Yoma 80a (פ.) — the Talmud in English

It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi says

all the measures

of foodstuffs

are an olive-bulk

except for the ritual impurity of foodstuffs,

whose measure is an egg-bulk.

Since

the verse changed its wording—

in its expression concerning the ritual impurity of foodstuffs, as it states, “from every food that may be eaten,” rather than simply “from every food,” as will be explained below—

and

therefore

the Sages changed their measures

for these forms of impurity.

And there is proof of this matter:

that a change in the meaning of the verse brings about a change in the measure, as demonstrated by the measure of eating on

Yom Kippur.

And the Gemara explains:

What change did the verse make in its meaning

with regard to Yom Kippur?

We can learn about the change

from

the wording of the verse, “For any soul who

does not afflict,”

where the verse uses this wording instead of stating plainly, with regard to eating on Yom Kippur: “For any soul who does not eat.”

And what change did the Sages make in its measure

with regard to Yom Kippur?

The measure of eating on that day is

the volume of a large date.

And why,

why was it necessary to bring

proof,

and what greater proof is there

for this matter

than

Yom Kippur?

After all, the change in the case of the ritual impurity of foodstuffs itself should suffice to establish that the measure of food impurity changes, just as it does on Yom Kippur.

For if we had only that,

the change in the wording concerning the ritual impurity of foodstuffs,

I would have said: It is merely the customary style of the verse

to say, “from every food that may be eaten,” and there is no proof from this that the measure changes. Therefore, we brought proof from Yom Kippur, since there the change in wording is more significant.

And now the Gemara explains:

The ritual impurity of foodstuffs,

whose measure is

an egg-bulk—

from where do we derive this?

Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Elazar said: The verse states

with regard to the ritual impurity of foodstuffs [Leviticus 11]:

“From every food that may be eaten,”

which means that the food must have the measure of

“food that comes by means of food”!

And what is this?

What is food that comes by means of food? It is

a chicken egg.

And we raise an objection:

But perhaps the

measure should be that of a

kid,

which is also food that comes by means of food.

And we answer: A kid is not called “food,” since it is

in need of slaughter.

And we challenge this:

But perhaps the

measure should be that of

a ben pekua [

a live offspring found in its mother’s womb after she has been slaughtered, which is permitted to be eaten without slaughter]?!

And we answer: It is still

in need of tearing open,

in order to remove its blood, and it is forbidden to eat it alive as it is; therefore, it is not called food.

And we challenge this further:

But perhaps the measure should be that of a large egg, such as

the egg of

the

bird called

Bar Yochnei,

which is larger than the egg of an ordinary bird?!

And we answer: This is the general rule when the same matter can be derived in two possible ways:

If you grasp the greater measure—

you have grasped nothing.

If you grasp the lesser measure—

you have grasped it.

And now we challenge the derivation according to this rule:

But perhaps the measure is smaller, that of

a

small egg,

the egg

of a small bird,

of a tiny bird,

which is exceedingly small,

whose measure is extremely small. Rashi did not have this version.

It follows that the Gemara has answered Rabbi Abbahu’s derivation in the name of Rabbi Elazar with an answer that cannot resolve it.

The Gemara adds that

Rabbi Abbahu himself,

personally,

said

and expounded this matter in another way:

“From every food that may be eaten”—

food that you can eat all at once!

And the Sages measured

that

the throat cannot contain more than a chicken egg.

Rabbi Elazar said: One who eats forbidden fat

unintentionally

in the present era,

when he cannot bring a sin-offering for this eating,

must write down for himself

the

measure

of his eating.

Perhaps another court will come and increase the measures,

as the Gemara explains.

And we raise an objection:

What does “increase the measures” mean?

If we say that they will obligate

a future court

to bring a sacrifice for an olive-bulk

that is

smaller

than the intermediate olive-bulk measure [called “aguri”] accepted by us today,

he need not be concerned about this, since he will not be obligated in the future to bring a sin-offering.

For

it was taught in a baraita: It is stated with regard to the obligation to bring a sin-offering [Leviticus 4],

“One who fails to perform any of these mitzvot

unintentionally, and incurs guilt.”

And we expound: A person who

repents when informed,

whose sin resulted only from a lack of knowledge, and who, upon learning of it, repents of his sin,

brings a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression.

But if he

does not repent when informed,

meaning that even if he had known what he was doing, he would still have sinned,

he

does not

bring a sacrifice for his unwitting transgression.

