Zevachim 107b (קז:) — the Talmud in English

And if you will reason and say that kemitza and receiving the blood

should be derived from a combination of the two

—from slaughter and sprinkling, by a bama he-tzad derivation: If you challenge this derivation by asking, “What is true of slaughter? It disqualifies an offering through the thought that it is not for those who may eat it, in the case of the Paschal offering,” sprinkling proves otherwise, as the thought that it is not for those who may eat it does not disqualify it. And if you challenge it by asking, “What is true of sprinkling? A zar who performs it is liable to death,” slaughter proves otherwise, as a zar is qualified to perform it. The common denominator of the two is that they are avoda, and one who performs them outside is liable. I, too, will include kemitza and receiving the blood, which are avoda, and one who performs them outside will be liable.

There is still room to refute this, because

if so

—if it is possible to derive by a bama he-tzad from both of them that one is liable outside for acts not explicitly mentioned in the passage—it will again be difficult:

It should not have stated

the prohibition

with regard to sprinkling,

and there would be no need for the derivations mentioned above to include one who sprinkles the blood outside [“blood shall be reckoned” according to Rabbi Yishmael, or “or sacrifice” according to Rabbi Akiva], since

it should be derived from a combination of the two

from slaughter and burning .

Rather,

necessarily,

this is why the verse was written, and it was not derived from a combination of the two: to say that although it could be derived from a combination of the two,

even so,

it should not be derived from a combination of the two!

The same applies with regard to kemitza and receiving the blood outside: “It should be derived from a combination of the two” is not stated .

Rabbi Abbahu said: If one slaughtered and sprinkled

outside,

according to Rabbi Yishmael,

who derived liability for sprinkling from “blood shall be reckoned,” which is stated with regard to slaughter,

he is liable only once,

because only one karet and one prohibition are stated with regard to them. But

according to Rabbi Akiva,

who derived it from “or sacrifice,” which is stated with regard to burning,

he is liable twice,

for they are distinct designations and are derived from two different matters .

Abaye said: Even according to Rabbi Akiva, he is liable only once, for the verse states: “There you shall offer

your burnt offerings,

and there you shall perform everything that I command you.” The verse

which mentioned burning alone, while including the other avoda together,

made them one act.

That is, it teaches that one is liable separately for burning, and separately for all the other avoda; therefore one is liable only once for slaughter and sprinkling.

And if one

sprinkled and burned

outside,

according to

the view of

Rabbi Yishmael, he is liable twice,

because they have distinct designations, as the source for liability for sprinkling is not stated with regard to burning, but with regard to slaughter. But

according to

the view of

Rabbi Akiva, he is liable only once,

because the source for liability for sprinkling is “or sacrifice,” which is stated with regard to burning .

Abaye said: Even according to

the view of

Rabbi Akiva, he is liable twice,

for

this is why the verse divided them

and did not write burning together with the other avoda, but was precise and wrote

“There you shall offer, and there you shall perform,”

to teach that one is liable for it separately, and for the other avoda separately .

If one slaughtered, sprinkled, and burned

outside,

according to everyone he is liable twice,

because whichever way one looks at it, slaughter and sprinkling were derived from separate verses. Rabbi Yishmael holds that one is liable once for burning, which is stated explicitly, and once for slaughter and sprinkling, both of which were derived together from another verse. Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, holds that one is liable once for slaughter, and once for burning and sprinkling. Abaye does not disagree with Rabbi Abbahu in this case, for Abaye too agrees that according to everyone he is liable twice: once for burning and once for the other acts.

The Sages taught:

It is stated: “Any man of the House of Israel who slaughters an ox, a sheep, or a goat

in the camp.” One might have thought that if one slaughters a burnt offering in the south

[which is not the place for slaughtering offerings of the highest sanctity, as they are slaughtered only in the north],

he would be liable

to karet, as in the case of offerings slaughtered outside .

The verse therefore states: “

or who slaughters

outside the camp.”

But

if only the phrase

“outside the camp”

had

been stated,

one might have thought

that he is liable only when he slaughters specifically

outside

the

camp of the Levites,

which is merely outside the wall of the Temple courtyard. How do we know that one who slaughters

in the camp

is also liable, and not only outside the three camps? This is derived from the phrase “in the camp,” and not outside it.

