Zevachim 10b — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Joshua said to him: ![](pamud.bmp "

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I return to the beginning,

to refute the inferences from both sides: one cannot derive from a sin-offering, because its blood is given above, and one cannot derive from a Paschal offering, because its time is fixed. [And below we ask that Rabbi Eliezer should derive it from both together by “the common side.”]

Rabbi Eliezer reconsidered and argued another argument: Concerning a sin-offering it is stated

with regard to the slaughtering of the goat of the ruler: “And he shall slaughter it at the place where he slaughters the burnt-offering before the Lord—it is a sin-offering,”

it is;

and we expound the word

“it is”

as a limitation, to teach that only if he slaughtered it

for its sake is it valid,

but if he slaughtered it

not for its sake, it is invalid.

And

also concerning the offering of

a Paschal offering it is stated in it:

“And you shall say: A Paschal sacrifice,”

it is;

and we expound from

“it is”

that only if it was slaughtered

for its sake

is it

valid,

but if it was slaughtered

not for its sake,

it is

invalid.

And if so,

also a guilt-offering,

since

it was stated

also

in it:

“A guilt-offering,”

it is,

one should expound from it, as in the case of a sin-offering and a Paschal offering, that

“it is”

was stated as a limitation, to teach us that only if he slaughtered the guilt-offering

for its sake

is it

valid,

but if he slaughtered it

not for its sake,

it is

invalid!

Rabbi Joshua said to him:

The “it is” stated concerning a sin-offering and a Paschal offering differs from the “it is” stated concerning a guilt-offering, for

a sin-offering

in which

there was stated

the limitation

“it is”,

it was written

with regard to the slaughtering,

and therefore the limitation is expounded as follows: A sin-offering

it is—

for its sake it is valid; not for its sake it is invalid.

And likewise

in

the offering of

a Paschal offering,

a limitation is stated in it,

“it is,”

with regard to slaughtering,

and we expound: “A Paschal sacrifice,

it is”—

if he slaughtered it

for its sake, it is valid,

but if he slaughtered it

not for its sake, it is invalid.

But

in the offering of

a guilt-offering it was not stated in it

a limitation,

“it is,”

but only after the burning of the sacrificial portions.

Therefore it is impossible to derive from it that a change of sacred designation invalidates it, for

it itself, when its sacrificial portions have not been burned,

at all, is

valid,

because its owners have already achieved atonement through the sprinkling of the blood; and all the more so, if they burned them not for their sake, they do not invalidate the offering and do not prevent the atonement. Consequently, it is impossible to derive from the burning of the sacrificial portions of the guilt-offering to its slaughtering that a change of sacred designation should invalidate it.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: Behold, it says,

in the section “This is the law of the guilt-offering”:

“Like the sin-offering, like the guilt-offering”—

“one law applies to them.” Scripture compared a guilt-offering to a sin-offering, to tell you:

Just as a sin-offering

that he slaughtered

not for its sake invalidates

the offering, so

a guilt-offering

that he slaughtered

not for its sake

is

invalid! On a matter learned by comparison, one does not raise a refutation, even if there is a distinction between the sin-offering and the guilt-offering .

And one may not challenge a matter derived by means of an analogy between verses, even if there is a distinction between the sin-offering and the guilt-offering.

The Master said

in the beraita above:

“Rabbi Joshua said to him”—

“I return to the beginning”

to refute the inferences from both sides.

And we raise a difficulty: Indeed, there is a refutation against each inference by itself; but why did Rabbi Eliezer not say

“Let the argument return, and let us bring [the conclusion] through the common side”

that is equal in both: A sin-offering and a Paschal offering are both eaten, and the thought of “not for its sake” invalidates them; I, too, will bring a guilt-offering, which is eaten, and the thought of “not for its sake” will invalidate it!?

And we answer:

Because there is room to refute—

What is distinctive about the common feature in them? They have a side of excision,

for a sin-offering comes to atone for an inadvertent transgression punishable by excision, and one who did not offer a Paschal offering is liable to excision; thus, through bringing it, he is released from excision. Since they are stringent, Scripture made them stringent by invalidating them through the thought of “not for its sake,” and one cannot learn from them concerning a guilt-offering, which is less stringent than they, since it has no side of excision.

The Master said [at the beginning of the beraita, when Rabbi Eliezer said that a guilt-offering should be learned from a sin-offering]:

“Rabbi Joshua said to him”:

“Rabbi Joshua said to him”—

“No.”

“If you say this concerning a sin-offering

that is invalidated when not for its sake,

for its blood

is given

above

the scarlet line.

And we raise a difficulty:

And let him say to him—

let Rabbi Joshua say to Rabbi Eliezer another distinction between a guilt-offering and a sin-offering:

“No.”