And a person nowadays, who knows that the punishment of karet for eating forbidden fat applies only to eating an intermediate olive-bulk [“aguri”], as the court rules in our time, will not refrain [because of the severity of the punishment of karet] from eating forbidden fat in a smaller measure, since he knows that one is not liable for karet for less than an intermediate olive-bulk [“aguri”].

Rather,

he must therefore write down the measure of his eating, in case in the future it happens that

the court will not obligate

the court of that time to bring a

sacrifice

until there is a large olive-bulk,

and not for an intermediate olive-bulk.

Therefore, a person nowadays who eats forbidden fat in the measure of an intermediate olive-bulk should not write for himself that he is obligated to bring a sin-offering; rather, he should write down the measure of his eating. Perhaps, according to the ruling of the court that will exist in those days, he will be exempt for it, and if he nevertheless brings a sin-offering, it will turn out that he has brought a non-sacred animal into the Temple courtyard!

And now the Gemara clarifies the initial assumption:

And according to what initially entered our minds, that they would obligate

a future court

to bring a sacrifice for a small olive-bulk—

what

how could we have understood Rabbi Elazar’s statement that one must be concerned lest a future court

“increase the measures”?

And the Gemara explains: According to the initial assumption, we understood that he must write down the measure of his eating and not suffice with writing that he is obligated to bring a sin-offering, because

perhaps he will bring more sacrifices,

more than he currently thinks,

because of

the reduction of the

measures.

For it is possible that, because of this eating, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings for eating two olive-bulks, rather than one sin-offering for eating only a single olive-bulk—for example, where there is something that divides the period of unawareness between the two small olive-bulks, making them subject to two obligations to bring a sin-offering.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The measures and the punishments—

are a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

And the Gemara wonders: Are

“the punishments”

only derived from a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai? After all,

they are written explicitly

in the Torah!?

And we answer:

Rather, this is what he is saying: The measures of punishments—

are a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

It was taught likewise in a baraita: The measures of punishments—

are a halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

Others say:

The measures of punishments were

instituted by the court of Jabez [

Othniel son of Kenaz, who was the first judge in the period of the Judges] and

they established them.

And the Gemara wonders:

But it is written [Leviticus 27],

“These

are the mitzvot

that the Lord commanded Moses at Mount Sinai”—the verse teaches

that a prophet is not permitted to introduce anything from that point onward!

How, then, is it possible to say that the court of Jabez instituted the measures of punishments?

And we answer: Indeed, the measures had been transmitted in a halakha to Moses from Sinai.

However, they were forgotten

during the days of mourning for Moses [see Temura 16a],

and

the court of Jabez

reestablished them.

We learned in the Mishna:

One who drinks a cheekful.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Not literally “a cheekful,” but rather

a measure such that

if he moves it to one side, it appears to be a cheekful,

he is liable for drinking it.

And we raise an objection:

But we learned in the Mishna, “a cheekful,”

which implies literally a full cheekful!?

And we answer:

Say: like a cheekful.

The Gemara raises an objection

against Shmuel from that which was taught in a baraita:

How much must one drink

on Yom Kippur

to be liable?

Beit Shammai say: A quarter-log.

And Beit Hillel say: A cheekful.

Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: Like a cheekful.

Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: Enough for one swallow!

But the halakha is in accordance with Beit Hillel, and they obligate one for a literal full cheekful.

And we answer:

Is

the wording of the baraita

superior to that of the Mishna, which we interpreted

as meaning that the Mishna does not refer to a literal full cheekful, but

enough

for him to move it to one side,

so that it appears

to be a full cheekful, in which case he is liable?

Here too,

in the baraita, say that its intention is

that it appears

to be a full cheekful when he moves it to one side, and not a literal full cheekful.

And we ask:

If so—

that is identical to Rabbi Eliezer,

who disagrees with Beit Hillel and says, “Like a cheekful”!

And we answer:

There is a difference between them,

between Beit Hillel and Rabbi Eliezer:

a constricted cheekful.

According to Beit Hillel, who say “a cheekful,” a constricted measure is insufficient to make him liable; rather, a full cheekful must appear on one side with room to spare.

But according to Rabbi Eliezer, “like a cheekful” is sufficient even with a constricted measure.

Rav Hoshaya raised an objection

to Shmuel:

If so,

according to your statement, that a literal full cheekful is not required to make him liable, this measure is less than a quarter-log.

And if so,

it would be

this law

one of the leniencies of Beit Shammai and the stringencies of Beit Hillel,

since Beit Shammai obligate one only for a quarter-log, whereas Beit Hillel obligate one for less than that.

But we learned in tractate Eduyot all the cases in which Beit Shammai are more lenient than Beit Hillel, and this law is not listed there!?