Zevachim 13a — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Ben Azzai! ![](pamud.bmp "

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does not challenge with the aspect of karet,

because karet is not equivalent in the Pesach offering and in the sin offering: for in the Pesach offering, the obligation of karet is for nullifying the mitzva of bringing the Pesach offering, whereas in the sin offering there is no obligation of karet for not bringing a sin offering; rather, a sin offering comes to atone for a sin that involves unintentional liability for karet.

And we challenge: If Ben Azzai maintains that one cannot challenge the kal va-chomer from the common aspect of the sin offering and the Pesach offering, “What is there in the common aspect of the sin offering and the Pesach offering? That they have an aspect of karet,” because the aspect of karet is not equivalent in them, then this should be difficult for you: Why does he not disqualify a guilt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake? For

a guilt offering, too, should be brought

by an av binyan from the Pesach offering and the sin offering, since it is impossible to challenge: What is there in the Pesach offering and the sin offering? That they have an aspect of karet? And we answer: Ben Azzai did not derive

a guilt offering

from the Pesach offering and the sin offering because he

raises

another challenge:

What is there in their common aspect? That they are found both in the community and in the individual,

for we find a communal sin offering on festivals and New Moons, and likewise the Pesach offering is considered a communal offering because it is brought in an assembly, whereas they do not teach concerning a guilt offering, which comes to atone only for an individual and does not apply to the community.

And if you wish, say: He also challenges with the aspect of karet,

and therefore one cannot derive a guilt offering from the Pesach offering and the sin offering;

and Ben Azzai

did not derive from the Pesach offering and the sin offering to disqualify a burnt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake, but

the Gemara learned it

by tradition, having received it by tradition from the mouths of seventy-two elders, that a burnt offering is disqualified by an intention not for its sake.

And that which Rav Huna said

that Ben Azzai derived the disqualification of the burnt offering by a kal va-chomer from the sin offering,

he said it only

for the purpose of

sharpening his students,

so that they would challenge the kal va-chomer.

Mishna:

The Pesach offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake,

or

received

or

carried

or

sprinkled

their blood

not for their sake,

or if he formulated an intention in one of the rites to make them

for their sake and added in that same rite

an intention not for their sake,

or if at first he formulated an intention

not for their sake

and afterward added in that same rite an intention

for their sake,

they are

disqualified!

How

is there an intention

for their sake and not for their sake

in the same rite? For example, if at first he formulated the intention that he was slaughtering

for the sake of the Pesach offering

and added the intention

for the sake of a peace offering.

And how is there an intention not for their sake and for their sake? For example, if at first he formulated the intention

for the sake of a peace offering

and added an intention

for the sake of the Pesach offering.

And an intention not for its sake disqualifies in all four rites,

for the sacrifice is disqualified through four matters—

through slaughter, and through receiving

the blood,

and through carrying

the blood

and through sprinkling

the blood.

Rabbi Shimon validates

if he formulated an intention not for its sake

during carrying

,

because

Rabbi Shimon used to say:

It is impossible

for the sacrifice to be performed

without slaughter

or

without receiving

or

without sprinkling, but it is possible

to perform the sacrifice according to its law

without carrying

at all, for example, if he

slaughters

the offering

beside

the altar

and sprinkles

its blood upon it without needing to carry it; therefore, if he formulated an intention during carrying not for its sake, it is not considered an intention during a rite, to disqualify the offering.

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon disagrees with Rabbi Shimon his father and says: One who walks in a place where he needs to walk, the intention that he formulated during that walking not for its sake

disqualifies.

And if he walked

in a place where he does not need to walk—

the intention does not disqualify

during that walking! And the Gemara explains that walking that is not needed is when he carries it from the altar and onward toward the outer side of the courtyard, distancing it from the altar.

Gemara: We learned in the Mishna that receiving the blood not for its sake in the Pesach offering and in the sin offering disqualifies the offering. And we wonder:

the intention does not disqualify the offering during that walk! The Gemara explains that carrying where one does not need to walk is when he carries the blood from the altar outward, toward the outer side of the Temple courtyard, thereby moving it away from the altar.

during that walking! And the Gemara explains that unnecessary carrying is when he carries it away from the altar, toward the outer side of the courtyard, thereby moving it farther from the altar .

And receiving

that is performed not for its sake,

does it disqualify? But it was taught:

It is stated concerning the burnt offering [Leviticus 1:5], “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord,”

and the sons of Aaron

shall bring

the blood, and we expound: “And they shall bring”

—

this is receiving the blood

in a vessel.

You say

this is

receiving

the blood, or is it only sprinkling,

for “and they shall bring” means bringing the blood to the altar by sprinkling it upon it, and we still have no source that he must receive the blood in a vessel?

When it says

later in the verse,

“And they shall sprinkle

the blood on the altar all around,”

sprinkling has been stated; therefore, how do I realize

“and they shall bring”?

This is receiving the blood,

which must be performed in a vessel.

And the continuation of the verse, “the sons of Aaron the priests,” comes to teach that the receiving of the blood shall be performed by a fit priest, and in a consecrated service vessel, that is, at a time when the priest is wearing priestly garments, as they expounded below [18a], “the priests”—when they are in their priestly status, at the time when they are wearing priestly garments! Rabbi Akiva said:

The word “the priests” does not mean that they are in their priestly status with the priestly garments. Rather,

from where do we know that receiving shall be only

by a fit priest and in a consecrated service vessel [in priestly garments]?

