Zevachim 10a (י.) — the Talmud in English

For it was stated:

One who slaughters the animal

of non-sacred meat

with the intention of sprinkling its blood for the sake of idolatry ,

and burning its fats for the sake of idolatry—Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The animal is forbidden to derive benefit from, according to the law of “sacrifices of the dead” [the designation of the prohibition applying to offerings slaughtered for idolatry], even though ultimately he did not sprinkle the blood or burn the fats for idolatry, because

one may have a thought concerning one sacrificial rite with regard to another

in the context of idolatry, since

we derive the rites performed outside

—idolatry—

from

the rites

performed inside: Just as one who, while slaughtering an offering, has the thought that its blood will be sprinkled beyond its proper time thereby renders the offering piggul [even though ultimately he did not sprinkle the blood beyond its proper time], so too, when one slaughters an unconsecrated animal and thinks at the time of slaughter that its blood will be sprinkled for idolatry, the animal becomes forbidden as a “sacrifice of the dead” .

performed inside: Just as one who, while slaughtering an offering, has the thought that its blood will be sprinkled beyond its proper time thereby renders the offering piggul [even though ultimately he did not sprinkle the blood beyond its proper time], so too, when one slaughters an unconsecrated animal and thinks at the time of slaughter that its blood will be sprinkled for idolatry, the animal becomes forbidden as a “sacrifice of the dead” .

Reish Lakish said:

The unconsecrated animal

is permitted, because one may not have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another

in the context of idolatry,

and we do not derive the rites performed outside from those performed inside

and therefore the law of idolatry cannot be derived from the law of one who renders an offering piggul through his thought at the time of slaughter. The same applies to deriving the law of one who renders an offering piggul from the law of one who has a thought during the rites in the Temple involving a change of consecration or a change of ownership. It is only with regard to piggul that the novel principle was established that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another.

And they are both necessary

to teach us their dispute—the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish concerning the law that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another—both in the case of a change of consecration in the rites of offerings in the Temple and in the case of “sacrifices of the dead” .

If it had taught us this

in the case of “sacrifices of the dead” alone, we might have said that only

in this case did Reish Lakish say

that one may not compare sacrifices of the dead outside to the sacrificial rites inside,

but

with regard to a change of consecration, which is derived through

a comparison of inside to inside, say that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan

that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another even in the case of a change of consecration.

And if it had taught us this

—only the law that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another in the case of a change of consecration inside the Temple—we might have said that

in this case

alone

did Rabbi Yoḥanan say

so, because they derived inside from inside,

but in that case

—the law of sacrifices of the dead, which involves a rite performed outside—

say that he concedes to Reish Lakish

that the laws of rites performed outside are not derived from those performed inside. Therefore,

they are both necessary

to teach us that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree in both of these laws.

When

the following sage arrived,

Rav Dimi

from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia,

he said:

Rav Yirmeya raised an objection

against Reish Lakish in order

to support Rabbi Yoḥanan.

And Rabbi Ila

raised an objection against Rabbi Yoḥanan in order

to support Reish Lakish:

This is how

Rav Yirmeya

challenged Reish Lakish

to support Rabbi Yoḥanan

that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another:

Here the matter follows by means of a kal va-chomer:

And if in a case where

the thought of piggul, which is less stringent than a thought involving a change of consecration—for it is impossible to formulate a thought of piggul with regard to the slaughter itself—

if one said, “I am slaughtering

the offering

beyond its proper time,” it is valid

because his statement has no significance, as in reality he is slaughtering it at its proper time [and, furthermore, a thought of piggul relates only to human consumption or consumption upon the altar: at the time of a rite, he thinks that the consumption will take place not at its proper time, but not that the slaughter itself will take place beyond its proper time], and nevertheless, in the case of a thought of piggul, one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another, so that if he thought at the time of slaughter that the sprinkling—which is consumption upon the altar—would take place beyond its proper time, the offering is thereby invalidated; then, in the case of a thought involving a change of consecration, which is more stringent than it, namely,

in a case where, if one said “

I am slaughtering it not for its sake,”

it is

invalid

because of the thought concerning the slaughter itself—if he had a thought concerning one rite with regard to another, for example, if he

slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, is it not the case that it should be invalid?!

Rava bar Ahilai challenged

the kal va-chomer brought by Rav Dimi in the name of Rav Yirmeya: One can refute it by showing that, conversely, there is a stringency in a thought of piggul that does not apply to a thought involving a change of consecration, because

what is there about

a thought of piggul

concerning beyond its proper time

that is more stringent? The invalidity it causes to the offering obligates one who eats it to receive the severe punishment of

karet.

It is possible that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another only in the case of such a thought, and it is impossible to derive by means of a kal va-chomer from it that this applies to a thought involving a change of consecration, since one is not liable to receive karet for eating an offering invalidated by a thought involving a change of consecration.

