Zevachim 11a — the Talmud in English

And one can say:

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shows that it is

stringent, for it is offered

entirely

and nevertheless, if

its blood entered inside

it is

valid [both according to the Rabbis and according to Rabbi Eliezer].

[according to both the Rabbis and Rabbi Eliezer].

The guilt-offering,

which is less stringent than it,

does not

get offered

entirely,

but its flesh is eaten;

all the more so

that we should not be stringent concerning it to invalidate its blood that entered inside, and the kal va-chomer would nullify the derivation from the analogy, “like the sin-offering, so the guilt-offering.”

And we challenge: There is room to refute this, for, on the other hand, we find that the burnt-offering is less stringent than the guilt-offering:

What is the case with the burnt-offering, which does not atone

for a sin? Can you say the same concerning the guilt-offering, which comes to atone for a sin?

And we answer:

The sin-offering of the poor,

which is a sin-offering brought by the poor person in the variable offering,

proves

that even though it comes to atone for a sin, if it was brought inside it is not invalidated; and the same law applies to the guilt-offering whose blood was brought inside.

And we challenge:

Let the bird sin-offering prove it,

for it comes to atone for a sin, and nevertheless, if its blood entered inside, it is not invalidated. It is preferable to prove this from it rather than from a meal-offering, because it concerns blood, like the guilt-offering, and not a meal-offering, which is not one of the types of blood.

And we answer: It is impossible to prove from the law that

the bird sin-offering

whose blood entered inside is not invalidated, because this law was not stated definitively; rather,

it is Rabbi Avin’s unresolved question [below, 92b, since there is no reception of the bird sin-offering’s blood, and the discussion concerns a case in which he brought its blood in its neck: is this considered bringing in blood, and it is invalidated, or bringing in flesh, and it is valid]. Therefore the Rabbis had to derive from the sin-offering of the poor that it is not invalidated when it is brought inside.

And if you will refute:

What is the case with the sin-offering of the poor, which is not a type of offering,

and one cannot prove from it that the blood of an offering—the guilt-offering—that entered inside is valid,

the burnt-offering proves it,

for it is a type of offering and is not invalidated when its blood enters inside.

And

likewise, if you will refute from the other side: What is the case with the burnt-offering, which does not atone? Can you say the same concerning the guilt-offering, which comes to atone for a sin? Let the sin-offering of the poor prove it.

And the matter returns: this one is not seen as that one, and that one is not seen as this one; the common aspect in them [in the burnt-offering and in the sin-offering of the poor]

[of the burnt offering and the sinner’s meal offering]

is that they are most holy

and if they

entered inside,

they are

valid.

I, too, will bring in the guilt-offering, which is most holy, and whose blood entered inside: it is valid.

And this is the reason of the Rabbis who declared it valid.

Rava of Barnish said to Rav Ashi:

How did the Rabbis derive from the common aspect of the burnt-offering and the sin-offering of the poor that the blood of a guilt-offering brought inside is valid?

But let us refute it—

What is the common aspect of them, that they have no fixed amount

for the burnt-offering or the sin-offering of the poor?

Can you say the same concerning the guilt-offering, which has a fixed amount,

for one is obligated to bring an offering worth at least two sela?

Rather, this is the reason of the Rabbis:

because

the verse says,

“and every sin-offering whose

blood

is brought,” and Scripture came to exclude, for specifically

the blood of

this sin-offering,

itself,

when brought inside, invalidates the offering,

but not its blood

of another offering

that

enters inside, which does not invalidate the offering! And by this Scripture revealed that one should not derive from the analogy, “like the sin-offering, so the guilt-offering,” concerning the law of a guilt-offering whose blood was brought inside for atonement.

And we challenge:

But the other one,

Rabbi Eliezer, who derived from the analogy that a guilt-offering whose blood entered inside is invalid, what will he do with the exclusion from the word “its blood”?

And we answer: Rabbi Eliezer expounded it as follows:

Its blood

of the sin-offering that was brought inside invalidates it,

but not its flesh

that was brought inside; and Scripture did not come to exclude the blood of a guilt-offering.

And we further challenge:

But the other one,

the Rabbis—from where did they know that “its blood” comes to exclude the blood of the guilt-offering from invalidation? Perhaps Scripture came only to exclude the flesh of the sin-offering, as Rabbi Eliezer expounded it?

And we answer: The Rabbis derived it from the implication of the verse. It could have said

“blood,”

but it wrote

“its blood,”

to teach us an exclusion: only the blood of the sin-offering that was brought inside invalidates, but not the blood of another offering.

But the other one,

Rabbi Eliezer:

“blood”—

“its blood”

he does not expound,

because this is the way Scripture speaks. [But the Torah could not write only, “and every sin-offering that is brought,” without mentioning blood at all, because it must exclude bringing in its flesh, which does not invalidate.]

And the Gemara returned to discuss the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis concerning a guilt-offering that was performed not for its sake:

Granted, according to the Rabbis, who say that a guilt-offering slaughtered not for its sake is valid—

this is why the meal-offering was compared

of the sinner

to the sin-offering,

for both of them, if they were performed not for their sake, are invalid; and

the meal-offering

brought as a voluntary offering was compared

to the guilt-offering,

for in both cases it is valid when performed not for its sake.

