Zevachim 9b — the Talmud in English

One

verse is needed

when its time has passed,

the time for slaughtering the Paschal offering,

and its year has passed,

meaning that it has already become more than one year old and is no longer fit to be a Paschal offering.

And one

verse is needed

for

a Paschal offering that was lost and for which another was brought in its place and

its time has passed,

but its

year has not yet passed,

so it is fit to be offered as a Paschal offering on the second Passover.

And one

verse is needed

when neither its time nor its year has passed,

but one slaughtered it early, before Passover, and removed its designation as a Paschal offering [even though it was fit to be offered as a Paschal offering at its proper time] .

And all three verses are necessary.

all three verses.

For had the Merciful One written only one,

we would have said that this applies only when both its year and its proper time have passed, so that it has been completely rejected as a Paschal offering

but when its proper time has passed and its year has not passed, since it is fit for the second Passover, I would say no

it does not become a peace-offering; rather, it still retains the designation of a Paschal offering. Since it was not slaughtered as a Paschal offering, it is invalid. Therefore, an additional verse was required to teach that even in this case it is offered as a peace-offering.

And had the Merciful One written only these two

verses, we would have said that only

because they were rejected from their function,

since they were not offered on the first Passover, are they therefore offered as peace-offerings.

But when

they slaughtered it during the other days of the year before Passover,

when neither its time nor its year had passed, since it was fit for the

first Passover,

I would say no

it is possible to remove it from its designation as a Paschal offering, and it would be invalid when slaughtered before Passover eve. The third verse therefore teaches us that its designation may be removed even while it is fit to be a Paschal offering. Thus we said that all three verses

are necessary!

Rav said in the name of Mavog

[the name of a Sage]:

A sin-offering that one slaughtered with the intention that it be the sin-offering of Nahshon

—the goat brought by the princes as a sin-offering at the dedication of the Tabernacle, which Nahshon brought on the first day—

is valid, as the verse says: “

This is the law of the sin-offering” —

one law for all sin-offerings.

A change from one sin-offering to another is not considered a change of sacred designation, even though the change is to Nahshon’s sin-offering, which was brought as a gift and not for a sin. In this case it is also not considered a change of owner, since he did not slaughter it with the intention that Nahshon achieve atonement through it.

Rava sat and repeated this teaching.

Rav Mesharsheya raised an objection to Rava: Rabbi Shimon says: All meal-offerings whose handful was removed not for their own sake are valid, and they count for their owners toward fulfilling their obligation.

Because meal-offerings are not similar to animal offerings.

For

meal-offerings differ from one another in the manner in which they are made, whereas animal offerings are all made in the same manner, because

one who removes the handful

of a

pan-baked

meal-offering with the intention that it be a

deep-pan

meal-offering is nevertheless shown by his actions to be making a

pan-baked

meal-offering. A pan-baked meal-offering is fried in oil in a shallow vessel and becomes firm, whereas a deep-pan meal-offering is made in a deep vessel in which the oil moves around it, and therefore it is soft.

Likewise, one who removes the handful of a

dry

meal-offering, which is the meal-offering of a sinner made without oil, with the intention of making it

mixed

with oil,

his actions

with regard to the

meal-offering show that it is dry.

Since the manner in which it is made demonstrates which meal-offering he is making, his thought while removing the handful that it should be for another meal-offering does not disqualify it, and it counts for its owners toward fulfilling their obligation. The handful itself demonstrates whether it is the handful of a pan-baked offering or of a deep-pan offering, and likewise whether it is that of a mixed or a dry offering .

But with animal offerings this is not so,

because

there is one slaughtering for all of them, one receiving of the blood for all of them, and one sprinkling for all of them.

It is therefore not recognizable, at the time the Temple service is performed, for which offering it is being performed. Consequently, the thought that it is for another animal offering prevents it from counting toward the owners’ obligation.

The Gemara infers:

The reason

that the meal-offering is valid even though its handful was removed not for its own sake is

that its actions demonstrate what it is.

But if its actions do not demonstrate what it is, it is not valid.

And

why? Let us say

that its validity can be learned from: “

This is the law of the meal-offering” —

one law for all meal-offerings.