Rather, Rava bar Ahilai said—

this is what

Rav Yirmeya said to support Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is a kal va-chomer from a thought of “beyond its proper place.” If, while performing the rites, one thought that human consumption or consumption upon the altar would take place outside the place designated by the Torah, the offering is thereby invalidated, but one is not liable to receive karet for eating an offering invalidated by such a thought. Therefore, it is possible to derive from here by means of a kal va-chomer that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another even in the case of a change of consecration—

And if in a case where, if one said, “I am slaughtering

with the thought

beyond its proper place,”

it is valid,

because his statement has no significance, as in reality he is slaughtering it in its proper place [and, furthermore, a thought of beyond its proper place applies only when, during the rite, one thinks that human consumption or consumption upon the altar will take place outside its proper place, but not when one thinks that the slaughter itself, which is a rite, will take place outside its proper place], so that a thought of beyond its proper place is less stringent than a thought involving a change of consecration, which invalidates the offering through a thought concerning the rite itself; and nevertheless, one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another, so that if he thought at the time of slaughter that the sprinkling of the blood would take place outside its proper place, the offering is invalidated. Then, all the more so, in the case of the more stringent thought involving a change of consecration, namely,

in a case where, if one said, “I am slaughtering it not for its sake,” it is invalid,

because of the thought concerning the slaughter itself, then if he

slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, is it not the case that it should be invalid

because “one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another”?!

Rav Ashi challenged

Rava bar Ahilai: This kal va-chomer too can be refuted, because, conversely, a thought of beyond its proper place is more stringent than a thought involving a change of consecration—

What is there about

a thought of

beyond its proper place

that is more stringent? Its invalidating effect

applies to all offerings.

Can you say that this is so with regard to not for its sake, whose invalidating effect applies

only to

the Paschal offering and a sin offering

alone?!

Rather, Rav Ashi said—

this is what

Rav Yirmeya said to support Rabbi Yoḥanan: It is a kal va-chomer that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another in the case of a change of consecration, from the fact that one may have such a thought in the case of a change of ownership. A thought involving a change of ownership invalidates the offering only when, during one of the rites, he thinks that the atonement effected through the sprinkling of the blood will be performed for the sake of other owners, since this is the essence of a thought involving a “change of ownership”: The atonement of the offering [which is effected through the sprinkling of the blood] will be attributed to someone who is not the owner of the offering.

And therefore, this may be derived by means of a kal va-chomer:

And

a thought involving a change of ownership, which is less stringent than a thought involving a change of consecration, since

in a case where, if one said—

“I am slaughtering it for the sake of so-and-so,”

who is not the owner of the offering,

it is valid,

because a change of ownership is relevant only to atonement through the sprinkling of the blood; and nevertheless, one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another in this case, so that if he thought at the time of slaughter

to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so,

another person, it is

invalid.

Then, all the more so in the case of a thought involving a change of consecration, which is more stringent than it and invalidates the offering even through a thought concerning that very rite, namely,

in a case where, if one said, “I am slaughtering it not for its sake,” it is invalid [

because of the thought concerning the slaughter itself]—if he had a thought concerning one rite with regard to another, for example, when he

slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its sake, is it not the case that it should be invalid?!

Now, after Rav Yirmeya’s proof for Rabbi Yohanan’s position—that an intention can transfer from one service to another—has been explained, the Gemara explains what Rav Dimi said:

Now, after Rav Yirmeya’s proof of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s view—that one may have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another—has been explained, the Gemara explains what Rav Dimi said:

Rabbi Ila

raised a difficulty

to support Reish Lakish,

that one may not have a thought concerning one rite with regard to another. This is how he challenged it:

Why was it necessary to derive through a special exposition that a change of consecration invalidates the offering with regard to each and every rite? Even if

you do not say

that there is a special verse

concerning sprinkling, and

still

let it be derived

that a change of consecration invalidates the offering during that rite

by means of a kal va-chomer from the intermediate case

of the other rites,

from slaughter and receiving the blood,

And we can derive it from them by a bamah hatzad: If slaughter, which is the less stringent, is nevertheless valid even when performed by a non-priest, and a thought of shinui kodesh invalidates it, then sprinkling, which is more stringent, as it is valid only when performed by a kohen—is it not all the more so that a thought of shinui kodesh should invalidate it?

And if you would refute this: What is unique about slaughter, which has a stringency, namely, that it invalidates the Paschal offering if, at the time of slaughter, one intended to slaughter it for those who are not eligible to eat it? Can you say the same with regard to sprinkling, which is not invalidated if one sprinkled it for those who are not eligible to eat it? The receiving of the blood will prove it, as it does not invalidate the Paschal offering when performed for those who are not eligible to eat it, and nevertheless a thought of shinui kodesh invalidates it.

And since it is possible to learn that shinui kodesh invalidates the sprinkling from slaughter and the receiving of the blood

for what halakhic purpose did the Merciful One write

a special teaching to invalidate shinui kodesh in sprinkling? Rather,

to teach

you

that one does not apply a thought from one sacrificial service to another.

