Zevachim 11b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:

if you disqualified a shelamim when slaughtered for the sake of a Pesah by a kal va-chomer from a Pesah whose surplus becomes a shelamim, you can learn by a similar kal va-chomer to disqualify an olah slaughtered for the sake of a hattat—

for behold,

we find

that

the surplus of a hattat becomes an olah [for example, when one set aside money for his hattat, purchased a hattat with part of it, and excess money remained in his possession, the law is that he brings olot with it for the summer-offering of the altar. And likewise when he set aside two hattot, so that one would be offered and the second would be for responsibility if the first were lost: after he offered one as a hattat, he offers the remaining one as an olah for the summer-offering of the altar],

but the surplus of an elevation-offering does not become a sin-offering [because there is never a situation of “the surplus of an elevation-offering,” since he can always sacrifice it as an elevation-offering]. And according to your reasoning, it would be appropriate to derive an a-fortiori inference:

but the surplus of an olah does not become a hattat [for there is never a circumstance of “the surplus of an olah,” since he can always offer it as an olah], and according to your words it would have been proper to expound a kal va-chomer:

the less stringent offering,

And if a hattat

which is the less stringent,

whose surplus becomes an olah, if he slaughtered it

for a hattat

for the sake of an olah

then it is

disqualified.

An olah,

which is more stringent than it, for

its surplus

of an olah

does not become a hattat,

if

he slaughtered it

as an olah

for the sake of a hattat, is it not logical that it should be disqualified?! [And from the fact that Rabbi Eliezer did not answer that indeed, according to his view, an olah for the sake of a hattat is also disqualified, Rabba proved that Rabbi Eliezer disputes Yosef ben Honi in this and holds that an olah slaughtered for the sake of a hattat is valid].

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: No,

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: No,

compare the law of the less stringent hattat to the law of the more stringent Pesah , for

if you said with regard to a hattat,

that when one slaughters an olah for the sake of a hattat, the olah is not disqualified, this is because there is a leniency in the hattat itself, for it itself is

valid when it is slaughtered

the entire year,

for its own sake

throughout

the entire year, and not only on a particular day.

which is not valid when it is slaughtered

Can you say this with regard to a Pesah,

whose law is stringent,

which is not valid

when one slaughters it

for its own sake except at its proper time, and therefore only with regard to a Pesah is it possible to say:

with its proper intention,

since

it itself during the rest of the year is

disqualified if it is slaughtered

We learned in the Mishna:

for its own sake,

therefore

it is the law that they should disqualify

sacrifices

other

that were slaughtered

for its sake, for the sake of the Pesah, on the fourteenth of Nisan [1a].

the Pesaḥ on the fourteenth of Nisan [1a].

We learned in the Mishna:

Shimon, the brother of Azariah, says:

if he slaughtered them for the sake of offerings more exalted than they are, they are valid; for the sake of offerings lower than they are, they are disqualified.

Rav Ashi teaches in the name of Rabbi Yohanan, and Rav Aha, son of Rava, teaches in the name of Rabbi Yannai: What is the reason of Shimon, the brother of Azariah?

For the verse says: “

And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel, that which they set apart for the Lord.” And we expound:

But with regard to offerings of lower sanctity than them, they

with regard to one more exalted than they: if they slaughter the offerings for the sake of other offerings more exalted than they are,

And they raise an objection: But is this verse coming for this purpose? It is needed for that which Shmuel taught,

they are not profaned.

But

with regard to one lower than they are,

they are

profaned.

And we raise an objection:

But

is

this

verse

coming only for this? But it is needed for that which Shmuel said.

For Shmuel said: From where is it derived that one who eats untithed produce is liable to death

at the hands of Heaven?