Just as Mavog interpreted the verse “This is the law of the sin-offering” to teach that a sin-offering slaughtered as another sin-offering is valid because there is one law for all sin-offerings, so too this verse should teach that all meal-offerings are valid in such a case!?

Rather,

it must be that one cannot derive from “This is the law” that there is one law for all sin-offerings. It follows that even a sin-offering slaughtered as Nahshon’s sin-offering is invalid because of a change of sacred designation.

It must therefore be said that

if this teaching was stated, it was stated as follows:

Rav said in the name of Mavog: A sin-offering that one slaughtered with the intention that Nahshon achieve atonement through it is valid,

and it is not subject to the disqualification of a change of owner, because Nahshon is not obligated to achieve atonement like the person who brought the offering, since

the dead do not receive atonement!

The Gemara asks: Why was it necessary to say “as Nahshon’s offering”?

Let him say

that it was slaughtered as an offering for

any dead person.

The Gemara answers:

This teaches us that the reason

this sin-offering is valid is only

that

Nahshon

is dead

and the dead do not receive atonement.

But

if one slaughtered it as an offering for a

living person comparable to Nahshon,

even in a case where that person is not obligated to bring a sin-offering for his transgression, but brings it merely as a gift, it is

invalid,

because even slaughtering it as such a sin-offering is considered a change of owner.

And what is that?

Which sin-offering is not brought to atone for a sin but as a gift?

The sin-offering of a nazirite and the sin-offering of a person afflicted with tzara’at!

The Gemara asks: Are

these

the sin-offering of a nazirite and the sin-offering of a person afflicted with tzara’at considered sin-offerings? They are, after all, like

elevation-offerings,

because since they are not brought to atone for a sin, slaughtering a sin-offering as one intended for someone obligated to bring these sin-offerings is not considered a change of owner. For we learned: If one slaughters a sin-offering as an offering for someone obligated to bring an elevation-offering, it is valid!

Rather, if this teaching was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav said in the name of Mavog: A sin-offering that one slaughtered for someone obligated to bring a sin-offering

as a gift and not for atonement,

like Nahshon,

is

valid,

because

Nahshon’s sin-offering,

with regard to the law of a change of owner, is considered

an elevation-offering,

and there is therefore no change of owner.

There are those who say: Rav said in the name of Mavog:

A sin-offering that one slaughtered as Nahshon’s sin-offering is invalid,

because this is a change of sacred designation.

Nahshon’s sin-offering,

with regard to the law of a change of sacred designation,

is considered an elevation-offering,

not a sin-offering; and a change from a sin-offering to an elevation-offering disqualifies a sin-offering .

And we raised it:

But let him say:

a sin-offering that he slaughtered for the sake of

the sin-offering of a nazirite or the sin-offering of a leper

is disqualified, for these sin-offerings too, which are a gift, are considered like an olah, and disqualify the sin-offering by the law of a change of sacred designation?

And we answer: It is the sin-offering of Nahshon,

the principal sin-offering,

for it was the first sin-offering of an individual, and therefore

he mentioned

it.

Rava said: A sin-offering for forbidden fat,

which was set aside for the sin of eating forbidden fat inadvertently,

that he slaughtered for the sake of a sin-offering for blood,

or that he slaughtered for the sake of

a sin-offering for idolatry,

this is not considered a change of sacred designation, and it is

valid.

But if he slaughtered the sin-offering for forbidden fat

for the sake of the sin-offering of a nazirite

or for the sake of

the sin-offering of a leper,

it is

disqualified,

because

these,

with respect to the law of a change of sacred designation, are

olot.

Rava raised a dilemma: A sin-offering for forbidden fat that he slaughtered for the sake of a sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects—what is the law?

And the sides of the dilemma are:

Do we say

that there is no change of sacred designation in this, for a sin-offering that was set aside for the sin of impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects also comes for an inadvertent sin whose intentional violation is

karet, like it

of the sin-offering for forbidden fat?

