Zevachim 12b — the Talmud in English

And

so

infer from this

there is

a law of

rejection

even

with

the sanctity of

.

For here, the offering does not acquire sanctity of its body for sacrifice, because it is impossible to sacrifice half an animal. Rather, it acquires only sanctity of its body with regard to its monetary value: he must sell the animal and bring an offering with its proceeds. Nevertheless, it is considered rejected, and the animal remains rejected forever, even when it becomes fit for sacrifice after he acquires the second half and sanctifies it.

Ulla said that Rabbi Yohanan said:

One who

ate forbidden fat

unintentionally

and set aside an offering

a sin offering,

and

before he sacrificed it he

became an apostate

and was therefore no longer fit to have it sacrificed, so the offering became rejected from sacrifice because of the disqualification of its owner,

and

afterward

he repented

from his apostasy and became fit to have it sacrificed—the offering is disqualified, because

since it was rejected

from sacrifice at a time when its owner was an apostate,

it will remain rejected

forever!

It was also stated: Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Yohanan said: One ate forbidden fat and set aside an offering

a sin offering,

and became mentally incompetent

and was thereby disqualified from bringing the offering [because a mentally incompetent person cannot achieve atonement through an offering, as he cannot sacrifice it “willingly”],

and then regained his mental competence

the offering is disqualified, because

since it was rejected

from sacrifice at a time when its owner was mentally incompetent,

it will remain rejected

forever!

And both statements are necessary,

because Rabbi Yohanan had to state both laws, concerning an apostate and concerning a mentally incompetent person, since each contains a separate novel point:

If Rabbi Yohanan had taught only the first case,

concerning an apostate, I might have said that the reason an apostate’s offering remains rejected forever is only

because he actively rejected himself.

But here,

in the case of a mentally incompetent person,

who became rejected on his own,

I might say that he is

.

Just as an offering belonging to anyone who is asleep at night does not become rejected, so too an offering belonging to a mentally incompetent person should not be considered rejected. The statement teaches us that a mentally incompetent person is not like someone who is asleep. Once he becomes mentally incompetent, he is rejected from sacrifice, and therefore his offering also remains rejected forever.

And if he had taught us only this case,

that an offering belonging to a mentally incompetent person remains rejected forever, I might have said that specifically the offering of a mentally incompetent person becomes rejected

because he has no ability

of his own

to recover

and restore himself to mental competence.

But here,

in the case of an apostate,

who can repent, I might say that he is not

considered to have undergone a valid rejection. The statement teaches us that even an apostate is considered rejected. Therefore

both statements are necessary

for Rabbi Yohanan to teach: in both cases, once an offering has been rejected, it remains rejected forever.

Rabbi Yirmeya raised a question:

One who

ate forbidden fat and set aside an offering

a sin offering,

and

before he sacrificed it,

the High Court

in Jerusalem [mistakenly]

ruled that

a particular kind of forbidden fat, such as the fat of the stomach, is

permitted

to eat [because they thought it was permitted suet and not forbidden fat]. The offering consequently became unfit for sacrifice, because in light of the ruling of the High Court, no sin offering is brought for eating this type of fat.

And they retracted

the court’s mistaken ruling.

What is the law?

Is this considered rejection,

for when the court mistakenly ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, the offering became rejected? Had he eaten the fat at that time on the basis of the court’s ruling, he would have been exempt from bringing an individual offering even if it later became clear that the court had erred. He would consequently not be obligated to bring an offering.

Or is it not considered rejection,

for there was no defect either in the owner of the offering or in the offering itself: he had eaten the fat before the court permitted it, and had set aside his offering properly. It was only that a period passed during which it could not be sacrificed because of the court’s mistaken ruling. But such a period causes rejection only if there was a period of exemption between the setting aside of the offering and its bringing.

A certain elder said

to Rabbi Yirmeya:

When Rabbi Yohanan began

his statement

with

the laws

of rejected offerings, was it from this case—the law that one who set aside a sin offering for forbidden fat and the court ruled that the fat was permitted—

с закона о том, кто отделил хатат за хелев, а суд постановил, что хелев разрешен, —

that he began,

saying that this rejection is more extensive than the rejection of an apostate or a mentally incompetent person?

The Gemara explains:

What is the reason

that this rejection is more severe than the other forms of rejection?

There,

in the cases of the apostate and the mentally incompetent person, only

the person was rejected

from sacrifice, but

the offering

of a sin offering for forbidden fat in general

was not rejected,

because someone who is neither an apostate nor mentally incompetent can sacrifice it.

Here,

when the court ruled that forbidden fat was permitted, the very

offering

of a sin offering for forbidden fat

was also rejected in its entirety. This is not a rejection relating only to a particular person or a particular offering; rather, the entire category of the sin offering for forbidden fat was removed during the period of the court’s ruling. It is therefore considered a more extensive rejection that disqualifies the offering.

в целом: это не отстранение, относящееся лишь к определённому человеку или определённой жертве; всё учение об очистительной жертве за тук было полностью отменено на время постановления суда, и поэтому это считается большим отстранением, делающим жертву непригодной.

We learned in the Mishna:

Shimon ben Azzai said: I have received from seventy-two elders

that all the edible offerings that were slaughtered not for their sake are valid, but they have not fulfilled the owners’ obligation, except for the Passover-offering and the sin-offering.

And the Gemara explains:

Why do I need it to teach “seventy-two” "

elder”

elder"

and not “elders”? To inform us

that all of them were standing at one time in one (methodical) session,

that they sat in one session and decided this together.

We learned in the Mishna:

Ben Azzai added only the burnt offering.

Rav Huna said: What is the reason of Ben Azzai?

Because it is stated: "

It is a burnt offering, a fire-offering, a pleasing fragrance to the Lord',"

and we expound: "

It" —

when performed for its sake it is valid; when performed not for its sake it is invalid!

And we object: If so,

with regard to the guilt offering it is also written "

it",

and let us derive from this that if one performed it not for its sake, it is invalid?

And we answer:

That "

it",

is written after the burning of the sacrificial portions.

For then invalidity does not apply to it, since even if he does not burn its sacrificial portions at all, the offering will also be valid.

And we refute:

This "

it" that is stated with regard to the burnt offering,

is also written after the burning of the sacrificial portions,

and how did they derive from it that it is invalid?

And we answer:

Two "

it"

are written

in the burnt offering, and from the second “it” they expounded: if it is not relevant to the time after the burning of the sacrificial portions, apply it to the time before it, to invalidate the services performed with the burnt offering not for its sake.

And we still object:

with regard to the guilt offering as well, two "

it"

are written,

and why did they not expound the second “it” as with the burnt offering, that it comes to teach by “if it is not relevant” that a guilt offering slaughtered not for its sake is invalid?

Rather,

the exposition is not from the redundancy of the second “it,” which is stated after the burning of the sacrificial portions, and

Ben Azzai by a kal va-chomer

from the sin offering

derives it

to invalidate a burnt offering that was slaughtered not for its sake, and this is how he learned:

And just as a sin offering,

which has a leniency,

that it is not

burned

entirely

on the altar, if

one slaughtered it not for its sake,

it is

invalid.

A burnt offering,

which is more stringent than it in this respect,

that it is

burned

entirely; is it not all the more so

that slaughtering not for its sake should invalidate it!

And if you challenge this,

what is there about the sin offering, for

it has, from another perspective, a stringency that the burnt offering does not have: a sin offering

aton es,

whereas a burnt offering does not atone —

the Passover-offering proves it,

for it does not atone, and nevertheless slaughtering not for its sake invalidates it.

And if you argue against this:

what is there about the Passover-offering, for its time is fixed,

and it is impossible to prove from it to invalidate a burnt offering, whose time is not fixed —

the sin offering proves it,

for its time is not fixed, and nevertheless [performing it] not for its sake invalidates it.

And the argument returns: this one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one.

The common aspect in them is that they are sacred offerings, and if one slaughtered them not for their sake, [the offering is] invalid.

I too will bring a burnt offering, which is a sacred offering, and if one slaughtered it not for its sake, it is invalid!

And we object:

what is there about the common aspect in them, for they have an aspect of karet,

for one who nullifies the mitzva of the Passover-offering is liable to karet, and a sin offering comes for an unwitting violation involving karet; can you say this with regard to a burnt offering, which has no aspect of karet?