For it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon says:

It is stated concerning the meal-offering,

“It is most holy, like the sin-offering and like the guilt-offering,”

and Scripture comes to say that

the sin-offering of the poor is like the sin-offering; therefore

if

he took its handful not for its sake,

it is

invalid; whereas

But

a voluntary meal-offering is like the guilt-offering; therefore

if

he took its handful not for its sake,

it is

valid.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer,

who likewise holds that a guilt-offering slaughtered not for its sake is invalid, the difficulty arises:

for what halakhic purpose was the meal-offering compared to the sin-offering

on one side

and the meal-offering to the guilt-offering

on the other, when the law of the sin-offering and the guilt-offering is identical, that if they were performed not for their sake, they are invalid!?

And we answer: The analogy both to the sin-offering and to the guilt-offering was needed

for that other teaching of Rabbi Shimon.

For we learned [in tractate Menahot 26a]: If it happened

[in tractate Menahot 26a]: If it happened that he

that he did not

sanctify the handful

in a service vessel,

the meal-offering is

invalid according to everyone. But if, after he sanctified it in a service vessel, he carried it in his hand and burned it not from a service vessel, the Rabbis and Rabbi Shimon disputed this. According to the Rabbis, all the services of a meal-offering must be performed like the performance of the service of the blood; and since in the services of the blood the carrying is performed in a vessel and the sprinkling is likewise performed from the vessel, therefore the carrying of the handful must also be performed in a vessel,

and if he carried it in his hand it is invalid, whereas

Rabbi Shimon declares valid

the carrying of the handful in his hand.

And Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya, said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon?

The verse says, with regard to the meal-offering’s double analogy,

“It is most holy,”

“like the sin-offering and like the guilt-offering,”

and that means that the analogy to the sin-offering teaches us that if

he comes to perform it,

to perform the carrying and burning service of the meal-offering, he may perform it

by hand,

like the sprinkling service in a sin-offering, in which he places its blood on the altar with his finger and not by sprinkling it from a vessel; except that if he performs it by hand, he is obligated

to perform it

specifically

with the right hand, like the sin-offering,

in which he places its blood on the altar with the right hand.

And the analogy does teach us that if

he comes to perform it in a vessel

then he

performs it with the left hand, as with an asham

, for he can convey the blood in a vessel in his left hand to the altar and sprinkle the blood from it with his left hand , for Rabbi Shimon held that in all the offerings, apart from the sin-offering, conveyance and sprinkling with the left hand are valid.

And we raise an objection:

And Rabbi Shimon, this verse

“It is most holy, like the sin-offering and like the asham”—how

does he derive it for this

—to teach that if the flour-offering of a sinner was scooped not for its own sake, it is invalid, while if a freewill flour-offering was scooped not for its own sake, it is valid—

and

on the other hand

does he derive it

also

for this

—that if he comes to perform it by hand, he performs it with the right hand, and if he comes to perform it in a vessel, he performs it with the left hand?

And we answer:

The primary purpose of the verse was for the teaching of Rav Yehuda, son of Rabbi Hiyya

, that if he comes to perform it by hand, he performs it with the right hand, and if in a vessel, he performs it with the left hand.

And the fact that the flour-offering of a sinner is invalid when performed not for its own sake has another reason

—for

why is a sin-offering

invalid when performed not for its own sake?

Because it is written concerning it

“it”.

If so,

it is also written concerning the flour-offering of a sinner

“it”!

And we raise another objection:

And according to the Rabbis

, who disagreed in our Mishna with Rabbi Eliezer and held that an asham slaughtered not for its own sake is valid,

for what halakhic purpose was the asham compared to the sin-offering?

And we answer:

To tell you—

just as a sin-offering requires laying on of hands, so an asham requires laying on of hands !

Just as a sin offering requires placing one’s hands upon it, so too a guilt offering requires placing one’s hands upon it !

We learned in the Mishna:

Yosef ben Honi says

—all the offerings

that are slaughtered in the name of a Passover-offering or in the name of a sin-offering

are invalid.

Rabbi Yohanan said: Yosef ben Honi and Rabbi Eliezer stated the same position

, for Rabbi Eliezer’s view in tractate Pesahim [62b] is that all offerings slaughtered during the time of the Passover-offering in the name of a Passover-offering are invalid, and likewise all offerings slaughtered throughout the entire year in the name of a sin-offering are invalid, as Rabbi Yohanan will prove below from his words in a beraita.

Rabba said

: Only if he slaughtered offerings during the time of the Passover-offering in the name of a Passover-offering did Rabbi Eliezer hold like Yosef ben Honi—that they are invalid. But when he slaughtered offerings on the other days of the year

in the name of a sin-offering, they disagree

—Yosef ben Honi and Rabbi Eliezer—as Rabba will soon prove from his words in a beraita.

