Zevachim 107a (קז.) — the Talmud in English

Rava said:

the warning against slaughtering outside the Temple precincts is derived by a hekesh,

as in the statement of Rabbi Yona.

As Rabbi Yona said:

It is stated: “There you shall bring up your burnt offerings, and there you shall perform,”

“there” is derived

from the word “there”

“there”

stated with regard to bringing up the offering, by means of a hekesh.

Just as there,

with regard to bringing up an offering,

he is not punished unless he was first warned, so too here,

with regard to slaughtering,

he is not punished unless he was first warned.

And we raise a difficulty:

We find this with regard to offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned inside,

which had been slaughtered inside, and which should have been brought up and offered in accordance with their prescribed procedure inside,

but he brought them up outside,

and therefore he is liable for bringing them up.

With regard to offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned outside, which

he slaughtered outside, so that they had already become disqualified through their slaughter, and afterward

he brought them up outside, from where do we know

that he is liable?

Rav Kahana said: The verse states: “And to them you shall say:

“Any man of the House of Israel who brings up a burnt offering or sacrifice.” We read it as “And upon them,” whose meaning is

upon the first ones,

those concerning which he had previously been warned, namely, offerings slaughtered outside, which were mentioned earlier in the passage;

“you shall say,”

meaning that if he brings them up outside, he is liable.

Rabba objected to this: Is “and upon them you shall say” written!?

But

“and to them” is written,

and if so,

read it as “and to them”!

Rather,

from the vav, which adds this matter to the preceding matter, we learn that one is liable for bringing up offerings slaughtered outside, just as for offerings slaughtered inside,

as taught by Rabbi Yishmael.

As Rabbi Yishmael taught:

The verse says

“and to them you shall say,”

although it could have said simply “to them,” without a vav. Rather,

it was written to combine the passages,

to combine and equate the first passage, concerning offerings slaughtered outside, with the final passage, concerning bringing up an offering outside, for which one is liable.

Whereas

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: It is derived

by means of a gzera shava,

“bringing” “bringing.” Just as there,

with regard to offerings slaughtered inside, we find that the Torah made one liable for bringing them up outside because they are

“offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned outside,”

so too here,

with regard to offerings slaughtered outside, the Torah made one liable for bringing them up outside because they are

“offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned outside.”

Rav Bibi bar Abaye objected to

the teaching of the school of Rabbi Yishmael [derived from the additional vav], and likewise to the teaching of Rabbi Yoḥanan, who expounded a gzera shava, to render one liable also for bringing up outside offerings slaughtered outside [and not only for bringing up outside offerings slaughtered inside]:

With regard to that which we learned

in tractate Keritot:

Thirty-six

liabilities for

karet

are

in the Torah,

and among them was counted “one who brings up an offering outside”; if he performed them all during one period of unawareness, he is liable for each and every one.

Since here we find two prohibitions involving bringing up an offering—bringing up outside the limbs of offerings slaughtered inside, and bringing up outside the limbs of offerings slaughtered outside—and each of them is considered an independent transgression, it follows that according to Rabba and Rabbi Yoḥanan there should be

thirty-seven: There is one who brings up

the limbs of offerings slaughtered inside,

and one who brings up

the limbs of offerings slaughtered outside! And we conclude:

The matter is difficult!

And we raise another difficulty:

With regard to that which we learned

in the Mishna below [111b]:

One who throws some of the blood outside,

meaning one application ,

is liable,

since we find that one application is effective inside, as we learned: With regard to all those offerings whose blood is applied to the outer altar, if he applied it in one application, he has achieved atonement.

From where do we know

that he is also liable for throwing blood outside? Was the prohibition not stated only with regard to slaughtering and bringing up an offering?!

He derives it from that which was taught:

It is stated in the passage concerning offerings slaughtered outside:

“Blood shall be accounted

to that man; he has shed blood.”

