Zevachim 108a — the Talmud in English

Rava raised a question: If one who brings up

outside

the head of a dove 52 ,

of a bird burnt-offering,

which does not contain an olive-bulk, and salts it

[for this is its mitzva, as it is written: “You shall not abolish the salt of the covenant of your God from your meal-offering”]

completing it to an olive-bulk, what is the law?

Rava of Parzekaya said to Rav Ashi:

And is it not

the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish?

And just as they disputed concerning attachments of things that are brought up [on the altar], they will also dispute concerning this law.

Rav Ashi rejected this to him: These matters do not depend upon one another. Rather, this question of whether salt completes it

is a question according to Rabbi Yohanan, and it is a question

also

according to Reish Lakish,

as follows:

It is a question according to Rabbi Yohanan,

for it is possible that

Rabbi Yohanan stated there only

that a bone joins with meat because attachments of things brought up [on the altar] are like things brought up,

but a bone

specifically

because it is of the type of meat,

and they are considered one thing.

But salt, which is not of the type of the dove’s substance, does not

join even according to Rabbi Yohanan.

Or perhaps it is no different

whether bone or salt; salt also joins, because attachments of things brought up [on the altar] are like things brought up.

It is a question according to Reish Lakish,

for it is possible that

Reish Lakish stated there only

that a bone does not join

but

because

if it separates

from the meat [whether before it went up or after it went up, as explained above, 86a],

it is not a mitzva to bring it up. But here,

with salt,

if it separates from it, it is a mitzva to bring it up,

he did not

say [that it does not join].

Or perhaps it is no different,

and in both cases attachments of things brought up [on the altar] are not like things brought up.

And we conclude:

teyku.

We learned in the Mishna:

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says

and so on. The Sages said to him: Even one who slaughters inside and brings up outside—once he has taken it out, he has disqualified it.

And the Gemara brings a discussion between the tannaim:

Rabbi [Yehuda HaNasi] replied

to the claim of the Sages,

on behalf of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean:

What

is there concerning one who slaughters inside and brings up outside? For there was a time when it was fit,

for it was fit to be offered inside, and therefore he is liable for bringing it up outside.

Can you say this concerning one who slaughters

outside

and brings up outside, for there was no time when it was fit

at all inside?

And likewise

Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon replied,

to the claim of the Sages,

on behalf of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean: What is there concerning one who slaughters inside and brings up outside? For the sacred [service] accepts it

if he brought it up on the altar; and although he took it out, if he brought it back in and brought it up, it need not come down, as above [84a]. Therefore he is liable for bringing it up outside.

Can you say this concerning one who slaughters outside and brings up outside, for the sacred [service] does not accept it?

And if he brought it up, it must come down; therefore he is exempt for bringing it up outside.

And the Gemara asks:

What is the difference between them,

between Rabbi and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon?

Zeiri said: Slaughter at night is the difference between them.

If one slaughtered an animal inside at night and brought it up outside [see above, 84b, at the end of the page], according to Rabbi he is exempt, because there was no time of fitness, since it became disqualified through its slaughter. But according to Rabbi Elazar he is liable, since the sacred [service] accepts it, and its law is that if it went up on the altar it need not come down.

Rabba said: Receiving

of the blood

in an unconsecrated vessel,

which did not become sanctified,

is the difference between them.

If one slaughtered an animal and received its blood in an unconsecrated vessel, this is disqualified. According to Rabbi, if he brought it up outside he is exempt, because there was no time of fitness. But according to Rabbi Elazar, he is liable, since the rule is [above, 84a]: “Anything whose disqualification is within the sacred [area], which became disqualified after it entered the courtyard, the sacred [service] accepts it.”

We learned in the Mishna:

An impure person who ate

sacred food,

whether the sacred food

was impure, and so on. Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says and so on. The Sages said to him: Even an impure person who ate pure sacred food, once he touched it, he rendered it impure.

And we raised the difficulty: But

the Rabbis have argued well with Rabbi Yosei the Galilean!

Rava said: Wherever the body became impure

of the person eating,

and afterward the meat became impure,

so that the bodily impurity of the person eating preceded the impurity of the meat,

everyone agrees that he is liable, since bodily impurity is [punishable] by karet.

For Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s reason for exempting him is that one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition, as follows; here, the prohibition of bodily impurity comes first, and it is obvious that he is liable for a sin-offering when inadvertent and for karet when intentional, because of [the verse]: “And his impurity is upon him, and he shall be cut off.”

When do they disagree?

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean and the Rabbis,

when the meat became impure

first, and eating the meat became forbidden to the person because of the impurity of the meat, for one is not liable to karet for it and there is no sin-offering for it,

and afterward the body became impure.