“If you say this concerning a sin-offering

which has a stringent feature,

for its blood enters into the innermost areas [such as on the Day of Atonement], can you say this concerning a guilt-offering, whose blood is sprinkled only on the outer altar?! [This refutation is preferable, because bringing its blood into the interior proves that it is more sacred and is considered a stringency, whereas giving its blood above is merely a designation of place and elevation, but does not involve additional sanctity] .

[as in the case of the Yom Kippur sin-offering], can you say this of a guilt-offering, whose blood is sprinkled only on the outer altar?! [This challenge is preferable, because bringing the blood inside proves that it has greater sanctity and is a stringency. By contrast, placing its blood above is merely a location requirement and does not indicate additional sanctity.]

And we answer: The invalidity of a sin-offering not for its sake that we learned in the Mishna—

we are speaking of external sin-offerings,

whose blood does not enter into the innermost areas, and nevertheless the thought of “not for its sake” invalidates them. Since Rabbi Eliezer learned from these sin-offerings concerning a guilt-offering, one can refute him only by saying that their blood is sprinkled above.

And we raise another difficulty: Why does Rabbi Joshua refute from the fact that the blood of a sin-offering is given above, even though this is not a stringency? It would be preferable to argue to Rabbi Eliezer: What is distinctive about an external sin-offering? It has a stringency

that if its blood

of the external sin-offering

enters into the innermost areas, the sin-offering is invalid, whereas in the case of a guilt-offering, if its blood was brought into the innermost areas, it is not invalidated by this.

And we answer: It is impossible to refute Rabbi Eliezer in this way, because

Rabbi Eliezer holds

that

even the guilt-offering

that had its blood brought into the innermost areas is invalidated by this, and in this law it is equal to a sin-offering.

And we raise another difficulty: Rabbi Joshua could refute: What is distinctive about a sin-offering,

for it atones for those liable for excision,

whereas in the case of a guilt-offering, it does not atone for those liable for excision?!

And we answer: Rabbi Eliezer learned concerning a guilt-offering

from the sin-offering of

“hearing the voice,”

which does not atone for excision, but for the prohibition transgressed by the witness when his fellow adjured him to come and testify testimony that he knew in his fellow’s favor [in civil cases], and he denied the adjuration and claimed that he did not know. This is a transgression of a prohibition, but it does not involve excision. This sin-offering is called the “sin-offering of hearing the voice” because of the verse written concerning it [Leviticus 5:1]: “If a person sins, and hears the voice of an oath, and he is a witness … if he does not tell, he shall bear his iniquity.”

And we raise another difficulty: Why could Rabbi Joshua not refute: What is distinctive about a sin-offering,

for it requires

four placements

of

four separate placements of blood on the four corners of the altar, whereas in the case of a guilt-offering, it requires only two placements that are four, which he gives on two opposite corners of the altar, and every sprinkling that divides into two sides is considered as though he gave two placements? And we answer: Rabbi Joshua holds

in accordance with Rabbi Ishmael, who says that all blood

of all the offerings

requires four placements

of blood separately, so that even offerings whose blood-placement is two that are four must be performed in such a manner that each placement is given separately: He stands at one corner of the altar and gives on one side of the altar, then returns and gives on its other side; afterward he approaches the opposite corner and gives on one side and returns and gives on the other side.

It follows that there is no distinction between a sin-offering and the other offerings in the number of acts of placing, but only that in a sin-offering he gives the four placements at the four ends of the altar, whereas in the other offerings he gives them at two opposite corners. Since in a guilt-offering as well he gives the blood through four separate acts of placing, it is possible to learn a guilt-offering from a sin-offering, and therefore Rabbi Joshua did not refute from this law.

But we still raise a difficulty: Rabbi Joshua could refute: What is distinctive about a sin-offering,

for it requires

placement of the blood of

four placements

on four corners, whereas in the case of a guilt-offering, even according to Rabbi Ishmael, who requires four separate placements, they are not given on the four ends of the altar, but at its two opposite corners, and therefore they are considered “two that are four”?

And we answer:

And according to your reasoning, why did you refute only from this law? Rabbi Joshua could refute from many laws in which there is a distinction between a sin-offering and a guilt-offering, for

there is

the placement of

a finger

in a sin-offering, which does not apply to a guilt-offering [whose blood is thrown from the vessel and is not placed with the priest’s finger].

And likewise,

there is a law that the blood of a sin-offering must be placed on the

corner of the altar above, unlike a guilt-offering, whose blood is placed on the sides of the altar, and it need not be raised so high as the corner, as in the case of a sin-offering .

And likewise,

a law requiring the blood of a sin-offering to be applied on the

corner

of the altar above, unlike a guilt-offering, whose blood is applied to the sides of the altar and need not be raised all the way to the corner as in the case of a sin-offering.

there is in a sin-offering the placing of the blood specifically on the

edge

of the corner, unlike a guilt-offering, whose blood is not placed on the edge .

the edge

of the corner, unlike a guilt-offering, whose blood is not applied on the edge.

