Zevachim 10a — the Talmud in English

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If one slaughters the animal

of non-sacred meat

with the intention of sprinkling its blood for idol worship and offering its fat for idol worship, Rabbi Yohanan says: the animal is forbidden to derive benefit from, under the law of “sacrifices of the dead” [the designation of the prohibition applying to offerings slaughtered for idol worship], even though in the end he did not sprinkle its blood or offer its fat for idol worship, because

the thought concerning one Temple service can take effect with regard to another Temple service in the context of idol worship,

because we derive the laws of external worship

from

internal worship

[idol worship]

from

the

Temple service, just as when, during the slaughter of an offering, one intends that its blood be sprinkled outside the prescribed time, he thereby renders the offering piggul—despite the fact that in the end the blood was not sprinkled outside the prescribed time—so too, when one slaughters a non-sacred animal and intends during the slaughter that its blood be sprinkled for idol worship, the animal becomes forbidden as a “sacrifice of the dead” .

и подобно тому как тот, кто во время заклания жертвы помыслил, что кропление крови будет совершено вне его времени, тем самым делает жертву פיגול [несмотря на то что в конце он не кропил кровь вне ее времени], так и в данном случае тот, кто режет חולин-животное и во время резания думает, что кропление крови будет совершено для идолопоклонства, запрещает животное по закону «жертв мертвых».

Reish Lakish said:

the non-sacred animal is

permitted, because one does not transfer an intention from one service to another

in the context of idol worship,

and we do not derive external worship from internal worship.

One cannot derive the law of idol worship from the law of one who renders an offering piggul during its slaughter. The same applies to deriving the law of one who forms an intention during the Temple services to change the offering’s designated status or its owner. It was only with regard to piggul that the new principle was established that an intention concerning one service can take effect with regard to another service.

And it is necessary

to state their disagreement both regarding transferring an intention from one service to another when the designated status of an offering is changed during the Temple services, and regarding “sacrifices of the dead” .

Had it been stated only in this case,

in the law of “sacrifices of the dead” alone, one might have said that only

in this case did Reish Lakish say

that one may not compare external “sacrifices of the dead” with the Temple services performed internally,

but

with regard to changing the designated status of an offering, which is derived by

comparing one internal matter with another, one might say that he agrees with Rabbi Yohanan

that an intention can transfer from one service to another even when the designated status of the offering is changed.

And had it been stated only in the other case,

only that an intention can transfer from one service to another when the designated status of an offering is changed internally, one might have said that

in this case

alone

Rabbi Yohanan said so,

because one internal matter was derived from another,

but in that case,

in the law of “sacrifices of the dead,” which involves external worship,

one might say that he agrees with Reish Lakish

that the laws of external worship are not derived from internal worship. Therefore,

it is necessary

to state that Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish disagree in both of these cases.

When

Rab Dimi

came

from the Land of Israel to Babylonia,

he said:

Rav Yirmeya raises an objection

against Reish Lakish in order

to support Rabbi Yohanan.

And Rabbi Ila

raises an objection against Rabbi Yohanan in order

to support Reish Lakish:

This is how

Rav Yirmeya

objected to Reish Lakish

to support Rabbi Yohanan,

that an intention can transfer from one service to another:

These matters can be established by an a-fortiori inference:

And just as in a case where

the intention of piggul is less stringent than an intention that changes the designated status of an offering—for it is impossible to form an effective intention of piggul with regard to the slaughter itself,

as when one says, “I am slaughtering

the offering

outside its prescribed time,” it is valid.

This is because his statement has no practical significance, since in reality he is slaughtering it at its proper time [A0098][Furthermore, the intention of piggul applies only to the eating of a person or the eating of the altar: during a service, one intends that the eating take place outside its prescribed time, but not that the slaughter itself take place outside its prescribed time.] Nevertheless, in the case of piggul, an intention can transfer from one service to another: if, during slaughter, he intended that the sprinkling—which is the altar’s consumption—be performed outside its prescribed time, the offering is thereby invalidated. If so, in the case of the more stringent intention that changes the designated status of an offering, namely,

in a case where, if one says, “

I am slaughtering it not for its designated purpose,”

it is

invalid

[because of the intention formed during the slaughter itself], then if he transferred the intention from one service to another—for example, if he

slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its designated purpose, should it not certainly be invalid?

