Zevachim 11b (יא:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:

If you disqualify a shelamim sacrificed for the sake of a Pesaḥ by means of a kal va-chomer from a Pesaḥ whose surplus becomes a shelamim, you can derive by a similar kal va-chomer that an olah slaughtered for the sake of a ḥatat should be disqualified—

for

we find

that

the surplus of a ḥatat becomes an olah [

for example, if one set aside money for his ḥatat, purchased a ḥatat with part of it, and some extra money remained in his possession, the law is that he brings olot with it for the kayitz ha-mizbe’aḥ. The same applies if he set aside two ḥataot, so that one would be offered and the other would serve as a replacement should the first be lost: after offering one as a ḥatat, he offers the remaining one as an olah for the kayitz ha-mizbe’aḥ]

whereas the surplus of an olah does not become a ḥatat [

because there is never such a circumstance as “the surplus of an olah,” since he can always offer it as an olah], and according to your reasoning, one should have expounded a kal va-chomer:

And if a ḥatat,

the less stringent offering,

whose surplus becomes an olah, if it is slaughtered

as a ḥatat

for the sake of an olah

it is

invalid,

then an olah,

which is more stringent than it, since

its surplus

of an olah

does not become a ḥatat,

if

it is slaughtered

as an olah

for the sake of a ḥatat, is it not logical that it should be invalid?! [

And from the fact that Rabbi Eliezer did not answer that indeed, in his view, an olah sacrificed for the sake of a ḥatat is invalid, Rabba proved that Rabbi Eliezer disagrees here with Yosef ben Ḥoni and holds that an olah slaughtered for the sake of a ḥatat is valid.]

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: No.

Do not compare the law of the less stringent ḥatat to the law of the more stringent Pesaḥ , because

if you say with regard to a ḥatat

that when one slaughters an olah for the sake of a ḥatat the olah is not invalid, that is because there is a leniency with regard to the ḥatat itself, for it itself is

valid when it is slaughtered

for its sake

throughout

Can you say this with regard to the Paschal offering,

the entire year

and not only on a particular day.

Can you say this with regard to a Pesaḥ,

whose law is more stringent,

which is not valid

when it is slaughtered

for its sake except at its proper time,

and therefore only with regard to a Pesaḥ can one say:

Since

it itself, during the rest of the year, is

invalid

if it is slaughtered

for its sake,

therefore

it is proper that they should be disqualified,

offerings

other

than it that are slaughtered

for the sake of

the Pesaḥ on the fourteenth of Nisan [1a].

We learned in the Mishna:

Shimon, the brother of Azarya, says:

If one slaughters them for the sake of offerings of a higher sanctity than theirs, they are valid. If he slaughters them for the sake of offerings of a lower sanctity than theirs, they are invalid.

Rav Ashi taught in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan, and Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, taught in the name of Rabbi Yannai: What is the reason for the ruling of Shimon, the brother of Azarya?

As the verse states: “

And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel, that which they set apart for Him.”

And we expound:

When directed toward offerings of a higher sanctity than theirs,

if they slaughter the offerings for the sake of other offerings that are of a higher sanctity than they are,

they are not profaned.

But

when directed toward offerings of a lower sanctity than theirs,

they

are profaned.

And we raise an objection:

But

if

this

verse

comes for this purpose? But it is needed for that which Shmuel taught.

For Shmuel said: From where is it derived that one who eats tevel is liable to death

at the hands of Heaven?

As it is stated: “

And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel, that which they set apart for Him.”

And from the precision of the verse, which uses the future tense, “that which they will set apart,” it is evident that

the verse is speaking of what is destined to be separated.

Thus, eating tevel also involves profaning the sacred portion that will eventually be separated from it. And from here we derive by a gzera shava, “profanation”–“profanation,” from teruma itself: Just as a non-koen who eats teruma is liable to death at the hands of Heaven, so one who eats tevel is liable to death .

If so, how can we derive from the verse “that which they will set apart” both the law of a change of sacred designation, according to Shimon, the brother of Azarya, and the prohibition against eating tevel?

