Zevachim 10b (י:) — the Talmud in English

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:

I return to the beginning,

to challenge the inferences from both sides: One cannot derive the law from a sin offering, because its blood is presented above the midpoint line, and one cannot derive it from a Paschal offering, because its time is fixed. [Later, the Gemara asks why Rabbi Eliezer does not derive it from both of them together by means of a bamaḥ hatzad.]

Rabbi Eliezer returned and made a different inference: With regard to a sin offering, it is stated

concerning the slaughter of the goat of the ruler: “And he shall slaughter it in the place where he slaughters the burnt offering before the Lord—it is a sin offering,”

it is,

and we interpret the word

it is

as an exclusion, teaching that only if he slaughtered it

with its proper designation is it valid,

but if he slaughtered it

not with its proper designation, it is invalid.

And

also with regard to the

Paschal offering, it is stated:

“And you shall say, It is a Paschal sacrifice,”

it is,

and we interpret

it is

to mean that only if it was slaughtered

with its proper designation

is it

valid,

but if it was slaughtered

not with its proper designation,

it is

invalid.

And if so,

also a guilt offering,

since

it is stated

also

with regard to it,

“A guilt offering

it is,”

one should derive from it, as from a sin offering and a Paschal offering, that

it is

is stated as an exclusion, teaching us that only if he slaughtered the guilt offering

with its proper designation

is it

valid,

but if he slaughtered it

not with its proper designation,

it is

invalid!

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him:

The “it is” stated with regard to a sin offering and a Paschal offering differs from the “it is” stated with regard to a guilt offering, for

the sin offering

with which

it is stated

the exclusion

it is,

is written

in the context of slaughter,

and therefore the exclusion is interpreted as follows: A sin offering

it is—

if slaughtered with its proper designation it is valid; if not with its proper designation, it is invalid.

And likewise,

with regard to the

offering of

the Paschal offering,

an exclusion is stated

it is

in the context of slaughter,

and we interpret, “A Paschal sacrifice

it is”:

if he slaughtered it

with its proper designation, it is valid,

but if he slaughtered it

not with its proper designation, it is invalid.

But

with regard to a

guilt offering,

an exclusion

it is

is stated only after the burning of the sacrificial portions.

Therefore, it is impossible to derive from it that a change in designation invalidates it, for

the guilt offering itself, when its sacrificial portions have not been burned,

at all, is

valid,

because its owner has already achieved atonement through the sprinkling of the blood; all the more so, if he burned them not with their proper designation, they do not invalidate the offering and do not prevent atonement. Consequently, it is impossible to derive from the burning of the sacrificial portions of a guilt offering that a change in designation invalidates it at slaughter.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: But it says,

in the passage “This is the law of the guilt offering,”

“Like the sin offering, like the guilt offering—one law applies to them.” The verse juxtaposes a guilt offering with a sin offering, to tell you:

“Like the sin offering, like the guilt offering”—

just as a sin offering,

which one slaughtered

not with its proper designation, renders the offering invalid,

so too

a guilt offering,

which one slaughtered

not with its proper designation,

is

invalid!

And with regard to a matter learned through a juxtaposition, one may not refute the inference, even if there is a distinction between a sin offering and a guilt offering.

The Master said

in the beraita above:

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him—

I return to the beginning,

to challenge the inferences from both sides.

And we raise a difficulty: Indeed, there is a refutation of each inference individually, but why did Rabbi Eliezer not say

let us return to the inference and derive it by means of the common element shared by both of them: A sin offering and a Paschal offering are both eaten, and an intention not with the proper designation invalidates them; I, too, will bring in a guilt offering, which is eaten, and an intention not with its proper designation should invalidate it?!

shared by the two offerings: Both a sin-offering and a Paschal offering are eaten, and an improper designation invalidates them. I too can bring in a guilt-offering, which is eaten, and an improper designation should invalidate it!?

And we answer:

Because it can be refuted—

What is distinctive about the common element shared by them? They both have an aspect of karet,

for a sin offering is brought to atone for an inadvertent transgression punishable by karet, and one who did not offer a Paschal offering is liable to karet. Thus, by bringing it, he is exempted from karet. Since these offerings are more severe, the verse made their law more stringent and invalidated them through an intention not with the proper designation; one cannot derive from them the law of a guilt offering, which is less severe than they are, as it has no aspect of karet.

The Master said [at the beginning of the beraita, when Rabbi Eliezer said that the law of a guilt offering should be derived from a sin offering]:

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him—

No.

If you say with regard to a sin offering

that it is rendered invalid when offered not with its proper designation,

that is because

its blood

is presented

above

the midpoint line.

And we raise a difficulty:

Let him say to him,

let Rabbi Yehoshua offer Rabbi Eliezer another distinction between a guilt offering and a sin offering—

No.