As it is stated: “

And they shall not profane the sacred offerings of the Children of Israel, that which they set apart for the Lord.” From the precision of the verse, which uses the future tense, “that which they will set apart,” it is evident that

And from the precision of the verse, which uses the future tense, “that which they will set apart,” it is evident that

the verse speaks of that which is destined to be separated: eating untithed produce also involves profaning the sacred portion destined to be separated from it. From this, we learn by a gzera shava, “profanation”—“profanation,” from teruma itself: just as a non-koen who eats teruma is liable to death at the hands of Heaven, so one who eats untithed produce is liable to death .

Thus, eating tevel also involves profaning the sacred portion that will eventually be separated from it. And from here we derive by a gzera shava, “profanation”–“profanation,” from teruma itself: Just as a non-koen who eats teruma is liable to death at the hands of Heaven, so one who eats tevel is liable to death .

And if so, it is difficult: how can we expound from the verse “that which they will set apart” both the law of a change of designation, according to Shimon, the brother of Azariah, and the eating of untithed produce?

And we answer: from the verse itself it follows that it was stated to teach both laws, for if it had come to teach only about a change of designation,

then let the verse write “

Abaye said, and some say Rabbi Zerika: Let us consider a proof from the way Shimon, the brother of Azarya, himself explained his words in the Mishna. As we learned: “How so? Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered with the intention that they be offerings of lesser sanctity are disqualified. Offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered with the intention that they be offerings of the most sacred order are valid.” The firstborn and the animal tithe that one slaughtered with the intention that they be peace-offerings— are valid. Peace-offerings that one slaughtered with the intention that they be a firstborn or with the intention that they be an animal tithe— are disqualified.

that which was set apart.”

What is the reason that it was written in the future tense, “

is the reason that it was written in the future tense,

that which they will set apart”? It must be that the verse came to teach you that there is liability for death for eating untithed produce, on account of the gifts of the koanim in it, which are destined to be separated from it:

It must be that the verse comes to teach that there is liability to death for eating tevel because of the priestly gifts contained within it, which are destined to be separated from it.

Learn from it two [laws]!

Rabbi Zeira raised a question concerning the words of Shimon, the brother of Azariah, “One who slaughters the offerings for the sake of offerings more exalted than they are, they are valid.” What is his intention? Does he mean that they are

concerning the words of Shimon, the brother of Azarya, “One who slaughters offerings for the sake of offerings of a higher sanctity than theirs—they are valid”: What is his intention? Does he mean that they are

valid but do not effect acceptance, as the Sages say, and he disputes them only regarding one who slaughters for the sake of an offering lower than they are, which the Sages validate whereas Shimon, the brother of Azariah, disqualifies,

and

it follows that

he disputes in one matter

alone—

he disputes,

or perhaps his intention is that when one slaughters for the sake of an offering more exalted than they are, they are

his intention is to say that if one slaughters for the sake of an offering of higher sanctity than theirs, they are

valid and effect acceptance, and it follows that

if so, it follows that

they dispute in two matters, the Sages and Shimon, the brother of Azariah, since according to the Sages they are only valid but do not effect acceptance?

Abaye said, and some say Rabbi Zerika: ta shma, from what Shimon, the brother of Azariah, himself explained concerning his words in the Mishna. For we learned: How so? Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity are disqualified; offerings of lesser sanctity that one slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order are valid.

And if it enters your mind that when one slaughters an offering with the intention that it be one of higher sanctity than itself, Shimon, the brother of Azarya, holds that it is

A firstborn and a tithe-offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a shelamim—

are valid.

Shelamim that one slaughtered for the sake of a firstborn or for the sake of a tithe-offering—

are disqualified.

And Abaye infers:

And if it enters your mind that, when one slaughters for the sake of an offering more exalted than they are, according to Shimon, the brother of Azariah, they are

valid but do not effect acceptance.

valid and effect acceptance, why did he state in his words, “A firstborn and a tithe-offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a shelamim are valid”? Is a firstborn capable of effecting acceptance?!