And from the words “he has shed blood” we learn

to include

one who

throws

the blood of consecrated offerings outside, who is likewise liable to karet.

These are the words of Rabbi Yishmael. Rabbi Akiva says:

The source for liability for throwing blood outside is derived from “Any man of the House of Israel who brings up a burnt offering

or a sacrifice,”

because the word “or” comes

to include one who throws 26 .

And we ask:

And according to Rabbi Yishmael, what does he do with this “or a sacrifice”?

And we answer:

He needs it to distinguish,

to teach that one is liable both for bringing up a burnt offering outside and for bringing up a peace offering outside. We should not interpret the liability as applying only when he brought up both a burnt offering and a peace offering.

And we ask:

And according to Rabbi Akiva, from where does he derive the distinction?

For he expounds “or” to include one who throws the blood.

And we answer:

He derives it from “He shall not bring it” [“He shall not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting”], whose meaning is a single offering.

“He shall not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting,” whose wording indicates a single offering.

And if you object:

And according to Rabbi Yishmael,

why did he not expound this verse as establishing the distinction?

He needs that verse

for another exposition, to teach that specifically

for

a

complete offering is he liable, but he is not liable for an incomplete one. [Below, 108b, the Sages disagree as to what is lacking: some say that it exempts one for an offering lacking a limb; some say that the exemption is for an incomplete animal, and he is not liable until he brings up the entire animal; and some say that the exemption is for incomplete burning, such as less than an olive-bulk.]

And below (108b), the Sages disagree about what is considered incomplete. Some say that the verse exempts one who brings up an offering that is missing a limb. Others say that the exemption applies to an incomplete animal, and that he is not liable until he brings up the entire animal. Others say that the exemption applies to incomplete burning, such as burning less than an olive-bulk.

And Rabbi Akiva derives

the exemption for an incomplete offering

from

that which is written, “He shall not bring it

to make it,”

which implies that it must be complete and not incomplete.

And Rabbi Yishmael

holds that he requires

one

verse

to

exempt one for

offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned inside that were incomplete and he brought them up outside,

and one

verse

for offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned outside that were incomplete and he brought them up outside.

For had only one verse been written, we might have said that it came specifically to exclude incomplete offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned outside, but that one is liable for offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned inside. There is reason to impose liability in that case, just as limbs that fell from the altar are returned to the altar even though they have become incomplete, since they retain the status of something subject to burning even when incomplete. Therefore, it might have entered one’s mind that the same applies when one burns an incomplete offering outside: he should be liable. Consequently, the second verse is necessary to exempt him.

But was it not taught

in a beraita as follows? For it was taught:

Rabbi Yishmael says: One might have thought that if offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned inside became incomplete and he brought them up outside, he should be liable. The verse states: “To make it,”

and we expound:

For the complete

offering

is he liable, but he is not liable for the incomplete.

And Rabbi Akiva

disagrees and

holds: If offerings whose sacrificial portions were burned inside became incomplete,

such as when they fell from the fire of the altar,

and he brought them up outside, he is liable,

since limbs that fell from the altar inside are returned to the altar, and the same law applies that one is liable for them outside.

And we ask:

And according to Rabbi Akiva, what does he do with this “Blood shall be accounted,”

from which Rabbi Yishmael derived the inclusion of one who throws the blood,

what does he do with it?

And we explain: Rabbi Akiva derives from it

to include

and impose liability also for

slaughtering a bird

outside, just as for slaughtering an animal.

And we ask:

And according to Rabbi Yishmael,

from where does he know that one is liable for slaughtering a bird outside? And we explain:

He derives it

from a superfluous expression,

from “or that slaughters,”

which is stated with regard to one who slaughters outside the camp, since the verse has already stated “that slaughters” in this passage. Necessarily, the superfluous expression comes to include the slaughtering of a bird.

And Rabbi Akiva would say to you:

it is impossible to derive from

that

verse, “or that he slaughters,” because

it is needed

to teach

with regard to one who slaughters

a bird outside, that

he is liable.

