Zevachim 108b — the Talmud in English

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to exclude an unwitting act,

for if he raised it outside unwittingly, or if he was

coerced

in the raising, or if he was

misled

by others, he is not liable. For thus we expound in the Torat Kohanim: every “that one” that is stated together with “and shall be cut off” means when he is in his state and in possession of his awareness, but not when he is coerced, unwitting, or misled .

And we still ask:

if so, here,

with regard to slaughtering,

also it is needed

for “that one”

to exclude one coerced, unwitting, or misled?

And we reject this:

two “that one” are written

in connection with slaughtering. For in addition to “that one” stated together with “and shall be cut off,” there is also the statement, “blood shall be accounted to that man; he has shed blood,” and from it we learn to exclude two who slaughter.

And we ask:

but “for the Name,”

which is stated in connection with slaughtering,

why do I need it?

Surely even one who slaughters for the sake of an ordinary person is liable!?

And we answer: “for the Name” is stated

to exclude

one who slaughters

the goat sent away

to Azazel outside. For its meaning is: that which is fit to be offered for the Name, one is liable for it outside; but that which is not designated for the Name, one is not liable for it outside .

We learned in the Mishna:

“The stringency of raising,” and so forth.

The Sages taught:

In the verse stated concerning the prohibition of raising, we find that Scripture repeated the word “man.” For Scripture could have said, “and

a man

who raises,” and if so,

what does it teach?

Why did Scripture say,

“a man, a man who raises”?

To include two who took hold of a limb of

the animal

and raised it, who are liable.

And Scripture needed this inclusion to teach that two are also liable,

for one might reason: is this not a logical inference,

I could say by a kal va-chomer that they are exempt:

Just as one who slaughters for an ordinary person

outside

is liable,

and nevertheless

two who took hold of the knife and slaughtered are exempt,

as we expounded above from “that one,” so

one who raises for an ordinary person

outside,

who is exempt—is it not a logical inference that two who took hold of a limb and raised it are exempt?

Therefore

the Torah teaches, “a man, a man,”

to teach that two who raised it are also liable,

the words of Rabbi Shimon.

And the Mishna was taught in accordance with his view.

Rabbi Yose says: “that one,”

which is stated concerning raising, teaches that only if

one

person raised it outside is he liable,

and not two. If so, what does “a man, a man” teach? The Torah spoke in the language of human beings.

For it is their way to repeat their words, and one cannot expound from this to include and make two who raised it liable.

And Rabbi Shimon: “that one,”

which is stated concerning raising,

what does he do with it?

He needs it to exclude an unwitting, coerced, or misled person,

as we expounded above.

And Rabbi Yose

excludes them because it would have been possible to write

“he”

but it wrote

“that one,”

to exclude an unwitting, coerced, or misled person.

And Rabbi Shimon,

did not exclude them like Rabbi Yose, because he

does not expound

И всё же возражают:

the distinction between

“he” and

если так, здесь,

“that one.”

And we ask:

And Rabbi Yose, since this “a man, a man”

which is stated concerning raising he does not expound, because in his view

the Torah spoke in the language of human beings,

then

this “a man, a man” which

is written concerning

slaughtering also

cannot be used for inclusion, since

the Torah spoke in the language of human beings. But then, from where does he derive that one who slaughters for an ordinary person

outside

is liable?

And we answer: he derives it from

“blood shall be accounted to that man; he has shed blood,”

which is written concerning slaughtering outside, and its meaning is to make one liable for slaughtering outside

even when he slaughters for a person,

that is, even though in his thought this blood is for the needs of an ordinary person, and it is like “blood that has been shed” and not like a sacrifice, nevertheless he is liable for it outside .

We learned in our Mishna:

“He raised it, and again raised it,”

he is liable for a sin-offering for each raising and raising, the words of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yose says: he is liable only once.

Reish Lakish said: The dispute

between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yose is only

in

a case in which he raised outside

four

or

five limbs

of the sacrifice .

For he says,

Rabbi Yose,

holds: when it is written

“he shall not bring it

to make it”

we expound:

he is liable for the whole,

if he raises it outside,

but he is not liable for the deficient—

в отношении заклания,

all

for raising the entire

animal is what is written.

And he is not liable for one limb.

And the other one,

Rabbi Shimon,

holds: “each limb and limb” is written,

so that the limb must be complete and not deficient.

But

when he raises

one limb,

and offers it in halves after he has offered the other limbs, or when one limb sprang off the fire and he returned it,

everyone agrees that he is liable only once.

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[But it cannot be explained that the case is one in which he offered only one limb in halves, for even if he offered it complete by itself, Rabbi Yose exempted him, since according to his view the liability depends on raising the entire animal.]

And Rabbi Yohanan said: The dispute

between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yose is

with one limb,

for everyone agrees that “it” teaches that the liability applies specifically to a complete limb, but it is not necessary that the entire animal be complete .

For he says,

Rabbi Shimon, who makes one liable,

holds that offerings burned

of those slaughtered

inside that became deficient and were raised outside—he is liable,

since inside one returns limbs that spring away to the altar, even though they became deficient during their burning. And the verse “it,” which teaches that the liability applies specifically to a “complete” limb, is applied only to offerings burned outside.