For it was taught

: A

Passover-offering whose year had passed

, and which was no longer fit to be a Passover-offering, and which ordinarily stands for the sake of a peace-offering,

and he slaughtered it at its time in its name

, in the name of a Passover-offering, so that it turns out that he slaughtered a peace-offering in the name of a Passover-offering at the time of the offering of the Passover-offering,

and likewise one who slaughters

offerings

other than it in the name of a Passover-offering at its time

[on the fourteenth of Nisan in the afternoon]—

Rabbi Eliezer declares it invalid.

And Rabbi Yehoshua declares it valid.

Rabbi Yehoshua said

to Rabbi Eliezer: Are these not matters subject to a kal va-chomer, that the other offerings slaughtered on the fourteenth of Nisan in the name of a Passover-offering should not be declared invalid? For

if during the other days of the year

, which is a time more stringent with regard to the Passover-offering that was slaughtered in its name,

when it is not valid

then if the Passover-offering is slaughtered

in its name

, but, on the contrary, it is invalid because it was slaughtered in its name at a time unsuitable for it—and nevertheless, with regard to other offerings, you did not impose stringency upon them to declare them invalid at this time when they were slaughtered in the name of a Passover-offering; rather, you conceded that they are

valid

even when slaughtered

in its name

of a Passover-offering.

If so, a kal va-chomer

at its time

of the Passover-offering, on the fourteenth of Nisan,

when it

[the Passover-offering itself] is

valid

when it is slaughtered then

in its name, is it not so

that we should not impose stringency to invalidate offerings slaughtered on this day in the name of a Passover-offering; rather, we should say that their status is

that they should be made valid

those offerings

other

that are slaughtered

in its name

of the Passover-offering, since it itself is valid then when slaughtered in its name!?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Or reverse the matters!

That is, if you have come to expound such a kal va-chomer, you can state by this method an additional kal va-chomer, and arrive at a conclusion that contradicts the law [and if so, it is proven that this kal va-chomer is fundamentally refuted]:

And if

a Passover-offering

throughout the other days of the year, when it is not valid

if it is slaughtered then

in its name

, nevertheless

it is valid

if it is slaughtered then

in the name of other offerings —

When the Passover-offering is slaughtered

at its proper time, when it is valid

then if it is slaughtered

in its name

, and

is it not so that it should be made valid

if it is slaughtered then

in the name of other offerings!

And

by force of this kal va-chomer

a Passover-offering on the fourteenth

would be made valid even though it was slaughtered

not for its own sake.

But this matter contradicts the law taught in our Mishna, that a Passover-offering slaughtered at its proper time not for its own sake is invalid,

and

is this what you say?!

Rather, it is necessarily the case that the kal va-chomer that you refuted to me is not considered a kal va-chomer. For

what is the significance of the fact that they were made valid

other offerings

throughout the other days of the year

that were slaughtered

in its name

of the Passover-offering, because

it

[the Passover-offering itself] is

valid

if it is

slaughtered

then

in the name of other offerings

; but how

will they be made valid

offerings

other

that were slaughtered

at its proper time

of the Passover-offering in the name of a Passover-offering, at a time

when it

itself

is invalid

at that time if

they slaughtered it in the name of other offerings?

From here Rabbi Yohanan inferred that according to Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that other offerings slaughtered in the name of a Passover-offering during the time of the Passover-offering are invalid, the same law applies if one slaughtered other offerings in the name of a sin-offering: they are invalid through this act. For Rabbi Eliezer’s reason is that because the Passover-offering is invalid at its proper time when slaughtered in the name of other offerings, therefore other offerings slaughtered in its name are also invalid. If so, the same applies to a sin-offering: if it is slaughtered in the name of other offerings, it is invalid, and therefore one who slaughters other offerings in the name of a sin-offering invalidates them.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him

to Rabbi Eliezer:

If so

—according to your words, that you declared all offerings slaughtered during the time of the Passover-offering in the name of the Passover-offering invalid—

you have weakened the force of the Passover-offering and given force to peace-offerings

. For according to your words, the Passover-offering itself, when slaughtered throughout the entire year in the name of peace-offerings, is valid ,

whereas peace-offerings [and other offerings] slaughtered on the eve of Passover in the name of a Passover-offering are invalid. It follows that the invalidity of “not for its own sake” in peace-offerings is more powerful than the invalidity of not for its own sake in a Passover-offering. Yet the Mishna implies that the Passover-offering is more stringent than peace-offerings, for only a Passover-offering slaughtered not for its own sake is invalid, whereas peace-offerings slaughtered not for their own sake are valid ? Rabbi Eliezer returned and presented another argument

: Are these not matters subject to a kal va-chomer—

What is the case with a Passover-offering, whose surplus becomes a peace-offering

, nevertheless, if

he slaughtered it at its proper time in the name of peace-offerings

, it is

invalid

[even though throughout the other days of the year it is offered as a peace-offering] ;

and if so, peace-offerings

, which are more stringent than a Passover-offering,

whose surplus does not become a Passover-offering

[for there is no concept of “surplus—peace-offerings,” since they can always be offered],

if he slaughtered them in the name of a Passover-offering at its proper time, is it not so that they should be invalid!?

should it not follow that if one slaughters them with the intention that they be Paschal offerings at the proper time, they are invalid!?