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that Rabbi Joshua

selected one of two—

three reasons,

and since this is so, one cannot raise the difficulty why he did not refute from four placements on four corners.

The Master said [at the beginning of the beraita]:

“Rabbi Joshua said to him: No, if you say this concerning a sin-offering”

for its blood is given above the scarlet line, can you say this concerning a guilt-offering, whose blood is given below the scarlet line?

And we raise a difficulty: And according to the conclusion, that Rabbi Eliezer learns from the comparison, “Like a sin-offering, like a guilt-offering,”

let him say to him—

let

him answer,

Rabbi Eliezer

to Rabbi Joshua and reject his refutation: Indeed,

a guilt-offering too

is learned through the comparison to require giving

its blood above!?

And again we would learn a guilt-offering from a sin-offering, which is invalidated through the thought of “not for its sake,” and there would be no distinction between a sin-offering and a guilt-offering with which to refute this derivation .

And we answer: Abaye said: A guilt-offering,

that its blood should be given

above, you cannot say.

For one can learn

a kal va-chomer from a burnt-offering

that the blood of a guilt-offering must be given specifically below and not above—

And what of a burnt-offering, which is stringent in that

it

is offered

entirely; its blood

is given

below,

for no corners are stated concerning it;

a guilt-offering, which does not

get offered

entirely,

but its flesh is eaten,

all the more so

its blood is not given above but below.

And they raise an objection:

What can be said about a burnt-offering? It does not atone for a sin; can you say the same about a guilt-offering, which does atone for a sin? Since it is superior with regard to atonement, as it atones for a sin, its blood should be placed above, as is the blood of a sin-offering?

грех, — скажешь ли об ашаме, который искупает грех? И поскольку он более строг в отношении искупления, ведь он искупает, пусть его кровь будет дана наверху, как кровь хатат?

And they answer:

A bird sin-offering

that comes to atone for a sin

proves the contrary: although it is superior in that it comes to atone, its blood is placed below.

ведь несмотря на то, что она более строга, поскольку приносится для искупления, ее кровь дается внизу.

And if you raise the following objection:

What can be said about a bird sin-offering? It is not a type of offering slaughtered in the ordinary manner—

for it is not slaughtered; rather, its head is pinched off—can you say the same about a guilt-offering, which is a type of offering slaughtered in the ordinary manner?

A burnt-offering proves the contrary,

for it is a type of offering slaughtered in the ordinary manner, and nevertheless its blood is placed below.

The argument returns to its starting point: This one is not like that one, and that one is not like this one; the common element between them is that

in the case of a burnt-offering and a bird sin-offering,

they are most sacred offerings and their blood is placed below. So too, I will bring a guilt-offering, which is a most sacred offering, and its

blood will be

placed

below,

below.

Rava of Parzika said to Rav Ashi: Could one not raise the following objection to the common element between them? “What can be said about the common element between them? A burnt-offering and a bird sin-offering have no fixed minimum value; can you say the same about a guilt-offering, which does have a fixed minimum value?”

For one is obligated to bring an offering worth at least two sela. Since they do not provide proof that a guilt-offering should not be learned from a sin-offering, which was the basis of the question, Rabbi Eliezer could answer Rabbi Yehoshua that indeed the blood of a guilt-offering is placed above, based on the verbal comparison “like a sin-offering, like a guilt-offering.” If so, one can learn from a sin-offering that a guilt-offering is disqualified when offered with an improper intention!

поскольку он обязан принести жертву стоимостью по меньшей мере в два сэла?! И поскольку от них нет доказательства, чтобы не учить ашам от хатат, в чем состоит возражение, рабби Элиэзер может ответить рабби Йеошуа, что действительно кровь ашама дается наверху — на основании сопоставления «как хатат, так и ашам»; и тогда можно учиться относительно ашама от хатат, чтобы сделать его непригодным из-за мысли о принесении не ради себя?!

And they answer:

Rather, this is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer’s

not deriving from the verbal comparison that the blood of a guilt-offering is placed above:

the verse says

with regard to a sin-offering: “

The priest who effects its expiation shall eat it” [Leviticus 6:19].

The meaning of the verse is that the priest who throws the blood of the sin-offering is the one entitled to eat it. And they expound the exclusion in the words “the priest who effects its expiation shall eat

it”: only in the case of a sin-offering does the priest place

its

blood above; the blood of

an offering is not thrown

above.

