Zevachim 108a (קח.) — the Talmud in English

Rava raised a dilemma: If one who offers outside

outside

the head of a turtledove 52 ,

of a bird burnt-offering,

which does not contain an olive-bulk, and salts it

[as this is its mitzva, as it is written: “You shall not omit the salt of the covenant of your God from your meal-offering”]

thereby completing it to an olive-bulk, what is the law?

Rava of Parzekaya said to Rav Ashi:

Is this

not the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish

? Just as they disputed the status of attachments of items offered on the altar, they should likewise dispute this law.

Rav Ashi rejected this argument: These two issues are not dependent on one another. Rather, this question of whether salt completes the measure

is raised with regard to Rabbi Yohanan, and it is raised

also

with regard to Reish Lakish,

as follows:

It is raised with regard to Rabbi Yohanan,

for it is possible that

Rabbi Yohanan stated only there

that a bone joins with meat because attachments of items offered on the altar have the status of items offered on the altar,

but specifically a bone

specifically,

that is of the same type as meat,

and they are considered one entity.

But salt, which is not of the same type as the flesh of a bird, does not

join even according to Rabbi Yohanan.

Or perhaps there is no difference

between a bone and salt, and salt too joins with it because attachments of items offered on the altar have the status of items offered on the altar.

It is raised with regard to Reish Lakish,

for it is possible that

Reish Lakish stated only there

that a bone does not join

because

because

if it separates

from the meat [whether before it was placed on the altar or after it was placed there, as explained above, 86a],

it is not a mitzva to take it up. But here,

with regard to salt,

if it separates from it, it is a mitzva to take it up,

he did not

say that it does not join.

Or perhaps there is no difference,

and in both cases attachments of items offered on the altar do not have the status of items offered on the altar.

And we conclude:

The matter remains unresolved.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says

and so on. The Sages said to him: Even one who slaughters inside and offers outside, once he has taken it outside, has disqualified it.

The Gemara brings a discussion between the tannaim:

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi replied

to the argument of the Sages,

on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

What

is the case of one who slaughters inside and offers outside? It is different, since it had a period of fitness,

as it was fit to be sacrificed inside, and therefore one is liable for offering it outside.

Can you say the same with regard to one who slaughters

outside

and offers outside, which never had a period of fitness

inside at all?

Likewise,

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, replied

to the argument of the Sages,

on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is the case of one who slaughters inside and offers outside? It is different, since the sacred domain accepts it

if he placed it on the altar. Even though he took it outside, if he brought it back inside and placed it on the altar, it need not be removed, as stated above [84a]. Therefore, one is liable for offering it outside.

Can you say the same with regard to one who slaughters outside and offers outside, which the sacred domain does not accept?

If he placed it on the altar, it must be removed, and therefore he is exempt for offering it outside.

The Gemara asks:

What is the difference between them,

between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon?

Ze'iri said: Slaughtering at night is the difference between them.

If one slaughtered an animal inside at night and offered it outside [see above, 84b, at the end of the page], Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi exempts him, because it did not have a period of fitness, since it was disqualified through its slaughter. But according to Rabbi Elazar, he is liable, since the sacred domain accepts it, and its law is that if it was placed on the altar, it need not be removed.

Rabba said: Receiving

the blood

in a non-sacred vessel

which did not sanctify it,

is the difference between them.

If one slaughtered an animal and received its blood in a non-sacred vessel, this is disqualified. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, if he offered it outside he is exempt, because it did not have a period of fitness. But according to Rabbi Elazar, he is liable, since the rule is [above, 84a]: “Anything whose disqualification is within the sacred domain, once it became disqualified after entering the courtyard, is accepted by the sacred domain.”

We learned in the Mishna:

An impure person who ate

sacred food,

whether the sacred food

was impure, and so on. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says, and so on. The Sages said to him: Even an impure person who ate pure sacred food, once he touched it, rendered it impure.

And we raised the following objection:

Did the Sages not argue well with Rabbi Yosei HaGelili?

Rava said: Wherever the person became impure

who ate the food

and afterward the meat became impure,

so that the person’s bodily impurity preceded the impurity of the meat,

everyone agrees that he is liable, since bodily impurity carries karet.

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s reason for exempting him is that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, as will be explained below. Here, the prohibition of bodily impurity came first, and it is obvious that, if he ate unintentionally, he is liable to bring a sin-offering, and if intentionally, to karet, because “his impurity is upon him, and he shall be cut off.”

They disagree

—Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Sages—

when the meat became impure

first, and eating the meat became forbidden to the person because of the impurity of the meat, which does not carry karet and for which there is no sin-offering,

and afterward the person became impure.