Is that necessarily so?! Is there any requirement to interpret the first clause in the same manner as the latter clause? It is possible that

Is a firstborn capable of effecting acceptance?! Rather, necessarily, a firstborn and a tithe-offering slaughtered for the sake of an offering more exalted than they are are

And they raise a difficulty: If only a firstborn and an animal tithe are valid but do not effect acceptance because they cannot effect acceptance, whereas other offerings of lesser sanctity are valid and effect acceptance, this is difficult for you:

valid but do not effect acceptance.

And since in the latter clause he says “valid but do not effect acceptance”,

he says,

the first clause likewise,

in which he validated offerings of lesser sanctity slaughtered for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order, means to say

valid but do not effect acceptance.

And we reject this:

Offerings of the most sacred order that one slaughtered with the intention that they be offerings of lesser sanctity, and so on.” Necessarily, the continuation of his words in the latter clause, concerning a firstborn and an animal tithe, comes to clarify the first clause: Shimon, the brother of Azarya, holds that even if one slaughters offerings of lesser sanctity with the intention that they be offerings of the most sacred order, they are valid but do not effect acceptance?!

Is that necessarily so?!

Is there a necessity to establish the first clause like the latter clause? It is possible that

this one is according to its matter, and that one is according to its matter. The first clause speaks of offerings of lesser sanctity that can effect acceptance; although he slaughtered them with a change of designation, they are valid and effect acceptance because he slaughtered them for the sake of offerings more exalted than they are. But the latter clause speaks of a firstborn and a tithe-offering, which do not effect acceptance; they are valid but do not effect acceptance, in accordance with their law.

And we raise an objection: if only a firstborn and a tithe-offering are valid but do not effect acceptance, because they cannot effect acceptance, whereas other offerings of lesser sanctity are valid and effect acceptance, this would be difficult for you—

rather, what does the latter clause teach us,

by stating the latter clause concerning a firstborn and a tithe-offering? What is considered

“more exalted”

and

“lower”

does it teach us?

But we have already

learned the law of the more exalted and the lower, for it stated previously: “

the law of higher and lower offerings, since it first stated:

How so?—

offerings of the most sacred order slaughtered for the sake of offerings of lesser sanctity, etc.” Necessarily, the continuation of his words in the latter clause, concerning a firstborn and a tithe-offering, comes to reveal about the first clause that Shimon, the brother of Azariah, holds that even if one slaughters offerings of lesser sanctity for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order, they are valid and do not effect acceptance!?

Necessarily, the continuation of his words in the latter clause, concerning a firstborn animal and an animal tithe, comes to clarify the first clause: Shimon, the brother of Azarya, holds that even if one slaughters lesser-sacred offerings for the sake of offerings of the most sacred order, they are valid but do not effect acceptance?!

And we answer: no; from the latter clause there is neither a difficulty nor a proof, for in the latter clause an additional novelty is stated concerning a firstborn and a tithe-offering:

lest you say that it is with offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity that there is a more exalted and a lower, but with offerings of lesser sanctity and offerings of lesser sanctity there is not, and it would not be said concerning them that one who slaughters for the sake of a lower offering is disqualified. Therefore he explained that even shelamim, which are offerings of lesser sanctity, if one slaughtered them for the sake of a firstborn or a tithe-offering, which are offerings of lesser sanctity lower than shelamim, they are disqualified .

And we raise an objection:

we have also learned this—that there is a more exalted and a lower among the types of offerings of lesser sanctity. For we learned [below 89a]:

primary source for the law. Whereas

shelamim precede a firstborn for offering; when shelamim and a firstborn are standing ready for offering, the shelamim are offered first

for offering

because they require the placing of four blood-gifts,

Mishna:

and leaning, and libations, and the waving of the breast and the thigh?!

And we answer:

this, our Mishna, is the

Rabbi Yehoshua deems it valid, as though it had been slaughtered on the thirteenth, since it is like a Paschal offering slaughtered during the rest of the year not with its proper intention: the designation “Paschal offering” is removed from it, and it is then sacrificed as a peace-offering.

principal law. But

source of the law. But

that, the Mishna below,

Mishna below

was brought incidentally,

incidentally to the laws of precedence among the offerings taught in that Mishna,

it was mentioned,

it stated it.