It is stated here—in the rite of receiving—

“the sons of Aaron,” and it is stated below [Numbers 3:3] concerning Elazar and Itamar,

“These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests who were anointed,

who filled their hands to serve as priests.”

Just as there, by a fit priest and in a consecrated service vessel,

for “filled their hands” means wearing priestly garments,

so too here, by a fit priest and in a consecrated service vessel!

it is stated there

[Numbers 3:3], concerning Elazar and Itamar:

“These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the kohanim who were anointed

and whose hands were filled to serve as kohanim.”

Just as there, it is by a fit koen and in a service vessel,

because “whose hands were filled” means wearing the priestly garments,

so too here, it is by a fit koen and in a service vessel!

Rabbi Tarfon said: “May I bury my sons” [A formula of an oath],

—this is an expression of an oath—

“if I did not hear

that there is

a distinction between receiving and sprinkling, but I have no way to explain

what that distinction is.

Rabbi Akiva said: “I shall explain”

the distinction between them:

with receiving, Scripture did not make

the

thought like the act, whereas

with

sprinkling, Scripture did make

the

thought like the act.

That is, a thought of not for its sake or outside its time disqualifies only with sprinkling, but not with receiving.

And there are additional distinctions between them: if one slaughtered an offering outside [the Temple] and afterward

received

the blood of the offering

outside, he is not liable for karet

for the service of receiving outside. For the liability stated in the Torah is only for one who slaughters outside and not for one who receives the blood, whereas if he

sprinkled

the blood

outside, then he is

то он

punished with karet,

because it is said concerning offerings slaughtered outside, “Blood shall be reckoned,” to teach that one who sprinkles the blood outside is also liable for karet.

And another distinction: if

disqualified persons received it,

such as non-priests or priests intoxicated from wine ,

they are not liable for it

to death, whereas if

disqualified persons sprinkled it, they are liable for it

to death.

Rabbi Tarfon said to him

to Rabbi Akiva:

“The service” [A formula of an oath]

—an expression of an oath—

“that you did not incline right or left,”

but rather, your intention was to reach the truth in your explanation.

“I heard, but I have no way to explain

what I heard, whereas

you expound

on your own

and agree with the report

that I heard” .

In these words he said to him

Rabbi Tarfon to Rabbi Akiva:

“Akiva”—

“Anyone who separates from you is as one who separates from his life!”

And now the Gemara understood from the words of the beraita that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon held that thoughts of not for its sake and outside its time do not disqualify if he thought them during the service of receiving. If so, it is difficult: how did we learn anonymously in the Mishna that receiving not for its sake disqualifies?

Rava said: “It is not difficult.”

What is stated in the beraita does not contradict our Mishna, because

here,

in the beraita, it speaks

of a thought of piggul

of outside its time, which disqualifies only if he thought it during sprinkling and not during receiving. Whereas

here,

in the Mishna, it speaks

of a thought of not for its sake,

which disqualifies in all the services, even in receiving .

It is precise also

that the Mishna deals with a thought of not for its sake and not with a thought of piggul,

for it teaches: “

that the offering is disqualified

through four matters,”

and it does not teach

that the offering

becomes piggul—learn from it

that the Mishna speaks only of the disqualification of not for its sake and not of a thought of piggul.

And we object:

A

re

you saying that a thought of piggul did not disqualify

when he thought

at

the

time of receiving? But it was taught: “Could it be that the thought

of piggul—to eat the offering outside its time—

is effective [A thought that disqualifies]

—that is, effective in invalidating it—

only in sprinkling,

for example, when he thought during sprinkling that the eating of the offering would be outside its time?

From where is it derived to include slaughtering and receiving,

so that if he thought in them to eat the offering outside its time, he should disqualify the offering?

The verse says: “

And if he surely eats of the flesh of his peace-offering on the third day, it shall not be accepted”—

with matters that bring

the offering

to the state of

permission

for eating, Scripture speaks,

that is, all the services necessary for validating the offering, including slaughtering and receiving .

Could I say that I also include

the service of

pouring the remainder

of the blood onto the foundation of the altar , and likewise the service of

burning the fats

on the altar , so that if he thought in them to eat the offering outside its time, he should disqualify the offering?

The verse says: “And if he surely eats of the flesh of his peace-offering on the third day,”

“

it shall not be accepted, the one who offers it”—

“it shall not be reckoned

to him.” The meaning of the verse “it shall not be accepted” concerns one who causes piggul through sprinkling, because through it the owner of the offering is accepted.

And we expound:

sprinkling was included

among all the services that bring to permission for eating;

and why did it emerge

from their general category to be written separately?

To compare to it

and

to tell you:

what

sprinkling is distinctive in that it is a service and holds back atonement,

[without it the owner of the offering does not attain atonement], and therefore a thought of piggul disqualifies through it;

so too everything that is a service

and holds back atonement, a thought of piggul disqualifies through it. Excluded are

pouring the remainder and burning the fats,

which are performed after acceptance through the sprinkling of the blood,

which do not hold back atonement,

and therefore even if he causes piggul through them, the offering does not become piggul.

According to this exposition, it emerges that receiving too—which without it atonement is impossible—disqualifies through a thought of piggul. This is difficult against Rava, who said that “with receiving, he did not make the thought like the act”; its explanation is that a thought of piggul does not disqualify with receiving!