And they raise an objection:

If so—if the exclusion “it,” stated concerning the throwing of the blood of a sin-offering, excludes all other offerings from having their blood placed above—then let us also say that the exclusion “and he shall slaughter it as a sin-offering,” stated concerning the slaughter of

a

sin-offering, also teaches that an improper intention does not disqualify the slaughter of other offerings. And let us expound it as follows: “And he shall slaughter

что оно приходит учить: мысль о принесении не ради себя не делает непригодными при зарезании остальных жертв, и истолкуем это так: «и зарежет

it as a sin-offering”—that sin-offering alone has the law that if one slaughters it

with the intention of offering it

with the proper intention, it is

valid, but if one slaughters it

fit, and if one slaughtered it

не

with an improper intention, it is

disqualified;

but other offerings

including a guilt-offering,

whether one slaughters them with the proper intention or with an improper intention, are valid. This would be difficult for Rabbi Eliezer, since this exclusion proves that a guilt-offering slaughtered with an improper intention is valid!

And they answer:

The word

“it”—

“it” stated concerning the slaughter of the sin-offering—necessarily

сказанное относительно зарезания хатат, неизбежно

is not precise and does not come to exclude all offerings and validate them when offered with an improper intention,

because

it leaves out the

offering of

the Paschal offering, which is disqualified when slaughtered with an improper intention.

And they raise an objection: If indeed the word “it” stated concerning the slaughter of a sin-offering is not precise because it leaves out the Paschal offering,

then

here too, concerning the word “it” stated with regard to throwing the blood of a sin-offering—and expounded to teach that only its blood is placed above the altar—let us claim that it

относительно «ее», сказанного при бросании крови хатат и истолкованного как учение, что только ее кровь должна быть дана наверху на жертвеннике, утверждается, что оно

is not precise,

—

it leaves out a bird burnt-offering, whose blood is also placed above the altar.

And they answer: The blood of a bird burnt-offering is not considered an omitted case, because

with regard to

slaughter—

that is, offerings slaughtered in the ordinary manner—

it leaves out nothing at all. Since a bird burnt-offering is not included among offerings slaughtered in the ordinary manner, it is not considered an omitted case.

а поскольку птичья оולה не входит в число зарезаемых, она не считается оставленным исключением.

And if you wish, say instead:

There is another reason that a bird burnt-offering is not considered an omitted case:

whose opinion is this? It is the opinion of Rabbi

Elazar

son of Rabbi Shimon, who says:

This place—

the place where the blood of a sin-offering is placed—is one place,

and this place—

the place where the blood of a bird burnt-offering is placed—is a different place,

entirely. Therefore, even though the blood of both is placed above, the blood of a bird burnt-offering is not considered an omitted case, because it is placed in a different location from the blood of a sin-offering.

As it is taught in a beraita: The lower blood is placed below the red line, and the upper blood is placed above the red line.

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon said: When are these words stated?

They apply when the upper blood is placed above the red line, without a specific location being fixed for it above that line:

in the case of a bird burnt-offering. But in the case of an animal sin-offering,

it is not enough for its blood to be placed above the red line; rather,

it itself—

that is, the blood of the sin-offering itself—

is placed only on the body of the horn

of the altar—

the horn that projects upward from the roof of the altar, one cubit by one cubit. We learned there: With regard to all offerings whose blood is placed on the outer altar, if one brought their blood inside and then returned and placed it outside, Rabbi Akiva disqualifies them, and the Sages declare them valid.

поскольку

For Rabbi Akiva would say: All blood

of offerings intended for the outer altar

that entered the Sanctuary to effect atonement is disqualified.

And the Sages say that only the blood of an external

sin-offering

is

alone disqualified if it is brought inside, as it is stated concerning it: “Any sin-offering whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to effect atonement in the Sanctuary shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire” [Leviticus 6:23]. We do not derive the law from it for the other offerings, and therefore even if their blood entered inside, they remain valid. One then returns and places their blood on the outer altar.

as it is stated with regard to it: “Any sin offering whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to effect atonement in the Sanctuary shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire” [Leviticus 6:23]. We do not derive the law from it for the other offerings, and therefore, even if their blood entered inside, they remain fit. One then returns and places their blood on the outer altar.

Rabbi Eliezer says: The guilt-offering as well

is disqualified if some of its blood was brought inside to effect atonement, like the sin-offering,

as it is stated:

“Like the sin-offering, so is the guilt-offering!”

And we examine this:

Granted, Rabbi Eliezer

declares the other offerings valid but disqualifies a guilt-offering,

as he stated the reason,

because the guilt-offering was compared to the sin-offering. [And Rabbi Akiva’s reason for disqualifying all of them is also understandable, because he expounded the word “all” as including every offering.]

But the Sages,

who declared valid a guilt-offering whose blood entered inside,

what is their reason?

After all, the guilt-offering was compared to the sin-offering.

Rava said:

The Sages maintain that the statement,

“A guilt-offering whose blood entered inside to effect atonement”

is disqualified,

cannot be said,

because we can derive

by an a-fortiori inference from a burnt-offering that if its blood entered inside, it is valid,

…