Mishna:

a.

A Pesah that one slaughtered in the morning,

before midday,

on the fourteenth of Nisan [when the time of its slaughter had not yet arrived, until midday],

of Nisan [when the time for its slaughter had not yet arrived, since it arrives only at midday]

not for its own sake—

Rabbi Yehoshua validates it, as though it had been slaughtered on the thirteenth, since it is like a Pesah slaughtered during the rest of the year not for its own sake: the designation of Pesah is removed from it, and it is offered as a shelamim.

for it is like a Pesaḥ slaughtered during the rest of the year not for its sake: the designation “Pesaḥ” has been removed from it, and it is offered as a shelamim.

Ben Beteira disqualifies it, as though it had been slaughtered between the evenings, for a Pesah slaughtered at its proper time not for its own sake is disqualified .

for a Pesaḥ slaughtered at its proper time not for its sake is invalid .

b.

Shimon ben Azai said: I have received

by tradition

from seventy-two elders

who were in the Sanhedrin, who said

on the day when they seated Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah in the session [many halakhot were taught on that day]—

when many halakhot were taught that day]—

that all sacrificial animals that are eaten, which were slaughtered not for their sake, are valid, but they do not count for their owners as an obligation, except for the Pesach and the sin-offering!

And the Mishna explains:

And ben Azai did not add

to the words of the Sages

except

the offering

of elevation,

for according to his view it too is disqualified when slaughtered not for its sake [for this is what ben Azai said: “all sacrificial animals that are eaten,” excluding an offering of elevation, which is not eaten] ,

and the Sages did not agree with him!

Gemara:

Rabbi Elazar said that Rabbi Oshaya said: ben Beteira would declare valid a Pesach that one slaughtered on the morning of the fourteenth for its sake,

because he held

that the entire day is its time [and he expounded the verse “between the evenings” as between the end of the evening preceding the fourteenth and the beginning of the evening preceding the fifteenth]. Therefore ben Beteira held in the Mishna that if one slaughtered the Pesach in the morning not for its sake, it is disqualified, since it is in its time .

[and he interpreted the verse “between the evenings” as meaning between the end of the evening of the night leading into the fourteenth and the beginning of the evening of the night leading into the fifteenth]. Therefore, ben Beteira held in the Mishna that if the Paschal offering was slaughtered in the morning not for its sake, it is disqualified, since it was slaughtered in its proper time .

But according to this—that its entire day is its time—it is difficult:

what

is the reason that ben Beteira said that if one slaughtered it in the morning not for its sake, it is disqualified

as though

he had slaughtered it between the evenings? According to his words, the entire day is truly considered “between the evenings,” since it is between the evening preceding the fourteenth and the evening preceding the fifteenth!

And the Gemara explains:

Since Rabbi Yehoshua said,

that if one slaughtered it in the morning not for its sake, it is valid

as though

it had been slaughtered on the thirteenth [and he disagreed with ben Beteira, holding that “between the evenings” is only from midday of the fourteenth, and therefore before midday its status is that of the thirteenth],

he too said

that if one slaughtered it for its sake in the morning, it is

as though

it had been slaughtered after midday, to teach us that the entire day is valid for slaughtering the Pesach!

And we challenge:

If so,

since they disagreed about when the time of “between the evenings” stated in the Torah is,

rather than disagreeing

in our Mishna concerning a Pesach slaughtered in the morning

not for its sake, let them disagree about one slaughtered in the morning

slaughtered in the morning

for its sake,

whether it is considered slaughtered in its time and is valid, or not in its time and is disqualified?

