other offerings was not learned from shelamim, but

comes from an amplification of the verse; here too

the thought of piggul during finger-dipping in an inner sin-offering

comes from an amplification of the verse!

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said:

Here,

in this upper chamber, I heard from Rabbi Sh

that a thought of piggul during

finger-dipping

in the blood of an inner sin-offering

renders it piggul!

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish raised an objection: Did we learn

the law of a thought of

piggul only from shelamim?

If so, one could say:

Just as finger-dipping does not render shelamim piggul,

since there is no avoda of finger-dipping in shelamim,

so too a sin-offering

inner sin-offering,

finger-dipping does not

with a thought of piggul

render it piggul!?

The Gemara is astonished at the objection of Resh Lakish, just as it was earlier astonished at the words of Rav Pappa:

Did we learn everything from shelamim?

All the offerings were included as subject to piggul through the amplification expounded in Torat Kohanim. For if all the laws of piggul were learned from shelamim, it would have been appropriate to say:

Just as with shelamim,

which one rendered piggul at the time of slaughter and afterward thought during the remaining avodot

that they were not for their sake, the

thought that they were not for their sake

does not remove them from piggul,

but one is liable for karet for eating them,

so too a sin-offering

that one rendered piggul at the time of slaughter and afterward entertained during the remaining avodot the thought

that it was not for its sake—

the

thought that it was not for its sake

does not remove it from piggul. This is not correct, for we learned below that a thought that a sin-offering is not for its sake removes it from the status of piggul!? [It must therefore be that the law of piggul in a sin-offering is learned from an amplification, and the same should be learned regarding a thought of piggul during finger-dipping].

We answer:

Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: Yes, everything was learned from shelamim.

Accordingly, the law follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: a thought of piggul during finger-dipping in the blood of an inner sin-offering does not invalidate it, since there is no such avoda in shelamim and it is consequently impossible to learn it from shelamim for a sin-offering. Nevertheless, a thought that a sin-offering is not for its sake during the other avodot removes it from piggul that was effected during slaughter, because this may be learned as follows:

Since

one who thinks during an avoda in a shelamim offering that he will eat it

outside its place

thereby

invalidates the shelamim,

and likewise one who entertains the thought

that it is not for its sake

in a sin-offering thereby

invalidates the sin-offering,

we learn by means of a binyan av:

Just as a thought of outside its place, which invalidates shelamim,

removes them

from piggul [since the acceptance of the piggul was not like the acceptance of a valid offering],

so too a thought that it is not for its sake, which invalidates a sin-offering, removes it from piggul!

However, this applies specifically when one thinks that the sin-offering is not for its sake during the four avodot, for it is possible to learn from shelamim to a sin-offering that an invalidating thought removes it from piggul. But one who renders it piggul during finger-dipping—which is an avoda not found in shelamim—cannot learn this with regard to a sin-offering from shelamim, and a thought of piggul does not take effect during it.

Rabbi Yirmeya said: Its refutation lies alongside it

[the refutation of Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Ḥanina’s method of derivation is found alongside that method]. For the invalidity of the thought that the offering is not for its sake is not comparable to the invalidity of a thought of outside its place:

What is the reason for outside its place, which invalidates shelamim,

that it is a severe invalidity and, by virtue of its severity, can remove the offering from piggul?

It applies to all offerings; can you say the same of a thought that it is not for its sake,

which is a less severe invalidity,

that applies only to the Paschal offering and a sin-offering?

From where do you know that such a less severe invalidity also removes the offering from piggul?

Rather,

if you came to learn from shelamim that every invalidity in every offering prevents piggul,

what can you say?

The derivation must necessarily proceed as follows:

Just as with shelamim,

something that invalidates them

[a thought of outside its place]

removes them from piggul, while something that prevents it in them,

namely, the four avodot,

brings them to piggul.

So too

with a sin-offering:

something that invalidates it,

[a thought that it is not for its sake or a thought of outside its place],

removes it from piggul, while something that prevents it,

even finger-dipping,

brings it to piggul.

Rav Mari said: We too learned this—that finger-dipping renders an offering piggul,

as we learned

in tractate Menachot: What is the law of piggul with regard to a meal-offering?

