Zevachim 107a — the Talmud in English

Rava said:

the warning concerning slaughtering outside is learned by a hekesh,

in accordance with Rabbi Yona.

For Rabbi Yona said:

It is stated: “There you shall bring up your burnt offerings, and there you shall perform

‘there’

which is stated with regard to the performances of the offering, from

“there”

which is stated with regard to bringing up, by a hekesh.

Just as there,

with regard to bringing up,

he is not punished unless he has first been warned, so here,

with regard to slaughtering,

he is not punished unless he has first been warned.

And we raise an objection to this:

We find [the source concerning] offerings designated for burning inside,

which were slaughtered inside, so that he was required to bring them up according to their law inside,

and he brought them up outside,

and therefore he is liable for bringing them up.

[But with regard to] offerings designated for burning outside, which

he slaughtered outside, and they had already become disqualified through their slaughter, and afterward

he brought them up outside, from where do we know

that he is liable?

Rav Kahana said: The verse says, “And to them you shall say:

‘Any man who brings up a burnt offering or a sacrifice.’” And we read [the word] “and upon them,” whose meaning is

upon the first ones,

concerning which he was warned previously, namely, concerning those slaughtered outside, which were stated in the earlier passage,

you shall say,

that if he brings them up outside, he is liable.

Rabba raises an objection to this: Is it written, “and upon them you shall say”!?

But

“and to them” is written,

and if so,

read it as “and to them”!

Rather,

from the vav, which adds to the first matter, it is learned that one is liable for bringing up outside those slaughtered outside, just as those slaughtered inside,

as taught by Rabbi Yishmael.

For Rabbi Yishmael taught:

The verse said

“And to them you shall say,”

and it could have said “to them,” without a vav. Rather,

to join the passages

it was written, to join and equate the first passage concerning those slaughtered outside with the final passage concerning bringing up outside, for which one is liable when he brings them up.

But

Rabbi Yohanan said: It is derived

by a gezera shava,

“bringing” and “bringing.” Just as there,

with regard to those slaughtered inside, we find that the Torah made one liable for bringing them up outside on account of

“offerings designated for burning outside,”

so here,

with regard to those slaughtered outside, the Torah made one liable for bringing them up outside on account of

“offerings designated for burning outside.”

Rav Bibi bar Abaye raises an objection to

the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael [from the vav that adds], and likewise to the teaching of Rabbi Yohanan, who expounded a gezera shava, to make one liable even for bringing up outside those slaughtered outside [and not only for bringing up those slaughtered inside]:

That which we learned

in tractate Keritot:

Thirty-six

liabilities of

karet

there are

in the Torah,

and among them “one who brings up outside” was also counted, so that if he performed them all in one period of unawareness, he is liable for each and every one.

And since here we find two prohibitions concerning bringing up—one who brings up outside the limbs of those slaughtered inside, and one who brings up outside the limbs of those slaughtered outside—and each of them is considered a separate substance of transgression, then it is difficult for Rabba and Rabbi Yohanan:

Would there not be thirty-seven? For there is one who brings up

the limbs of offerings designated for burning inside

and one who brings up

the limbs of offerings designated for burning outside! And we conclude:

The matter is difficult!

And we raise another objection:

And that which we learned

in the Mishna below [111b]:

One who casts some of the blood outside,

namely, one application,

is liable,

since we find that inside one application is effective, as we learned: With regard to all those whose blood is placed on the outer altar, if he placed it with one application, he effected atonement.

From where do we know

that he is also liable for casting blood outside? Was the prohibition not stated only with regard to slaughtering and bringing up?!

He derives it from that which was taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning those slaughtered outside:

“Blood shall be accounted

to that man; he has shed blood.”

And from the words “he has shed blood” we learned

to include

the one who

casts

the blood of consecrated offerings outside, so that he too is subject to a liability of karet—

the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says:

The source for making one liable for casting outside is learned from “Any man who brings up a burnt offering

or a sacrifice,”

because the word “or” comes

to include the one who casts 26 .

And we ask:

And Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this “or a sacrifice”?

And we answer:

He needs it to divide,

to say that he is liable both for bringing up a burnt offering outside and for bringing up a peace offering. We should not interpret the liability as stated only in a case where he brought up both a burnt offering and a peace offering.

And we ask:

And Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive division?

For he expounds “or” to include the one who casts.

And we answer:

He derives it from “He shall not bring it,”

“to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting he shall not bring it,” whose meaning is one offering.

And if you raise a difficulty:

And Rabbi Yishmael,

why did he not expound this verse to divide?

That verse he needs

for another exposition, to teach that specifically

for

an offering

that is complete he is liable, but he is not liable for one that is incomplete. [Below, 108b, they disagree about what is incomplete. Some say that it comes to exempt one from an offering in which a limb is missing. Some say that the exemption is for an incomplete animal, and he is not liable until he brings up the entire animal. And some say that the exemption is for incomplete burning, such as less than an olive’s bulk.]

And below (108b), the Sages disagree about what is considered incomplete. Some say that the verse exempts one who brings up an offering that is missing a limb. Others say that the exemption applies to an incomplete animal, and that he is not liable until he brings up the entire animal. Others say that the exemption applies to incomplete burning, such as burning less than an olive-bulk.

And Rabbi Akiva, he derives

the exemption for the incomplete

from

that which is written, “He shall not bring it

to make it,”

which implies complete and not incomplete.

And Rabbi Yishmael

holds that one needs

one

verse

for

the exemption of

offerings designated for burning inside that became incomplete, and he brought them up outside.

