Zevachim 107b — the Talmud in English

And if you will reason and say that kemitza and receiving

should come from between them,

from slaughtering and sprinkling, by a bama-side argument: if you refute, What is so about slaughtering? That it disqualifies through the thought of “not for those who will eat it” with regard to the Passover offering; sprinkling proves that it does not disqualify through “not for those who will eat.” And if you refute, What is so about sprinkling? That a non-priest is liable to death for it; slaughtering proves that a non-priest is valid for it. The common aspect of them is that they are an avoda, and one is liable for them outside. I, too, will bring kemitza and receiving, which are an avoda, and one will be liable for them outside.

There is still room to reject this, because

if so,

that it is possible to learn by a bama-side argument from both of them to make one liable outside for avodot that are not explicit in the passage, it will again be difficult:

he should not state

a prohibition

with regard to sprinkling,

and there is no need for the teachings that we found above to include one who sprinkles blood outside [“it shall be accounted blood” according to Rabbi Ishmael, or “or a sacrifice” according to Rabbi Akiva], for

it should come from between them

from slaughtering and burning upon the altar.

Rather,

necessarily,

for this reason the verse was written, and it does not come from between them, to say: even though it does come from between them,

nevertheless

it should not come from between them!

And the same applies also with regard to kemitza and receiving outside: “it should come from between them.”

Rabbi Abahu said: If one slaughtered and sprinkled

outside,

according to Rabbi Ishmael,

who learned liability for sprinkling from “it shall be accounted blood,” which was stated with regard to slaughtering,

he is liable only once,

because only one punishment of excision and one prohibition were stated concerning them. But

according to Rabbi Akiva,

who learned from “or a sacrifice,” which was stated with regard to burning upon the altar,

he is liable twice,

for they are distinct names, and they are learned from two matters.

Abaye said: Even according to Rabbi Akiva’s statement, he is liable only once, for the verse says, “There you shall bring up

your burnt offerings,

and there you shall perform everything that I command you.” The verse

which mentioned burning upon the altar alone, whereas it included the other avodot together,

made them one act.

And it comes to say that one is liable for burning upon the altar by itself, and for all the other avodot by themselves; therefore he is liable only once for slaughtering and sprinkling.

And if

he sprinkled and burned upon the altar

outside,

according to

the statement of

Rabbi Ishmael he is liable twice,

because they are distinct names, for the source for liability for sprinkling was not stated with regard to burning upon the altar, but with regard to slaughtering. But

according to

the statement of

Rabbi Akiva he is liable only once,

because the source for liability for sprinkling is “or a sacrifice,” which was stated with regard to burning upon the altar.

Abaye said: Even according to

the statement of

Rabbi Akiva he is liable twice,

for

for this reason the verse divided them

and did not write burning upon the altar together with the other avodot, but was precise and wrote

“There you shall bring up, and there you shall perform,”

to teach that one is liable for it by itself, and for the other avodot by themselves.

If he slaughtered, sprinkled, and burned upon the altar

outside,

according to everyone he is liable twice,

because whichever way one considers it, slaughtering and sprinkling were learned from separate verses. For Rabbi Ishmael makes one liable once for burning upon the altar, which was stated explicitly, and once for slaughtering and sprinkling, both of which were learned together from another verse. Whereas Rabbi Akiva makes one liable once for slaughtering, and likewise once for burning upon the altar and sprinkling. And in this Abaye did not disagree with Rabbi Abahu, for Abaye also concedes that according to everyone he is liable twice: once for burning upon the altar and once for the other acts.

The Sages taught:

“Any man, any man of the House of Israel, who slaughters an ox or a sheep or a goat

in the camp.” It might be that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south

[which is not the place for slaughtering most-sacred offerings, whose slaughtering is only in the north]

will be liable

for excision, as is the law concerning offerings slaughtered outside?

The verse says: “

or who slaughters

outside the camp.”