For the Rabbis hold: We say “by virtue of”: Since now, when he became impure, the person became forbidden to eat other pieces of pure sacred food, because of the impurity of the body, [which carries karet and a sin-offering], he also became forbidden regarding the piece that became impure before he became impure. Although generally one prohibition does not take effect upon another, here the prohibition of bodily impurity does take effect, because it is an “inclusive prohibition,” which forbids the person also from the other pieces.

But

whereas

Rabbi Yosei the Galilean holds that one prohibition does not take effect upon another. Although it is an inclusive prohibition, and there is here a “by virtue of” by which it takes effect upon the other pieces and should likewise take effect upon this piece, nevertheless, in his view

we do not say “by virtue of”

at all, even in the case of an inclusive prohibition.

Therefore the Rabbis’ proof from an impure person who ate pure sacred food is not relevant here, because there the bodily impurity preceded.

And we challenge Rabbi Yosei the Galilean:

And Rabbi Yosei, granted that “by virtue of”

to make one prohibition take effect upon another

we do not say,

and even though it is inclusive; all this, however, applies when both prohibitions are equal, even though the second prohibition is inclusive. But here, where they are not equal in the severity of the prohibition,

let bodily impurity, which is more severe, come

since it carries karet

and

take effect

as an inclusive prohibition

upon the impurity of the meat,

which is a light prohibition. For they said in tractate Ḥullin [101a] that Rabbi Yosei the Galilean holds that one prohibition takes effect upon another through an inclusive prohibition when it is more severe than the first prohibition.

And we reject this:

Rav Ashi said: From where do you know that

eating pure sacrificial meat under

bodily impurity is more severe

because one is liable for it by karet?

Perhaps eating sacrificial meat that has

the impurity of the meat is more severe,

the more severe impurity of the meat

because

it has no purification in a ritual bath!

Mishna:

There is a stringency in slaughter

outside

over bringing up

outside.

And

there is a stringency

in bringing up

outside

over slaughter.

The stringency in slaughter: For one who slaughters

sacred offerings outside

for

eating by a

layperson is liable 58 .

But

one who brings it up for a layperson,

to serve it for this purpose,

is exempt

from liability for bringing it up outside, but is liable because he serves idolatry .

Regarding bringing up

as opposed to slaughter:

If two people grasped the knife and slaughtered, they are exempt.

As it is stated: “The blood shall be accounted to that man.” And we expound: “One, but not two.”

But with regard to bringing up, if

two

people

grasped a limb

of the animal

and brought it up, they are liable.

As it is stated: “Any man who brings up,” to include two who grasped a limb and brought it up, that they are liable.

And if he

brought it up

unintentionally, and then became aware of it,

and again brought it up,

and then again brought it up from that same animal itself,

he is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every bringing up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon.

Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable only for

a sin-offering

one.

Even though he became aware in the interim, and separate acts of awareness ordinarily create separate liabilities, the verse excluded this case and exempted him, as explained in the Gemara.

And he is not liable

for bringing up outside according to Rabbi Yosei

until

he builds an altar for this purpose and

brings it up to the top of the altar

outside.

Rabbi Shimon says: Even if

he

brought it up onto a rock or onto a stone,

and did not designate them at all as an altar,

he is liable

for bringing up outside.

Gemara:

The Gemara discusses:

What is different about one who brings up an offering for a non-sacred purpose

outside

that he is exempt, as it is written: “And he shall not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it”

для него»

to the Lord,”

the implication of the verse being that liability applies only when he performs the act for the sake of the Lord; if so,

with regard to slaughter

outside,

is it not also written: “And they have not brought it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to offer it as a sacrifice”

для него»

to the Lord”?

Why, then, is one who slaughters outside for a non-sacred purpose liable?

And we answer:

It is different there,

with regard to slaughter,

as the verse says: “Any man

who slaughters,” to include a man who slaughters for the needs of another man.

And we challenge: But

with regard to bringing up, it is also written: “Any man

who brings up,” and let us derive: One who brings up for the sake of another man is liable?!

And we answer:

That verse,

which is stated with regard to bringing up,

is needed to include two who grasped a limb and brought it up, that they are liable.

And we challenge:

If so, here,

with regard to slaughter,

it is also needed

the repetition “Any man”

to include two who grasped the knife and slaughtered,

to say

that they are liable!

Yet we learned in the Mishna that they are exempt.

And we answer:

It is different there,

with regard to slaughter,

as the verse says: “And that man

самый

shall be cut off,”

specifically

one, but not two

who hold the knife and slaughter, for they are exempt.

The Gemara understood that the intent was to exclude by means of “that man,” which is stated with regard to karet for slaughtering outside. Therefore, we challenge:

If so, with regard to bringing up as well, is it not written

“And that man

shall be cut off

from among his people”? Nevertheless, two who performed the act are liable. Why, then, do you not expound: One, but not two? And we answer:

“That man,”

which is stated with regard to bringing up,