And he says,

Rabbi Yosei

held that

the parts intended for burning inside that became deficient and were offered up outside

is exempt.

And its source is from “He shall not bring it,” like Rabbi Yishmael [above 107a]. And although, with regard to parts intended for burning inside, each limb must be complete,

but with regard to four or five limbs, everyone agrees that he is liable for each and every limb.

And it disagrees,

the words of Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan, with

Ulla’s position.

For Ulla said: Everyone agrees, with regard to parts intended for burning inside that became deficient and were offered up outside, that he is liable. They disagreed only with regard to parts intended for burning outside that became deficient and were offered up outside 78 .

One master holds that he is exempt,

because outside there is no rule of “pieces that fall away” being returned, since it is not considered burning.

And one master holds that he is liable,

because he expounded “it” as excluding only less than an olive-bulk, which is not complete burning.

But if there was an olive-bulk in the burning, he is liable for it, even though it is not complete. And it implies that “it” does not teach that the liability applies specifically to a complete limb, and it therefore emerges contrary to Rabbi Yohanan’s words.

Some say

the opposite:

Ulla said: Everyone agrees, with regard to parts intended for burning outside that became deficient and were offered up outside, that he is exempt,

because the rule of pieces that fall away does not apply to them, and they do not return.

They disagreed only with regard to parts intended for burning inside that became deficient and were offered up outside. One master holds that he is exempt, and one master holds that he is liable.

And Ulla’s words imply that “it” does not teach that liability applies only to the burning of the entire animal, and it therefore emerges contrary to Reish Lakish’s view.

And

it further emerges that

they disagree with Samuel’s father, according to Ulla’s first wording.

For Samuel’s father said: In accordance with whom do we restore pieces that fell away

that fell away from the altar fire

with regard to the altar? In accordance with whom? Not Rabbi Yosei!

For if Rabbi Yosei held that limbs that fall away inside are considered fit for burning, even though they became deficient through falling away, he would have held one liable for burning them outside.

And Samuel’s father’s words prove that Rabbi Yosei disagrees with regard to parts intended for burning inside that became deficient and were offered up outside. But Ulla’s first wording holds that, with regard to parts intended for burning inside that fell away and he offered them up outside, Rabbi Yosei agrees that he is liable; and he disagrees only with regard to parts intended for burning outside that became deficient and he offered them up outside.

We learned in the Mishna:

And he is not liable until he offers it up to the top of the altar,

Rabbi Shimon says: even if he offered it up on the rock, and so forth:

Rav Huna said:

What is Rabbi Yosei’s reason

that liability applies specifically when he offers it up on an altar?

For it is written: “And Noah built an altar to the Lord,”

and it proves that even on a private bama, which is outside, offering it up is not considered offering it up without an altar.

Rabbi Yohanan said: What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason

that he holds one liable for offering up even though it is not on an altar?

For it is written, “

And Manoah took the kid of the goats and the meal-offering, and offered it up on the rock to the Lord.”

And it implies that offering it up on a rock is considered offering it up, even though he did not build an altar for this purpose.

And we raise an objection:

But the other one also has, “And Noah built an altar to the Lord.”

“And he built an altar to the Lord,”

and how did Rabbi Shimon not require an altar? And we answer:

That

altar that Noah made, he did not make it for the requirement of an altar, but for

height alone,

so that it would be high and convenient to use.

And we raise an objection:

But the other one also has, “And Manoah took,”

and how did Rabbi Yosei say that liability depends on offering it up on an altar, when Manoah burned on a rock?

And we answer:

It was an instruction for that particular time

that he should burn in the field without an altar, and it does not teach for the generations.

And if you wish, say: This is Rabbi Shimon’s reason, as it is taught

in a beraita:

Rabbi Shimon says:

It is stated in the passage concerning slaughtering outside, “And the koen shall cast the blood on the

altar

of the Lord

at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”

and it implies that only at the entrance of the Tent of Meeting does one need to burn specifically on an

altar. But not

when they burn

on a private bama

during the time when private altars are permitted.

Therefore,

even if

he offered it up on the rock or on the stone, he is liable.

And we raise an objection: If this refers to the time when private altars are permitted, why did we learn that the one who burns

is liable?

But

“he has fulfilled his obligation” should have been required,

for he performed a mitzva by his burning.

And we explain:

This is what it says:

Since, during the time when private altars are permitted, burning on a rock is considered burning,

therefore,

also

during the time when private altars are prohibited,

if

he offered it up on the rock or on the stone, he is liable. Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Hanina asked: The horn

of the altar,

the ramp, the foundation, and the square form

of the altar, which impede [the offering] on the altar of the Tabernacle,

what is the law: do they impede on a private bama

of an individual?

Rabbi Yirmeya said to him: It is taught

in a beraita:

The horn, the ramp, the square form, and the foundation impede on a large bama

of the public,

but they do not impede on a small bama

of an individual.