If,

if only the words

“outside the camp” had been stated,

it might be

that one is liable only when he slaughters specifically

outside the three camps,

because it is learned by a gezerah shavah from “outside the camp” written with regard to the bulls that are burned, as we expound in Sanhedrin [42b], that it means specifically outside the three camps. If so,

from where do we know that even

one who slaughters

in the Levite camp,

which is only outside the wall of the courtyard, is liable?

The verse says, “in the camp,”

and not outside it.

If “in the camp,” it might be that one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south

—that he changed the place of its slaughtering within the camp of the Divine Presence—

will be liable?

The verse says, “or who slaughters outside the camp.” Just as outside the camp

is

distinctive

in this respect,

that it is not fit for the slaughtering of any sacrifice, so too

one who slaughters in its improper place, but slaughters

in the camp,

will not be liable except in a place

that is not fit for the slaughtering of any sacrifice.

The south is excluded, for although it is not fit for the slaughtering of most-sacred offerings,

nevertheless

it is fit

for

the slaughtering of lesser-sacred offerings,

whose slaughtering is anywhere in the courtyard.

Ulla said:

Since the liability is because outside the camp is not fit for the slaughtering of any sacrifice, therefore even

one who slaughters on the roof of the Sanctuary is liable, since it is not fit

for this place

to be used for the slaughtering of any sacrifice

at all.

Rava challenged Ulla

as follows:

If so, let the verse write “in the camp” and “to outside the camp,”

and let us expound:

“outside,” to exclude one who slaughtered a burnt offering in the south, who is not liable on account of an offering slaughtered outside; and “in the camp” comes to explain that liability is not dependent on being outside the three camps, but even one outside the Levite camp is liable,

and “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” would not be needed,

and according to your words the verse

“and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting

he did not bring it”

why do I need it?

Rather,

no, it was written to exclude the roof

of the Sanctuary. For this is its meaning: one who did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting is liable; this one is excluded, for he brought it to the courtyard, and is not liable, even though the roof of the Sanctuary is not fit for the slaughtering of any sacrifice.

And we raise a difficulty:

and according to Rava,

who exempted one who slaughters on the roof of the Sanctuary because he holds that “to the entrance” includes the interior space of the courtyard,

if so, let

the verse write

“to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”

to exclude one who slaughters on the roof and to exclude one who slaughters in the south, for they came “to the entrance”; it follows by itself that one who slaughters in the Levite camp is liable, since he did not bring it to the entrance. If so, it is difficult:

“outside the camp” and “in the camp,”

which the Merciful One wrote,

why do I need them?

Is it

not to include the roof [

And the reason that both “in the camp” and “outside the camp” were written is so that we should not include from “in the camp” liability also for one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south. Therefore “outside the camp” was stated, meaning that one is liable only in a place that is not fit for the slaughtering of any sacrifice; and the same applies to the roof of the Sanctuary, which is not fit. And from “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” we expound that one is liable outside for everything fit for the entrance of the Tent of Meeting; the red cow and offerings for the repair of the Temple are excluded, for one is not liable for them, since they are not fit to come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, as below].

And we answer:

Rav Mari said: No,

“in the camp” was not stated to make one who slaughters on the roof of the Sanctuary liable, because he does not transgress “and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it,” for he did bring it. Rather,

to include

a sacrificial animal that was

entirely inside, while its neck

was

outside.

And it teaches that one is liable for it, because it is not considered as having come to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting.

And “outside” reveals that we do not learn from “in the camp” to make one liable for slaughtering a burnt offering in the south, nor do we explain that “and to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he did not bring it” refers to one who did not bring it in the manner of bringing most-sacred offerings, whose slaughtering is in the north, for “outside the camp” was stated, and one is liable only on account of “slaughtering outside,” which applies only in a place that is not fit for any sacrifice; this one is excluded, since it is fit for lesser-sacred offerings.

It follows that “to the entrance” excludes and exempts one who slaughters on the roof of the Sanctuary, for if one who slaughters a burnt offering in the south is exempt, necessarily the intention of “to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting” is not to make one liable when he did not bring it in the manner in which it is brought; rather, the essential requirement is that it be entirely within the interior space of the courtyard.