And we answer: The verse itself indicates that it was stated to teach both laws, because if it came to teach only the law of a change of sacred designation,

then let the verse write

Abaye said, and some say Rabbi Zerika: Let us consider a proof from the way Shimon, the brother of Azarya, himself explained his words in the Mishna. As we learned: “How so? Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered with the intention that they be offerings of lesser sanctity are disqualified. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered with the intention that they be offerings of the most sacred order are valid.” The firstborn and the animal tithe that one slaughtered with the intention that they be peace-offerings— are valid. Peace-offerings that one slaughtered with the intention that they be a firstborn or with the intention that they be an animal tithe— are disqualified.

“that which was set apart.”

What

is the reason that it was written in the future tense,

“that which they will set apart”?

It must be that the verse comes to teach that there is liability to death for eating tevel because of the priestly gifts contained within it, which are destined to be separated from it.

Learn from this both laws.

Rabbi Zeira raised a question

concerning the words of Shimon, the brother of Azarya, “One who slaughters offerings for the sake of offerings of a higher sanctity than theirs—they are valid”: What is his intention? Does he mean that they are

valid but do not effect acceptance, as the Sages say, and that he disagrees with them only when one slaughters for the sake of an offering of lower sanctity than theirs, in which case the Sages declare the offering valid but Shimon, the brother of Azarya, declares it invalid,

and

it follows

that he disagrees on only one point,

alone,

he disagrees?

Or perhaps

his intention is to say that if one slaughters for the sake of an offering of higher sanctity than theirs, they are

valid and effect acceptance, and

if so, it follows that

they disagree on two points, the Sages and Shimon, the brother of Azarya, since according to the Sages they are merely valid, but they do not effect acceptance?

Abaye said, and some say Rabbi Zerika: Come and hear

from the way Shimon, the brother of Azarya, himself explained his words in the Mishna. For we learned: “How so? Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity are invalid. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are valid.”

A firstborn animal and an animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a shelamim—

are valid.

A shelamim that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn animal or for the sake of an animal tithe—

is invalid.

And Abaye analyzes:

And if it enters your mind

that when one slaughters for the sake of an offering of higher sanctity than theirs, Shimon, the brother of Azarya, holds that they are

valid and effect acceptance, why did he state specifically that “a firstborn animal and an animal tithe that one slaughtered for the sake of a shelamim are valid”? Is

a firstborn animal

capable of effecting acceptance?! Rather,

necessarily, a firstborn animal and an animal tithe slaughtered for the sake of offerings of higher sanctity than theirs are

valid but do not effect acceptance.

And since in the latter clause he says that they are valid but do not effect acceptance,

he stated this,

the first clause as well,

in which he declared valid lesser-sacred offerings slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order, must mean

that they are valid but do not effect acceptance.

And we reject this:

And we reject this:

Is that necessarily so?!

Is there any necessity to establish the first clause in the same manner as the latter clause? It is possible that

each is as it is stated. The first clause speaks of lesser-sacred offerings that can effect acceptance; although they were slaughtered with a change of sacred designation, they are valid and effect acceptance because they were slaughtered for the sake of offerings of higher sanctity than theirs. But the latter clause speaks of a firstborn animal and an animal tithe, which do not effect acceptance; they are therefore valid but do not effect acceptance, as is their law.

We ask: If only a firstborn animal and an animal tithe are valid but do not effect acceptance, because they cannot effect acceptance, whereas other lesser-sacred offerings are valid and do effect acceptance, this presents a difficulty:

Rather, what does the latter clause come to teach us

by mentioning a firstborn animal and an animal tithe? What is considered

“higher”

and

“lower”

does it come to teach us?

But we have already

learned

the law of higher and lower offerings, since it first stated:

“How so?”—

“Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, and so forth.”

Necessarily, the continuation of his words in the latter clause, concerning a firstborn animal and an animal tithe, comes to clarify the first clause: Shimon, the brother of Azarya, holds that even if one slaughters lesser-sacred offerings for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order, they are valid but do not effect acceptance?!

And we answer: The latter clause presents neither a difficulty nor a proof, because it contains an additional novel teaching concerning a firstborn animal and an animal tithe:

Lest you say that it is only with regard to offerings of the most sacred order and lesser-sacred offerings that there is a distinction between higher and lower, but not with regard to lesser-sacred offerings and lesser-sacred offerings, that is, that the rule that one who slaughters an offering of higher sanctity for the sake of one of lower sanctity is invalid does not apply to them, therefore he specified that even shelamim, which are lesser-sacred offerings, are invalid if one slaughters them for the sake of a firstborn animal or an animal tithe, which possess a lower degree of sanctity than a shelamim .

