Zevachim 108b (קח:) — the Talmud in English

It is needed

to exclude an inadvertent act,

for if he brought it up outside inadvertently, or if he was

coerced

in bringing it up , or if he was

misled

by others, he is not liable. For this is how we expound in the Torat Kohanim: Every instance of the word “that” (hahu) that is stated together with “and shall be cut off” means that he acts with full awareness and intent, and not when he is coerced, inadvertent, or misled .

We nevertheless ask:

If so, here

with regard to slaughtering,

it too is needed

for the word “that”

to exclude one who is coerced, inadvertent, or misled?

And we reject this:

Two instances of “that” are written

with regard to slaughtering. In addition to the “that” stated together with “and shall be cut off,” there is another instance: “Blood shall be accounted to that person; he has shed blood.” From this we learn to exclude two people who slaughter together!

We ask:

And then, “for God,”

which is stated with regard to slaughtering,

why do I need it?

After all, even one who slaughters for the sake of a common person is liable!?

And we answer: “For God” is stated

to exclude

one who slaughters

the goat sent away

to Azazel outside. The meaning is that an animal fit to be offered to God incurs liability when offered outside, whereas one that is not designated for God does not incur liability when offered outside .

We learned in the Mishna:

We learned in the Mishna:

The stringency of bringing it up, etc.

The Sages taught: In the verse stated concerning the prohibition of bringing an offering up outside, we find that the Torah repeated the word “person.” For the verse could have said, “And

a person

who brings it up.” If so,

what does it teach—why did the verse say

“

a person, a person who brings it up”?

To include two people who grasped a limb

of the animal

and brought it up, that they are liable.

The verse needed this inclusion to teach that two people are also liable.

One might have reasoned by a kal va-chomer:

I could have said that they should be exempt:

Just as one who slaughters for the sake of a common person

outside

is liable,

and nevertheless

two people who grasped a knife and slaughtered are exempt,

as we derived above from “that,” so

one who brings up for the sake of a common person

outside,

who is exempt—does it not follow that two people who grasped a limb and brought it up should be exempt?

Therefore,

the verse states, “a person, a person,”

to teach that two people who brought it up are also liable,

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

And the Mishna was taught in accordance with his view.

Rabbi Yosei says: “That,”

which is stated with regard to bringing it up, teaches that only if

one

person brings it up outside is he liable,

but not two. If so, what does the verse teach by saying, “a person, a person”? The Torah spoke in the language of human beings.

That is, people customarily repeat their words, and nothing can be derived from this repetition to include and render two people who brought it up liable.

And Rabbi Shimon: What does he do with “that,”

which is stated with regard to bringing it up?

What use does he make of it?

He needs it to exclude an inadvertent, coerced, or misled person,

as we derived above.

And Rabbi Yosei

excludes them because it would have been possible for the verse to write

“he”

but it wrote

“that,”

to exclude an inadvertent, coerced, or misled person.

And Rabbi Shimon

did not exclude them as Rabbi Yosei did, because

he does not expound the distinction between

“he” and “that.”

We ask:

And Rabbi Yosei: Since this

“a person, a person”

that is stated with regard to bringing it up he does not expound,

because in his view

the Torah spoke in the language of human beings,

then

this “a person, a person”

written with regard to

slaughtering, too,

cannot be used to include anything, since

the Torah spoke in the language of human beings. And then, from where does he derive that one who slaughters for the sake of a common person outside

is liable?

And we answer:

He derives it from what is written concerning slaughtering outside: “

Blood shall be accounted to that person; he has shed blood.”

Its meaning is to render one liable for slaughtering outside

even when he slaughters for a person,

that is, even though in his intention this blood is for the needs of a common person, and is therefore like “blood that has been shed” rather than like a sacrificial offering, he is nevertheless liable for it outside .

We learned in our Mishna:

If he brought it up, and then brought it up again,

he is liable for a sin-offering for each and every act of bringing it up; these are the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable only once.

Reish Lakish said: The dispute

between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosei applies only

when

he brought up outside

four

or

five limbs

of the offering .

For one master,

Rabbi Yosei,

holds that when it is written,

“He shall not bring it”

to make it

we expound:

He is liable for the complete animal

if he brings it up outside,

but he is not liable for an incomplete one—

all

[

of the animal is what the verse refers to.

And he is not liable for one limb.

And the other master,

Rabbi Shimon,

holds that “each limb and limb” is written,

meaning that the limb must be complete and not incomplete.

But when he brings up

one

limb,

and offers it in halves after he has offered the other limbs, or when one limb fell off the fire and he returned it ,

everyone agrees that he is liable only once.

[But it cannot be explained that the case concerns one who offered only a single limb in halves, since even if he offered it complete by itself, Rabbi Yosei exempted him, for according to his view the liability depends on bringing up the entire animal.]

And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The dispute

between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yosei is

with regard to one limb,

for everyone agrees that “it” teaches that liability applies specifically to a complete limb, but it is not necessary for the entire animal to be complete .