Rava bar Ahilai challenges

the a-fortiori inference brought by Rav Dimi in the name of Rav Yirmeya: perhaps the opposite can be argued, that we find a stringency in the intention of piggul that does not apply to an intention that changes the designated status of an offering, because

what can be said about

the intention of piggul

outside its prescribed time?

The invalidity it causes the offering makes one who eats it liable to the severe punishment of

excision.

Perhaps, then, an intention can transfer from one service to another only in such a case, and it is impossible to derive by an a-fortiori inference that the same applies to an intention changing the designated status of an offering, since one is not liable to excision for eating an offering invalidated by such an intention.

Rather, Rava bar Ahilai said—

this is what

Rav Yirmeya meant in supporting Rabbi Yohanan: it is an a-fortiori inference from the intention of “outside its designated place.” If, during the performance of the services, one intended that the eating of a person or the eating of the altar take place outside the place prescribed by the Torah, the offering is thereby invalidated, but one is not liable to excision for eating an offering invalidated by such an intention. Therefore, it can be derived by an a-fortiori inference that an intention can transfer from one service to another even when the designated status of an offering is changed—

And just as in a case where, if one says, “I am slaughtering it

with an intention of slaughter

outside its designated place,”

it is valid,

because his statement has no practical significance, since in reality he is slaughtering it in its designated place [A0132][Furthermore, an intention of being outside its designated place applies only when, during a service, one intends that the eating of a person or the eating of the altar take place outside its designated place, not when one intends that the slaughter itself, which is a service, take place outside its designated place], it follows that an intention of being outside its designated place is less stringent than an intention changing the designated status of an offering, which invalidates the offering through an intention concerning the service itself. Nevertheless, an intention can transfer from one service to another: if, during slaughter, he intended that the blood be sprinkled outside its designated place, the offering is invalidated. If so, all the more so with regard to the more stringent intention changing the designated status of an offering, namely,

in a case where, if one says, “I am slaughtering it not for its designated purpose,” it is invalid,

because of the intention concerning the slaughter itself—then if he

slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its designated purpose, should it not certainly be invalid

because “an intention can transfer from one service to another”?

Rav Ashi challenges

Rava bar Ahilai: the same a-fortiori inference can also be challenged, because, on the other hand, an intention of being outside the designated place is more stringent than an intention changing the designated status of an offering—

what can be said about

an intention of

being outside its designated place?

It is stringent because its invalidating effect

applies to every offering.

Can you say that the same applies to an intention

whose invalidating effect

applies only to a Paschal offering and a sin offering

alone?!

Rather, Rav Ashi said—

this is what

Rav Yirmeya meant in supporting Rabbi Yohanan: it is an a-fortiori inference that an intention can transfer from one service to another when the designated status of an offering is changed, based on the fact that an intention can transfer from one service to another when the owner of the offering is changed. An intention changing the owner invalidates only when, during one of the services, he intends that the atonement achieved through sprinkling the blood be performed for the sake of another owner. This is the essence of an intention changing the owner: the atonement of the offering [which is achieved through sprinkling the blood] is attributed to someone who is not the owner of the offering.

Accordingly, this can be derived by an a-fortiori inference:

And just as

an intention changing the owner is less stringent than an intention changing the designated status of an offering, since

in a case where, if one says—

“I am slaughtering it for the sake of so-and-so,”

who is not the owner of the offering,

it is valid,

because a change of owner applies only to atonement through sprinkling the blood—nevertheless, an intention can transfer from one service to another: if, during slaughter, he intended

to sprinkle its blood for the sake of so-and-so,

someone else,

it is invalid.

