Zevachim 13a (יג.) — the Talmud in English

And we answer:

Ben Azzai

does not challenge on the aspect of karet,

because karet is not equivalent in the case of the Paschal offering and in the case of the sin offering: with regard to the Paschal offering, the obligation of karet is for neglecting the mitzva of bringing the Paschal offering, whereas with regard to the sin offering there is no obligation of karet for failing to bring a sin offering. Rather, a sin offering comes to atone for a sin that involves inadvertent liability for karet.

And we challenge this: If Ben Azzai maintains that one cannot refute the kal va-chomer by saying, “What is true of the common aspect of the sin offering and the Paschal offering? They have an aspect of karet,” because the aspect of karet is not equivalent in their cases, then this should pose a difficulty for you: Why does he not disqualify a guilt offering that one slaughtered not for its sake? After all,

the guilt offering too should be derived

by an av binyan from the Paschal offering and the sin offering, since it is impossible to refute this by saying, “What is true of the Paschal offering and the sin offering? They have an aspect of karet.” And we answer: Ben Azzai did not derive

the guilt offering

from the Paschal offering and the sin offering, because he

raises

another refutation:

What is true of the common aspect between them? They apply both to the community and to the individual.

We find a communal sin offering on Festivals and New Moons, and likewise the Paschal offering is considered a communal offering because it is brought by an assembly, whereas they cannot teach with regard to a guilt offering, which comes to atone only for an individual and is not applicable to the community.

Alternatively, I could say: He does challenge on the aspect of karet as well,

and therefore a guilt offering cannot be derived from the Paschal offering and the sin offering.

And Ben Azzai

did not derive from the Paschal offering and the sin offering that an elevation offering slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified. Rather,

he had it as a received teaching from the Gemara,

having received it by tradition from seventy-two Elders that an elevation offering is disqualified through an intention not for its sake.

And that which Rav Huna says

that Ben Azzai derived that an elevation offering is disqualified by a kal va-chomer from a sin offering,

he said it only

in order

to sharpen his students,

so that they would refute the kal va-chomer.

Mishna:

With regard to the Paschal offering and the sin offering that one slaughtered not for their sake,

or

received

or

carried

or

sprinkled

their blood

not for their sake,

or if one formulated an intention during one of the services

to perform them for their sake

and added during that same service an intention

not for their sake,

or if at first he formulated an intention

not for their sake

and afterward added during that same service an intention

for their sake,

they are

disqualified!

What

is an intention

for their sake and not for their sake

during the same service? For example, if at first he intended to slaughter

for the sake of a Paschal offering

and added the intention

for the sake of a peace offering.

And what is an intention not for their sake and for their sake? For example, if at first he intended

for the sake of a peace offering

and added the intention

for the sake of a Paschal offering.

And an intention not for its sake disqualifies in all four services,

as the offering is disqualified through four matters—

through slaughter and through receiving

the blood,

through carrying

the blood,

and through sprinkling

the blood.

Rabbi Shimon deems it valid

if he formulated an intention not for its sake

during carrying ,

because

Rabbi Shimon would say:

It is impossible

for the offering to be performed

without slaughter,

or

without receiving,

or

without sprinkling, but it is possible

to perform the offering in accordance with its law

without carrying

at all, for example, if he

slaughters

the offering

beside

the altar

and sprinkles

its blood upon it without needing to carry it. Therefore, if he formulated an intention during carrying not for its sake, this is not considered an intention during a service sufficient to disqualify the offering .

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon,

disagrees with Rabbi Shimon, his father,

and says: If one walks in a place where he needs to walk, an intention

that he formulated during that walking, not for its sake,

disqualifies.

But if he walked

in a place where he does not need to walk—

an intention does not disqualify

during that walking! And the Gemara explains that unnecessary carrying is when he carries it away from the altar, toward the outer side of the courtyard, thereby moving it farther from the altar .

Gemara: We learned in the Mishna that receiving the blood not for its sake in the case of the Paschal offering and the sin offering disqualifies the offering.

And we ask:

And does receiving

performed not for its sake

disqualify? But wasn’t it taught

as follows: It is stated with regard to an elevation offering [Leviticus 1:5]: “And he shall slaughter the young bull before the Lord,”

and they shall bring

the blood, the sons of Aaron, the priests,” and we expound: “And they shall bring”

—

this is receiving the blood

in a vessel.

You say

that this is

receiving the blood, or is it only sprinkling

—for “and they shall bring” means bringing the blood to the altar by sprinkling it upon it, and we still have no source that the blood must be received in a vessel?

When it says

later in the verse,

“And they shall sprinkle

the blood around the altar,”

sprinkling is stated. What, then, do I establish

the phrase

“and they shall bring”?

It refers to receiving the blood, which must be performed in a vessel .

And the continuation of the verse, “the sons of Aaron, the priests,”

teaches that receiving the blood must be performed

by a fit koen and in a consecrated service vessel,

that is, while the koen is wearing the priestly garments, as they expound below [18a]: “the priests”—when they are in their priestly state, at the time when they are wearing the priestly garments!

Rabbi Akiva said:

The word “the priests” does not mean that they are in their priestly state, wearing the priestly garments. Rather,

from where is it derived that receiving may be performed only by a fit koen and in a consecrated service vessel

[while wearing priestly garments]?