If you say with regard to a sin offering

that it has an aspect of greater severity,

as its blood enters within and within

[for example, on Yom Kippur], can you say this with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is sprinkled only on the outer altar?! [This refutation is preferable, because bringing its blood inside proves that it has greater sanctity and is considered a stringency. By contrast, presenting its blood above is merely a distinction of location and elevation, but does not involve additional sanctity.]

And we answer: Regarding the disqualification of a sin offering offered not with its proper designation, which we learned in the Mishna,

we are speaking of outer sin offerings,

whose blood does not enter within and nevertheless an intention not with the proper designation disqualifies them. Since Rabbi Eliezer derived the law of a guilt offering from these offerings, one can refute his inference only by noting that their blood is sprinkled above.

And we raise another difficulty: Why does Rabbi Yehoshua refute the inference by noting that the blood of a sin offering is presented above, even though this is not a stringency? It would have been preferable to argue to Rabbi Eliezer: What is distinctive about an external sin offering, which has the stringency

that if its blood enters

within,

the sin offering is invalid,

whereas in the case of a guilt offering, if its blood entered within, it would not thereby be rendered invalid?

And we answer: It is impossible to refute Rabbi Eliezer in this manner, because

Rabbi Eliezer holds

that

even a guilt offering,

whose blood entered within, is thereby rendered invalid, and in this matter it is equal to a sin offering.

And we raise another difficulty: Rabbi Yehoshua could have refuted the inference by saying: What is distinctive about a sin offering,

as it atones for those liable to karet,

whereas a guilt offering does not atone for those liable to karet?!

And we answer: Rabbi Eliezer derived the law of a guilt offering

from the sin offering of

the hearing of the voice,

which does not atone for karet, but for the prohibition transgressed by the witness when another person adjured him to come and testify testimony that he knew in the other person’s favor [in monetary litigation], and he denied under oath, claiming that he did not know. This is a transgression of a negative prohibition, but it does not involve karet. This sin offering is called “the sin offering of the hearing of the voice” on account of the verse stated concerning it [Leviticus 5:1]: “If a person sins, having heard the voice of an oath, and he is a witness ... if he does not testify, he shall bear his iniquity.”

And we raise another difficulty: Why should Rabbi Yehoshua not refute the inference by saying: What is distinctive about a sin offering,

as it requires

the presentation of

four applications

of blood, separate applications on the four corners of the altar? Can you say this with regard to a guilt offering, which requires only two applications that are four, which are given on two opposite corners of the altar, with each sprinkling that divides into two sides considered as though he gave two applications? And we answer: Rabbi Yehoshua holds

in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael, who says that all blood

of all offerings

requires four separate applications

of blood. Even offerings whose blood is given as two that are four must be performed in such a manner that each application is given separately: He stands at one corner of the altar and gives on one side of the altar, then returns and gives on the other side; afterward he approaches the opposite corner and gives on one side, then returns and gives on the other side.

It follows that there is no distinction between a sin offering and the other offerings in the number of acts of application. The only distinction is that with a sin offering he gives the four applications at the four ends of the altar, whereas with the other offerings he gives them at two opposite corners. Since with a guilt offering as well he gives the blood through four separate acts of application, one can derive the law of a guilt offering from that of a sin offering, and therefore Rabbi Yehoshua did not refute the inference from this law.

But we still raise a difficulty: Rabbi Yehoshua could have refuted the inference by saying: What is distinctive about a sin offering,

as it requires

the presentation of blood through

four applications on four corners, whereas in the case of a guilt offering, even according to Rabbi Yishmael, who requires four separate applications, they are not given on the four ends of the altar, but at its two opposite corners, and are therefore considered “two that are four”

?

And we answer:

According to your reasoning, why did you challenge the inference only from this law? Rabbi Yehoshua could have refuted it from many laws in which there is a distinction between a sin offering and a guilt offering, for

there is

the presentation by

finger

in the case of a sin offering, which does not apply to a guilt offering [whose blood is cast from the vessel rather than being applied with the priest’s finger].

And likewise,

there is

a law that the blood of a sin offering must be presented on the

corner

of the altar above, unlike a guilt offering, whose blood is presented on the sides of the altar, and it need not be raised all the way to the corner as in the case of a sin offering

.

And likewise,

there is

in the case of a sin offering the presentation of blood specifically on the

edge

of the corner, unlike a guilt offering, whose blood is not presented on the edge

. Rather,

it must necessarily be said that Rabbi Yehoshua

selected one of two

or three reasons, and since this is so, there is no basis for asking why he did not refute the inference from four applications on four corners.

The Master said [at the beginning of the beraita]:

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No, if you say with regard to a sin offering,

because its blood is presented above the midpoint line, can you say this with regard to a guilt offering, whose blood is presented below the midpoint line?