And one

verse

for offerings designated for burning outside that became incomplete, and he brought them up outside.

For if only one verse had been written, we would have said that it comes to exclude specifically offerings designated for burning outside that became incomplete, but with regard to offerings designated for burning inside he is liable. There is reason to make him liable in their case, just as limbs that sprang off the altar are returned to the altar even though they became incomplete, because they have the status of burning even when they became incomplete. Therefore, it might enter your mind that the same law applies when he burns an incomplete offering outside: he should be liable. For this reason the second verse is needed to exempt him.

But was it not taught

thus in a beraita, for it was taught:

Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that with regard to offerings designated for burning inside that became incomplete, and he brought them up outside, he should be liable. The verse states, “to make it,”

and we expound:

For the complete

he

is liable, but he is not liable for the incomplete.

And Rabbi Akiva,

disagrees and

holds: Offerings designated for burning inside that became incomplete,

such as those that sprang off the fire of the altar,

and he brought them up outside, he is liable,

for limbs that spring off are returned to the altar, and the same law applies: one is also liable for them outside.

And we ask:

And Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this “Blood shall be accounted,”

from which Rabbi Yishmael expounded to include the one who casts,

what does he do with it?

And we explain: Rabbi Akiva learned from it

to include,

to make one liable also for

the slaughtering of a bird

outside, like the slaughtering of an animal.

And we ask:

And Rabbi Yishmael,

from where does he know that one is liable for slaughtering a bird outside? And we explain:

He derives it

from an extra expression,

from “or that slaughters,”

which is stated with regard to one who slaughters outside the camp, for “that slaughters” has already been stated in this verse. Necessarily, the extra expression comes to include the slaughtering of a bird.

And Rabbi Akiva would say to you,

it is impossible to derive from

that

verse, “or that he slaughter,” because

it is needed for him

to teach

concerning one who slaughters

a bird outside, that

he is liable.

But he is not liable for pinching,

because pinching a bird outside renders it an animal carcass, and there is liability for slaughtered offerings outside only in the case of an offering that is accepted inside. And therefore two verses were needed, because had it been stated only, “that he slaughters,” I would have said: all the more so, he is liable for pinching, since it is the manner of making it fit inside. And therefore it is stated, “he has poured blood,” to include the bird. And it is again written, “that he slaughters,” to exclude one who pinches.

And Rabbi Ishmael,

from where does he learn to exclude one who pinches?

He derives it from “This is the matter,”

which is stated at the beginning of the verse.

For it was taught:

It is stated, “Any man, any man

who slaughters.”

I have only one who slaughters an animal

outside.

If he slaughtered a bird

outside,

from where do we know

that he is liable?

The verse states, “or that he slaughters,” to include one who slaughters a bird.

One might be able to say that I also include

even

the

one who pinches,

that he is liable.

And

even

the law follows,

to learn this by a kal va-chomer.

For

what of slaughtering

a bird,

which is not

the

manner of making it fit inside,

nevertheless

he is liable

for it outside.

Pinching, which

is the

manner of making it fit inside, is it not the law that he is liable

for it outside?

The verse states, “This is the matter

that the Lord commanded,” and immediately afterward it says, “that he slaughters,” to teach that he is liable only for slaughtering, and not for pinching.

And Rabbi Akiva would say to you: that

“this is the matter,”

is needed for a gzera shava,

which teaches another law.

[And it is in Tractate Nedarim: It is stated here, concerning slaughtered offerings outside, “this is the matter,” and it is stated concerning vows in the portion of Mattot, “this is the matter.” Just as there, it refers to the heads of the tribes, so here too, it refers to the heads of the tribes. For what halakhic purpose? Rav Sheshet said: to say that there is a request for the dissolution of consecration.]

We were still discussing it:

But what of the Mishna that we learned

below, at the beginning of the chapter “The bullock of the sin-offering”:

One who takes the handful

of a meal-offering outside,

and one who receives the blood outside is exempt,

from where do we know

that he is not liable outside for taking the handful and for receiving the blood outside, just as he is liable for slaughtering and for bringing up?

The Gemara raises an objection to the question:

And from where would it occur to us

that

he is liable,

so that the verse had to inform us that he is exempt?

Perhaps you will say:

Let

taking the handful

be derived from slaughtering.

But it can be refuted:

What is special about slaughtering,

that it is stringent,

for it

is

disqualifying

when he slaughtered with the thought

not for the sake of those who may eat on Passover,

such as when he slaughtered for the sake of an old or sick person who cannot eat the Passover offering that he is slaughtering, and therefore one who slaughters outside is also liable. But from where do we know that he is liable also in a case where he took the handful of a meal-offering, to which the disqualification of taking a handful not for those who may eat does not apply? And likewise, one cannot learn to make him liable for receiving the blood outside, for even with a Passover offering it is impossible to disqualify through a “thought not for those who may eat” during receiving, but only during slaughtering, as explained in Pesachim [61a].

Perhaps you will say that taking the handful and receiving the blood outside

should be derived from sprinkling,

for if he sprinkled not for those who may eat with a Passover offering, it does not disqualify, and nevertheless he is liable for sprinkling outside, and the same law should apply to taking the handful and receiving?! This proof too can be refuted, because

what is special about sprinkling, that a non-priest is liable to death for it,

whereas for taking the handful and receiving there is no liability to death, for liability to death applies only to a “complete” service, in which the act of the service is completed, and not to a service after which there is another service. For receiving and conveying the blood, and likewise taking the handful with the handful, there is an additional service after them. But sprinkling is the final service with the blood.