Zevachim 9b (ט:) — the Talmud in English

And one

verse is necessary

for its time to have passed,

the time for slaughtering the Paschal offering,

and its year to have passed,

meaning that it has already become a year old and is no longer fit to be a Paschal offering.

And one

verse is necessary

for

a Paschal offering that was lost, and he brought another in its place and

its time passed,

but its year

had not yet passed,

and it is fit to be offered as a Paschal offering on the Second Pesaḥ.

And one

verse is necessary

for a case in which neither its time nor its year has passed,

but he advanced and offered it before Pesaḥ, and uprooted from it the designation of a Paschal offering [although it was fit to be offered as a Paschal offering at its proper time] .

And all three are necessary

all three verses.

For if the Merciful One had written only one,

we would have said that this applies only when both its year and its proper time have passed, so that it has been entirely rejected from being a Paschal offering

but when its proper time has passed and its year has not passed,

since it is fit for the Second Pesaḥ, say that it does not become a peace-offering but still retains the designation of a Paschal offering. And since it was not slaughtered under the designation of a Paschal offering, it would be invalid. Therefore, an additional verse was necessary to teach that even in this case it is offered as a peace-offering.

And if the Merciful One had written these two

verses alone, we would have said that only

because they were rejected from their function,

since they were not offered at the time of the First Pesaḥ, are they therefore offered as peace-offerings.

But where

he slaughtered it during the other days of the year before Pesaḥ,

when neither its proper time nor its year had passed, and it was fit for the Paschal offering

the First Pesaḥ,

say that it may not

be uprooted from its status as a Paschal offering, and that it becomes invalid when slaughtered before the eve of Pesaḥ. The third verse therefore teaches us that its designation may be uprooted even while it is fit to be a Paschal offering. And this is why we said that all three verses

are necessary!

Rav said in the name of Mavog

the name of a Sage:

A sin-offering that one slaughtered for the sake of the sin-offering of Nahshon

the goat that the tribal princes brought as a sin-offering at the dedication of the Tabernacle, with Nahshon bringing one on the first day,

is valid, as the verse says: “

This is the law of the sin-offering” —

one law for all sin-offerings,

so that a change from one sin-offering to another is not considered a change of sacred designation, even though the change is to the sin-offering of Nahshon, which was brought as a gift and not for a sin. In this case it is also not considered a change of owners, since he did not slaughter it with the intention that Nahshon achieve atonement through it.

Rava was sitting and stating this teaching.

Rav Mesharsheya raised an objection to Rava: Rabbi Shimon says: All meal-offerings whose kemitza was performed not under their proper designation are valid, and they fulfill the owners’ obligation,

because meal-offerings are not comparable to animal offerings.

For

meal-offerings differ from one another in the manner in which they are prepared, whereas animal offerings are all made in the same manner, since

the handful

of a

pan

meal-offering taken for the sake of a

deep-pan

meal-offering is identified by its procedure as a

pan

meal-offering. For a pan meal-offering is fried in oil in a shallow vessel and becomes hard, whereas a deep-pan meal-offering is made in a deep vessel in which the oil bubbles, and therefore it is soft.

Likewise, the handful of a

dry

meal-offering, which is the sin-offering of a poor person made without oil in it, when he intends to make it

for the sake of a mixed

meal-offering with oil,

its procedure

of the dry meal-offering

demonstrates that it is dry.

Since the manner of preparation demonstrates which meal-offering he is making, his intention during kemitza for the sake of another meal-offering does not invalidate it, and it fulfills the owners’ obligation. For the handful itself demonstrates whether it is the handful of a pan meal-offering or of a deep-pan meal-offering, and likewise whether it is from a mixed or a dry meal-offering .

But this is not so with regard to animal offerings,

because

there is one slaughtering for all of them, one receiving for all of them, and one sprinkling for all of them,

and at the time the sacrificial service is performed, it is not apparent for which offering it is being performed. Therefore, an intention for the sake of another animal offering prevents it from fulfilling the owners’ obligation.