We ask:

But we have also already learned

that there is a distinction between higher and lower among the types of lesser-sacred offerings, as we learned [below, 89a]:

A shelamim precedes a firstborn animal

for offering; if a shelamim and a firstborn animal are both ready to be offered, the shelamim is offered first,

because it requires the placing of four

blood presentations,

as well as leaning, libations, and the waving of the breast and thigh?!

And we answer:

This,

our Mishna, is the

primary

source of the law. But

that

Mishna below

was brought incidentally,

along with the laws of precedence among the offerings listed in that Mishna,

it was included

and stated there.

Mishna:

1.

A Pesaḥ that one slaughtered in the morning,

before midday,

on the fourteenth

of Nisan [when the time for its slaughter had not yet arrived, since it arrives only at midday]

not for its sake—

Rabbi Yehoshua declares it valid, as though it had been slaughtered on the thirteenth,

for it is like a Pesaḥ slaughtered during the rest of the year not for its sake: the designation “Pesaḥ” has been removed from it, and it is offered as a shelamim.

Ben Beteira declares it invalid, as though it had been slaughtered in the afternoon,

for a Pesaḥ slaughtered at its proper time not for its sake is invalid .

b.

Shimon ben Azai said: I have received a tradition

from the tradition

from seventy-two elders

who were in the Sanhedrin, who said

on the day that they seated Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya in the academy

[when many halakhot were taught that day]—

that all offerings that are eaten, if they were slaughtered not for their sake, are valid, but they do not count for their owners as fulfillment of their obligation; except for the Paschal offering and the sin-offering!

And the Mishna explains:

And ben Azai did not add

to the words of the Sages

anything but

the offering

the burnt-offering,

for in his view it too is disqualified when slaughtered not for its sake [as ben Azai said, “all offerings that are eaten,” excluding a burnt-offering, which is not eaten] ;

and the Sages did not concede this to him!

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: Ben Beteira would deem valid a Paschal offering that was slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth for its sake,

because he held

that the entire day is its appointed time [and he expounded the verse “between the evenings” as meaning between the end of the evening beginning the fourteenth and the beginning of the evening beginning the fifteenth]. Therefore, in the Mishna ben Beteira held that if one slaughtered the Paschal offering in the morning not for its sake, it is disqualified, since it is being slaughtered in its time .

[and he interpreted the verse “between the evenings” as meaning between the end of the evening of the night leading into the fourteenth and the beginning of the evening of the night leading into the fifteenth]. Therefore, ben Beteira held in the Mishna that if the Paschal offering was slaughtered in the morning not for its sake, it is disqualified, since it was slaughtered in its proper time .

However, according to this—that the entire day is its time—a difficulty arises:

what

is the reason ben Beteira said that if it was slaughtered in the morning not for its sake, it is disqualified,

as though

it had been slaughtered between the evenings? According to his view, surely the entire day is truly considered “between the evenings,” since it lies between the evening preceding the fourteenth and the evening preceding the fifteenth!

And the Gemara explains:

Since Rabbi Yehoshua said

that if it was slaughtered in the morning not for its sake it is valid,

as though

it had been slaughtered on the thirteenth [and he disagreed with ben Beteira, holding that “between the evenings” begins only at midday on the fourteenth, and therefore before midday its status is that of the thirteenth],

he too said

that if it was slaughtered for its sake in the morning it is

as though

it had been slaughtered after midday, to teach us that the entire day is valid for slaughtering the Paschal offering!

And we challenge this:

If so, since they disagree about when the Torah’s “between the evenings” occurs,

since they disagreed about when the Torah’s stated time “between the evenings” is,

rather than disagreeing

in our Mishna concerning a Paschal offering slaughtered in the morning

not for its sake, let them disagree concerning one slaughtered in the morning

slaughtered in the morning

for its sake,

whether it is considered to have been slaughtered in its time and is valid, or not in its time and is disqualified.

