Zevachim 111b (קיא:) — the Talmud in English

a bird

outside, and offered it

he or another

outside, he is liable

both for the offering and for the slaughter.

It follows that

the manner of making it fit inside,

namely, melika in the manner prescribed inside, is the manner of

exemption outside.

Thus, if he performed melika outside and then offered it outside, he is exempt.

And

the manner of making it fit outside

namely, slaughter, so that if he slaughtered it outside and offered it outside he is liable, is the manner of

exemption inside.

Thus, if he slaughtered it inside and offered it outside, he is exempt.

Rabbi Shimon says: For anything for which one is liable outside, one is liable for its equivalent inside if he offered it outside.

The Gemara will explain his intention.

Except for one who slaughters a bird inside and offers it outside,

who is exempt in this case, because it is not fit inside.

Gemara:

We learned in the Mishna: The manner of making it fit outside is the manner of exempting it inside.

The Gemara asks:

This “outside”—how can it be regarded as the “manner of

making it

fit”?

Is it not the “manner of

incurring liability”?

For through slaughtering it he incurs liability for slaughtering outside.

The answer is: Indeed,

teach

in our Mishna, “the manner of

incurring liability”!

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Shimon says, and so on.

We raise a question:

To what does Rabbi Shimon

refer— to the first clause or to the latter clause?

If you say he refers to the first clause,

to what the first tanna said:

One who performs melika on a bird inside and offers it outside is liable; if he performs melika outside and offers it outside, he is exempt.

And Rabbi Shimon said to him: Just as

one who performs melika

inside incurs liability

if he offers it outside, so too, if he

performs melika outside, he also incurs liability

for offering it. If so,

it should have said: “For anything for which one is liable inside, one is liable for it outside,”

rather than the formulation in the Mishna.

Rather,

if we explain that Rabbi Shimon said this to the first tanna:

Just as one does not incur liability outside, so too one does not incur liability inside.

If so,

it should have said: “For anything for which one is not liable outside, one is not liable inside,”

rather than the formulation in the Mishna.

Rather, he refers to the latter clause,

in which the first tanna said:

“One who slaughters a bird inside and offers it outside is exempt. If he slaughters it outside and offers it outside, he is liable.” And Rabbi Shimon said

to the first tanna:

Just as one who slaughters

inside

does not incur liability

if he offers it outside, so too one who slaughters it

outside also does not incur liability

if he offers it.

If so,

“For anything for which one is not liable inside, one is not liable outside,” should have been stated!?

Rather,

let us explain that Rabbi Shimon said to him:

Just as when he slaughters and offers

outside he

incurs liability, one who slaughters

inside

and offers it outside

also incurs liability.

This too cannot be the explanation, because

it teaches

in the Mishna:

“Except for one who slaughters inside and offers outside,”

and it is explicit that in this case Rabbi Shimon agrees that he is exempt.

Since it has not become clear in what Rabbi Shimon disagrees with the first tanna,

Zeiri said: Slaughtering an animal at night

inside and offering it outside

is the difference between them.

There is a textual omission in the words of the first tanna,

and this is what he said: “And likewise, one who slaughters

an animal

at night inside

and it becomes disqualified for offering inside, because it is stated with regard to it, “on the day of your sacrifice,” and even if it was offered, it must be taken down; therefore,

if he offered it outside, he is exempt 155 .

But if he

slaughtered it at night outside and offered it outside,

whether during the day or at night,

he is liable.

For with regard to slaughtering and offering outside, there is no distinction between day and night, since the sacrifice is fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting on the following day .

Rabbi Shimon says: For anything for which one is liable outside, one is liable for its equivalent inside if he offered it outside.

Therefore, one who slaughters an animal at night inside and offers it outside is liable, since according to Rabbi Shimon it is not entirely rejected, as he said above [84a], that if it was offered on the altar it need not be taken down. Consequently, one is liable for it just as if he had slaughtered it outside.

Except for one who slaughters a bird inside and offers it outside,

who is exempt even according to Rabbi Shimon, because even if it was offered it must be taken down, since slaughtering a bird inside is considered mere killing: inside, its prescribed procedure is specifically melika.

Rava said: Receiving

the blood

in a non-sacred vessel is the difference between them,

and there is a textual omission in the words of the first tanna,

and this is what he said: “And likewise, one who receives

the blood

in a non-sacred vessel inside and offers it outside is exempt.”