The Gemara infers:

The reason

that the meal-offering is valid even though its kemitza was performed not under its proper designation is

that its procedure demonstrates

what it is. But if its procedure does not demonstrate what it is, it is not valid.

And

why? Let us say

that it can be shown to be valid from “

This is the law of the meal-offering” —

one law for all meal-offerings,

just as Mavog derived with regard to a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of another sin-offering that it is valid from the verse “This is the law of the sin-offering,” one law for all sin-offerings!?

Rather,

it must be that “This is the law” cannot be used to derive one law for all sin-offerings. It follows that even a sin-offering slaughtered for the sake of the sin-offering of Nahshon is invalid, because this is a change of sacred designation.

We must therefore say that

if this teaching was stated, it was stated as follows:

Rav said in the name of Mavog: A sin-offering that one slaughtered with the intention that Nahshon achieve atonement through it is valid,

and it is not subject to the disqualification of a change of owners, because Nahshon was not obligated to obtain atonement as he is, since

the dead do not achieve atonement!

The Rabbi Elhanan of Malin discussed whether its validity is because a dead person is not obligated to obtain atonement, and therefore its status is like that of one who slaughters for the sake of a living person who has not sinned and is not obligated to obtain atonement; or whether it is merely because the atonement of an offering cannot benefit the dead, but if it could benefit him, the offering would be invalid. For although the dead person is not obligated to bring the offering, he is capable of atonement, and is not like a living person who has not sinned at all. [The practical difference is whether an intention for the sake of a minor disqualifies, since he has committed a transgression but is not obligated to obtain atonement.] See the commentary attributed to Rashi b. in Me’ila [10b s.v. “and the offspring”], which explains that the reason the dead do not achieve atonement is that “their death atoned for them,” [so that the status of the dead is equivalent to that of a living person who has not sinned]. Tosafot in Temura [15b s.v. “but”] explained that the statement [there and in Horayot 6a] that, since the heifer whose neck is broken atones for the living, it atones for the dead as well, refers to their obligation as a community, which does not lapse through death; but an individual’s obligation is atoned for by his death. [See the novellae of Rabbi Elhanan of Malin, p. 53, and the notes to the Chavruta on Horayot, there]. b. It requires examination whether now, when we do not derive the law from “This is the law,” and slaughtering for the sake of the sin-offering of Nahshon disqualifies, the Gemara has returned to the view that the sin-offering of Nahshon is considered a burnt-offering, and is therefore valid only if it was slaughtered so that Nahshon would achieve atonement through it, because the dead do not achieve atonement; or whether the Gemara holds that it is a sin-offering, but that Scripture decreed that this sin-offering should be brought as a freewill offering and a gift. From the Gemara’s inference that slaughtering for the sake of the sin-offering of a nazirite or a leper is invalid, it appears that in this formulation the Gemara held that all these sin-offerings, including the sin-offering of Nahshon, are considered freewill sin-offerings. They do not disqualify a sin-offering through a change of sacred designation when performed for their sake, but they do so through a change of owners when the person for whom it is performed is obligated to obtain atonement as he is. [Only a dead person is not obligated to obtain atonement.] The Gemara rejects this, saying that their status is that of burnt-offerings, and that the person for whom they are performed is not considered obligated to obtain atonement as they are, so they do not disqualify the offering. Apparently, according to this, the Gemara’s rejection that they are burnt-offerings applies to all sin-offerings of this type. And shortly afterward it appears that the alternative formulation adopted this reasoning; perhaps it indeed adopted the reasoning of the rejection.

We inquire about this: Why was it necessary to say “for the sake of Nahshon”?

Let him say

for the sake of

any dead person?

We answer:

This teaches us that the reason

this sin-offering is valid is only

because

Nahshon

is dead

and the dead do not achieve atonement.

But

if he slaughtered it for the sake of a

living person comparable to Nahshon,

even if that person is not obligated to bring a sin-offering for his transgression, but brings one merely as a gift, it is

invalid,

because even slaughtering for the sake of such a sin-offering is considered a change of owners.

