Zevachim 111b — the Talmud in English

Slaughtered

a bird

outside, and raised it

he or another

outside, he is liable

both for the raising and for the slaughter.

It follows that

the manner of its fitness inside,

that is, melika, according to its law inside, is the manner of

its exemption outside.

For if he pinched it outside and afterward raised it outside, he is exempt.

And

the manner of its fitness outside,

that is, slaughtering—for if he slaughtered it outside and raised it outside, he is liable—is the manner of

its exemption inside.

For if he slaughtered it inside and raised it outside, he is exempt.

Rabbi Shimon says: For everything for which one is liable outside, one is liable for its counterpart inside when he raised it outside.

And in the Gemara his intention will be explained.

Except for one who slaughters inside and raises outside,

for in this manner he is exempt, since it is not fit inside.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The manner of its fitness outside is the manner of its exemption inside.

The Gemara asks:

This

“outside”—how is it possible to consider it the “manner of

its fitness”?

Is it not the “manner of

its liability”?

For through its slaughtering he becomes liable on account of slaughtering outside.

And we answer: Indeed,

teach

in our Mishna, “the manner of

his liability”!

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says, etc.

And we inquire:

To what does

Rabbi Shimon refer—to the first clause or to the final clause?

If you say he refers to the first clause,

to what the first tanna said:

One who pinches a bird inside and raises it outside is liable; if he pinched it outside and raised it outside, he is exempt.

And Rabbi Shimon said to him: Just as

one who pinches

inside is made liable

if he raised it outside, so too, if he

pinched it outside, he is also made liable

for raising it. If so,

it should have said: “For everything for which one is liable inside, one is liable for it outside,”

should it not?

Rather,

if we explain that this is what Rabbi Shimon said to the first tanna:

Just as outside he is not made liable, so too inside he is not made liable.

If so,

it should have said: “For everything for which one is not liable outside, one is not liable inside,”

should it not?

Rather, he refers to the final clause,

where the first tanna said:

One who slaughters a bird inside and raises it outside is exempt. If he slaughtered it outside and raised it outside, he is liable. And Rabbi Shimon said

to the first tanna:

Just as

one who slaughters

inside is not made liable

if he raised it outside, likewise one who slaughters

outside is also not made liable

if he raises it.

If so,

“For everything for which one is not liable inside, one is not liable outside,” should it not have said!?

Rather,

we shall explain that this is what Rabbi Shimon said to him:

Just as

if he slaughtered and raised

outside he is made liable,

one who slaughters

inside

and raises it outside

is also made liable.

This too cannot be explained in this way, for

it teaches

in the Mishna:

“Except for one who slaughters inside and raises outside,”

and it is explicit that in this manner Rabbi Shimon agrees that he is exempt.

And since it has not become clear in what Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first tanna,

Zeiri said: Slaughtering at night of an animal

inside, with its raising outside,

is the difference between them.

And there is a deficiency of words in the statement of the first tanna,

and this is what he said: “And likewise, one who slaughters

an animal

at night inside

and it becomes invalid for offering inside, because it is stated concerning it, “on the day of your sacrifice,” and even if it went up, it must come down; therefore,

if he raised it outside, he is exempt” 155.

But if he

slaughtered at night outside and raised it outside,

whether during the day or at night,

he is liable.

For with slaughtering and raising outside, there is no difference at all between day and night, since the sacrifice is fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting on the following day .

Rabbi Shimon says: For everything for which one is liable outside, one is liable for its counterpart inside when he raised it outside.

Therefore, one who slaughters an animal at night inside and raises it outside is liable, for according to Rabbi Shimon it is not completely rejected, as he said above [84a], that if it went up on the altar it need not come down. Therefore he is liable for it just as if he had slaughtered it outside .

Except for one who slaughters a bird inside and raises it outside,

who is exempt even according to Rabbi Shimon, because even if it went up it must come down, since slaughtering a bird inside is considered piercing, for inside its law is specifically melika .

Rava said: Receiving

the blood

in an unconsecrated vessel is the difference between them,

and there is a deficiency of words in the statement of the first tanna,

and this is what he said: “And likewise, one who receives

the blood

in an unconsecrated vessel inside and raises it outside is exempt.”

Because it is considered as though the blood had been spilled, and he holds like Rabbi Judah that in this manner, even if it went up, it must come down; and since it is entirely unfit, if he raised it outside he is exempt .