It is stated here

—with regard to the service of receiving—

“the sons of Aaron,” and it is stated there

[Numbers 3:3], with regard to Elazar and Itamar:

“These are the names of the sons of Aaron, the priests, the anointed

who were invested to serve as priests.”

Just as there

it is by a fit koen and in a consecrated service vessel,

because “who were invested” means wearing the priestly garments,

so too here, by a fit koen and in a consecrated service vessel!

Rabbi Tarfon said: May I bury my sons

—this is an expression of an oath—

if I did not hear

that there is

a distinction between receiving and sprinkling, but I cannot explain

what that distinction is.

Rabbi Akiva said: I shall explain

the distinction between them:

With regard to receiving, Scripture did not make

the

thought equivalent to the act

whereas

with regard to sprinkling, it made

the

thought equivalent to the act.

That is to say, a thought of not for its own sake or outside its designated time invalidates only when formulated during sprinkling, but not when formulated during receiving.

And there are further distinctions between them: If one slaughtered an offering outside the Temple and afterward

received

the blood of the offering

outside, he is not liable to karet

for the service of receiving outside. For the liability stated in the Torah applies only to one who slaughters outside, and not to one who receives the blood. But if he

sprinkled

the blood

outside, he is

liable to karet,

because it is stated with regard to slaughtering outside: “Blood shall be reckoned,” teaching that one who sprinkles the blood outside is likewise liable to karet.

There is another distinction: If

disqualified persons received it

—for example, non-priests or priests who had drunk wine—

they are not liable for it

to receive the death penalty. But if

disqualified persons sprinkled it, they are liable for it

to receive the death penalty.

Rabbi Tarfon said to him

to Rabbi Akiva:

By the service

—an expression of an oath—

that you have not deviated right or left,

but intended to arrive at the truth through your explanation.

I heard, but I cannot explain

what I heard, whereas

you expound

on your own

and agree with the teaching

that I heard.

In these words he said to him,

Rabbi Tarfon to Rabbi Akiva:

Akiva—

whoever separates from you is as one who separates from life!

The Gemara now understood from the words of the beraita that Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Tarfon held that thoughts of not for its own sake and outside its designated time do not invalidate an offering if they were formulated during the service of receiving. If so, it is difficult: How could we have learned anonymously in the Mishna that receiving with a thought not for its own sake invalidates the offering?

Rava said: It is not difficult

to reconcile what is stated in the beraita with our Mishna, because

here,

in the beraita, the discussion is about

a thought of piggul, that the offering be eaten outside its designated time, which invalidates the offering only if it was formulated during sprinkling and not during receiving. Whereas

of outside its time, which disqualifies only if he thought it during sprinkling and not during receiving. Whereas

here,

in the Mishna, the discussion is about

a thought of not for its own sake, which invalidates during all the services, even during receiving.

which disqualifies in all the services, even in receiving .

It is also precise

that the Mishna deals with a thought of not for its own sake and not with a thought of piggul,

as it teaches: “

The offering is invalidated

by four matters,”

and it does not teach

that the offering

becomes piggul; infer from it

that the Mishna speaks only of the invalidation of not for its own sake and not of a thought of piggul.

The Gemara raises an objection:

And

is it so that

a thought of piggul does not invalidate

when one formulates it

during

the

receiving? But it was taught in a beraita: “Could it be that a thought

of piggul—to eat the offering outside its designated time—

is effective

—that is, effective in invalidating it—

only during sprinkling,

for example, when he thought during sprinkling that the offering would be eaten outside its designated time?

From where is it derived to include slaughtering and receiving,

so that if one thought during them to eat the offering outside its designated time, the offering is invalidated?

The verse states: “

And if he shall eat of the flesh of his sacrifice of peace offerings on the third day, it shall not be accepted”—

the matters that bring

the offering

to

permission for

eating are what the verse is speaking of.

That is, it refers to all the services necessary to render the offering valid, including slaughtering and receiving.

Could I include even

the service of

pouring the remainder of the blood

onto the base of the altar, as well as the service of

burning the sacrificial portions

on the altar, so that if one thought during them to eat the offering outside its designated time, the offering would be invalidated?

The verse states: “And if he shall eat of the flesh of his sacrifice of peace offerings on the third day,”

and the verse continues:

“it shall not be accepted; the one who offers it”

“shall not have it reckoned

for him.” The meaning of the expression “it shall not be accepted” is that it refers to one who renders the offering piggul during sprinkling, because through sprinkling the owner’s offering is accepted.

And we expound:

Sprinkling was included

among all the services that bring an offering to permission for eating.

And why did it go out

from the general category to be written separately?

To compare other services to it

and

to tell you:

Just as

sprinkling is distinctive in that it is a service and prevents atonement

—without it, the owner of the offering does not achieve atonement—and therefore a thought of piggul invalidates the offering during it,

so too, any service

that prevents atonement renders the offering piggul through a thought formulated during it.

Pouring the remainder and burning the sacrificial portions

are excluded, as they are performed after the offering has been accepted through the sprinkling of the blood,

because they do not prevent atonement

and therefore, even if one renders the offering piggul through a thought formulated during them, the offering does not become piggul.

According to this exposition, it follows that receiving as well—since without it atonement cannot take place—renders the offering piggul through a thought formulated during it. This is difficult for Rava, who said that the explanation of “with regard to receiving, he did not make the thought equivalent to the act” is that a thought of piggul does not invalidate during receiving!