And what is it?

What is this sin-offering that does not atone for a transgression but is a gift?

The sin-offering of a nazirite and the sin-offering of a leper!

Rashi b. explained that the sin-offerings of a nazirite and a leper are not brought to atone, but to render them fit. They are comparable to the sin-offering of Nahshon, which was not brought for a sin. It requires clarification for what fitness the sin-offering of Nahshon was brought, and how it can be considered a “gift” after the Torah calls it a sin-offering and the Sifrei [Naso] explains that it was brought to atone for uncertainty concerning impurity of the depths. See the commentary of the Ra m on Rashi, which explains that there could not have been a sin involving impurity of the depths, since the Tabernacle did not yet exist. Rather, they brought an offering to atone for possible impurity of the depths before entering the Tabernacle. It follows that this sin-offering was indeed not brought to atone for a past sin, but as a “gift” to render them fit to partake of sacred things, like the sin-offering of a nazirite and a leper.

We challenge this: Are

these

the sin-offering of a nazirite and the sin-offering of a leper considered sin-offerings? After all,

they are burnt-offerings,

since, because they are not brought to atone for a sin, slaughtering a sin-offering for the sake of one obligated to bring these offerings is not considered a change of owners. For we learned: If one slaughters a sin-offering for the sake of one obligated to bring a burnt-offering, it is valid!?

Rather, if this teaching was stated, it was stated as follows: Rav said in the name of Mavog: A sin-offering that one slaughtered for the sake of one obligated to bring a sin-offering

as a gift and not for atonement,

like Nahshon,

is

valid,

because

the sin-offering of Nahshon

with regard to the law of a change of owners is considered

a burnt-offering,

and there is no change of owners in this case.

Some say: Rav said in the name of Mavog —

A sin-offering that one slaughtered for the sake of the sin-offering of Nahshon is invalid,

because this is a change of sacred designation.

The sin-offering of Nahshon

with regard to the law of a change of sacred designation

is considered a burnt-offering,

not a sin-offering; and a change of sacred designation from a sin-offering to a burnt-offering disqualifies a sin-offering .

And we raised this objection:

And let him say:

a sin-offering that he slaughtered in the name of

a nazirite’s sin-offering or a leper’s sin-offering

is disqualified, since these sin-offerings as well, which are gifts, are considered like an olah and disqualify the sin-offering by the law of a change of sacred designation?

And we answer: The sin-offering of Nahshon was

the primary sin-offering—

it was the first individual sin-offering—and therefore he

mentioned

it.

Rava said: In the case of a sin-offering for forbidden fat—

which was designated for the unwitting transgression of eating forbidden fat—

that he slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering for blood

or that he slaughtered in the name of

a sin-offering for idolatry,

this is not considered a change of sacred designation, and it is

valid.

However, if he slaughtered the sin-offering for forbidden fat

in the name of a nazirite’s sin-offering

or in the name of

a leper’s sin-offering,

it is

disqualified,

because

these

with regard to the law of a change of sacred designation

are olot.

Rava inquired: In the case of a sin-offering for forbidden fat that he slaughtered in the name of a sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, what is the law?

The sides of the uncertainty are:

Do we say

that this does not constitute a change of sacred designation, since a sin-offering designated for the transgression of impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects is also brought for an unwitting transgression whose intentional violation is punishable by

karet, like it—

the sin-offering for forbidden fat?

Or perhaps, it does not:

the sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects is not

fixed like it—

the sin-offering for forbidden fat. Rather, the sin-offering brought for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects is an offering that varies according to the means of the one who brings it: a wealthy person brings an animal offering, a poor person brings a bird, and the poorest person brings a meal-offering; whereas the sin-offering for forbidden fat is fixed as an animal offering alone. Consequently, if he slaughters a sin-offering for forbidden fat in the name of a sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, this is considered a change of sacred designation!?