And we raise a difficulty: how is it possible that the verse comes to teach that one is liable when

its neck is outside?

For in this situation it is obvious that he is liable, because

why does the Merciful One insist? On slaughtering—and this slaughtering

is

outside.

For since he did not bring its neck to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, it is learned from “to the entrance” that he is liable for it.

Rather,

necessarily, the additional wording “and outside the camp” and “in the camp” is needed to teach the reverse case, and it comes

to include

that he is liable in a case where the animal is

entirely outside and its neck is inside.

And the verse teaches us that even though its neck is inside, so that the slaughter is found to be performed inside, nevertheless he is liable, until it is entirely inside.

It was stated: One who offers up in the present time,

when the Temple is destroyed, outside,

Rabbi Yohanan says: He is liable 43 ,

because of offering up outside.

Resh Lakish says: He is exempt.

Rabbi Yohanan says: He is liable,

for in his view

the first sanctity

that Joshua son of Nun sanctified

sanctified it for its time, and sanctified it

also

for the future 44 ,

for all generations. And if so, it follows that the sanctity of Jerusalem still rests upon it, and the time of the prohibition of private altars continues forever.

Resh Lakish says: He is exempt,

for in his view

the first sanctity sanctified

only

for its time, and did not sanctify it for the future.

And after the destruction there is no prohibition of offering up outside on private altars .

And we raise an objection to this:

Let us say that Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish disagree in the dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Joshua

Rabbi Yohanan and Resh Lakish.

For we learned

in tractate Eduyot:

Rabbi Eliezer said: I heard that, when they were building the Sanctuary,

when they came up from Babylonia in the days of Ezra,

they made curtains in the Sanctuary

and curtains in the courtyards,

so that they would serve as a partition.

Rather,

those

in the Sanctuary, they built

the builders while they were standing

outside,

outside the curtains, so that their eyes would not feast upon the sacred .

And in the courtyards, they built from inside.

Rabbi Joshua said: I heard that they would offer

offerings

even though there is no House, and eat offerings of the highest degree of sanctity,

such as a burnt-offering and a sin-offering,

even though there are no curtains.

And likewise they eat

offerings of lesser sanctity and second tithe, even though there is no wall. Because the first sanctity sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future.

This is the conclusion of the Mishna .

And the Gemara infers: What is the meaning of

“Is it not, by implication”

that you learn the reason of Rabbi Joshua?

that Rabbi Eliezer holds

that the first sanctity

did not sanctify it for the future,

and therefore, according to him, they made curtains in place of a wall, and again sanctified it through a king, a prophet, the Urim and Tummim, and a Sanhedrin of seventy-one, as explained in tractate Shevuot [16a].

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: From where

do we know that they disagreed over whether the first sanctity sanctified it for the future or not?

Perhaps everyone

holds that

the first sanctity sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future.

And this one,

Rabbi Eliezer,

what he heard

from his teachers

he said.

And this one,

Rabbi Joshua,

what he heard

from his teachers

he said,

and they did not disagree with one another concerning this law.

And if you would say,

if it was sanctified for the future,

why do I need curtains according to Rabbi Eliezer?

But the place is holy and there is no need to sanctify it again. One may say that

for modesty alone

they made them.

It was stated: One who offers up

outside

a limb in which there is not an olive-bulk

of flesh,

and the bone completes it to an olive-bulk. Rabbi Yohanan says: He is liable. Resh Lakish says: He is exempt 49 .

Rabbi Yohanan said: He is liable,

because the bone is attached to the flesh, for in his view

, the attachments of

the things

offered

on the altar,

are deemed like the offerings

themselves

;

and therefore the bone joins with the flesh to complete it to the measure sufficient to incur liability, even though for a bone alone there is no mitzva to bring it up onto the altar if it became detached.

Reish Lakish said: He is exempt,

because he held that

the attachments of offerings are not deemed like offerings,

and here, after all, there is no sufficient measure in the flesh to make him liable for bringing it up outside.