And we raise a difficulty: And according to the conclusion, that Rabbi Eliezer derives the law from the juxtaposition, “Like the sin offering, like the guilt offering,”

let him say to him,

let

Rabbi Eliezer

answer Rabbi Yehoshua and reject his refutation: Indeed,

a guilt offering too

is learned through the juxtaposition to require that

its blood be presented above!?

And we would once again derive a guilt offering from a sin offering, which is rendered invalid through an intention not with its proper designation, and there would be no distinction between a sin offering and a guilt offering with which to refute this inference.

And we answer: Abaye said: In the case of a guilt offering, that its blood should be presented above, you cannot say so.

And again we would learn a guilt-offering from a sin-offering, which is invalidated through the thought of “not for its sake,” and there would be no distinction between a sin-offering and a guilt-offering with which to refute this derivation .

For one can derive

by a kal va-chomer from a burnt offering

that the blood of a guilt offering must specifically be presented below and not above

—

And if a burnt offering, which is more severe in that

it

is offered

entirely,

its blood

is presented

below,

for the verse does not state that it requires the corners,

then

a guilt offering, which is not

offered

entirely,

but rather its flesh is eaten,

all the more so

its blood is not presented above but below.

And we challenge:

What is the case with the burnt offering? It does not atone for a sin; shall you say the same with regard to the guilt offering, which does atone for a sin? And since it is more stringent with regard to atonement, as it atones, its blood should be placed above, like the blood of a sin offering?

What is the case with the burnt offering? It does not atone for a sin; shall you say the same with regard to the guilt offering, which does atone for a sin? And since it is more stringent with regard to atonement, as it atones, its blood should be placed above, like the blood of a sin offering?

And we resolve:

The bird sin offering,

which comes to atone for a sin,

proves this. Although it is stringent, as it comes to atone, its blood is placed below.

proves this. Although it is stringent, as it comes to atone, its blood is placed below.

And if you would challenge:

What is the case with the bird sin offering? It is not a type of sacrifice—as it is not slaughtered; rather, its neck is pinched— shall you say the same with regard to the guilt offering, which is a type of sacrifice?

for it is not slaughtered; rather, its head is pinched off—can you say the same about a guilt-offering, which is a type of offering slaughtered in the ordinary manner?

The burnt offering proves this,

as it is a type of sacrifice, and nevertheless its blood is placed below.

And the argument returns: This one is not comparable to that one, and that one is not comparable to this one; the common denominator between them is

that in the burnt offering and the bird sin offering,

which are most sacred offerings and whose blood is placed below, I too will bring a guilt offering, which is a most sacred offering, and

it will be that

its blood

is placed

below.

Rava of Parzika said to Rav Ashi: But let us challenge this derivation: What is the case with the common denominator between them? The burnt offering and the bird sin offering have no

fixed minimum value; shall you say the same with regard to a guilt offering, which does have a fixed minimum value, as one is obligated to bring an offering worth at least two sela? Since they do not provide proof from which to derive the guilt offering from the sin offering, which was the basis of the challenge, Rabbi Eliezer could answer Rabbi Yehoshua that indeed the blood of the guilt offering is also placed above, based on the analogy “like the sin offering, so the guilt offering.” If so, one can derive from the sin offering that a guilt offering is disqualified when offered with an improper intent?

fixed minimum value; shall you say the same with regard to a guilt offering, which does have a fixed minimum value, as one is obligated to bring an offering worth at least two sela? Since they do not provide proof from which to derive the guilt offering from the sin offering, which was the basis of the challenge, Rabbi Eliezer could answer Rabbi Yehoshua that indeed the blood of the guilt offering is also placed above, based on the analogy “like the sin offering, so the guilt offering.” If so, one can derive from the sin offering that a guilt offering is disqualified when offered with an improper intent?

And we resolve:

Rather, this is the reason for Rabbi Eliezer:

he does not derive from the analogy that the blood of the guilt offering is placed above, because

the verse states with regard to the sin offering,

“The priest who effects its atonement”

shall eat it—

and the intent of the verse is that the priest who casts the blood of the sin offering is the one entitled to eat it. We derive from the restrictive expression “the priest who effects its atonement

for it shall eat it” that only with regard to a sin offering does the priest place

its

its blood above; the blood of

an offering is not cast

above.

We challenge:

If so, if the exclusion “for it” stated with regard to casting the blood of the sin offering excludes the other offerings from having their blood placed above, then we should likewise say that the exclusion “and he shall slaughter it as a sin offering,” stated with regard to the slaughter of a

a

sin offering, also teaches that an improper intent does not disqualify the slaughter of other offerings. We should derive it as follows: “And he shall slaughter

sin offering, also teaches that an improper intent does not disqualify the slaughter of other offerings. We should derive it as follows: “And he shall slaughter

it as a sin offering”—that sin offering alone; only with regard to it was it stated that if one slaughtered the sin offering

with the intention of offering it

for its own sake, it is

valid, but if one slaughters it

fit, and if one slaughtered it

fit, and if one slaughtered it

not for its own sake, it is

disqualified;

disqualified; whereas the other offerings,

including a guilt offering,

whether one slaughtered them for their own sake or not for their own sake, are fit. This would challenge Rabbi Eliezer, since this exclusion proves that a guilt offering slaughtered not for its own sake is fit.