This is the general rule:

Anyone who takes the handful

from the meal-offering and, during the taking of the handful, entertains a thought of piggul—to eat the remainder or to burn the handful outside its designated time; and likewise if he

places

the handful

in a vessel

of service with a thought of piggul; and likewise if he

carries

the handful

and burns

it with a thought of piggul—he renders the meal-offering piggul, and anyone who eats it incurs liability for karet, because a meal-offering was compared to shelamim with regard to piggul, just as all offerings were compared to shelamim with regard to piggul.

Rav Mari analyzed this:

Granted, the handful; that is

the avoda of the meal-offering corresponding to the avoda of the

slaughterer

of an animal-offering. For the slaughterer removes the blood, which is the portion of the Most High, from the offering, while the taking of the handful removes the handful, which is the portion of the Most High, from the meal-offering. The comparison between rendering an offering piggul during taking the handful and rendering shelamim piggul during slaughter is therefore understandable.

And likewise, granted,

carrying

the meal-offering,

that is

corresponding to

carrying

the animal-offering. And likewise,

burning too is the equivalent of sprinkling

the blood. It is therefore properly understood that rendering a meal-offering piggul during its four avodot is compared to rendering shelamim piggul during their four avodot.

But placing

the handful

in a vessel—what is it

the avoda in the animal-offering that resembles it and to which it is compared?

If you say that it resembles receiving

the blood of the animal-offering—

Are they comparable?

There,

the blood falls into the vessel automatically, and therefore holding the vessel is considered the avoda of receiving; whereas

here, he himself takes

the handful

and places

it with his hand into the vessel. Placing it by hand is not considered receiving until the handful comes to rest in the vessel.

But

necessarily,

since it is indispensable to place

the handful in the vessel, for it is impossible to burn the handful before sanctifying it by placing it in a vessel of service,

necessarily

the placing of the handful in the vessel

is an important avoda,

and is considered receiving, and a thought of piggul renders the offering piggul during it.

Here too,

with regard to finger-dipping in a sin-offering,

since it is indispensable to perform it, necessarily

it is an important avoda, and since he brings the blood closer to the altar with his finger,

that is carrying,

and therefore a thought of piggul renders the offering piggul during it! We reject this:

No—it is impossible to prove from the Mishna in Menachot that finger-dipping renders an offering piggul, because

it is always

possible to explain that placing the handful in a vessel

resembles

placing the handful

receiving

blood, and therefore a thought of piggul renders the offering piggul during it. But finger-dipping is not considered carrying, and therefore we have no source from which to learn that a thought of piggul renders an offering piggul during it.

And as for what you said,

that there is a distinction between placing the handful in a vessel and receiving blood in an animal-offering—for

here,

with blood,

automatically

it falls into the vessel, whereas

there,

with placing the handful,

he himself takes

it with his hand

and places

it in the vessel—it may be said that

since both are placing something in a vessel, what difference is there whether it happens automatically or whether he takes and places it? Let us say

that this question of whether finger-dipping renders inner sin-offerings piggul is

subject to a dispute among tanna’im:

One baraita taught: The finger immersion renders a sin offering piggul!

And another baraita was taught:

finger immersion

does not render it piggul,

if he immersed it with the intention of burning the sacrificial portions on the following day,

nor does it become piggul,

if he formulated the thought at the time of slaughter or collection that he would perform the finger immersion on the following day.

What, is it not a dispute between tannaim

who disagreed over whether finger immersion is considered holakha and renders the offering piggul, or whether it is not considered holakha and therefore does not render it piggul?

And we reject this:

No,

the dispute is not between tannaim. Rather, everyone holds that finger immersion is holakha, and the dispute between the baraitot is the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis concerning holakha itself—whether a thought of piggul renders the offering piggul through it. It follows that

this

baraita in which we learned that finger immersion renders a sin offering piggul is

the Rabbis, whereas

the other

this

baraita in which we learned that it does not render the offering piggul is

Rabbi Shimon, whose view is that even holakha does not render the offering piggul!

whose view is that even conveyance does not render [the offering] piggul!

And we raise an objection:

If

you understood the baraita that held that finger immersion does not render the offering piggul as following the view of

Rabbi Shimon, why specifically

did the baraita mention the service of

finger immersion

as one that does not render the offering piggul ? Since an inner sin offering does not involve the presentation of blood on the outer altar, even if one formulated a thought of piggul at the slaughter or at the sprinkling, he would not render it piggul according to Rabbi Shimon, because

Rabbi Shimon said:

: