Zevachim 11a (יא.) — the Talmud in English

And one can say:

what

does it prove? It proves that the burnt-offering]]

is more stringent, for it is offered

entirely

and nevertheless, if

its blood entered inside

it is

valid [for both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer].

[according to both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer].

The guilt-offering,

which is less stringent than it,

does not

offer

entirely,

but its flesh is eaten;

all the more so

we should not be stringent with regard to it, disqualifying its blood that entered inside. And this kal va-chomer would nullify the derivation from the juxtaposition: “Like the sin-offering, so is the guilt-offering.”

And we challenge this: Surely it can be refuted, for, on the other hand, we find that a burnt-offering is less stringent than a guilt-offering:

What is the case with a burnt-offering, which does not atone

for a sin? Can you say the same with regard to a guilt-offering, which comes to atone for a sin?

And we answer:

The sin-offering meal-offering,

which is a sin-offering brought by a poor person in the variable offering,

proves

that even though it comes to atone for a sin, if it was brought inside it is not disqualified. The same applies to a guilt-offering whose blood was brought inside.

And we challenge this:

Let us say that the bird sin-offering proves it:

it comes to atone for a sin, and nevertheless, if its blood entered inside it is not disqualified. It would be preferable to prove the point from it rather than from a meal-offering, because it involves blood, like a guilt-offering, and not a meal-offering, which is not of the types of blood.

And we answer: It is impossible to prove the matter from the law of

the bird sin-offering,

“whose blood entered inside and is not disqualified,” because this law was not stated definitively. Rather,

it is Rabbi Avin’s unresolved question [below, 92b. Since there is no reception of the blood of a bird sin-offering in a vessel, the issue is whether bringing its blood in while it is in its neck is considered bringing in blood, in which case it is disqualified, or bringing in flesh, in which case it is valid]. Therefore, the Rabbis had to derive the point from the sin-offering meal-offering, which is not disqualified when brought inside.

And if you would refute the proof by saying:

What is the case with the sin-offering meal-offering, which is not a type of sacrifice?

One cannot prove from it that the blood of a sacrifice—namely, a guilt-offering whose blood entered inside—is valid;

the burnt-offering proves it,

for it is a type of sacrifice and is not disqualified when its blood enters inside.

And

likewise, if you would refute the proof from the other side by saying: What is the case with a burnt-offering, which does not atone? Can you say the same with regard to a guilt-offering, which comes to atone for a sin? The sin-offering meal-offering proves it.

The matter has returned: This one is not seen as that one, and that one is not seen as this one; the common denominator between them

[the burnt-offering and the sin-offering meal-offering]

is that they are most holy offerings,

and if

they entered inside,

they

remain valid.

I, too, will include a guilt-offering: It is a most holy offering, and its blood entered inside; it remains valid.

This is the reasoning of the Rabbis who declared it valid.

Rava of Barnish said to Rav Ashi:

How did the Rabbis derive from the common denominator of a burnt-offering and a sin-offering meal-offering that the blood of a guilt-offering brought inside is valid?

Let us refute this:

What do they share in common, which is that they have no fixed minimum

for the burnt-offering or the sin-offering meal-offering?

Can you say the same with regard to a guilt-offering, which does have a fixed minimum,

as one is obligated to bring an offering worth at least two sela?

Rather, this is the reasoning of the Rabbis:

Because

the verse says: “And any sin-offering whose

blood is brought”

its blood,

and the verse comes to exclude that specifically

the blood of

this

particular

sin-offering that was brought inside disqualifies the offering,

but not its blood,

the blood of

another

offering that enters inside, which does not disqualify the offering. In this way, the verse reveals that one should not derive from the juxtaposition “like the sin-offering, so is the guilt-offering” with regard to the law of a guilt-offering whose blood was brought inside for atonement.

And we challenge this:

But the other one,

Rabbi Eliezer, who derived from the juxtaposition that a guilt-offering whose blood entered inside is disqualified—what does he do with the exclusion derived from the word “its blood”?

And we answer: Rabbi Eliezer expounded it as follows:

Its blood

of the sin-offering that was brought inside disqualifies it,

but not its flesh

that was brought inside. The verse did not come to exclude the blood of a guilt-offering.

And we challenge further:

But the other one,

the Rabbis—how did they know that “its blood” comes to exclude the blood of the guilt-offering from disqualification? Perhaps the verse came only to exclude the flesh of the sin-offering, as Rabbi Eliezer expounded it?

And we answer: The Rabbis derived it from the wording of the verse. It could have said

“blood”,

but it says

“its blood”,

to teach us an exclusion: Only the blood of the sin-offering that was brought inside disqualifies it, but not other blood.

But the other one,

Rabbi Eliezer:

“Blood”—

“its blood”—

he does not expound

this distinction, because this is the ordinary style of the Torah. [The Torah could not have written only, “And any sin-offering that is brought,” without mentioning blood at all, because it needed to exclude bringing in its flesh, which does not disqualify it.]

The Gemara returns to discuss the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis concerning a guilt-offering that was performed not for its sake:

Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that a guilt-offering slaughtered not for its sake remains valid—

this is why the meal-offering was juxtaposed

of a sinner

to a sin-offering:

both are disqualified if performed not for their sake; and

the meal-offering

brought voluntarily was juxtaposed

to a guilt-offering, since in both cases an offering performed not for its sake remains valid.

since in both cases the offering remains valid when performed not for its own sake.

As it was taught in a beraita: Rabbi Shimon says:

It is stated concerning a meal-offering:

“It is most holy, like the sin-offering and like the guilt-offering.”

And the verse comes to teach that

the sin-offering meal-offering is like a sin-offering; therefore,

if

one took its handful not for its sake,

it is

disqualified;

whereas

a voluntary meal-offering is like a guilt-offering; therefore,

if

one took its handful not for its sake,

it remains

valid.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who likewise holds that a guilt-offering slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified,

for what halakhic purpose was the meal-offering juxtaposed to a sin-offering

on the one hand

and to a guilt-offering

on the other? The law of a sin-offering and a guilt-offering is identical: If one performed either not for its sake, it is disqualified!?

And we answer: The juxtaposition to both a sin-offering and a guilt-offering was necessary

for the other teaching of Rabbi Shimon.

As we learned

[in tractate Menaḥot 26a]: If it happened that he

did not

consecrate the handful

in a sacred vessel,

the meal-offering is

disqualified according to everyone. But if, after consecrating it in a sacred vessel, he carried it in his hand and burned it without a sacred vessel, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disagree. According to the Rabbis, all the services of a meal-offering must be performed in the same manner as the service of the blood. Since the carrying in the blood services is performed in a vessel, and the sprinkling is also performed from the vessel, the carrying of the handful must likewise be performed in a vessel

. If he carried it in his hand, it is disqualified, whereas

Rabbi Shimon declares it valid

when the handful is carried by hand .

And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Ḥiyya, said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

The verse says: The meal-offering is doubly juxtaposed:

“It is most holy,

like the sin-offering and like the guilt-offering.”

That is, the juxtaposition to a sin-offering teaches us that if he

comes to perform its service,

the service of carrying and burning the meal-offering, he may perform it

by hand,

like the service of sprinkling in a sin-offering, in which he places its blood on the altar with his finger rather than sprinkling it from a vessel. However, if he performs it by hand, he is obligated

to perform it

specifically

with the right hand, like a sin-offering,

in which he places its blood on the altar with the right hand.

And in the Shita Mekubetzet [letter 3], he asked: According to the Rabbis, who disqualified a meal-offering not performed in a sacred vessel, why was the juxtaposition of the sin-offering meal-offering to a sin-offering and a guilt-offering necessary? To disqualify an offering performed not for its sake, we know this from the word “it,” and to declare a voluntary meal-offering valid, we know this from its juxtaposition to a peace-offering. And if you would say that it is needed to require performance with the right hand, this can be derived from the rule, “Every place where the word finger is stated,” and so forth. He answered that the juxtaposition was needed to teach that the law of a meal-offering is like that of a sin-offering: it must come only from non-sacred funds, as we will expound below, 98a. One must examine his question: Why did he challenge the words of the Rabbis, who required consecration in a vessel? The principal question should have been: Why is it necessary to derive from the juxtaposition that it must be performed with the right hand, when the Rabbis disqualify performance with the left hand because the priesthood is mentioned with regard to it? Rabbi Yosef Dov Soloveitchik proved from this that the derivation from the sin-offering does not concern performance with the right hand, but performance by hand; a sacrifice that includes a service performed by hand does not require a sacred vessel. Therefore, the Shita Mekubetzet first stated that the Rabbis held that a meal-offering not performed in a sacred vessel is disqualified, and asked: If so, why is the juxtaposition necessary? Clearly, it must have a service performed by hand, whereas performance with the right hand requires no derivation, since priesthood is mentioned with regard to it]]. And the juxtaposition to the guilt offering teaches us that if he

comes to perform its service with a vessel

then he

performs it with the left hand, as with a guilt offering

, meaning that he may carry the blood in a vessel in his left hand to the altar and sprinkle the blood from it with his left hand , since Rabbi Shimon held that, with regard to all offerings other than a sin offering, carrying and sprinkling with the left hand is valid.

And we raise an objection:

And Rabbi Shimon, how does he derive this verse

“It is most holy, like a sin offering and like a guilt offering,”

to teach this

—that if the handful of a sinner’s meal offering was taken not for its sake, it is disqualified, whereas if the handful of a freewill meal offering was taken not for its sake, it is valid—

and

on the other hand

derive it

also

to teach this

: That if he comes to perform its service by hand, he performs it with the right hand, and if he comes to perform its service with a vessel, he performs it with the left hand?

And we answer:

The principal purpose of the verse is for the teaching of Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya

, that if he comes to perform its service by hand, he performs it with the right hand, and if with a vessel, he performs it with the left hand.

And as for the sinner’s meal offering, which is disqualified when performed not for its sake, that has another reason

:

With regard to a sin offering, what is the reason

that it is disqualified when performed not for its sake?

For it is written concerning it

“it”

. If so,

it is also written concerning a sinner’s meal offering

“it”!

And we raise another objection:

And according to the Rabbis

, who disagreed with Rabbi Eliezer in our Mishna and held that a guilt offering slaughtered not for its sake is valid,

for what halakhic purpose is a guilt offering juxtaposed to a sin offering?

And we answer:

To teach you

: Just as a sin offering requires semikha, so too a guilt offering requires semikha !

Just as a sin offering requires placing one’s hands upon it, so too a guilt offering requires placing one’s hands upon it !

We learned in the Mishna:

Yosef ben Honi says

: All offerings

that are slaughtered in the name of a Paschal offering or in the name of a sin offering

are disqualified.

Rabbi Yohanan said: Yosef ben Honi and Rabbi Eliezer stated the same position

, for Rabbi Eliezer’s view in tractate Pesaḥim [62b] is that all offerings slaughtered during the time of the Paschal offering in the name of a Paschal offering are disqualified, and likewise all offerings slaughtered throughout the year in the name of a sin offering are disqualified, as Rabbi Yohanan will demonstrate below from his statement in a beraita.

Rabba said

: Only when one slaughtered offerings during the time of the Paschal offering in the name of a Paschal offering did Rabbi Eliezer agree with Yosef ben Honi that they are disqualified. But when one slaughtered offerings during the rest of the year

in the name of a sin offering, Yosef ben Honi and Rabbi Eliezer disagree

, as Rabba will demonstrate shortly from Rabbi Eliezer’s statement in a beraita.

As it was taught

: A

Paschal offering whose second year has passed

, so that it is no longer fit to be a Paschal offering and, ordinarily, stands designated as a peace offering,

and one slaughtered it at its proper time in its name

, in the name of a Paschal offering—meaning that he slaughtered a peace offering in the name of a Paschal offering during the time of the Paschal offering—

and likewise one who slaughters

offerings

in the name of a Paschal offering at its proper time

[on the fourteenth of Nisan in the afternoon]—

Rabbi Eliezer declares it disqualified

.

And Rabbi Yehoshua declares it valid.

Rabbi Yehoshua said

to Rabbi Eliezer: Are these not matters subject to a kal va-chomer, that the other offerings slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan in the name of a Paschal offering should not be disqualified? For

if during the rest of the year

it is not valid

if the Paschal offering is slaughtered

in its name

, but, on the contrary, it is disqualified because it was slaughtered in its name at a time when that designation is inappropriate, nevertheless, with regard to other offerings you did not rule stringently to disqualify them at that time when they were slaughtered in the name of a Paschal offering; rather, you conceded that they are

valid

even when slaughtered

in the name

of a Paschal offering.

If so, by a kal va-chomer,

at its proper time

—on the fourteenth of Nisan—

it

[the Paschal offering itself] is

valid

when slaughtered

in its name; is it not logical

that we should not be stringent and disqualify offerings slaughtered on that day in the name of a Paschal offering? Rather, on the contrary, their status should be

that they are valid

—those

other

offerings slaughtered

in its name

—in the name of the Paschal offering, since at that time it itself is valid when slaughtered in its name!?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Or reverse the matter!

That is, if you wish to derive such a kal va-chomer, you can formulate an additional kal va-chomer in this manner, and arrive at a conclusion opposed to the law [and if so, it is demonstrated that this kal va-chomer is fundamentally refuted]:

And if

a Paschal offering

throughout the rest of the year, when it is not valid

if slaughtered then

in its name

, nevertheless

it is valid

if slaughtered then

in the name of other offerings —

When the Paschal offering is slaughtered

at its proper time, when it is valid

, then if it is slaughtered

in its name

, is it not

logical that it should be valid

if slaughtered then

in the name of other offerings!

And

by virtue of this kal va-chomer

a Paschal offering on the fourteenth

would be rendered valid despite being slaughtered

not for its sake

. This contradicts the law taught in our Mishna, that a Paschal offering slaughtered at its proper time not for its sake is disqualified,

and

is this what you say?!

Rather, necessarily, the kal va-chomer that you refuted to me is not considered a kal va-chomer: For

what is the reason that other offerings were rendered valid

—offerings

slaughtered

throughout the rest of the year

with

in its name

, in the name of a Paschal offering? It is because

it is

[the Paschal offering itself]

valid

if

slaughtered

then

in the name of other offerings. But how can

. But how can

other offerings

—

slaughtered

at the proper time

of the Paschal offering in the name of a Paschal offering—be rendered valid, when

with the intention that they be a Paschal offering, at a time

it is

itself

disqualified

at that time if

it is slaughtered in the name of other offerings? [From here Rabbi Yohanan inferred that according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that other offerings slaughtered in the name of a Paschal offering during the time of the Paschal offering are disqualified, the same applies when one slaughters other offerings in the name of a sin offering: They too are disqualified. Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning is that because a Paschal offering is disqualified at its proper time when slaughtered in the name of other offerings, other offerings slaughtered in its name are likewise disqualified. The same should therefore apply to a sin offering: If it is slaughtered in the name of other offerings, it is disqualified, and consequently one who slaughters other offerings in the name of a sin offering disqualifies them.]

From here Rabbi Yohanan precisely inferred that according to Rabbi Eliezer, just as other offerings slaughtered with the intention that they be Paschal offerings during the time of the Paschal offering are invalid, so too, if one slaughters other offerings with the intention that they be a sin offering, they are invalid. Rabbi Eliezer’s reasoning is that because a Paschal offering is invalid at its proper time when slaughtered with the intention that it be another offering, other offerings slaughtered with the intention that they be a Paschal offering are likewise invalid. The same applies to a sin offering: if one slaughters it with the intention that it be another offering, it is invalid, and therefore one who slaughters other offerings with the intention that they be a sin offering renders them invalid as well.

Rabbi Yehoshua said

to Rabbi Eliezer:

If so

—according to your words, that you disqualify all offerings slaughtered during the time of the Paschal offering in the name of the Paschal offering—

you have weakened the power of the Paschal offering and strengthened the power of peace offerings

. For according to your words, a Paschal offering slaughtered throughout the year in the name of a peace offering is valid , whereas peace offerings [and other offerings] slaughtered on Passover eve in the name of a Paschal offering are disqualified. It follows that the disqualification of “not for its sake” in the case of peace offerings is more powerful than the disqualification of “not for its sake” in the case of a Paschal offering. Yet the Mishna implies that the Paschal offering is more stringent than peace offerings, for only a Paschal offering slaughtered not for its sake is disqualified, whereas peace offerings slaughtered not for their sake are valid?

Rabbi Eliezer returned and presented another argument

: Are these not matters subject to a kal va-chomer?

If a Paschal offering, whose surplus becomes a peace offering

, nevertheless, if

one slaughters it at its proper time in the name of peace offerings

, it is

disqualified

[even though throughout the rest of the year it is offered as a peace offering] , then

peace offerings

, which are more stringent than a Paschal offering,

whose surplus does not become a Paschal offering

[for there is no concept of “surplus—peace offerings,” since they may always be offered],

if one slaughters them in the name of a Paschal offering at its proper time, is it not logical that they should be disqualified!?