If the verse states “in the camp,” one might have thought that if one slaughters a burnt offering in the south

—having changed the place of its slaughter within the camp of the Divine Presence—

he would be liable?

The verse therefore states: “or who slaughters outside the camp.” Just as outside the camp

is

distinctive

in that

no sacrifice whatsoever is fit to be slaughtered there, so too

one who slaughters in the wrong place but

in the camp

is liable only in a place

where no sacrifice whatsoever is fit to be slaughtered.

The south is excluded, for although it is not fit for the slaughter of offerings of the highest sanctity,

nevertheless

it is fit

for

the slaughter of offerings of lesser sanctity,

whose slaughter may take place anywhere in the Temple courtyard.

Ulla said:

Since liability is because outside the camp is not fit for the slaughter of any sacrifice,

one who slaughters on the roof of the Sanctuary is liable, since it is not fit

for

the slaughter of any sacrifice

at all.

Rava raised an objection

to Ulla:

If so, let the verse write “in the camp” and “to outside the camp,”

and we would derive “outside,” to exclude one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south, who is not liable for slaughtering outside; and “in the camp” would teach that liability does not depend on being outside the three camps, but that one is liable even outside the camp of the Levites.

to exclude one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south, who is not liable for slaughtering outside; and “in the camp” would teach that liability does not depend on being outside all three camps, but that one is liable even outside the Levite camp.

And there would be no need for “and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,”

and according to your words,

“and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

he did not bring it,”

why do I need it?

Rather,

it must have been written to exclude the roof

of the Sanctuary. Its meaning is as follows: One who did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is liable; this one is excluded, because he brought it to the Temple courtyard and is not liable, even though the roof of the Sanctuary is not fit for the slaughter of any sacrifice .

And we challenge this:

And according to Rava,

who exempts one who slaughters on the roof of the Sanctuary because he maintains that “to the entrance” includes the interior space of the Temple courtyard,

if so, let

the

verse write “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”

to exclude one who slaughters on the roof and one who slaughters in the south, since they have come “to the entrance”; it follows that one who slaughters in the camp of the Levites is liable, since he did not bring it to the entrance. If so, it is difficult: the phrases

“outside the camp” and “in the camp,”

which the Merciful One wrote,

why do I need them?

Is it not

to include the roof [and the reason both “in the camp” and “outside the camp” were written is so that we should not derive from “in the camp” that one is liable even for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south. Therefore “outside the camp” is stated, teaching that he is liable only in a place unfit for the slaughter of any sacrifice; the same applies to the roof of the Sanctuary, which is unfit. And from “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” we derive that one is liable outside for anything fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting. The red heifer and offerings for the maintenance of the Temple are excluded, as one is not liable for them, because they are not fit to be brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, as will be stated below].

And the reason that both “in the camp” and “outside the camp” were written is so that we should not include from “in the camp” liability also for one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south. Therefore “outside the camp” was stated, meaning that one is liable only in a place that is not fit for the slaughtering of any sacrifice; and the same applies to the roof of the Sanctuary, which is not fit. And from “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” we expound that one is liable outside for everything fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting; the red cow and offerings for the repair of the Temple are excluded, for one is not liable for them, since they are not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, as below].

And we answer:

Rav Mari said: It was not

stated that “in the camp” makes one liable for slaughtering on the roof of the Sanctuary, because he does not violate “and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it,” since he did bring it there. Rather, it was stated

to include

a sacrificial animal that was

entirely inside, while its neck

was

outside.

This teaches that he is liable for it, because it is not considered to have been brought to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.

And “outside” reveals that we do not derive from “in the camp” that one is liable for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south, nor do we interpret “he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” as referring to one who did not bring it in the manner appropriate for bringing offerings of the highest sanctity, whose slaughter is in the north. For “outside the camp” is stated, and he is liable only on account of “slaughtering outside,” which applies only in a place unfit for any sacrifice; this one is excluded, since it is fit for offerings of lesser sanctity.