If so, all the more so with regard to the more stringent intention changing the designated status of an offering, which invalidates even through an intention concerning that same service, namely,

in a case where, if one says, “I am slaughtering it not for its designated purpose,” it is invalid

[because of the intention concerning the slaughter itself]—if he transferred the intention from one service to another, for example, if he

slaughtered it with the intention of sprinkling its blood not for its designated purpose, should it not certainly be invalid?!

Now, after Rav Yirmeya’s proof for Rabbi Yohanan’s position—that an intention can transfer from one service to another—has been explained, the Gemara explains what Rav Dimi said:

that

Rabbi Ila

raised an objection

to support Reish Lakish,

that an intention cannot transfer from one service to another. His objection was as follows:

Why was it necessary to derive separately, for each service, that changing the designated status of an offering invalidates the offering during that service? Even if

you do not say

that there is a special verse

concerning sprinkling, and

even if

we derive

that changing the designated status of an offering invalidates it during sprinkling

by an a-fortiori inference from the intermediate case

of the other services,

from slaughter and receiving the blood,

And we shall learn from them by a bamah ha-tzad: Just as slaughter, which is lenient, since it is valid even when performed by a non-priest, and a thought of a change of sacred designation invalidates it, with regard to sprinkling, which is more stringent than it, since it is valid only when performed by a priest, is it not logically inferred that a change of sacred designation should invalidate it?

And if you will refute: What is there about slaughter that has a stringency? It invalidates [the offering] in the case of the Passover offering if he thought at the time of slaughter that he was slaughtering it for those who may not eat it. Can you say the same with regard to sprinkling, which is not invalid if he sprinkled it for those who may not eat it? Receiving [the blood] proves [otherwise], for it does not invalidate [the offering] in the case of the Passover offering for those who may not eat it, and nevertheless a thought of a change of sacred designation invalidates it.

And since it is possible to learn that a change of sacred designation invalidates [the offering] in sprinkling from slaughter and receiving [the blood],

for what halakhic purpose did the Torah write

a special teaching to invalidate a change of sacred designation in sprinkling? Rather,

to say

to you

that one does not formulate a thought from one service concerning another service. Since the Torah wrote a special teaching for each and every service, we learn that the offering is invalid only if he thought during that very service itself [that he was performing it] not for its sake, but not if he formulated a thought from one service concerning another service. For it was necessary to write this invalidation with regard to sprinkling separately: only if he thought during the sprinkling itself [that it would be performed] not for its sake is the offering invalid, but not if he thought at the time of slaughter that the sprinkling would be performed not for its sake.

Since the Torah wrote a special teaching for each sacrificial rite, we learn that the offering is invalidated only when one had the improper intention during that very rite, and not when one had the intention during one rite concerning another rite. For the Torah had to write this invalidation separately with regard to placement of the blood, teaching that the offering is invalidated only if one had the improper intention during placement of the blood itself, and not if, at the time of slaughter, one intended that the placement of the blood would be performed improperly.

Rav Pappa raised an objection to it: But perhaps

this teaching concerning sprinkling came to teach us the opposite,

that one does formulate a thought from one service concerning another service?!

And for this reason a special teaching was necessary, to teach us that there is no need to formulate the thought during the sprinkling itself; rather, it is sufficient that he think at the time of slaughter that the sprinkling will be performed not for its sake, thereby invalidating the offering?!

And we answer:

If so,

that one does formulate a thought from one service concerning another service,

let the verse be silent about it, and let it be derived

the law that one formulates a thought from one service concerning another service

by the kal va-chomer of Rav Ashi,

from a change of owner designation, with regard to which one formulates a thought from one service concerning another service, as above. And from the fact that a verse was necessary for the law of a change of sacred designation in sprinkling, it follows that it came to reveal that with regard to a change of sacred designation one does not formulate a thought from one service concerning another service!

And it is still difficult according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who said, “One does formulate a thought from one service concerning another service”: Why was it necessary to write [the law of] a change of sacred designation in sprinkling? After all, it could be learned by a kal va-chomer from slaughter and receiving [the blood].