But he is not liable for melika,

because melika of a bird outside renders it a neveila, and the liability for slaughtering consecrated animals outside applies only to a sacrifice that is acceptable inside. Therefore, two verses were necessary. For had only “that he slaughters” been stated, it might have entered your mind to say that all the more so he is liable for melika, since it is the manner in which the bird is rendered fit inside. Therefore, “he has spilled blood” is stated, to include the bird. And “that he slaughters” is then written again, to exclude one who performs melika.

And Rabbi Yishmael,

from where does he learn the exclusion of one who performs melika?

He derives it from “this is the matter,”

which is stated at the beginning of the verse.

As it is taught in a beraita:

“Any man,

who slaughters.”

I have derived only that one who slaughters an animal

outside is liable.

If he slaughtered a bird

outside,

from where do we know

that he is liable?

The verse states: “or that he slaughters,”

to include one who slaughters a bird.

One might have thought that I should also include

the

one who performs melika,

so that he is liable.

And

it is also

a logical inference

to learn this by means of a kal va-chomer.

For

with regard to shechita

of a bird,

although

it is

not the manner in which it is rendered fit inside,

nevertheless

he is liable

for it outside.

Melika, which

is

the manner in which it is rendered fit inside—surely he should be liable

for it outside?

The verse states: “This is the matter

that the Lord commanded,” and immediately afterward it says, “that he slaughters,” to teach that one is liable only for shechita, but not for melika.

And Rabbi Akiva would say to you: That “

this is the matter,”

is needed for a gzera shava,

which teaches another law. [

And this is discussed in tractate Nedarim: Here, with regard to slaughtering consecrated animals outside, it says, “this is the matter,” and there, in the passage concerning vows in Parashat Mattot, it says, “this is the matter.” Just as there, it refers to the heads of the tribes, so too here it refers to the heads of the tribes. For what halakhic purpose? Rav Sheshet said: To teach that there is a possibility of release from a consecration.]

We were still discussing this:

But did we not learn

below, at the beginning of the chapter “The Cow of the Sin-Offering”:

One who takes a handful

of a meal-offering outside,

and one who receives the blood outside is exempt,

from where do we know

that one is not liable outside for taking a handful or for receiving the blood outside, just as one is liable for shechita and for offering on the altar?

The Gemara raises an objection to the question:

And from where would it occur to us

that

he is liable,

so that it was necessary for the verse to inform us that he is exempt?

Lest you say:

Let

taking a handful

be derived from shechita,

this can be refuted:

What is distinctive about shechita,

that it is stringent,

as

it

renders the sacrifice unfit

when he slaughtered with the intention

of not being for those who may eat it on Pesaḥ,

for example, he slaughtered it for an elderly or sick person who cannot eat the Paschal offering that he is slaughtering, and therefore one who slaughters outside is also liable. But from where do we know that one is liable as well when he takes a handful from a meal-offering, with regard to which the disqualification of taking a handful for those who may not eat it is not applicable? Likewise, one cannot derive liability for receiving the blood outside, since even in the case of a Paschal offering it is impossible to disqualify it through an “intention of not being for those who may eat it” during receipt; this applies only during shechita, as explained in Pesaḥim [61a].

Lest you say that taking a handful and receiving the blood outside

should be derived from sprinkling,

for if he sprinkled it not for those who may eat it in the case of a Paschal offering, he does not disqualify it, and nevertheless he is liable for sprinkling outside; should the same law not apply to taking a handful and receiving the blood?! This proof too can be refuted, for

what is distinctive about sprinkling, that a non-priest incurs the death penalty for it,

whereas for taking a handful and receiving the blood there is no death penalty. The death penalty applies only for a “complete” service, in which the act of the service is completed, and not for a service that is followed by another service. Receipt and conveyance of the blood, as well as taking a handful of the meal-offering, are followed by an additional service. Sprinkling, however, is the final service involving the blood.