But

one who receives

blood

in an unconsecrated vessel outside and raises it outside is liable 161.

Rabbi Shimon says: For everything for which one is liable outside, one is liable for its counterpart inside when he raised it outside. And according to his view [there], if the blood was spilled inside and the sacrifice went up on the altar, it need not come down. The same applies if the blood was received in an unconsecrated vessel: it is considered fit for the altar, and therefore one is liable for it if he raised it outside.

Except for one who slaughters a bird inside and raises it outside,

who is exempt, because it requires melika, and through slaughtering inside it is fit for nothing. There is another formulation in Rabbi Shimon’s words:

And now, since the father of Rav Shmuel taught: “One who pinches a bird inside and they raised it outside is liable. If he pinched it outside and raised it outside, he is exempt. And Rabbi Shimon makes one liable”

even when he pinched it outside,

teach

that this is indeed what Rabbi Shimon said:

“For everything for which one is liable inside,

such as one who pinches inside

and raises it outside, one is liable for it

even if he pinched

outside” 163.

According to this formulation, it follows that the end of Rabbi Shimon’s words, “except for one who slaughters inside and raises outside,” came to teach that although from the beginning of his words it implies that for every sacrifice for which one is not liable inside—for example, invalid consecrated animals that became invalid before they entered the Temple courtyard—one is not liable for them if he slaughtered them outside, nevertheless the law of one who slaughters a bird inside and raises it outside is different. Although he is exempt for raising it outside, he is nevertheless liable for its counterpart when he slaughters and raises outside, because they learned from the scriptural amplification [above, 107a] to make one liable for its slaughtering from “or that he slaughters,” and for its raising from “and to them you shall say.”

Mishna:

The animal of

a sin-offering

whose

all

its blood he received in a single cup.

If he placed some of its blood outside, then whether he

placed

some first

outside and afterward placed it inside,

in which case the principal placing was outside, or whether he first placed some

inside and afterward placed it outside,

and it turns out that he placed only the remainder outside, he is

liable

for offering outside,

for

it is

all fit to be brought inside.

And this is an anonymous Mishna according to the view of Rabbi Nehemiah above, that the remnants of the inner sin-offerings are indispensable; he is liable for offering them.

But if he received its blood in two cups

from the outset, it is obvious that if he

placed both inside, he is exempt,

and it is likewise obvious that if he placed

both outside

in one lapse of awareness, he is

liable for one. [And if there was awareness between them, he is liable for two].

But if he initially placed

one

inside, and afterward placed one outside, he is exempt.

Because the first cup made the second “rejected,” and it does not even have the status of remnants.

And if he initially placed

one outside, and

afterward placed

one inside, he is liable for the one outside

the first, because of offering outside,

and

the cup

inside effects atonement

to make the sacrifice fit, as we learned above [82a], that blood sprinkled outside did not make the remaining blood like itself.

To what may this be compared? To one who designates

an animal for

his sin-offering, and it was lost. And he designated

an animal

as its replacement, and afterward the first was found. And now

they are

both standing

here.

For if he

slaughtered both inside,

the law is simply that he is certainly

exempt,

and it is likewise obvious that if he

slaughtered both outside he is liable for two, because at the time of slaughtering each one was fit to be brought inside.

But if he initially slaughtered

one

inside

and afterward

one

outside, he is

exempt.

For once atonement was effected through the first, it turns out that the second is a sin-offering whose owners have achieved atonement, and it goes to death . And it is not fit to be brought inside, and he is exempt for slaughtering it outside.

And if he first slaughtered

one outside

and afterward

one inside, he is liable for the one outside

because of slaughtered offerings outside, since at the time that he slaughtered it, it was fit to be brought inside,

and

the sin-offering

inside

that he brought afterward

effects atonement

for the owners.

And when he slaughters both inside and sprinkles the blood of one,

just as its blood exempts its flesh

from misuse—for the sprinkling of the blood removes the flesh of most-sacred offerings from the prohibition of misuse, and it becomes permitted to the priests—

so it exempts the flesh of its fellow

from misuse, since its owners achieved atonement through the first. And although it is disqualified, one does not commit misuse with it, since its law is that it must die; and we learned in tractate Meila [3a]: With sin-offerings that must die, one does not commit misuse.