And we answer:

But the other one,

Rabbi Yoḥanan,

refutes

the kal va-chomer from slaughter and receiving [the blood]

as follows: What is there about these

slaughter and receiving [the blood],

that, since

there is in them a stringent aspect, for they are

required to be [performed] in the north,

for with regard to some of the offerings, the slaughter and receiving [of the blood] must be performed specifically in the northern part of the Temple courtyard,

and

they

are found

also

in the inner sin offerings,

for all offerings, even those whose blood is brought inside and within, require slaughter and receiving [of the blood]. Can you say the same with regard to sprinkling, which is not required to be [performed] in the north and does not apply to the inner sin offerings [because the blood of the inner sin offerings is sprinkled in the Sanctuary and not on the outer altar, see above 4a]? Therefore, if a special teaching had not been written that a change of sacred designation invalidates [the offering] in sprinkling, we would not know that it invalidates [it] there. Consequently, the verse is not superfluous to teach us that one does not formulate a thought from one service concerning another service.

But the other one,

Rav Ila, who assisted Reish Lakish and learned from sprinkling by a kal va-chomer from slaughter and receiving [the blood], answers this refutation:

Now, in any event, we are dealing with peace-offerings—

the teaching to invalidate [an offering slaughtered] not for its sake in slaughter and receiving [the blood] was stated with regard to peace-offerings, and with regard to them there is no requirement that slaughter be in the north, and their blood is not sprinkled inside. Thus there is no refutation of the kal va-chomer that they learned from slaughter to sprinkling. And from the fact that they did not rely on the kal va-chomer and it was necessary to write a verse also with regard to sprinkling, it is proven that one does not formulate a thought at slaughter concerning the sprinkling, but only concerning the slaughter itself. And from here they also learned with regard to a change of sacred designation in a sin offering and in the Passover offering.

It was stated: If he slaughtered it

as a sin offering

for its sake,

with a thought at the time of slaughter

to sprinkle its blood not for its sake—

Rav Naḥman said: It is invalid,

and this is in accordance with Rabbi Yoḥanan, who says that one does formulate a thought from one service concerning another service.

Rava said: It is valid,

and this is in accordance with Reish Lakish.

And Rava retracted [his opinion] in favor of Rav Naḥman

and held like him that one does formulate a thought from one service concerning another service,

by the kal va-chomer of Rav Ashi,

from a change of owner designation, for his thought at the time of slaughter that he would sprinkle the blood with a change of owner designation invalidates [the offering]; and the same law applies to a thought of [performing it] not for its sake, which invalidates [the offering] at slaughter when he thought to sprinkle it not for its sake.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Eliezer says: Also the guilt offering

that was slaughtered not for its sake is invalid.

It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer said: A sin offering comes on account of a sin, and a guilt offering comes on account of a sin,

therefore we have to learn by analogy—

Just as a sin offering that was slaughtered not for its sake is invalid, so too a guilt offering

that was slaughtered

not for its sake is invalid.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: No,

you should not compare a guilt offering to a sin offering. For

if you say with regard to a sin offering

that it is invalid, this is because of the superiority of the sin offering ,

for its blood

of the sin offering is placed on the altar

above

the scarlet line [which is the line dividing the altar between its upper part and its lower part] , whereas the blood of the guilt offering is placed in the place where the blood of the other offerings is placed, below the scarlet line.

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: A

sacrifice

Passover offering proves it, whose blood

is placed

below,

and nevertheless, if he

slaughtered it not for its sake, it is invalid.

Rabbi Yehoshua said to him: What is there about the Passover offering

that it has another superiority,

that its time is fixed,

and therefore [a sacrifice slaughtered] not for its sake invalidates it? Can you say the same with regard to a guilt offering, which he may bring at any time?

Rabbi Eliezer said to him: If so,

then

a sin offering proves it,

whose time is not fixed, and nevertheless it is invalid if he slaughtered it not for its sake.