And they answer:

And we resolve:

That

“it,” stated with regard to the slaughter of the sin offering, necessarily

“it,” stated with regard to the slaughter of the sin offering, necessarily

is not literal in excluding all the offerings and rendering them fit when slaughtered not for their own sake,

because

for it leaves out the

offering of

Paschal offering,

which is disqualified when slaughtered not for its own sake.

We challenge: If indeed “it,” stated with regard to the slaughter of the sin offering, is not literal because it leaves out the Paschal offering,

then here too, with regard to “it” stated in connection with casting the blood of the sin offering—and which is expounded to teach that only its blood is placed above on the altar—let us argue that

then here too, with regard to “it” stated in connection with casting the blood of the sin offering—and which is expounded to teach that only its blood is placed above on the altar—let us argue that

it is not literal,

because

for it leaves out the bird burnt offering, whose blood is also placed above on the altar?

And they answer: The blood of a bird burnt-offering is not considered an omitted case, because

And we resolve: The blood of the bird burnt offering is not considered an item left out, because

with regard to slaughtering—

in the case of offerings slaughtered by slaughtering—

it leaves out nothing at all. Since the bird burnt offering is not included among those slaughtered, it is not considered an item left out.

it leaves out nothing at all. Since the bird burnt offering is not included among those slaughtered, it is not considered an item left out.

And if you wish, say: There is another reason that the bird burnt offering is not considered an item left out:

There is another reason that a bird burnt-offering is not considered an omitted case:

whose view is this? It is that of Rabbi

Elazar

Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, who says:

This place

is the place for the placement of the blood of a sin offering alone,

and this place

is the place for the placement of the blood of a bird burnt offering

alone. Therefore, although both are placed above, the blood of the bird burnt offering is not considered an item left out, because it is placed in a different location from the blood of the sin offering.

alone. Therefore, although both are placed above, the blood of the bird burnt offering is not considered an item left out, because it is placed in a different location from the blood of the sin offering.

As it was taught in a beraita: The lower bloods are placed from the red line and below, and the upper bloods from the red line and above.

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, said: When are these matters stated—that the upper bloods are placed from the red line and above, without a specific location being fixed above?

They apply when the upper blood is placed above the red line, without a specific location being fixed for it above that line:

With regard to a bird burnt offering; but with regard to an animal sin offering,

it is not sufficient that its blood be placed above the red line; rather,

it itself—

that is, the blood of the sin offering itself—

is performed only on the body of the horn—

the horn that projects above the roof of the altar, one cubit by one cubit.

We learned there: With regard to all offerings whose blood is placed on the outer altar, if one brought their blood inside and then returned and placed it outside, Rabbi Akiva disqualifies them, and the Sages deem them fit.

We learned there: With regard to all offerings whose blood is placed on the outer altar, if one brought their blood inside and then returned and placed it outside, Rabbi Akiva disqualifies them, and the Sages deem them fit.

For Rabbi Akiva would say: Any blood

of outer offerings

that entered inside to effect atonement in the Sanctuary is disqualified.

And the Sages say that only the blood of an external

And the Sages say that only the blood of an external

sin offering

is disqualified,

alone,

as it is stated with regard to it: “Any sin offering whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to effect atonement in the Sanctuary shall not be eaten; it shall be burned in fire” [Leviticus 6:23]. We do not derive the law from it for the other offerings, and therefore, even if their blood entered inside, they remain fit. One then returns and places their blood on the outer altar.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even the guilt offering,

whose blood was brought inside to effect atonement, is disqualified like the sin offering,

as it is stated:

“Like the sin offering, so the guilt offering!”

And we inquire:

Granted, Rabbi Eliezer

renders the other offerings fit and disqualifies a guilt offering,

as he stated the reason,

that the guilt offering was compared to the sin offering. [And Rabbi Akiva’s reason for disqualifying all of them is likewise understandable, as he expounded the word “any” to include all the offerings.]

But the Sages,

who deemed a guilt offering whose blood entered inside fit,

what is their reasoning?

After all, the guilt offering was compared to the sin offering.

Rava said:

The Sages hold that the statement,

“A guilt offering whose blood entered inside to effect atonement”

is disqualified,

you cannot say,

because we can derive by

a kal va-chomer from a burnt offering: If its blood entered inside, it is fit, ...

…