Or perhaps, no:

the sin-offering of impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects is not

fixed like it

of the sin-offering for forbidden fat, for the sin-offering that comes for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects is an “ascending and descending offering” [in which the wealthy brings an animal offering, the poor brings a bird, and the poorest brings a meal-offering], whereas the sin-offering for forbidden fat is fixed as an animal only. Therefore, if he slaughters a sin-offering for forbidden fat for the sake of a sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, the matter will be considered a change of sacred designation!?

And we conclude:

teyku!

Rav Aha son of Rava teaches all of them

the changes in a sin-offering

as disqualifying,

so that even one who slaughters a sin-offering for forbidden fat for the sake of a sin-offering for blood disqualifies it.

What is the reason? —

As it is stated: “

And he shall slaughter it for a sin-offering.”

And we expound it as though it were written, “And he shall slaughter [it] ‘for that sin-offering,’” to teach that he must slaughter

for the sake of that sin-offering.

And if he changed and slaughtered for the sake of another sin-offering, it is called a change of sacred designation, and it is disqualified.

Rav Ashi said to Rav Aha son of Rava:

According to your words, that every change in a sin-offering, even from forbidden fat to blood, is considered a change of sacred designation and disqualifies, if so, the

dilemma

that

Rava

discussed—whether changing from a sin-offering for forbidden fat to a sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects is considered a change of sacred designation—

how do you teach it?

After all, even from forbidden fat to blood is considered a change of sacred designation to disqualify, and all the more so from forbidden fat to impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, in which there is a change from a fixed offering to an ascending and descending offering!?

He said to him,

Rav Aha son of Rava to Rav Ashi:

We

did not learn Rava’s statement with regard to a change of sacred designation; rather,

we teach it with regard to a change of owners, and this is how we teach it:

Rava said: A sin-offering for forbidden fat that he slaughtered

with a change of owners

for one who is obligated to bring a sin-offering for blood

or who is obligated to bring

a sin-offering for idolatry—

it is disqualified.

And if he slaughtered it as a sin-offering for forbidden fat

for one who is obligated to bring the sin-offering of a nazirite

or

the sin-offering of a leper—

it is valid,

because it is considered like one who slaughters a sin-offering for one who is obligated to bring an olah, for such a change of owners does not disqualify; only its kind destroys it, and an olah is not of the kind of a sin-offering.

And they raised it

with regard to Rava’s dilemma

as follows:

Rava raised a dilemma: A sin-offering for forbidden fat that he slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects—what is the law?

Do we say

that he is liable for his intentional violation to

karet like it,

of the sin-offering for forbidden fat, and it is of its kind, and it destroys it?

Or perhaps, no:

he is not obligated

in a fixed offering like it,

of the sin-offering for forbidden fat, but in an ascending and descending offering, and it is not of its kind; therefore a thought involving a change of owners does not destroy it.

And we conclude:

teyku!

It was stated: If he slaughtered it

for a sin-offering

with its proper designation ,

that at the time of slaughter he intended to slaughter it for the sake of a sin-offering, but added in his thought while he slaughtered

to sprinkle its blood not with its proper designation—

Rabbi Yohanan said:

it is

disqualified.

And Reish Lakish said: It is valid.

And the Gemara explains in what they disagree:

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is disqualified,

because

they have in mind from one service to another,

for the thought of the change disqualifies even if his thought is to make the change during another service,

and we derive it from the thought of piggul,

for if he thought at the time of slaughter that he would sprinkle the blood or burn the innards after the time fixed for them, this thought disqualifies the offering. It is thus proven that a thought to disqualify the offering through another service disqualifies it already through this service, as will be explained below.

And Reish Lakish said: it is valid,

because

one does not think from one service to another.

And we do not derive this from the thought of pigul.

For the thought of pigul is different, for its essential form is from one service to another, such as when he thinks at the time of slaughtering that he will sprinkle the blood not at its proper time, or that he will burn the fat not at its proper time; but there is no possibility of a thought of pigul in the slaughtering itself. This is not so with the thought of a change of sacred designation, whose essential thought of change is in the slaughtering itself. Therefore, it is sufficient for it to invalidate if he thinks a thought of change during the service itself, but not when he thinks from one service to another.

And they went

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish

according to their own positions!