This is because it is considered as though the blood had been spilled, and he follows Rabbi Yehuda, who says that in such a case even if it was offered it must be taken down. Since it is entirely unfit, if he offers it outside he is exempt.

But

one who receives

blood

in a non-sacred vessel outside and offers it outside is liable 161 .

Rabbi Shimon says: For anything for which one is liable outside, one is liable for its equivalent inside if he offered it outside. According to his view [there], if the blood was spilled inside and the sacrifice went up onto the altar, it need not be taken down. The same applies when the blood was received in a non-sacred vessel: it is considered fit for the altar, and therefore one is liable if he offers it outside.

Except for one who slaughters a bird inside and offers it outside

who is exempt, because it requires melika, and when slaughtered inside it is fit for nothing. There is another formulation of Rabbi Shimon's statement:

And now, since Rav Shmuel's father taught: “One who performs melika on a bird inside and offers it outside is liable; if he performs melika outside and offers it outside, he is exempt. But Rabbi Shimon holds him liable”

even when he performs melika outside,

teach

that this is what Rabbi Shimon actually said:

“For anything for which one is liable inside,”

such as one who performs melika inside

and offers it outside, one is liable for it

even if he performed melika

outside 163 .

According to this formulation, the end of Rabbi Shimon's statement, “except for one who slaughters inside and offers outside,” teaches that although the beginning of his statement implies that for any sacrifice for which one is not liable inside—such as disqualified consecrated animals that became disqualified before entering the Temple courtyard—one is not liable if he slaughters them outside, nevertheless the law of one who slaughters a bird inside and offers it outside is different. Although he is exempt for offering it outside, one is nevertheless liable for its equivalent when he slaughters and offers it outside. This is because the Sages derived from the additional wording of the verse [above, 107a] liability for its slaughter from “or that he slaughters,” and liability for its offering from “and say to them.”

Mishna:

An animal of

a sin-offering

whose

entire

blood he received in a single cup.

If he placed some of its blood outside, then whether he

placed

some of it

outside first and then returned and placed it inside,

in which case the principal placement was outside, or whether he first placed some of it

inside and then returned and placed it outside,

so that he placed only the remainder outside,

he is liable

for offering it outside,

for

it is

all fit to be brought inside.

And this is an anonymous Mishna in accordance with the view of Rabbi Nehemiah stated above, that the remainder of the blood of inner sin-offerings is indispensable; therefore, one is liable for offering it.

But if he received its blood in two cups

from the outset, it is obvious that if he

placed both inside, he is exempt,

and it is likewise obvious that if he placed

both outside

unwittingly,

he is liable

one liability. [And if there was awareness between them, he is liable for two ].

However, if he initially placed

one inside and afterward placed one outside, he is exempt.

For the first cup rendered the second “rejected,” and it does not even have the status of remainder.

And if he initially placed

one outside, and

afterward placed

one inside, he is liable for the one placed outside

first, because of offering it outside,

and

the

inner cup effects atonement

to render the sacrifice fit, as we learned above [82a], that blood sprinkled outside does not cause the remaining blood to assume the same status.

To what may this be compared? To one who designates

an animal for the sake of

his sin-offering, and it is lost. And he designates

another animal

in its place, and afterward the first is found. And now

both

are standing

here.

If he

slaughtered both inside,

the law is obvious: he is certainly

exempt,

and it is likewise obvious that if he

slaughtered both outside, he is liable

for two offerings, because at the time of slaughtering each one was fit to be brought inside.

However, if he initially slaughtered

one inside

and

then

afterward

one outside, he is exempt.

For once atonement was effected through the first, it turns out that the second is a sin-offering whose owners have already achieved atonement, and it is destined to die . It is not fit to be brought inside, and he is exempt for slaughtering it outside.

And if he first slaughtered

one outside

and afterward

one inside, he is liable for the one slaughtered outside

because of slaughtering outside, since at the time he slaughtered it, it was fit to be brought inside,

and

the

inner

sin-offering that he brought afterward

effects atonement

for the owners.

And when he slaughters both inside and sprinkles the blood of one,

just as its blood exempts its flesh

from misuse, since sprinkling the blood removes the flesh of sacrificial animals of the highest sanctity from the prohibition of misuse and renders it permitted to the priests,

so it exempts the flesh of its fellow

from misuse, since its owners achieved atonement through the first. Although it is disqualified, one is not liable for misuse of it, since its law is that it must die; and we learned in tractate Me’ila [3a]: There is no misuse of sin-offerings that must die .