It follows that “to the entrance” excludes and exempts one who slaughters on the roof of the Sanctuary. For if one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south is exempt, it necessarily follows that “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” does not mean that one is liable when he did not bring it in the manner appropriate to its offering; rather, the essential requirement is that the entire animal be within the interior space of the Temple courtyard.

And we challenge this: How is it possible that the verse comes to teach that one is liable when

its neck is outside?

Surely in such a case it is obvious that he is liable, because

why would the Merciful One take issue? With the slaughter; and this slaughter

is

outside.

Since he did not bring its neck to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, we derive from “to the entrance” that he is liable for it .

Rather,

it is necessarily the case that the additional phrases “and outside the camp” and “in the camp” are needed to teach the reverse case, and they come

to include

that one is liable when the animal is

entirely outside and its neck is inside.

The verse thus teaches us that although its neck is inside, so that the slaughter is performed inside, he is nevertheless liable until the entire animal is inside.

It was stated: One who offers an offering outside nowadays,

when the Temple is destroyed,

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable

for offering outside.

Reish Lakish says: He is exempt.

Rabbi Yoḥanan says: He is liable,

because in his view

the first sanctification

performed by Joshua son of Nun

sanctified it for its time, and sanctified it

also

for the future,

for all generations. Accordingly, the sanctity of Jerusalem still rests upon it, and the period during which private altars are prohibited continues forever.

Reish Lakish says: He is exempt,

because in his view

the first sanctification sanctified it

only

for its time, and did not sanctify it for the future.

After the destruction, there is no prohibition against offering outside on private altars .

And the Gemara raises a question:

Shall we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish disagree in the same dispute as Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua

?

As we learned

in tractate Eduyot:

Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that when they were building the Sanctuary,

when they came up from Babylonia in the days of Ezra,

they would make curtains in the Sanctuary

and curtains in the Temple courtyards,

to serve as partitions.

Rather,

those

in the Sanctuary they would build

while the builders were standing

outside,

outside the curtains, so that their eyes would not feast upon the sacred objects .

But in the courtyards, they would build from inside.

Rabbi Yehoshua said: I heard that they would offer

offerings

even though there was no building, and they would eat sacrificial meat of the most sacred order,

such as burnt-offerings and sin-offerings,

even though there were no curtains.

And they would likewise eat

offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe even though there was no wall. Because the first sanctification sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future.

This concludes the Mishna .

The Gemara infers: What does

“is it not, by inference”

teach? From Rabbi Yehoshua’s reasoning, you learn

that Rabbi Eliezer holds

that the first sanctification

did not sanctify it for the future,

and therefore, according to him, they made curtains in place of a wall and then sanctified the site anew through a king, a prophet, the Urim and Thummim, and a Sanhedrin of seventy-one, as explained in tractate Shevuot [16a].

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where

do you know that they disagree over whether the first sanctification sanctified it for the future?

Perhaps everyone

holds that

the first sanctification sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future.

And this master,

Rabbi Eliezer,

stated what he heard

from his teachers

[and did not intend to rule on the matter].

And this master,

Rabbi Yehoshua,

stated what he heard

from his teachers

[and did not intend to rule on the matter],

and they did not disagree with regard to this law.

And if you would say

that it was sanctified for the future,

why do I need curtains according to Rabbi Eliezer?

The site is sacred and need not be sanctified again. It may be answered that

they made them merely for modesty

.

It was stated: One who offers

outside

a limb that does not contain an olive-bulk

of flesh,

but a bone completes it to an olive-bulk: Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable; Reish Lakish says he is exempt 49.

Rabbi Yohanan said: he is liable,

because the bone is attached to the flesh, for in his view

, the attachments

of the things

that ascend

to the altar,

are considered as though they ascend

themselves

; consequently, the bone joins the flesh to complete the requisite measure, making him liable, even though, when detached, a bone by itself is not subject to the mitzva of being brought up to the altar .

and therefore the bone joins with the flesh to complete the required measure and make him liable, even though, if the bone became detached, there would be no mitzva to bring the bone alone up to the altar.

Reish Lakish said: he is exempt,

because he held that

attachments of things ascending are not considered as though they ascend,

and here, the flesh does not have the requisite measure to make him liable for bringing it up outside .