Zevachim 112a — the Talmud in English

Gemara:

And we raise an objection against the beginning of the Mishna:

Granted,

he gave some of the blood

outside, and then gave

some of it

inside,

he is liable for what he gave outside initially,

for

the blood

is all fit to enter inside.

But

if he first gave

inside, and

only afterward

returned and gave

the remainder of the blood

outside,

why is he liable? But

they are the leftovers,

and they do not prevent the offering from being valid?!

They say: Who is this? It is Rabbi Neḥemya, who says

in the preceding Mishna,

“The leftovers of the blood that he offered outside: he is liable.”

And we raise an objection:

If

you established our Mishna according to the view of

Rabbi Neḥemya, say the latter clause: “If he received its blood in two cups, and gave both of them inside, he is exempt. If he gave both of them outside, he is liable. If he gave one inside and one outside, he is exempt.”

And why is he exempt in the latter clause for the leftovers?

But Rabbi Neḥemya said: “The leftovers of the blood that he offered outside: he is liable”!?

And we answer [according to Rashi’s version]:

They say: Who

is the

tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Shimon

above, in the chapter “All Those Disqualified” [34b], and holds that the

cup

from which he first sprinkled

makes

its

fellow “rejected”

so that it becomes disqualified?

It is Rabbi Neḥemya!

For we learned [there]: In the case of a sin-offering whose blood he received in four cups, and he gave all four presentations from only one of them, the remainder in that cup is poured onto the base, because only it is considered “leftovers,” whereas the other cups are poured into the channel, because they are rejected.

And Rabbi Eleazar son of Rabbi Shimon said there that all the cups are poured onto the base, because one cup makes its fellow leftovers.

And it follows that according to the first tanna there, who is Rabbi Neḥemya, one who sprinkles from the other cups outside is exempt, because they are rejected after the sprinkling of the first cup.

We learned in the Mishna:

“To what is this comparable? To one who designates his sin-offering and it is lost, and he designates another in its place, and afterward the first is found.”

And we inquire [according to Rashi’s version]:

What is “to what is this comparable”?

What law did they learn from comparing two cups to two sin-offerings?

And we explain:

Who is this? It is Rabbi, who says

in tractate Temura [22b] that the first sin-offering, which was

lost at the time of the designation

of the second, and was afterward found,

dies,

like a sin-offering whose owners achieved atonement.

But the Rabbis [there] said that the surplus sin-offering grazes; once a blemish occurs in it, it is redeemed, and its money is used for a voluntary burnt-offering. And we hold that the halakha follows Rabbi, even if the first was found before he achieved atonement through the second: since it was lost at the time of designation, the surplus sin-offering dies.

And

it follows that in our Mishna

this is what it is saying: The reason

that one who offers one of them outside is exempt is because

the first was lost

and he designated another in its place, and therefore it goes to death; and if he offered one of them inside, the second is like a “rejected cup,” and he is exempt for offering it outside.

But

if the first was not lost, but

he designated

from the outset

two sin-offerings for responsibility,

so that if one were lost he would achieve atonement through its fellow, then

one of them

that he chooses

is from the outset a burnt-offering.

And when he offers the first, the second does not go to death, but grazes until it becomes blemished, and its money falls to the voluntary offering for the burnt-offering of the summer of the altar. Therefore, if he offers it outside, he is liable for offering it, because if he had offered it inside, it would have been accepted as a burnt-offering.

And it is like what Rav Huna said in the name of Rav,

who said this concerning a guilt-offering.

For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav:

An

asham that was released

by the court

for grazing

until a blemish occurs in it—for example, its owners died or achieved atonement through another [as we hold: wherever, in the case of a sin-offering, the law is that it dies, in the case of a guilt-offering it grazes]—and the owner went

and slaughtered it without specification,

it is

valid as a burnt-offering 170 .

And we object:

Are

a sin-offering and Rav Huna’s guilt-offering comparable, such that we should make him liable for offering it outside? But

there,

in the situation Rav Huna took, the guilt-offering is valid as a burnt-offering, because

a guilt-offering is male, and a burnt-offering

is also ma

le. But here, a sin-offering is female

and is not fit to be a burnt-offering at all! And we answer:

Rav Ḥiyya of Avustinia said:

Our Mishna is speaking

of

a

leader’s goat

sin-offering, which is male. And it is speaking of a case in which he designated two for responsibility and one of them was lost; and since both are fit to be burnt-offerings, if he offered one, he becomes liable for its fellow if he offers it outside.

We have completed the chapter “The One Who Slaughters and the One Who Offers.”

Our Mishna deals with two matters. Its first part explains which offerings and sacrificial procedures do not incur liability for slaughtering offerings outside the Temple courtyard. Its second part discusses the laws of private altars: the periods when it was forbidden or permitted to offer sacrifices on them, and the laws governing offerings on them during the periods of permission.

Laws "

of slaughtering offerings outside"

Mishna:

1.

The red heifer,

the red cow, which is called a "sin-offering" because it is written concerning it, "It is a sin-offering,"

that one slaughtered

outside its enclosure,

outside the place prepared for burning it on the Mount of Olives, opposite the entrance to the Sanctuary, which was made like a hollow and where it was burned, after which its ashes were collected.

And likewise the scapegoat

on Yom Kippur, sent to Azazel,

that one offered outside

the courtyard,

he is exempt

from the punishment of karet in both cases, even if he slaughtered them outside.

As it is stated: "

And to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting they did not bring it."

This implies that liability applies only to the slaughtering of an offering that one is obligated to bring to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting and that is intended for this purpose. But

for anything that is not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, one is not liable.

A red heifer and the scapegoat were not intended to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, since they are performed outside. Therefore, one is not liable for them because of slaughtering offerings outside.

2.

An animal that copulated with a person, an animal with which a person copulated, an animal designated

for use in idolatrous worship,

and an animal worshipped

as an idol,

and an animal exchanged

for a dog,

and an animal given as a prostitute's fee, a hybrid, an animal with a fatal defect, and an animal delivered by caesarean section,

which was not born through the birth canal but by means of an incision in the animal's abdominal wall—all these, if they had already been designated as offerings and it happened

that one offered them outside, he is exempt,

since they are unfit to be offered,

as it is stated: "

They did not bring it to offer an offering

before the Sanctuary of the Lord"

This implies that

for anything that is not fit to be brought before the Sanctuary of the Lord, one is not liable 5 .

3. Offerings that are

animals with defects, whether animals with permanent defects

that can never be healed

or ![](pamud.bmp "

Exact page position")

animals with temporary defects

whose defect will heal after some time,

that one offered outside, he is exempt,

since they are not fit to be offered inside.