And we answer:

If they had disagreed concerning one slaughtered for its sake, I would have said

that they disagreed only concerning one slaughtered in the morning for its sake,

but concerning one not for its sake

they did not disagree; rather,

Rabbi Yehoshua agrees with ben Beteira

that a Pesach slaughtered in the morning not for its sake is disqualified [despite the fact that according to Rabbi Yehoshua its mitzva is only from midday]

since part of it

of the fourteenth day

is fit

for offering the Pesach for its sake, and I would have said that this day is not considered like “the rest of the year” , [for since on that day, after midday, it will be fit for offering, the designation Pesach is not removed from it even when one slaughters it in the name of peace-offerings]

it teaches us

the tanna in the Mishna that according to Rabbi Yehoshua the morning of the fourteenth is considered like the thirteenth, and when he slaughters it then in the name of peace-offerings, its status as a Pesach is removed and it is offered as a peace-offering.

And we challenge Rabbi Oshaya, who explained that ben Beteira’s reason is that the entire day is the time of the Pesach:

But it is written “

between the evenings,”

whose meaning is from midday onward?

Ulla, son of Rav Ilai, said:

The meaning of “between the evenings” is—

between two evenings! [between the end of the preceding evening and the beginning of the following evening] .

[Between the end of the previous evening and the beginning of the following evening.]

And we challenge: Is it so concerning the second offering of

the daily offering

the second one,

for it is written

also

in it “

between the evenings,”

is it likewise valid throughout the entire day,

so that one could offer the second daily offering immediately after the morning daily offering!?

And we answer: It is impossible to compare what is stated concerning the daily offering, for

there

it must necessarily be explained that “between the evenings” is from midday onward, since

from the fact that it is written

concerning the first lamb, “

the one lamb you shall make in the morning,”

it follows that “between the evenings”

stated concerning the second lamb is

between the evenings ממש,

for if it were possible to offer the second one also in the morning, why was “in the morning” stated concerning the first, while concerning the second it says “between the evenings”?!

And we challenge: How is it demonstrated from the difference in wording between the first and second offerings that “between the evenings” concerning the daily offering is specifically after midday?

And say

that the verse intends to teach that

one

—the first offering—its time is

in the morning

specifically, whereas

the other

its time is

the entire day, and in truth “between the evenings” stated concerning the daily offering is like “between the evenings” stated concerning the Pesach?

The Gemara answers: The verse states a limitation concerning the daily offering—“You shall make the one lamb in the morning”—and we derive:

And we answer: A limitation is stated concerning the daily offering—“the one lamb you shall make in the morning”—and we expound:

one

alone shall be made

in the morning, but not two in the morning!

Therefore, necessarily, “between the evenings” stated concerning the second lamb is from midday onward.

And we further challenge: The lighting of the

lamps

of the lampstand,

for it is written

concerning it, “when you raise the lamps

between the evenings,”

is it likewise valid throughout the entire day

for lighting the lamps, as with the Pesach offering?

And the Gemara distinguishes:

There it is different, for it is written

concerning the lighting of the lamps, “Aaron and his sons shall arrange it

from evening until morning.”

And it was taught: From evening until morning—

give it its measure

the fixed measure, half a log for each lamp,

so that it will burn and continue from evening until morning [this measure, suited to the long winter nights, is also given on the short summer nights] .

[This measure, which is sufficient for the long winter nights, is also given on the shorter summer nights.]

Alternatively—

the verse stated concerning the lamps, “Aaron and his sons shall arrange it from evening until morning,” teaches you that

you have no service

among the services performed during the day that is

valid

after the lighting of the lamps , for this is how it is expounded: “He shall arrange it from evening until morning”—it

from evening until morning

but not after evening until morning,

except for this alone,

so that when he arranges the lamps in the evening, in order that they burn until morning, all the services of the day have already been completed [Rashi, Yoma 15a]. This proves that “between the evenings” stated concerning the lighting of the lamps is toward evening and not throughout the entire day, since the lighting of the lamps is later than all the services performed in the evening.

And further we raise an objection: Is it that

incense

of the evening,

as it is written

also

concerning it "

“between the evenings”—is it likewise the case that

it is valid all day

for its burning?