And we answer:

If they had disagreed concerning one slaughtered for its sake, I would have said

that they disagreed only when it was slaughtered in the morning for its sake,

but when it was slaughtered not for its sake, they did not disagree; rather,

they did not disagree. Rather,

Rabbi Yehoshua concedes to ben Beteira

that a Paschal offering slaughtered in the morning not for its sake is disqualified [even though according to Rabbi Yehoshua its proper time begins only at midday],

since part

of the fourteenth day

is fit

for offering the Paschal offering for its sake, and I would have said that this day is not considered like “the rest of the days of the year” , [since once on that day, after midday, it will be fit to be offered, the designation “Paschal offering” is not removed from it even when it is slaughtered as a peace-offering];

it teaches us

that according to Rabbi Yehoshua, the morning of the fourteenth is considered like the thirteenth, and when it is slaughtered then as a peace-offering, its status as a Paschal offering is removed and it is offered as a peace-offering.

And we challenge Rabbi Oshaya, who explained that ben Beteira’s reason is that the entire day is the time of the Paschal offering:

But it is written,

“between the evenings,”

which means from midday onward?

Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, said:

The meaning of “between the evenings” is

between two evenings! [between the end of the preceding evening and the beginning of the following evening] .

[Between the end of the previous evening and the beginning of the following evening.]

And we challenge this: What about the second

daily offering,

the one

concerning which it is written

also

in it,

“between the evenings”?

Is it likewise the case that the entire day is valid,

so that one could offer the second daily offering immediately after the morning daily offering!?

And we answer: The statement concerning the daily offering cannot be compared, for

there it is necessarily necessary to explain that “between the evenings” means from midday onward. For

it must necessarily be explained that “between the evenings” means from midday onward. For

since it is written

with regard to the first lamb,

“The one lamb you shall make in the morning,”

it follows that “between the evenings”

stated with regard to the second lamb is

literally between the evenings. For if the second too could be offered in the morning, why does it say “in the morning” concerning the first, whereas concerning the second it says “between the evenings”?

The Gemara asks: How can it be proven from the difference in wording between the first and second offerings that “between the evenings” concerning the daily offering means specifically after midday?

And we challenge this: How does the difference in wording between the first and second offerings prove that “between the evenings” concerning the daily offering means specifically after midday?

Perhaps

the verse intends to teach that

one—the first offering—has its time

in the

in the morning

specifically, whereas

the other has its time

throughout

the entire day, and in fact “between the evenings” stated concerning the daily offering is the same as “between the evenings” stated concerning the Paschal offering?

The Gemara answers: The verse states a limitation concerning the daily offering—“You shall make the one lamb in the morning”—and we derive:

And we answer: A restriction is stated concerning the daily offering—“The one lamb you shall make in the morning”—and we expound:

one

alone shall be made

in the morning, but not two in the morning!

Therefore, “between the evenings” stated concerning the second lamb must mean from midday onward.

And we further challenge this: The lighting of the

lamps

of the Menorah,

concerning which it is written

“when you kindle the lamps,”

“between the evenings,”

is it likewise the case that the entire day is valid

for lighting the lamps, as with the Paschal offering?

And the Gemara distinguishes:

There it is different, for it is written

concerning the lighting of the lamps, “Aaron and his sons shall arrange it

from evening until morning.”

And it was taught in a beraita: “From evening until morning”—

give it its measure,

the fixed measure, half a log for each lamp,

so that it will burn continuously from evening until morning [the measure appropriate for the long winter nights is given even on the short summer nights] .

[This measure, which is sufficient for the long winter nights, is also given on the shorter summer nights.]

Alternatively—

the verse concerning the lamps, “Aaron and his sons shall arrange it from evening until morning,” teaches you that

there is no service

among the services performed during the day that is

valid

after the lighting of the lamps , for it is expounded as follows: “He shall arrange it from evening until morning”—that

from evening until morning

and not after evening until morning,

but this alone: when he arranges the lamps in the evening so that they will burn until morning, all the services of the day must already have been completed [Rashi, Yoma 15a]. This proves that “between the evenings” stated concerning the lighting of the lamps refers to toward evening, and not to the entire day, since the lighting of the lamps is later than all the services performed in the evening.

—when he arranges the lamps in the evening so that they will burn until morning, all the services of the day must already have been completed [Rashi, Yoma 15a]. This proves that “between the evenings” concerning the lighting of the lamps means toward evening, and not throughout the entire day, since the lighting of the lamps is later than all the services performed during the day.

And we further challenge: Is it that

the incense

of the evening,

as it is written

also

concerning it "

between the evenings," is it

likewise the case that the entire day is valid

for burning it?