For one master,

Rabbi Shimon, who renders him liable,

holds that offerings burned

[slaughtered]

inside that became incomplete and were brought up outside incur liability,

since inside, limbs that fall from the altar are returned to it even though they became incomplete during their burning. As for the verse “it,” which teaches that liability applies specifically to a “complete” limb, he applies it only to offerings burned outside.

And he says,

Rabbi Yosei

holds

that if parts designated for burning inside were lacking and one raised them outside,

he is exempt.

And its source is from “He shall not bring it,” in accordance with Rabbi Yishmael [above, p. 107a] . And although, with regard to parts designated for burning inside, each limb must be intact,

in the case of four or five limbs, everyone agrees that he is liable for each and every limb.

And it disagrees

with the statements of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan concerning the view

of Ulla.

For Ulla said: Everyone agrees that if parts designated for burning inside were lacking and one raised them outside, he is liable. They disagree only with regard to parts designated for burning outside that were lacking and one raised them outside 78 .

One holds that he is exempt,

because outside there is no law of restoring pieces that fall off, as they return, since it is not considered burning.

And one holds that he is liable,

because he expounds “it” as excluding only less than an olive-bulk, which is not complete burning .

But if there was an olive-bulk in the burning, he is liable for it, even though it was not intact. This implies that “it” does not teach that liability applies specifically to an intact limb, and it follows that this is not in accordance with Rabbi Yohanan.

Some say

the opposite:

Ulla said: Everyone agrees that if parts designated for burning outside were lacking and one raised them outside, he is exempt,

because the law of restoring pieces that fall off does not apply to them, and they do not return.

They disagree only with regard to parts designated for burning inside that were lacking and one raised them outside. One holds that he is exempt, and one holds that he is liable.

Ulla’s words imply that “it” does not teach that liability applies only to the burning of the entire animal, and it follows that this is not in accordance with Reish Lakish .

And

it is further found that

Avuh of Shmuel disagrees with Ulla’s first formulation.

For Avuh of Shmuel said: With regard to what did we restore pieces that fall off,

pieces that fall from the altar fire,

for the altar? With what view is that consistent? Not with Rabbi Yosei!

For if Rabbi Yosei held that limbs that fall off inside are considered fit for burning even though they became deficient through falling, he would have held one liable for burning them outside.

Avuh of Shmuel’s words prove that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with regard to parts designated for burning inside that were lacking and one raised them outside. But Ulla’s first formulation holds that, with regard to parts designated for burning inside that fell off and one raised them outside, Rabbi Yosei agrees that he is liable. He disagrees only with regard to parts designated for burning outside that were lacking and one raised them outside .

We learned in the Mishna:

“And he is not liable until he raises it to the top of the altar;

Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he raises it onto a rock, etc.”

Rav Huna said:

What is the reason of Rabbi Yosei,

who holds that liability applies specifically when he raises it onto an altar?

As it is written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord,”

which proves that even on a private bama, which is outside, raising is not considered raising without an altar .

Rabbi Yohanan said: What is the reason of Rabbi Shimon

who holds one liable for raising even when it is not on an altar?

As it is written:

“And Manoah took the kid of the goats and the meal-offering, and raised it upon the rock for the Lord.”

This implies that raising on a rock is considered raising even though he did not build an altar for this purpose.

And we raise an objection:

But the other one also has the verse

“And Noah built an altar for the Lord”;

how, then, did Rabbi Shimon not require an altar? And we answer:

That

altar that Noah made, he did not make it for the obligation of an altar, but for

height alone,

so that it would be elevated and convenient to use .

And we raise an objection:

But the other one also has the verse, “And Manoah took [it],”

so how could Rabbi Yosei say that liability depends on raising it onto an altar, when Manoah burned it on a rock?

And we answer:

It was a temporary instruction

that he should burn it in the field without an altar, and it does not teach the rule for later generations .

Alternatively, this is the reason of Rabbi Shimon, as it is taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Shimon says:

It is stated in the passage concerning slaughtering outside, “And the priest shall throw the blood upon the

altar

of the Lord,

at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”;

this implies that only at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting must one burn specifically upon an

altar. But not

when one burns

on a private bama

during the period when private altars are permitted.

Therefore,

even if one

raises it on a rock or on a stone, he is liable.

We raise an objection: If this is referring to the period when private altars are permitted, why did we learn that one who burns it is

“liable”?

He should rather have said

“he has fulfilled his obligation,”

since he performed a mitzva by burning it.

We explain:

This is what it is saying:

Since, during the period when private altars are permitted, burning on a rock is considered burning,

therefore,

even

during the period when private altars are prohibited,

if he

raises it on a rock or on a stone, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei bar Rabbi Hanina raised a dilemma: The horn,

the altar,

the ramp, the foundation, and the square shape

of the altar, which are indispensable on the altar of the Tabernacle,

what is the law as to whether they are indispensable on a

private bama?

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught

in a beraita:

The horn, the ramp, the square shape, and the foundation are indispensable on a large bama

of the community,

but are not indispensable on a small bama

of an individual .