For from the fact that the Torah wrote a special teaching for each and every service, we learn that the offering is invalidated only if one had the improper intention during that very service, and not if one had the intention during one service with regard to another service. For the Torah had to write this invalidation separately with regard to sprinkling, teaching that the offering is invalidated only if one had the improper intention during the sprinkling itself, and not if, at the time of slaughter, one intended that the sprinkling would be performed not for its sake.

Rav Pappa objects to this: But perhaps

this teaching with regard to sprinkling came to teach us the opposite,

that one does apply a thought from one sacrificial service to another?!

And for this reason a special teaching was necessary, to teach us that it is not necessary to have the improper intention during the sprinkling itself; rather, it is sufficient to intend, at the time of slaughter, that the sprinkling will be performed not for its sake, thereby invalidating the offering?!

The Gemara answers:

If so,

that one does apply a thought from one sacrificial service to another,

let the verse be silent concerning it, and let us derive

the law that one applies a thought from one sacrificial service to another

by means of the kal va-chomer of Rav Ashi,

from shinui ba'alim, with regard to which one does apply a thought from one service to another, as stated above. And from the fact that a verse was necessary for the law of shinui kodesh with regard to sprinkling, it follows that it came to reveal that, with regard to shinui kodesh, one does not apply a thought from one service to another!

Nevertheless, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said that one does apply a thought from one service to another, the difficulty remains: Why was it necessary to write shinui kodesh with regard to sprinkling? Could it not be derived by means of a kal va-chomer from slaughter and the receiving of the blood?

The Gemara answers:

But the other one,

Rabbi Yoḥanan,

refutes

the kal va-chomer from slaughter and the receiving of the blood

as follows: What is unique about these,

slaughter and the receiving of the blood,

that

they have a stringent aspect, namely, that they are

subject to the requirement of the north,

as with regard to some offerings, the slaughter and the receiving of the blood must be performed specifically in the northern part of the Temple courtyard,

and

they

are performed

also

in the case of the inner sin-offerings,

as all offerings, even those whose blood is brought inside, require slaughter and the receiving of the blood. Can you say the same with regard to sprinkling, which is not subject to the requirement of the north and is not performed in the case of the inner sin-offerings? [For the blood of the inner sin-offerings is sprinkled in the Sanctuary and not on the outer altar; see above, 4a.] Therefore, had a special teaching not been written that shinui kodesh invalidates sprinkling, we would not have known that it invalidates it. It follows that the verse is not superfluous, and does not teach that one does not apply a thought from one service to another.

But the other one,

Rav Ila, who assisted Reish Lakish and derived by means of a kal va-chomer from slaughter and the receiving of the blood that shinui kodesh invalidates sprinkling, responds to this refutation:

At any rate, we are dealing with peace-offerings—

the teaching that an improper intention invalidates slaughter and the receiving of the blood was stated with regard to peace-offerings. In their case there is no requirement that slaughter be performed in the north, and their blood is not sprinkled inside. Thus, there is no refutation of the kal va-chomer that was derived from slaughter with regard to sprinkling. And from the fact that they did not rely on the kal va-chomer and it was necessary to write a verse concerning sprinkling as well, it is proven that one does not apply a thought during slaughter to the sprinkling, but only to the slaughter itself. From here they also derived the matter of shinui kodesh with regard to a sin-offering and the Paschal offering.

It was stated: If one slaughtered

a sin-offering

for its sake,

with an intention at the time of slaughter

to sprinkle its blood not for its sake—

Rav Naḥman said: It is invalid,

and this is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that one does apply a thought from one service to another.

Rava said: It is valid,

and this is in accordance with Reish Lakish.

And Rava later retracted in favor of Rav Naḥman,

and held like him that one does apply a thought from one service to another,

by means of Rav Ashi's kal va-chomer,

from shinui ba'alim, where one's intention at the time of slaughter that the blood be sprinkled with a change of ownership invalidates the offering; the same applies to an intention that it be performed not for its sake, which invalidates the offering when one intended at the time of slaughter to sprinkle it not for its sake.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Even a guilt-offering

that was sacrificed not for its sake is invalid.

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin-offering is brought for a sin, and a guilt-offering is brought for a sin;

therefore, we can derive by analogy from what is found in one case

that just as a sin-offering that was sacrificed not for its sake is invalid, so too a guilt-offering

that was sacrificed

not for its sake is invalid.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No,

you may not compare a guilt-offering to a sin-offering. For

if you say with regard to a sin-offering

that it is invalid, this is due to the distinctive status of the sin-offering,

as its blood

is placed on the altar

above

the scarlet line [the line that divides the altar between its upper and lower sections] , whereas the blood of a guilt-offering is placed in the location where the blood of the other offerings is placed, below the scarlet line.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

An

Paschal offering will prove it, for its blood

is placed

below,

and nevertheless, if one

slaughtered it not for its sake, it is invalid.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: What is unique about the Paschal offering,

which has another distinction,

that its time is fixed?

You cannot say the same with regard to a guilt-offering, which one may bring at any time.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him:

If so,

a sin-offering will prove it,

which does not have a fixed time, and nevertheless it is invalid if one slaughtered it not for its sake.