And we conclude:

teiku—the question remains unresolved!

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, taught all of them—

the changes in the designation of a sin-offering—

as disqualifying,

so that even one who slaughters a sin-offering for forbidden fat in the name of a sin-offering for blood disqualifies it.

What is the reason?

As it is stated: “

And he shall slaughter it as a sin-offering.”

And we expound this as though it were written, “and he shall slaughter it ‘for that sin-offering,’” teaching that he must slaughter it

in the name of that same sin-offering.

If he changed and slaughtered it in the name of another sin-offering, this is called a change of sacred designation, and it is disqualified.

Rabbi Ashi said to Rav Aḥa, son of Rava:

According to you, since every change in a sin-offering—even from forbidden fat to blood—is considered a change of sacred designation and disqualifies it, then the

inquiry

that

Rava

discussed—whether changing from a sin-offering for forbidden fat to a sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects is considered a change of sacred designation—

how did you teach it?

After all, even changing from forbidden fat to blood is considered a disqualifying change of sacred designation, and certainly changing from forbidden fat to impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, which entails a change from a fixed offering to an offering that varies according to means!?

He said to him—

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi:

We

did not learn Rava’s statement as referring to a change of sacred designation. Rather,

we teach it as referring to a change of owners, and this is how we teach it:

Rava said: In the case of a sin-offering for forbidden fat that he slaughtered

with a change of owners

for one who is obligated to bring a sin-offering for blood

or who is obligated to bring

a sin-offering for idolatry—

it is disqualified.

But if he slaughtered the sin-offering for forbidden fat

for one who is obligated to bring a nazirite’s sin-offering

or

a leper’s sin-offering—

it is valid,

because this is considered like slaughtering a sin-offering for one who is obligated to bring an olah, and such a change of owners does not disqualify it; only a change to an offering of the same type is destructive in this regard, whereas an olah is not of the same type as a sin-offering.

And they presented

Rava’s uncertainty

in this form:

Rava inquired: In the case of a sin-offering for forbidden fat that he slaughtered for one who is obligated to bring a sin-offering for impurity of the Sanctuary and its sacred objects, what is the law?

Do we say

that he is obligated for an intentional violation punishable by

karet, like it—

the sin-offering for forbidden fat—and therefore it is of the same type, and a change to it is destructive?

Or perhaps, he is not

obligated

to bring a fixed offering like it

—the sin-offering for forbidden fat—but rather an offering that varies according to means; therefore it is not of the same type, and the thought involving a change of owners does not disqualify it?

And we conclude:

teiku—the question remains unresolved!

It was stated: If he slaughtered it

for a sin-offering

with its proper designation,

meaning that at the time of slaughter he intended to slaughter it in the name of a sin-offering, but while slaughtering he added the following intention:

to sprinkle its blood not with its proper designation—

Rabbi Yoḥanan said:

It is

disqualified.

And Reish Lakish said: It is valid.

The Gemara explains the basis of their dispute:

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is disqualified,

because

one may form an intention from one service to another—

the intention to change the designation disqualifies even when his intention is to make the change during another service.

And we derive this from the intention of piggul:

if, at the time of slaughter, he intended to sprinkle the blood or burn the sacrificial portions after the time fixed for them, that intention disqualifies the offering. This proves that an intention to disqualify the offering during another service disqualifies it already during the present service, as will be explained below.

And Reish Lakish said: It is valid,

because

one does not consider from one service to another.

And we do not derive this from the thought of piggul.

For the thought of piggul is different, since its essential application is from one service to another—for example, when one thinks during slaughtering that he will sprinkle the blood outside its proper time, or that he will burn the fat outside its proper time—but the thought of piggul cannot apply to the slaughtering itself. This is not so with the thought of a change in the sanctity of the offering, whose essential application is the thought of change during the slaughtering itself. Therefore, it is enough that the offering becomes invalid when one thinks a thought of change during the service itself, but not when one thinks from one service to another.

And they followed

Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish

their respective approaches!