The Sages hold that we apply the principle of “since,”

because now, once the person became impure, he is prohibited from eating other pieces of pure sacred food on account of his bodily impurity [which carries karet and a sin-offering], he is also prohibited from eating the piece that became impure before he did. Although generally one prohibition does not take effect upon another, here the prohibition of bodily impurity does take effect, because it is an “inclusive prohibition,” prohibiting him from eating other pieces as well.

Whereas

Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds

that one prohibition does not take effect upon another. Although this is an inclusive prohibition, and through the principle of “since” it takes effect upon the other pieces and should also take effect upon this piece, nevertheless, in his view

we do not apply the principle of “since”

at all, even in the case of an inclusive prohibition.

Therefore, the Sages’ proof from an impure person who ate pure sacred food is irrelevant here, because there the bodily impurity preceded the impurity of the meat.

We challenge Rabbi Yosei HaGelili:

And Rabbi Yosei, even if the principle of “since”

as a means of causing one prohibition to take effect upon another

is not applied,

and even when the second prohibition is inclusive, that is only when both prohibitions are equal, despite the fact that the second is an inclusive prohibition. Here, however, where the two prohibitions are not equal in severity,

let the bodily impurity, which is more severe,

because it carries karet,

take effect

as an inclusive prohibition

upon the impurity of the meat,

which is a less severe prohibition. For it was stated in tractate Hullin [101a] that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili holds that one prohibition takes effect upon another through an inclusive prohibition when it is more severe than the first prohibition.

We reject this:

Rav Ashi said: From where do you know that

eating pure sacrificial meat with

bodily impurity is more severe

because it carries karet?

Perhaps

eating sacrificial meat that has

the impurity of the meat is more severe,

is more severe,

since it cannot be purified in a ritual bath!

Mishna:

There is a stringency with regard to slaughtering

outside

over offering

outside.

And

there is a stringency

with regard to offering

outside

over slaughtering.

The stringency with regard to slaughtering is that one who slaughters

sacred offerings outside

for

the purpose of

ordinary consumption is liable. 58 .

Whereas

one who offers it for ordinary consumption,

intending to serve it in this manner,

is exempt

from liability for offering outside; rather, he is liable as one who performs the service of idolatry.

Regarding bringing up

as opposed to slaughter:

If two people grasped the knife and slaughtered, they are exempt.

As it is stated: “The blood shall be accounted to that man.” And we expound: “One, but not two.”

But with regard to bringing up, if

two

people

grasped a limb

of the animal

and brought it up, they are liable.

As it is stated: “Any man who brings up,” to include two who grasped a limb and brought it up, that they are liable.

And if he

brought it up

unintentionally, and then became aware of it,

and again brought it up,

and then again brought it up from that same animal itself,

he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every bringing up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable only for

a sin-offering

one.

Even though he became aware in the interim, and separate acts of awareness ordinarily create separate liabilities, the verse excluded this case and exempted him, as explained in the Gemara.

And he is not liable

for bringing up outside according to Rabbi Yosei

until

he builds an altar for this purpose and

brings it up to the top of the altar

outside.

Rabbi Shimon says: Even if

he

brought it up onto a rock or onto a stone,

and did not designate them at all as an altar,

he is liable

for bringing up outside.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses:

What is different about one who brings up an offering for a non-sacred purpose

outside

that he is exempt, as it is written: “And he shall not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it”

to the Lord,”

the implication of the verse being that liability applies only when he performs the act for the sake of the Lord; if so,

with regard to slaughter

outside,

is it not also written: “And they have not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it as a sacrifice”

to the Lord”?

Why, then, is one who slaughters outside for a non-sacred purpose liable?

And we answer:

It is different there,

with regard to slaughter,

as the verse says: “Any man

who slaughters,” to include a man who slaughters for the needs of another man.

And we challenge: But

with regard to bringing up, it is also written: “Any man

who brings up,” and let us derive: One who brings up for the sake of another man is liable?!

And we answer:

That verse,

which is stated with regard to bringing up,

is needed to include two who grasped a limb and brought it up, that they are liable.

And we challenge:

If so, here,

with regard to slaughter,

it is also needed

the repetition “Any man”

to include two who grasped the knife and slaughtered,

to say

that they are liable!

Yet we learned in the Mishna that they are exempt.

And we answer:

It is different there,

with regard to slaughter,

as the verse says: “And that man

shall be cut off,”

specifically

one, but not two

who hold the knife and slaughter, for they are exempt.

The Gemara understood that the intent was to exclude by means of “that man,” which is stated with regard to karet for slaughtering outside. Therefore, we challenge:

If so, with regard to bringing up as well, is it not written

“And that man

shall be cut off

from among his people”? Nevertheless, two who performed the act are liable. Why, then, do you not expound: One, but not two? And we answer:

“That man,”

which is stated with regard to bringing up,